Blas v. Muñoz-Palma

LABRADOR, J.:

Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, presiding, dated October 25, 1961, which (1) granted the motion of respondent executrix Rosalina Santos to set Civil Case No. 4395 of said court, appealed to this Court as G.R. No. L-14070, for hearing to determine certain factual issues before proceeding with the execution of the judgment rendered therein by this Court, (2) admitted the complaint in intervention of intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño, and (3) denied the motion filed by plaintiffs, petitioners herein, to enforce the judgment of this Court in the above-mentioned case without the necessity of further hearing. The events that led to the present petition may be summarized as follows: On July 26, 1961, plaintiffs, petitioners herein, filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a motion for the execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-14070, dated March 29, 1961 (Civil Case No. 4395, Court of First Instance of Rizal), which motion was granted by the respondent judge in an order dated August 16, 1961.

Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was issued by the clerk of the lower court on August 24, 1961, and notice thereof served upon respondent Rosalina Santos on August 29, 1961, giving the latter 10 days within which to comply the same. Instead of complying with the order, respondent executrix, on September 15,1961, filed a motion to set the case for hearing, alleging that it would be difficult to comply with the court's order unless the following questions were first resolved: (1) what properties to be conveyed by the executrix; (2) to whom conveyance is to be made; and (3) in what proportions conveyance should be effected. This motion was opposed by herein petitioners as well as by Marta Chivi on the ground that the decision of this Court was clear enough on the questions raised and could be complied with without the necessity of adducing evidence.

A reply to this opposition was filed by respondent executrix and a rejoinder thereto presented by petitioners. On October 3, 1961, plaintiff again filed a motion to enforce the final judgment in the above-numbered case in accordance with Sec. 10, Rule 39, to which motion defendant executrix filed an opposition reiterating the necessity of a hearing before the judgment of this Court could be executed. In the meantime, or on August 29, 1961, Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño presented a complaint in intervention, alleging that they are legatees named in the last will and testament of the deceased Don Simeon Blas as well as in that of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda.

de Blas, and that they are, therefore, entitled to participate in the one-half share of Maxima Santos in her conjugal partnership with Simeon Blas. Petitioners opposed the admission of the intervention complaint on the ground that Pinpin and Avendaño have absolutely no interest in the case, not being the heirs and legatees contemplated in the document Exhibit "A", signed by the late Maxima Santos, nor in the will and project of partition covering the estate of Simeon Blas nor in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court sought to be executed; and that the admission of the intervention complaint would violate the rule of res judicata and the doctrine of "law of the case". A reply to the opposition was filed by the claimants-intervenors and a rejoinder thereto presented by plaintiffs.

After considering the allegations of the parties in their respective pleadings, respondent judge issued an order dated October 25, 1961, wherein the motion for intervention was admitted, the motion for hearing granted, and the motion to enforce the judgment of this Court was denied. A motion for reconsideration of this order presented by petitioners on October 31, 1961 was denied by respondent judge on December 7, 1961. Hence, the present action was brought before this Court.

The pertinent parts of the order against which the present petition has been instituted is, for the sake of clarity, hereby quoted: In pages 27 to 46 of said Project of Partition, an enumeration was made of the properties constituting the entire share of Maxima Santos on the basis of the above-quoted distribution. It is, therefore, incorrect to state that all these properties listed in pages 27 to 46 of the Project of Partition constitute the one-half share of Maxima Santos in the conjugal properties for as already indicated, said enumeration includes: (a) the one-third portion devised to her by her husband, Simeon Blas in his will; (b) the one-third portion constituting the share of Lazaro Gervacio Blas; and (c) her one-half share in the conjugal properties. In view of this, there is need of segregating in that list of properties found in pages 27 to 46 of the Project of Partition, those which constitute the one-half share of Maxima Santos Vda.

de Blas in the conjugal properties from those portions which she inherited from her husband as well as those which she bought from Lazaro Gervacio Blas. As regards the allowance of the intervention of several parties in this proceeding, this Court is simply guided by that portion of the Decision of the Supreme Court which states that considering that all heirs and legatees designated in the will of Simeon Blas have not appeared in this Civil Case, the said heirs and legatees may file adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every one of them in the properties to be conveyed. For a proper understanding of the case at bar, we hereby quote the dispositive part of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-14070:.

