First Division, in its

First Division, in its Resolution dated June 7, 2016, DISMISSED for lack of merit [Piccio's] petition x x x. It found that [Vergara] had complied with the requirements of [R.A.] 9225. Third, [Piccio] also filed x x x a deportation complaint against [Vergara] for allegedly tampering with her [R.A.] 9225 records.

The complaint x x x was dismissed for lack of merit by Order dated October 7, 2016 issued by BI Commissioner [Morente]. It affirmed the Investigation Committee's findings that, "based on the Bureau's available records, and considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties," it appears that [Vergara's] petition x x x "was duly processed and approved by the [BI]."

Fourth, the Joint Resolution dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated November 7, 2017 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in NPS No. XV-07-INV-17C dismissing the complaints for falsification filed by [Piccio] against [Vergara], x x x involving the very same documents in the instant case x x x. The City Prosecutor found no probable cause for the imputations against [Vergara].189 To emphasize, the BI (twice), the COMELEC, the City Prosecutor of Manila and the HRET - all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies tasked to enforce the relevant laws and charged with technical knowledge of the matters falling within their primary jurisdiction - all dismissed the different suits filed by Piccio against Vergara concerning the very factual issues brought before the Court at present, and involving the same R.A. 9225 documents of Vergara. At this juncture, the Court quotes, with approval, the HRET's assailed Decision where it stated: "[t]o contradict the findings of these quasi-judicial bodies would run counter to the elementary principle that findings of administrative agencies deserve great respect, if not finality, by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said bodies over matters falling under their primary jurisdiction."190 In sum, there is overwhelming competent evidence proving Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225 for the re-acquisition of her Philippine citizenship.

The foregoing discussion shows that the records are replete with competent evidence, offered by both Piccio and Vergara, supporting the conclusion that Vergara had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship, in compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225. First , Vergara's original and genuine IC No. 06-12955. This establishes prima facie that the documents required for its issuance, including her Oath of Allegiance, were all duly submitted to the BI.

As testified to by the BI Legal Division Chief Atty. Santos and BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta, these submissions should have been in their original form.191 Second , the photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents192 including her Oath of Allegiance itself. To emphasize, these secondary pieces of evidence are competent and admissible to prove the existence and due execution of the original documents. Third , the letters, documents, and testimonies of different BI officials which, except only the June letters of Commissioner Geron, are all consistent in saying that: 1) Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its attachments were duly received, processed, and approved by the BI, as a result of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955; and 2) the BI has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.

These conclusions were based on the BI records, the BI electronic database, several formal hearings, investigations, and meetings conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's R.A. 9225 files, as well as on certifications, reports, and comments from the relevant BI offices. Fourth , the rulings and decisions of other quasi-judicial bodies and government agencies, resolving the same issues as those raised in the present case, regarding Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225, and the collateral issues of tampering, forgery, and irregularities in the processing of her R.A. 9225 Petition.

These rulings - which dismissed all such suits filed - coming from administrative agencies possessing special knowledge and experience over the matters under their primary jurisdiction, deserve great respect, if not finality, by the Court. Fifth , the BI electronic database and the Dual Citizenship's Office database, which record all BI transactions, showing that Vergara's R.A. 9225 application was duly received, supported by the required documents, processed and granted. As testified to by BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta, any tampering of records will reflect in the database.

As pointed out by the HRET, these recordings are entries in official records under Section 44,193 Rule 130 of the Rules, hence, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.194 On the other hand, Piccio's scant pieces of evidence fail, not just because Vergara's own evidence is overwhelming, but likewise because they are inherently defective for being inadequate, tangential and anomalous. First , the poor reproductions of Notary Public Atty. Cinco's signatures as appearing on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance and Atty. Cinco's notarial commission are gravely inadequate to prove Piccio's theory of forgery. It is settled that comparison of signatures requires the presentation of original documents.

Second , the Certification of the Manila City OCC merely demonstrates the failure of Atty. Cinco to comply with his duty to submit his notarial books to the court. It cannot be taken to prove that Vergara's Oath of Allegiance that was notarized by Atty. Cinco does not exist. Third , the June 2016 letters of Commissioner Geron, as earlier discussed, are highly suspicious and cannot be given any credence.

