gr_l-41322_1988

Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 1975, resolved to require the respondents to answer and to issue a temporary restraining order (Ibid. , p. 49).ℒαwρhi৷ In compliance therewith, private respondent filed its Answer on October 28, 1975 (Ibid.

, pp. 53-57). In the Resolution dated November 3, 1975, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 65).

Petitioner filed its Memorandum on December 10, 1975 (Ibid. , pp. 68-76), and private respondent on January 5, 1975 (Ibid. , pp. 77-85).

Petitioner raised four (4) issues, to wit: 1. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE; 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MATTER OF SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE IS A POLITICAL QUESTION; 3.

WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 242 SUPERSEDED REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6128; AND 4.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. The instant petition is impressed with merit. The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General. (15 SCRA 569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong.

Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have dismissed the case. On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions (Ibid. , pp. 73-74).

Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be patties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED ; the Orders of February 17, 1975, March 17, 1975 and July 10, 1975 of respondent Judge are SET ASIDE ; and Civil Case No. 475 is DISMISSED. The restraining order previously issued by this Court is made permanent. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.