Aguilon v. Bohol

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instant to adjudicate the possessory rights over a parcel of land for which the plaintiff had filed a homestead application but against which application the defendant had filed a protest with the Director Lands. On October 21, 1964 Purita S. Aguilon sued Montano Bohol the Court of First Instance of Davao to recover possession of portion of Lot No. 3046 situated in Ratio Kinabilangan, Baganga, Davao Oriental, with an area of more than twenty-one hectares (Civil Case No. 4464). Plaintiff Aguilon alleged in her complaint that through her father she cleared, cultivated and improved the said land immediately aft the war; that she declared it for realty tax purposes beginning 195 that she paid taxes due thereon up to 1964; that she filed homestead application No. 20-1846 for that land; that in 1957 Montano Bohol through his son-in-law, Crisanto Garay, usurped a portion of the land and refused to vacate it notwithstanding repeated demands and that she filed a forcible entry case against Garay in the justice of the peace court but it was dismissed on February 18, 1958 on the ground that her alleged remedy was with the Director of Land (Civil Case No. 66).

Purita S. Aguilon further alleged that after the dismissal of the forcible entry case, the district land officer, at her instigation required Bohol to vacate the homestead because it was covered by her application and because Bohol had not filed any application nor obtained any permit from the district land office for his entry and cultivation thereof; that Bohol refused to vacate the homestead and, instead, enlarged his clearing and planted seasonal crops and coconuts thereon, and that on July 23, 1958 Bohol filed a formal protest against her application. Bohol in his answer alleged that since 1951 he has occupied about six hectares of the disputed lot and that in 1952 he declared for taxation the said six hectares and paid the taxes due thereon up to 1964. Bohol pleaded prescription as a defense.

His theory is that the action to recover posession should have been brought within ten years from 1951. He also pleaded lack of jurisdiction because the land in litigation is a part of the public domain under the control of the Director of Lands. Purita S. Aguilon in her reply alleged that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case, following the rulings in Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil 5 and Bohayang vs. Maceren, 96 Phil. 390.

She countered that her action had not yet prescribed because the disturbance of her ion occurred in 1957 when Garay, Bohol's son-in-law, occupied the disputed area as found by the private land surveyor commissioned by the municipal judge in Civil Case No. 134 to make a relocation survey. On Appeal 21, 1966 the lower court, long after the pre-trial and upon motion of Bohol (the record on appeal does not show that he filed a written motion to dismiss), issued a minute order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff Aguilon appealed to this Court.

Her appeal is meritorious. Her action is an accion publiciana, which action "corresponde al que tiene derecho a la possesion contra el que posee in derecho o con titulo memos firme para que se ponga la cosa en ponder del actor con todas las accesories, frutos, etc." (I Enciclopedia Juridica Española 450).

The trial court has jurisdiction over the accion publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession independently of title (Bishop of Cebu vs. Manpron, 6 Phil. 286, 291; Rodriguez vs. Taiño 16 Phil. 301; Laguna vs. Abasolo, 94 Phil. 455; Emma vs. Bado, L-23685, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 183; Miranda vs. legaspi, 92 Phil 290).

Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all actions involving possesion of land except ejectment cases within one year from the unlawful deprivation of possession (Secs. 44[b] and 88, judiciary Law; Tenorio vs. Gomba, 81 Phil. 54). "Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the law and the Rules of Court" (Art. 539, Civil Code).

Even in cases involving public lands, the courts may decree the rotation of the possession of the said lands to one who has been illegally deprived of his possessory right (Kimpo vs. Tabañar and Director of Lands, 113 Phil. 409). A homesteader in possession of the land he has applied for, although his title thereto is still imperfect, cannot be forcibly dispossessed by a third party, and he, as sole lawful possessor of the land, is entitled to the protection of the law and the courts (Fabian vs, Paculan 25 Phil. 26, 31-32). Courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action for forcible entry instituted by a bona fide applicant for public land, who is in occupation and peaceful possession thereof and who has introduced improvements, against one who deprives him of the possession thereof before the award and pending investigation of the application Pitargue vs. Sorilia 92 Phil. 5).

The reason is that, even pending the resolution of his application, the bona fide applicant and occupant, by the priority of his application and of his entry, acquires a possessory right over the public land applied for as against any other public land applicant. That prior possessory right may be protected by means of a forcible entry action or by means of the accion publiciana. (Pitargue vs. Sorilla, supra).

It should be stressed that the authority given to the Director of Lands over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions over public lands (Molina vs. De Bacud, L-20195. April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 956). The instant case is similar to Bohayang vs. Maceren, 96 Phil. 390 to which the trial court's attention was called and which it arbitrarily ignored.ℒαwρhi৷ In the Bohayang case, the plaintiff, who had possessed a homestead from 1935 to 1941, filed an accion publiciana against the defendants, who had usurped his homestead after be had abandoned it during the Japanese occupation he had to evacuate to another place.

The trial court, on learning that the respective rights of the parties to the homestead were under consideration by the Director of Lands. ordered the suspension of the hearing until the Director had finally resolved the controversy. This Court issued the writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to set the case for trial because the suspension might last for a long stretch of time and because the Director who would decide of who is entitled to the hornestead.

This Court underscored that an action for recovery of p[ossession is an urgent matter which must be decided promptly to forestall breaches of peace, violence or even loss of life and, therefore, the court should act swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is reversed and set aside and it is directed to set the case for trial on the merits, Costs against the defendant-appellee. SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët Fernando, took no part.