They are refuted by all the other BI officials as well as an earlier letter of Commissioner Geron himself. Moreover, they were maliciously written and lack any reasonable basis. Piccio 's evidence is tainted by a circumstance of suspicion, hence, deserves little credence, if any.

In the earlier-discussed case of Vitangcol , the Court rejected, as proof of the alleged non-existence of marriage between petitioner (the husband charged with Bigamy) and his first wife, the OCR Certification stating that the marriage license cannot be located. Apart from the lack of a categorical declaration in the Certification that no such marriage license exists, the Court likewise appreciated the "circumstance of suspicion" that the petitioner fraudulently caused the issuance of the document to evade conviction for Bigamy.

Vitangcol differentiated itself from Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro195 (Castro) - a case involving an action for declaration of nullity of a marriage, wherein the plaintiff presented a similar certification from the OCR that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license x x x does not appear from [the local civil registrar's] records".196 Thus: This court held [in Castro] that "[t]he certification x x x enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of 'due search and inability to find' sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license x x x to the contracting parties."

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved.

On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words.

That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued. A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.

The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.197 Hence, proof presented by a party with a "circumstance of suspicion" may be rejected by the Court in favor of more credible evidence produced by the opposing party, even when such rejected proof was issued by an official custodian of the document allegedly missing. In Castro , the Court explained that the doctrine is based on Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules,198 which provides: SEC.

29. How judicial record impeached. - Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.

(26a) Here, the party who can be said to have a "circumstance of suspicion" is Piccio, who not only filed multiple suits regarding the same issues which were all dismissed by the different concerned administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, but likewise maliciously presented the contradicting and misleading letters he secured from Commissioner Geron. To stress, the contradictions between Commissioner Geron's May 20, 2016 letter, on the one hand, and his two June letters, on the other, are so flagrant, that their presentation in evidence can hardly be said to have been innocently done.

Hence, the fraudulent circumstances surrounding Piccio renders his already measly evidence all the weaker and less credible. On the other hand, unlike petitioner in Vitangcol who had the primordial interest to escape criminal liability for Bigamy, Vergara had no interest at all in the non-existence or loss of her documents with the BI. In fact, that is the very reason why her disqualification is being sought - her original R.A. 9225 documents cannot be located with the BI where it was filed and which is its official repository under the law.

Far from having such interest, Vergara vigorously tried to prove - as she did prove - the existence of her original Oath. On the other hand, the BI, which admitted through its officials that the originals are not in its custody despite their submission by Vergara, has no motive to forge documents or make misrepresentations. In fact, it is against its own interest to admit that Vergara did file her original documents but that the same are not in its custody.

It would have been so easy for the BI to "evade" censure by confirming Piccio's theory that Vergara did not at all submit her original documents. This way, the BI washes its hands of any liability which it may incur in the wrong handling of said documents.

That it admitted that it did not have the originals speaks volumes about the credibility of the BI. The official custodian of public records bears the responsibility of safekeeping such documents which were duly filed with it. Hence, its failure to preserve such public records should not prejudice the public, who filed the same and relied, in good faith, on the custodian's safekeeping as mandated by law.

It is uncontroverted that the BI is the official repository of documents - including oaths of allegiance - relating to applications for retention of re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225. Indeed, this is categorically provided in AO No. 91, entitled "Designating the Bureau of Immigration as the Implementing Agency of Republic Act No. 9225 otherwise known as the 'Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,"' thus: SEC. 2.

Functions - The Bureau of Immigration, shall: a. Promulgate and issue rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; b. Prescribe appropriate forms and documentary requirements as well as required fees for the processing of applications for retention and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the law; c.

Act as repository of Certificates of Oath of Allegiance, Applications for Retention or Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, supporting documents and other pertinent documents in pursuance with the requirements of the law and its implementing rules and regulations; x x x x The same is also reflected in the BI General Instructions, which declares that sworn statements, the original of which must be filed with the BI as part of the R.A. 9225 petition, shall be retained by the BI and be made part of its record, thus: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS To avoid summary dismissal/delay in the processing of your application/petition, please be advised of the following: x x x x 2. All documents required for submission must be complied with, arranged in the order as listed in the Checklist of Documentary Requirements (CDR), compiled in a legal size (8 ½ x 14 in.) folder and shall be submitted within the prescribed period, if applicable.

