People Of The Philippines v. "Jimmy"

JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused: 1. Arturo de Vera y Carlos, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum; 2. Jaime Caranzo y Catindig, likewise GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, penalized under Art. 249, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum; 3.

Rosemarie Balignasay - GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, penalized under Art. 246, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT or reclusion perpetua. 4. All the three accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Antonio Eugenio Jr., indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00, P3,975.00 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages and to pay jointly the costs.

All the three accused shall be given full Rollo , p. 38) The amended information filed against the accused alleges: The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE BALIGNASAY OF THE crime of Parricide and JAIME CARANZO Y CATINDIG alias "JIMMY" and ARTURO DE VERA CARLOS of the crime of Murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 1st day of August, 1983, in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,ROSEMARIE BALIGNASAY being then lawfully and legally married to the victim, ANTONIO EUGENIO JR.

Y LLANES, conspiring and confederating together with her co-accused ARTURO DE VERA and JAIME CARANZO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, stab the said ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR. Y LLANES on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the said ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR. Y LLANES serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR.

Y LLANES. (Records, pp. 13-14) The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is as follows: 1. Dr. Dario L. Gajardo - physician-major of the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame testified that at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of August 1, 1983 he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of a dead person named Antonio Eugenio, Jr. That the request for medical examination (Exh.

"A") was made by the Northern Police District Investigation Division, thru Quezon City Patrolman Restituto de Leon and the identification of the body (Exh. "D") was made by victim's mother, Mrs. Cristina Eugenio; that he prepared Medico-Legal report No. M-2168-83 (Exh. "B") dated August 1, 1983 with the following findings: Fairly developed, fairly nourished post-mortem lividity over the dependent TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES: (1) Stab (2) Abrasion, left suprascapular (3) Linear (4) Linear abrasion, right lumbar (5) Linear abrasion, right lumbar (6) Abrasion, proximal 3rd of the (7) Stab wound, point of entry, (8) Stab wound, middle 3rd of the (9) Incised wound, middle 3rd of (10) Stab wound, middle 3rd of the (11) Linear abrasion, middle 3rd of (12) Abrasion, right iliac region, (13) Stab wound, middle 3rd of the (14) Linear abrasion, middle 3rd of (15) Linear abrasion middle 3rd of The right lung is collapsed.

That he likewise prepared a sketch of the human body (Exh. "C") showing the location of wounds suffered by the victim. Finally, he prepared a post-mortem certificate of death (Exh.

"E") showing the cause of death as "Cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrage secondary to stab wounds. 2. Cristina Llanes Vda.

de Eugenio - testified that she is the mother of Antonio Eugenio, Jr., the victim; That on August 1, 1983 at 12:30 in the morning she was in their house at 30 Cuatro de Julio, Galas, Quezon City. With her then were her sons Antonio, Rodrigo and Jose and they were lying down on their stall-like house in the squatter's area. That while asleep in their house, she heard their house being stoned and looked out and saw Jimmy, Arturo and Rosemarie;sic) about one foot long; That her son was able to flee and went outside their house and ran towards Bayani Street; that the three followed him (Antonio) and she also followed; that she saw her son fall on a culvert (embornal) at Bayani Street and then Arturo de Vera stabbed him again and Rosemarie Balignasay was saying "Sige, saksakin pa at patayin na ninyo";sic) went to Mt.

Banawe That she next went to police sic) and other companions she was That she paid the Santiago Memorial She likewise testified that before the That on August 3, 1983, she executed a 3. Pat. Restituto de Leon - policeman That he proceeded to the scene of the That he took also the statement (Exh.

4. Rodrigo Eugenio - brother of the sic) mother sic) among those who killed Antonio Eugenio; that he was at home with her (sic) mother when his brother was being killed. (Rollo , pp. 26-29) On the other hand, the defense version as summarized by the trial court is as follows: 1.

Arturo de Vera - 23 years old, married, vendor and residing at Liberation He claimed that on August 1, 1983 at That after he stabbed Eugenio he left That he knew Jaime Caranza was left in That upon reaching home, he hurriedly went to Angeles City to surrender to a certain Major Mendoza with the Philippine Constabulary because he was afraid of Eugenio's relatives who were hunting him; that he left six o'clock and reached Angeles City around 10:00 o'clock of August 1, 1983; That he was brought by the Angeles City police to Quezon City on August 3, 1983 and was investigated by the Quezon City Police; That he has known Antonio Eugenio since their boyhood days; that he admitted that he and Rosemarie Balignasay are living as husband and wife after Rosemarie separated from her husband, the victim; 2. Rosemarie Balignasay -- she denied knowledge of the killing of her husband Then she knew Jaime Caranzo for a long time and his house at 50 Cuatro de Julio, Galas, Quezon City; that she went to Caranzo's house at past 12:00 midnight on August 1, 1983 to meet Arturo de Vera; that Arturo went to Caranzo's house to invite the latter on her birthday, August 8th; that he met de Vera and they went home; That on her way home, Antonia Eugenio On cross-examination, she testified that she was legally married to Antonio Eugenio on That she never saw her husband after that; that she worked as vendor in the Galas 3.

