Hoey v. Aurelio & Company

J.B.L., J.:

Petitioner-appellant (defendant in the lower court) directly appeals from portion of the decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 51949, sentencing her to pay the plaintiff (respondent-appellee herein) the sum of P109,242.30 received from the latter by way of mortgage loans with legal rate of interest, from the filing of the complaint. The court a quo had absolved her from paying the amount of P100,757.70, having found the same as usurious interests or exactions. Petitioner seeks a re-examination of this Court's doctrine in the case of Angel Jose Warehousing Co., Inc. vs. Chelda Enterprises to the effect that the usurious lender can recover his capital in case of usurious transactions, which doctrine was applied in the case below.

It is petitioner-appellant's contention, among others, that a usurious lender has forfeits his capital in view of Article 1957 of the New Civil Code1 which is a new provision, declaring "contracts and stipulation under any cloak or device whatever intended to circumvent the laws against usury as void. It is argued that respondent appellee forfeited his principal loan of P109,242.30 since it was found to be a usurious lender. Respondent-appellee, on the other hand, prays for the dismissal of this appeal in its verified answer for reason there stated.ℒαwρhi৷ In its brief,2 respondent-appellee also disputes the facts as found by the lower court, insisting that the real facts were those presented by it below, that the mortgages legal and valid and that the foreclosure of the same was in order, which makes petitioner-appellant liable for all the claims in its complaint.

Moreover, it has already appealed the lower court's decision to the Court of Appeals and the same is still pending. The established rule in this jurisdiction is that when a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case there for decision, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court. The only questions that may be raised are thorn of law.3Petitioner-appellant having appealed on a purely question of law, she is bound by the findings of fact for the court below.

Except for the fact that the appellant herein is prevailing party in the court below, the situation is similar to that in the case of Justo, et al. vs. Hernando et al. ,4The appellant in said case also direct appealed to this Court, raising only a question of law. However, the appellee raised question of fact in his brief. The Supreme Court was confronted in the question of whether to decide the appeal, confining the issue between the issues to the questions of law raised by the appellant or consider the issue as extending to the questions of fact raised by the appellee, in which case, the appeal should be referred5 to the Court of Appeals.

It was held and ordered therein that the appeal be decided by the Court of Appeals. The above ruling was reiterated in Ramos vs. Mañalac and Lopez6 and Masangcay, et al. vs. Valencia.7 In the present case, the appellee did not only dispute the facts in its brief. It has appealed the lower court's decision to the Court of Appeals.

Following the ruling laid down by the Court in the aforesaid cases, and considering the provision of Section 2, Republic Act No. 5440,8 effective 9 September 1968, further amending Republic Act No. 296 (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948), this Court is constrained to refer this appeal to the Court of Appeals. In view hereof, We find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by the parties in their respective briefs. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the herein appeal is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration and decision.

So ordered.

Concepcion, CJ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Castro, J., is on leave.