Otherwise, your application or petition shall not be accepted. 3. All sworn statements or affidavits must be original, signed and duly notarized.

x x x x 8. All original documents submitted as part of the petition will not be returned to the petitioner and will be part of the Bureau's record. x x x x 10.

It is recommended that you seek legal advice from lawyers and/or BI-accredited entities.199 On the other hand, the BI General Instructions' R.A. 9225 Checklist200 (R.A. 9225 Checklist) requires the submission of two original copies of the Oath of Allegiance, taken before an authorized BI Legal Officer or otherwise.201 Finally, the BI General Instructions form contains a Certification required to be filled up by the pertinent BI Officer that the supporting documents of the R.A. 9225 petitions filed are complete and complies with the requirements, thus: CERTIFICATION This is to certify that the documents submitted in support of the application/petition of (Name of Applicant) are complete and in accordance with the provided checklist. Central Receiving Unit Evaluator: | ---|--- Signature over Printed Name | Date202 As extensively discussed, there is overwhelming evidence - and the BI itself had admitted through several of its officers - that Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its supporting documents, including the original copy of her Oath of Allegiance, were duly filed and processed, resulting in the petition being granted by the BI which, in turn, resulted to the issuance of IC No. 06- 12955 in her favor on November 30, 2006.

Hence, the same is established. This means that the BI, by law, should have in its records, these documents. However, as it appears, it only has photocopies of some of such documents and it cannot account for the apparent loss of the originals.

Piccio would have the Court believe that Vergara's inability to present the original documents and BI's failure to offer reasonable explanation for their absence in its records - in 2016, when Vergara's citizenship became the object of the public's attention after she filed her CoC for the 2016 elections - are proof that she did not re-acquire her Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225. As earlier intimated, the Court disagrees.

At the outset, it bears clarifying that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents, which were filed with the BI, are public records, defined under R.A. 9470,203 thus: SEC. 4. Definition of Terms.

- For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall hereby apply: x x x x (w) "Public records" refers to record or classes of records, in any form, in whole or in part, created or received, whether before or after the effectivity of this Act, by a government agency in the conduct of its affairs, and have been retained by that government agency or its successors as evidence or because of the information contained therein. (x) "Records"

refers to information, whether in its original form or otherwise, including documents, signatures, seals, texts, images, sounds, speeches, or data compiled, recorded, or stored, as the case may be: (1) In written form on any material; (2) On film, negative, tape or other medium so as to be capable of being reproduced; or (3) By means of any recording device or process, computer or other electronic device or process. x x x x R.A. 9470 likewise mandates the State to "give utmost priority for the safeguard, protection and preservation of its public documents and records, x x x as fundamental instruments for efficient and effective governance x x x."204 Piccio challenges the evidentiary value of Vergara's IC No. 06-12955, although he does not contest its existence and genuineness, because of allegedly evident irregularities uncovered in the BI, such as its failure to explain the absence in its records of Vergara's documents, and the conflicting statements of its officials.

To recall, among the numerous statements from the BI, only Commissioner Geron's June letters, which were submitted by Piccio to refute Vergara's IC, conflicted with the rest and seemed anomalous. Hence, only these pieces of evidence deserve no credence. In any case, assuming arguendo that the BI or its officials are guilty of indiscretions in the custody of Vergara's documents, such may not be imputed against Vergara, absent any showing that she participated therein.

Allowing such prejudice violates the basic legal maxim, res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules which states: SEC. 28. Admission by third-party.

- The rights of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a) This is founded on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience - a man's own acts are binding upon himself or herself and are evidence against him or her. So are his or her conduct and declarations.

Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man or woman should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers. And if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him or her.205 Among the exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule are: (1) admission by third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4) admission by privies.206 None of these exceptions apply. There is neither allegation nor proof presented that Vergara had any hand in whatever irregularity the BI had committed, if any.