Jaime Caranzo - the other accused denied any participation in the killing of Antonio Eugenio; that on August 1, 1983 at 12:30 in the morning, he testified that he was That he then went upstairs to rest or to sleep; he woke up only past 7:00 o'clock and 4. Wilfredo Caranzo - Rollo , pp. 30-32) Of the three who were convicted, only Jaime Caranzo and Rosemarie Balignasay filed their notices of appeal (Records, p. 363 and p.

378 respectively). Although, both notices of appeal were filed with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case with regards to Balignasay were forwarded to the Supreme Court as the penalty meted out as to her case was reclusion perpetua.(Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d), Constitution) There is nothing in the records to show what became of Jaime Caranzo's appeal to the Court of Appeals. Balignasay is, then, the only appellant in this case.

She raises the following assignment of error in her appeal, to wit; I THE HON. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ARTURO DE VERA HAD NO MOTIVE TO KILL ANTONIO L. EUGENIO, JR. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH MOTIVE IN ARTURO DE VERA IS ESSENTIAL IN DECIDING WHETHER ROSEMARIE BALIGNASAY IS GUILTY OF CONSPIRING WITH HIM TO KILL ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR., FOR THE EVIDENCE OF SUCH ALLEGED CONSPIRACY BEING CIRCUMSTANCIAL, MOTIVE NOT ONLY IS IMPORTANT, BUT IS CONTROLLING.

II THE HON. TRAIL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR.'S ONLY FATAL WOUND ON HIS RIGHT CHEST, MEASURING 1.9 BY 0.5 CMS. AND 8 CM.

DEEP WHICH PASSED THROUGHT THE 2ND INTERCOSTAL SPACE AND LACERATED THE RIGHT LUNG'S UPPER LOBE, WAS INFLICTED INSIDE ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR.'S HOUSE IN 4 DE JULIO STREET, AS CLAIMED BY HIS MOTHER; AND NOT IN CORNER BAYANI AND SAN ISIDRO STREETS, AS CLAIMED BY ARTURO DE VERA. THE TESTIMONY (SIC) SUCH WOUND WAS INFLICTED AT NO. 304 DE JULIO IS LEGALLY INCREDIBLE, FOR CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF SUCH WOUND, RAPID -- IF NOT INSTANT -- DEATH COULD HAVE RESULTED, OR AT LEAST THE VICTIM WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY WEAKENED AND COLLAPSED: (1) DUE TO THE LUNG BEING PENETRATED BY THE BLADE OF THE WEAPON; (2) DUE TO PNEUMOTHORAX, OR ENTRY OF AIR BETWEEN THE WALLS OF THE CHEST AND THE LUNG; AND (3) DUE TO MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE, WHICH COULD BE THE RESULT OF LARGE BLOOD VESSELS BEING CUT OR SEVERED.

IT IS THUS IMPROBABLE (SIC) ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR. AFTER RECEIVING SUCH WOUND, COULD HAVE RUN 4 BLOCK AWAY FROM HIS TO HOUSE IN 4 DE JULIO STREET TOWARDS LUZON AVENUE; THEN TO SAN ISIDRO STREET AND FROM THERE TO CORNER SAN ISIDRO AND BAYANI STREETS. III SINCE ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR.'S ONLY FATAL WOUND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN INFLICTED ON HIM INSIDE HIS HOUSE AT 4 DE JULIO STREET, THEN THE HON.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE DEFENSE TESTIMONIES THAT WHILE ARTURO DE VERA AND ROSEMARIE BALIGNASAY WERE WALKING ALONG 4 DE JULIO STREET, ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR. SUDDENLY APPEARED FROM A DARK CORNER, STABBED AT BUT MISSED ARTURO DE VERA, WHO RAN BUT WAS CHASED BY ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR. STARTING AT 4 DE JULIO STREET, THEN LUZON AVENUE, THEN SAN ISIDRO STREET, THEN AT CORNER SAN ISIDRO AND BAYANI STREETS, WHERE ARTURO DE VERA WAS CORNERED; AND WHERE AFTER A STRUGGLE FOR POSSESSION OF A KNIFE THEN HELD BY ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR., ARTURO DE VERA FINALLY GOT POSSESSION OF SUCH KNIFE WITH WHICH HE STABBED MANY TIMES ANTONIO EUGENIO, JR., INFLICTING IV THE HON.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED CONSPIRACY ON WHICH ROSEMARIE BALIGNASAY'S CONVICTION IS BASED, WAS PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. FOR SUCH EVIDENCE, WHICH IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL, NOT ONLY IS INHERENTLY WEAK, BUT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF ROSEMARIE BALIGNASAY'S INNOCENCE. SHE MUST HENCE BE ACQUITTED AND Rollo , p.

