gr_243722_2020

en banc extended the scope of Article 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The Court's ruling states, in part: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce valid l y obtained abroad.

The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.

"The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure." Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained"

should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.

Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter. To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.

Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.40 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original) Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea.

The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue.

In fact, the CA considered said evidence sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in question: x x x [T]he records show that [Cynthia] submitted, inter alia, the original and translated foreign divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity. She also offered into evidence a copy of the Korean Civil Code, duly authenticated through a Letter of Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871, issued by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce obtained by the estranged couple abroad but [the CA agrees] with the OSG that the divorce cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as [Cynthia] is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement of a foreign spouse and a Filipino spouse.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility and probative value of Abigail's testimony claiming that Cynthia had been constrained to consent to the divorce.

As confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2017 and Resolution dated September 29, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division and Former Eleventh Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 3, 2015 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 in Special Proceedings No. SD(14)-417 is REINSTATED. By virtue of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code and the Certification of the Cheongju Local Court dated July 16, 2012, petitioner Cynthia A. Galapon is declared capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.