Hence, to prejudice Vergara with the acts, declarations or omissions of the BI or its officials would be to violate not only the res inter alios acta rule under the Rules but likewise the principles of good faith, mutual convenience, and justice that the rule is founded on. Moreover, the allegations of irregularity on the part of the BI are premised solely on its failure to produce Vergara's original R.A. 9225 documents, without reasonable explanation, when they were sought in 2016, or 10 years after they were admittedly filed by Vergara in 2006. In other words, any such irregularities attended the documents' custody and safekeeping, after they were received by the BI.

The conclusion that such irregularities likewise attended the receipt and processing of the documents which, again, occurred some 10 years prior, is non sequitur. More importantly, as repeatedly discussed, there is overwhelming evidence proving that these latter processes were above board and the same was admitted by the BI. Further, from a practical and doctrinal standpoint, the failure of the BI to comply with its mandate under the law to safekeep said documents should not be imputed to Vergara who cannot be expected to regularly police the BI, and ensure that her documents are safely in the BI's custody.

That there is a law mandating the BI to keep said documents safe must be enough basis for Vergara's trust that the documents are indeed safe in the possession of the agency. A contrary interpretation - that Vergara must bear the consequence of BI's negligence or fault in safekeeping her files - would be grossly unjust to Vergara. More concerning is the dangerous precedent that the Court will then set, that is, that documents duly filed but have gone missing while in the custody of the receiving agency, without fault or even knowledge of the persons filing, will be rendered useless and void, as if they never existed at all.

This will bestow great injustice, not just upon Vergara or other similarly situated public officials, but likewise upon the general public who, in the first place, is powerless to prevent such mishaps. On the other hand, placing the burden on the erring government agency would encourage prudence and vigilance on the part of such agency and its officials and employees to safekeep documents entrusted to them by the public in accordance with the standards set by law. The foregoing is consistent with the policy of the State to hold the government accountable in ensuring the maintenance and preservation of public records in its custody, and to strengthen public confidence on the safekeeping and preservation of such public records.

The Court cannot uphold Piccio's allegation that the HRET gravely abused its discretion in committing mosaic plagiarism. Piccio submits that the assailed Decision is an "obnoxious example of simple and mosaic plagiarism."207 He quotes portions of the assailed Decision and compares them to quoted portions of Vergara's Verified Answer and Memorandum, and concludes that as they are the same, the HRET had committed "mosaic plagiarism/patchwork plagiarism."208 He submits that this is "unacceptable, unethical[,] and open[s] [the HRET] to suspicion as to its fairness, impartiality[,] and integrity."209 He alleges that "such callous and dishonest conduct endangers the credibility and integrity of the Tribunal,"210 and then cites the case of In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, Etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo211 (In re Del Castillo). The Court rejects these submissions.

Foremost, it bears stressing that the charge of plagiarism in the In re Del Castillo case cited by Piccio was dismissed for lack of merit. In essence, the Court found therein that Justice Del Castillo (and his researcher) lacked any motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to their authors.212 The Court stressed the element of fraudulent intent in plagiarism which it defined as "'to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one's own.' The passing off of the work of another as one's own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism."213 In the subsequent Resolution of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration in In re Del Castillo ,214 the Court had occasion to clarify and distinguish judges from the academe where the element of malicious intent in plagiarism is disregarded - in the academe, original scholarship is highly valued because the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor or distinction.

In contrast, court decisions are not written to earn merit as an original piece of work or art.

Rather, deciding disputes is a service rendered for the public good.215 Moreover, as accuracy of words in law is foremost, the tendency to copy of judges and lawyers is explicable. Hence, the Court recognized the right of judges to use legal materials which belong to the public domain, even without attribution, including liftings from a party's pleading, thus: "A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party's brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal.

This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism." If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions.

These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary's more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism. x x x x The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.216 (Emphasis omitted) The Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (SAJ Carpio) in In re Del Castillo is more instructive for cases involving judges quoting or copying from pleadings of parties: b.