126-127) The only question that needs to be answered in deciding whether the appellant is innocent or guilty of parricide in whether or not conspiracy exists in the instant case. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, and all persons taking part in the crime shall be held guilty as principals. It is of no moment that the appellant did not take In the case at bar, the appellant in her four assignments of errors asserts that there is no conspiracy.

She maintains that the version of the prosecution showing the existence of conspiracy is not credible. The appellant states that the prosecution's version has several flaws. First, The contention is without As to the fact that the victim could not have run four (4) (three (3) according to Cristina's testimony) blocks after receiving the fatal stab wound, there is no showing in the As to the second and third flaws, suffice it to say that affidavits being taken ex parte usually are incomplete and often inaccurate, caused sometimes from partial suggestions, sometimes for want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.

(People v. Urquia, G.R. No. 94787, November 19, 1991) The statement given by Cristina placed the appellant at the scene of the crime. It was in her testimony in open court that she expounded on Balignasay's participation. As to the supposed motive of Cristina to falsely testify against the appellant, there is no showing in the records by clear and supra) that she has carried a grudge against the appellant because of the estrangement between her son and the appellant.

Nowhere in her more than 100-paged testimony did she malign or bad-mouth Balignasay. Her testimony rings true because she could have testified that the appellant had a hand in the stabbing of her son yet she did not. There was also no reason to include Caranzo as one of the accused if she was just bent on seeking revenge on the appellant and her lover.

Furthermore, in the span of almost two (2) years that her son and the appellant were separated, there is no mention of any altercation between herself and the appellant even though they had every opportunity to cross paths and to exchange heated words. The appellant's defense, however, did not stop there. She contends that assuming that Cristina Eugenio's testimony is true, the two circumstances that she was holding a 1 1/2 to 2 feet long piece of wood while the victim was being stabbed and that she was shouting "Sige, saksakin at patayin"

while the victim was being stabbed again are not sufficient to establish conspiracy. While it is the true that a finding of criminal conspiracy must be supported by evidence constituting proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is equally true that such evidence need not be direct evidence. (People v. Gabatin, G.R. No. 84730, October 28, 1991) It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

The conditions attending its commission and the act executed may be indicative of the common design to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of circumstances to the effect, then, conspiracy has been establish. (People v. Arroyo, 201 SCRA 616, 629 ) Conspiracy has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Aside from the two circumstances that the appellant mentioned above, we agree with the Solicitor General that the following additional circumstances show the existence of conspiracy: (1) Arturo de Vera and Rosemarie Balignasay were living together as husband and wife after the latter separated from the victim Antonio Eugenio, Jr.; (2) both Arturo and Rosemarie were with Jaime Caranzo when the latter shouted at the victim to come out of his house and fight; (3) Forthwith, the trio, armed with knives and piece of wood, forcibly opened the ply-wood door of the victim's house; and once inside, Arturo and Jaime started to stab the victim, while Rosemarie stood by the door and beat the victim with the piece of wood she was holding when the latter passed thru the door to flee; (4) The three chased the victim until the latter fell into a culvert along Bayani Street, where he was stabbed repeatedly by Arturo and Jaime in the presence of Rosemarie who exhorted them to continue on stabbing the victim; (5) Thereafter, the trio left together, leaving behind the victim who was mortally wounded; and, (6) The victim sustained no less than fifteen (15) wounds of different nature, indicating that they were inflicted by more than one assailant.

These circumstances show the unity of criminal purpose. In view of the foregoing, the assertion of the appellant in her first assigned error that motive is a controlling factor to establish conspiracy in this case must fail. Whether motive exists is not essential in the case at bar.

This Court has time and again ruled that lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused therein are definitely established. (People v. Ballinas, G.R. No. 93300, October 4, 1991) The appellant was placed at the scene of the crime and her actions before, during and after the incident indubitably show her participation in the crime committed. The proper penalty, however, to be imposed should only be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as the trial court rendered.

It is the oft-repeated rule that in a judgment of conviction for a felony, the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty inasmuch as under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties (See People v. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851, 863 ). There is no penalty of life imprisonment in the scheme of penalties under the Revised Penal Code (People v. Samillano, G.R. No. 62088, March 6, 1992). The actual damages should be P3,980.00 as per Exhibits "J", "K", "K-3", "L", and "M".

The death indemnity is increased to P50,000.00. The P50,000.00 moral damages is deleted. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the above modifications.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.