... the defendant-appellee, administratrix ... is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, ...

to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. The objection to the execution of the above-quoted dispositive part of the decision lies, as contended by counsel for respondent executrix Rosalina Santos and as found by the trial court, in the supposed impossibility of pointing out from among the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the project of partition of the estate of her deceased husband, the properties that should be conveyed and delivered. It must be borne in mind that it was not the intention of our decision in the, previous case (G.R. No. L-14070) which was ordered executed, that of the very numerous properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the project of partition, those that should be conveyed and delivered to the petitioners herein, petitioners also in the previous case, be specifically pointed out separately from the rest of the properties that should remain as Maxima Santos' share.

It was not expected, in view of the fact that the project of partition of the estate of Simeon Blas does not indicate the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership separately from those received by her from her husband as devisee of the free portion of his estate, or those acquired by purchase, that the properties constituting the one-half to be conveyed out of Maxima Santos' share in the conjugal partnership, be expressly singled out from the others. What was expected to be done by the court executing the judgment, in order to carry out the decision of this Court, was to determine what undivided portion or aliquot part of all the properties adjudicated to her in various capacities should be conveyed by virtue of the judgment, and then to have said undivided portion or aliquot part conveyed in an appropriate deed and delivered to the petitioners, without need of actually partitioning the bulk of the properties and pointing out which of them belongs to petitioners and which belongs to the widow Maxima Santos.1äwphï1.ñët The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons is to assign the whole of the properties left for distribution to the heirs in a certain definite proportion, an aliquot part pertaining to each of the heirs.

This method or plan of distribution and partition of estates is provided for in section 1 of Rule 91, which reads thus: . Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made.

Testimony taken on controversy preserved. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled , and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. ...

It might be pertinent to recall, in order to show the propriety of this method of partition by determination of the aliquot portion pertaining to each heir, that the original action, G.R. No. L-14070, was instituted to obtain a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties of Maxima Santos assigned to her as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband, be conveyed to the petitioners, because of a document signed by Maxima Santos (Annex "H" of complaint) in which she promised to convey to the heirs of her deceased husband one-half of the properties that she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband. The action was expressly based on said document, Annex "H"

of complaint, in which the promise to convey said one-half portion was made. There was no demand that said one-half be expressly and actually segregated in the action, or that the conjugal properties be actually divided or partitioned. The defendants in that case contended that the document Annex "H"

was not executed by Maxima Santos and that if it was so executed, the same was null and void as constituting a promise to convey future inheritance. There was no intent to designate or point out the properties to be conveyed. The properties appear in the inventory filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas but no demand was made for their determination in the case.

In view of the nature of the claim, which was to compel conveyance in accordance with the written contract or promise, and the nature of the defense, which is the supposed invalidity of the promise, the decision could not be other than a mere declaration of the validity of the instrument, coupled with an order for the conveyance and delivery to the petitioners of the said one-half share as promised in the document Annex "H". All of the above circumstances would have been ascertained had the court below taken pains to read even the decision and the project of partition alone. It is true that objection was also raised by the defendants in the previous case to the action on the ground that the deceased Maxima Santos had received in one single mass of properties, not only her share in the conjugal estate but also a devise of one-third of the free portion of the estate of her husband Simeon Blas, as well as the share of one of the latter's heirs.

But such objection could not prevent compliance with the promise made the deceased Maxima Santos (to convey to the heirs of her husband one-half of what she received of the conjugal properties of her husband and herself). And the objection then raised was opportunely denied. The project of partition mentioned in the dispositive part of our decision sought to be enforced, which is the project of partition in Civil Case No. 6707 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, contains the following resume of the properties received by Maxima Santos in various capacities in the settlement of the estate of her husband Simeon Blas: 1/2 of all properties left by the deceased, as her share in the conjugal partnership property .

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. . P339,440.00 1/3 free disposition .

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. 113,146.66 1/3 of strict legitime devised to Lazaro Blas and sold by the latter to the widow . .

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37,715.56 T O T A L . . .

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