Copying from Pleadings of Parties In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from the pleadings of the parties with proper attribution to the author of the pleading. However, the failure to make the proper attribution is not actionable. Pleadings are submitted to the court precisely so that the pleas, or the arguments written on the pleadings, are accepted by the judge.

There is an implied offer by the pleader that the judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case. If the judge accepts the pleader's arguments, he may copy such arguments to expedite the resolution of the case. In writing his decision, the judge does not claim as his own the arguments he adopts from the pleadings of the parties.

Besides, the legal arguments in the pleadings are in most cases merely reiterations of judicial precedents, which are Works of the Government. However, misquoting or twisting, with or without attribution, any passage from the pleadings of the parties, if done to mislead the parties or the public , is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge "should perform official duties honestly."

Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 of the Code provide that a judge must be faithful to the law, maintain professional competence, and strive diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law.217 Hence, from the foregoing, failure of judges to make proper attributions when quoting pleadings of parties filed before them is not actionable. What can be said to be an exception is when there is twisting of such passages from pleadings done with intent to mislead the parties or the public.

To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning of."218 In the present case, the Court does not find any misquoting or twisting of passages from Vergara's pleadings. Neither is there any showing of intent to mislead the parties by the HRET. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to sustain Piccio in this respect.

On this note, the Court takes exception to the rather callous language of this portion of Piccio's Petition, and its strong suggestion of partiality by the HRET - a constitutional body charged with the important mandate of resolving all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the country's legislators.219 Piccio's counsel is reminded to observe and maintain the respect due the HRET, as the same is essential to the orderly administration of justice.220 The Court had enjoined lawyers, in the assertion of their clients' rights, to "rein up their tempers," even as it understands the frustration brought by a court's dismissal of one's cause, the merit of which he or she so passionately believes in, thus: "The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army.

The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten , 40 Atl. 481) "We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment.

That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune.

Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines [v.] Ferrer , L-22979, June 26, 1967) 221 The ascription of improper motives to the HRET is especially alarming for it implies that the HRET was moved by considerations other than its sense of justice and fair play, and calls into question its integrity and impartiality. This chips away at the public's confidence on the overall judicial and quasi-judicial system in its fair dispensation of justice.

Such tone cannot be countenanced especially as the accusation of plagiarism, as discussed, lacks merit. It bears noting that the Petition quotes a small portion of In re Del Castillo , leading to the fair assumption that the whole Decision and Resolution thereon were read and understood by Piccio's counsel. To stress the obvious, In re Del Castillo is the very case which declared the afore-discussed exceptional rules applying to plagiarism charges against courts and lawyers.

These are the very doctrines applied by the Court herein, leading to the dismissal of Piccio's accusations of "mosaic plagiarism" by the HRET. It is, thus, curious that the Petition still fiercely insists on its claim, to the point of calling the HRET "unethical,"

"dishonest," and "callous," when a simple reading of the Court's discussion in In re Del Castillo would show its clear lack of merit.

The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Decision. Piccio and Umali failed to discharge their burden before the HRET to prove the ineligibility of Vergara by substantive evidence. To recall, the present case is one for certiorari , which means that no less than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET is needed for the Petition to prosper.

"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.

Time and again, this Court has held that mere abuse of discretion is not enough. The abuse of discretion must be grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.222 However, as mentioned earlier, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.223 By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an administrative body like the HRET over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment upon such matters.

Thus, its findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts,224 except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.225 Hence, a determination of whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in the present case necessarily requires a prior determination of the merits of the quo warranto petitions filed before it. On this note, the starting point is determined by the party who bears the burden of proof. In the case of a petition for quo warranto , that party is he or she who alleges the ineligibility or disqualification of the elected official.226 Thus, Piccio and Umali, bore the burden of proving Vergara's ineligibility before the HRET.

The creation of mere doubt is insufficient to discharge such burden.227 In light of the above discussion, petitioners before the HRET clearly and utterly failed to prove their assertion that Vergara did not comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225 for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship. All of the evidence they adduced have been, and are, debunked by contrary evidence presented by Vergara and the relevant laws. At this juncture, the Court qualifies Justice Hernando's point that the burden to show that the procedure in the retention of Philippine citizenship were strictly followed lies with the person claiming that he or she has complied with it.

