Velasco v. Court Of Appeals

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari, erroneously citing Section I of Rule 65, for the review of the decision of the Special Division of Five of the Court of Appeals dated December 6, 1977 in CA .G.R. No. 06152 declaring, by a vote of four to one, null and void the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 4260 dated December 2, 1976, which had declared the judgment of said court in said case final and executory, directing in consequence, said trial court to approve the record on appeal of herein respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS for short) and to give due course to its appeal, setting aside correspondingly the restraining order it had previously issued in the same case, the Court of Appeals holding that, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the motion for new trial of the GSIS admittedly filed on time is not pro-forma and, therefore, the period to appeal the trial court's decision in question had been suspended by said motion, hence, said decision was still appealable.

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that Our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro-forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if We should decide this case upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and We feel We can better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of Our inquiry, for as the record before Us stands, We see that there is enough basis for Us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims.

As a matter of fact, after our first study of this case, We already announced Our intention in this direction at the hearing held on February 21, 1979, where Attys. Celestino T. Ocampo, Vicente Sicat and Victoriano David appeared and argued for the petitioners and Justice Manuel Lazaro and Atty. Antonio F. Navarrete, for the GSIS. We reiterated said intention in Our resolution of said date by requiring the parties "to INFORM the Court ...

whether or not there are any issues of fact that the purported appeal of private respondent would involve and whether or not petitioners controvert the same, with the end in view of enabling this Court to take the necessary steps to convert this proceeding into an appeal ... (under) Republic Act 5440". To be sure, in its compliance dated April 10, 1979 with said resolution, GSIS does enumerate certain allegedly "pivotal factual issues"

its appeal "would involve." However, as will be explained anon even the "pivotal factual issues" referred to may be justly resolved here without the need of returning this case to the trial court.

The exact position of the parties in respect to said issues and the allegations of fact in their pleadings here and in the court below as well as the undisputed evidence related thereto are so clearly stated and comprehensively discussed by the parties in their said pleadings that to conduct further proceedings or to await any other briefs from them would be superfluous and a waste of time and effort.

Accordingly, We now deem this case as submitted for Our decision as a duly made appeal under Republic Act 5440. According to GSIS: A Detailed Statement of Facts and of the Case "It is not without reason to state that the ambience of a particular case has much to contribute to the resolution thereof. So it is with the instant case.

And for a better appreciation of the antecedents which led to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and subsequently the questioned decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the environmental facts which spawned them should thus be laid bare before this Honorable Court, the better to appreciate their factual significance and legal consequences. "1. Sometime on November 10, 1965, Alta Farms secured from the GSIS a Three Million Two Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,255,000.00) loan and an additional loan of Five Million Sixty-Two Thousand Pesos (P5,062,000.00) on October 5, 1967, to finance a piggery project.

These loans were secured by two mortgage (Exh. "B"). "2.

Alta Farms defaulted in the payment of its amortizations. it is presumably because of this that Alta Farms executed a Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage with Asian Engineering Corporation on July 10, 1969 (Exh. "C"), but without the previous consent or approval of the GSIS and in direct violation of the provisions of the mortgage contracts.

"3. Even without the approval of the Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage by the GSIS, Asian Engineering Corporation executed an Exclusive Sales Agency, Management and Administration Contract in favor of Laigo Realty Corporation, with the intention of converting the piggery farm into a subdivision (Exh. "D").

And on October 20, 1969, Asian Engineering executed another contract with Laigo, whereby Laigo was to undertake the development of the property into a subdivision (Exh. "E"). Conformably with the two contracts (Exh "D"

and "E"), Laigo started the development of the lot into a subdivision. Contract of Petitioner Lumanlan and his admission "4. After developing the area, on December 4, 1969, Laigo entered into a contract (Exh.

"GG") with Amable Lumanlan, one of the petitioners, to construct for the home buyers, 20 houses on the subdivision. The contract provided that Laigo shall secure the agreement and signature of the home buyers (Paragraph 6 of Agreement, Exh. "GG") and that Laigo "shall pay for the houses on a "turn-key"

bases" (Paragraph 5 of Agreement, Exh. "GG").

The parties to the agreement are, stated by the agreement itself, as follows: This Agreement, executed this 29th day of November, 1969, in the City of Manila, by and between LAIGO REALTY CORPORATION, x x x x x x x x x represented by its President, RHODY E. LAIGO, ... hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY - and - ... AMABLE G. LUMANLAN ...

hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY. And the signatories are - IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto affixed their signatures this 4th day of Dec. 1969 at Manila, Philippines.

LAIGO REALTY CORPORATION (Sgd) Illegible ALEJANDRO Y. DE JESUS BY: By: (Sgd) RHODY E. LAIGO (t) RHODY E. LAIGO - President - (Sgd) Illegible AMABLE G. LUMANLAN (Sgd) Illegible ANASTACIO F. DANAN (See Exh. "GG") "5. Petitioner Lumanlan allegedly constructed 20 houses for the home buyers and for which he claims a balance of P309,187.76 from the home buyers and Laigo.

This is reflected in Exhibit "X" of petitioners. However, in the letter of Lumanlan to the GSIS on January 7, 1972, he was collecting only P216,500.00 (Exh.

"W" evidence of Lumanlan). Thus, even the evidence of Lumanlan on what is due him is conflicting.

"6. Out of his claim, petitioner Lumanlan admits that Mrs. Rhody Laigo paid him in several checks totalling P124,855.00 but which checks were all dishonored when presented for payment. This is Exhibit "X"

of petitioners. "7. Thus, on November 7, 1970, petitioner Lumanlan wrote a letter to Laigo Realty Corporation (Exh.

"Y", evidence of Lumanlan) which reads - "I wish to inform you that I have received from Mrs. Rhody E. Laigo several bank checks which were either dishonored by the bank or were cancelled at the request of Mrs. Rhody E. Laigo for reasons of insufficient funds. The following are the checks: DATE SER. NO.

AMOUNT BANK May 20,1970 646371 P36,000.00 Prudential Bank June 10,1970 659907 9,000.00 " " June 30, 1970 646397 20,000.00 "

" July 6, 1970 646398 19,800.00 " "

July 3, 1970 464399 11,250.00 " " Aug.

7,1970 659913 16,200.00 " " Aug.

14,1970 659914 12,605.00