This burden of evidence shifts to the candidate if, and only if, the party challenging the elected official's citizenship and, hence, his or her eligibility, had adduced substantial evidence to prove such ineligibility. Nevertheless, Vergara, while not carrying any burden of evidence as the burden of proof had not shifted from Piccio, proved, by sufficient and substantial evidence, that she had duly taken her oath and duly executed an affidavit of renunciation in compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225. Hence, the HRET - far from having committed grave abuse of discretion - was actually very correct in the issuance of its assailed Decision and Resolution, and in ruling that Vergara is qualified to continue sitting as a Member of the House.

There is abundant evidence to support this conclusion.

WHEREFORE , the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 23, 2019 and Resolution dated June 27, 2019 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Gesmundo, C.J., Inting, J., Zalameda, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur. Hernando, J., dissent. See Dissenting Opinion.1âшphi1 Carandang, J., join the dissent of J. R. Hernando. Lazaro-Javier, J., please see concurrence. M. Lopez, J., join the dissent of J. Ramon Hernando. Gaerlan, J., join the dissent of J. Ramon Hernando. Dimaampao, J., concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Ramon Paul Hernando. Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., no part. Leonen, J., on official leave. Footnotes The present case was previously consolidated with G.R. No. 236113 entitled "Vergara v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al." However, the petition in G.R. No. 236113 was subsequently withdrawn. 1 Captioned "Petition for Review on Certiorari " rollo, pp. 3-36. 2 Rollo, pp. 37-64. Penned by then Associate Justice and Chairperson of the HRET Diosdado M. Peralta and signed by then Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, and Representatives Jorge T. Almonte, Gavini C. Pancho, Abigail Faye C. Ferriol-Pascual, Joaquin M. Chipeco, Jr., Wilter Wee Palma II, and Abdullah D. Dimaporo Associate Justice and then HRET Member Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe took no part. 3 Id. at 65. 4 Id. at 38. 5 Otherwise known as the "CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," approved on August 29, 2003. 6 Rollo, p. 38. 7 Id. 8 Id. at 70. 9 REVISED RULES GOVERNING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) No. 9225 AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (A.O.) No. 91, SERIES OF 2004. See Whereas Clause designating the BI as the Implementing Agency of R.A. 9225; rollo, p. 38. 10 Rollo, pp. 38-39. 11 Id. at 40. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 41. 14 Id. at 41-42. 15 Id. at 42. 16 Id. 17 Id. at 43. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. at 44. Underscoring in the original. 21 Id. at 74. 22 Id. at 44. 23 Id. 24 Id. at 45. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 45-46. 27 Id. at 46. 28 Id. at 46-47. 29 Id. at 49. 30 Id. 31 Id. at 160. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 6. 34 Id. 35 Id. at 52. 36 Id. at 8-9. 37 Id. at 13. 38 Id. at 9. 39 Id. at 20-31. 40 Id. at 276-301. 41 Id. at 278-280. 42 Id. at 293-298. 43 Id. at 314-336. 44 Id. at 322-323. 45 Id. at 324. 46 Id. at 330. 47 Id. at 332-334. 48 Id. at 379-387. 49 Id. at 322-323. 50 De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 149, 155. 51 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Sec. 6 provides: Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines x x x. 52 R.A. 7160 entitled, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991," approved on October 10, 1991. See Section 39. 53 Section 39 of the LGC provides: SECTION 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines x x x . 54 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 308. 55 Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255. 56 G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33 & 179240-41, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 434. 57 Id. at 447. 58 G.R. Nos. 192147& 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17. 59 Id. at 23-24. 60 Entitled, "SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC. 12, ART. XVIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND COMPLEMENTING ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1 OF JANUARY 28, 1988 ON EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSITION OF CASES PENDING IN THE SUPREME COURT," dated July 1, 1991. 61 Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 112, 127. 62 Id. 63 Rollo, p. 65. 64 Id. at 254. 65 Id . at 279-280. 66 Id. at 66-84. 67 Id. at 90-114. 68 Id. at 271-280. 69 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1 provides: SEC. 1. x x x The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (1a) 70 Union Industries, Inc. v. Vales, G.R. No. 140102, February 9, 2006,482 SCRA 17, 21. 71 Id. 72 Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020, accessed at . 73 Id. 74 Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 10, 21. 75 G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59. 76 Id. at 69-70. 77 Rollo, p. 117. 78 Supra note 72. 79 Rollo, pp. 37-64. 80 Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, 327 Phil. 521, 574-575 (1996). See also Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733; Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744; Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1; David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA 435. 81 David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, id. at 475. 82 Id. at 509. 83 Id. at 510. 84 Sinaca v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 282. 85 Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 753. 86 Supra note 55. 87 Id. at 574-575. 88 Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 753. 89 See CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17. 90 Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 97105, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 808, 841. 91 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 699. 92 Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, No. L-84297, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 391, 401. 93 Id. at 403-404. 94 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, supra note 91, at 700. 95 Id. 96 Domalanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 555, 573. 97 See Malabaguio v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 142507, December 1, 2000, 346 SCRA 699, 706. 98 Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 226. 99 David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 472, citing Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011). 100 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80, at 778. 101 Locsin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 635, 644. 102 Id. 103 In Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 654, the Court upheld the authority of the COMELEC to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it, as a consequence of its constitutional power to settle all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, thus: As enunciated, the COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. This is simply in congruence with the concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory bodies are enjoined to observe. The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over election contests. (Id. at 670.) Similarly, the HRET, which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, wields the same power to determine factual questions relative to the election contests before it, such as the issue, in the present case, of Vergara's compliance with the requirements for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship. 104 Rollo, p. 52. 105 Id. at 156-157. 106 Id. at 142-143. 107 Id. at 73. 108 Gepulle-Garbo v. Sps. Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 856-857 (2015). 109 Heirs of the Late Felix Bucton v. Sps. Go, 721 Phil. 851, 860 (2013). 110 Id. 111 787 Phil. 33 (2016). 112 Id. at 51. Citations omitted. 113 Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, supra note 72. 114 Rollo, p. 44. Underscoring omitted. 115 Id. at 53-54. 116 G.R. No. 207406, January 23, 2016, 780 SCRA 598. 117 Id. at 604-608. 118 Destrezua v. Atty. Riñoza-Plazo, et al., 619 Phil. 775, 782-783 (2009). 119 Rollo, p. 53. 120 Id. at 38. 121 Id. at 14. 122 Id. at 14-15. 123 Id. at 14. 124 Id. at 10. 125 Under the 2019 Proposed Amendments to the Revised Rules on Evidence (A.M . No. 19-08-15-SC), this Rule now reads: 1. Original Document Rule Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and (e) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a) Sec. 4. Original of document. - (a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device. any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original." (b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording. or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. (c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a) (Underscoring in the original) 126 Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 577, 584-585. 127 G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465. 128 Id. at 479. Citations omitted. 129 Id. at 483-484. Citations omitted. 130 Rollo, p. 38. 131 BI FORM 2014-01-004 Rev 1, accessed at . 132 Rollo, pp. 38-39. 133 Supra note 131. See General Instructions, Item No. 10. 134 Rollo, pp. 50-51. 135 2015 REVISED RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Rule 3. 136 Id. 137 Rollo, p. 55. 138 Id. 139 Hughey v. JMS Development Corporation, 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996); Black's Law Dictionary 1844 (9th ed. 2009). 140 Vitangcol v. People, supra note 116, at 608-610. 141 Rollo, pp. 38-39; common evidence of Piccio and Vergara. 142 Id. at 40; common evidence of Piccio and Vergara. 143 Id. at 44; Offered in evidence by Piccio. 144 Id. at 45; Offered in evidence by Piccio. 145 Id. at 45-46; Offered in evidence by Piccio. 146 Id. at 46-47; Offered in evidence by Vergara. 147 Id. at 55; Offered in evidence by Vergara. 148 Id. at 56; Offered in evidence by Vergara. 149 Id. at 170-171. 150 Id. at 48, 167; Offered in evidence by Vergara. 151 Id. at 46-47; Offered in evidence by Vergara. 152 Id. at 168; Offered in evidence by Vergara. 153 Id. at 16. 154 Id. at 61. 155 Id. 156 Id. at 22. 157 Id. at 195-197. 158 Id. at 190. 159 Id. 160 Id. at 59. 161 Id. at 60. 162 Id. 163 Id. 164 Id. at 60-61. 165 Id. at 204-207. 166 Id. at 15-17. 167 Id. at 15-16. 168 Id. at 61. 169 Id. at 9. 170 Id. at 60, 195-197. 171 Id. at 44. Underscoring omitted. 172 Id. at 45. Underscoring omitted. 173 Id. 174 See Rule 132, Section 11, Rules on Evidence which states: SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. - A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15) (Emphasis supplied) 175 Rollo, p. 47. 176 Id. Underscoring omitted. 177 Id. at 47, 55-56. 178 Id. at 55. 179 Id. at 56. 180 As stated in: 1) Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 of BI-TFCRA through Arbas; and 2) Order dated November 30, 2006 of BI Commissioner Fernandez. 181 As stated in 1) Letter dated May 20, 2016 of BI Commissioner Geron; 2) Letter dated August 10, 2016 of BI Commissioner Morente; 3) Certification dated August 4, 2016 signed by BI Records Section Chief Maceda; 4) Testimony of BI Legal Division Chief Atty. Santos; and 5) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta. 182 As stated in 1) Letter dated August 10, 2016 of BI Commissioner Morente; 2) Certification dated August 11, 2016 of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta; 3) BI Investigation Report dated August 28, 2016 of the BI Investigation Committee headed by Atty. Santos; 4) Testimony of Atty. Santos before the HRET; and 5) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta before the HRET. 183 Rollo, pp. 60-61. As shown in the 1) BI electronic database; 2) Dual Citizenship Office database; 3) Certification dated August 11, 2016 of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta; and 4) Testimony of Atty. Canta before the HRET. 184 As stated in 1) Testimony of BI Investigation Committee headed Atty. Santos before the HRET; and 2) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta before the HRET. 185 As stated in the Testimony of Records Section Chief Maceda before the HRET. 186 As stated in the Letters dated June 2 and June 29, 2016 of Commissioner Geron. 187 Rollo, pp. 314-338. 188 Id. at 328-330. 189 Id. at 56-57. 190 Id. at 57. 191 Id. at 49, 204-207. 192 1) Oath of Allegiance; 2) Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 of BI-TFCRA through Arbas, recommending the approval of Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition; 3) the Order dated November 30, 2006 signed by Commissioner Fernandez, granting her petition; and 4) her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 4, 2015. 193 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 44 provides: SEC. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38) 194 Rollo, p. 61. 195 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257. 196 Vitangcol v. People, supra note 116, at 609. 197 Id. at 609-610. Underscoring supplied. 198 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro, supra note 195, at 261-262. 199 Supra note 131. 200 Checklist Of Documentary Requirements For Petition For Retention/Re-Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship Under R.A. 9225, id. 201 Id. , Item nos. 3 and 4. 202 Id. 203 AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ARCHIVAL RECORDS, ESTABLISHING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES ACT OF 2007," approved on May 21, 2007. 204 R.A. 9470, Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. 205 People v. Bernardo, G .R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020, accessed , p. 9. 206 Tan Siok Kuan v. Ho, G.R. No. 175085, June 1, 2016, 791 SCRA 567, 579. 207 Rollo, p. 19. 208 Id. at 20. Emphasis omitted. 209 Id. at 23. 210 Id. 211 A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 607. 212 Id. at 629. 213 Id. at 619. 214 A.M. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 11. 215 Id. at 20. 216 Id. at 22-24. 217 Id. at 36-37. Emphasis in the original. 218 In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, supra note 212, at 632. 219 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17. 220 In the Matter of Proceeding for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay, 142 Phil. 353, 371 (1970). 221 Id. at 372. 222 Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 573, 587. 223 Garcia v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 134792, August 12, 1999, 312 SCRA 353, 363. 224 See Malabaguio v. COMELEC, supra note 97, at 706. 225 Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 98. 226 David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 509-510. 227 See id. at 510. 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