Decision

En Banc]. [4](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4l) Respondent's Memorandum, p. 2. [5](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5l) Respondent's Memorandum, Annex D. [6](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6l) Lagman Petitio

G.R. No. 235935, G.R. No. 236061, G.R. No. 236145, G.R. No. 236155 · LawPhil

En Banc]. [4](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4l) Respondent's Memorandum, p. 2. [5](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5l) Respondent's Memorandum, Annex D.…

En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4l) Respondent's Memorandum, p. 2.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5l) Respondent's Memorandum, Annex D. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6l) Lagman Petition, Annex B. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7l) Lagman Petition, Annex C. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8l) Lagman Petition, Annex C-1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9l) Lagman Petition, Annex C-2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10l) Lagman Petition, Annex C. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11l) Representative Lagman's Memorandum, Annex G. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12l) CONST., Art., VII, sec.

18. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13l) Representative Lagman's Memorandum, Annex G. Rule V, Section 6, Rules of the Joint Session of Congress on the Call of the President to Further Extend the Period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 217. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14l) Representative Lagman's Memorandum, Annex G. Rule V, Section 7, Rules of the Joint Session of Congress on the Call of the President to Further Extend the Period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 217.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15l) TSN dated January 16, 2018, pp. 58-60. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16l) Lagman v. Pimentel III, docketed as G.R. No. 235935; Cu/lamat v. Duterte, docketed as G.R. No. 236061, Rosales v. Duterte, docketed as G.R. No. 236145; and Monsod v. Pimentel Ill, docketed as G.R. No. 236155. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt17l) TSN, January 17, 2018, p.

51. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18l) CONST., art. VII, sec.

18 provides: Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt19l) CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1 provides: Section 1.

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt20l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /231658.

pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt21l) MALOLOS CONST., Art. 65. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt22l) MALOLOS CONST., Art. 71.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt23l) MALOLOS CONST., Art. 79. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt24l) MALOLOS CONST., Art. 77. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt25l) Phil. Bill of 1902, sec.

5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt26l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/23 l 658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt27l) Phil. Autonomy Act, sec.

21. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt28l) Phi. Autonomy Act, sec.

21. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt29l) 1935 CONST., sec. 10, par.

2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt30l) 91 Phil. 882 (1952) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt31l) Id.

at 887. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt32l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt33l) Lansangv.

Garcia, 149 Phil. 547, 586 (1971) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt34l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt35l) 158-A Phil. I (1974) [Per CJ.

Makalintal, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt36l) 206 Phil. 392 (1983) [Per J. De Castro, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt37l) Id.

at 431-432.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt38l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdt> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt39l) 684 Phil. 526 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt40l) Id.

at 557. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt41l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017 /july2017 /231658.pdf> 20 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt42l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> 19 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt43l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt44l) Id. at 20.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt45l) Id. at 11. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt46l) J.V. Capua, The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to the Petition of Right, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 152 (1977).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt47l) 327 U.S. 304 (1946) [Per J. Black]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt48l) C.J. Stone, Concurring Opinion in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304. 355 (1946) [Per.

J. Black] citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) [Per J. Taney]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt49l) Ex Parle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2-142 (1866) [Per J. Davis] (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt50l) Id. at 127.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt51l) PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY, Evolution of the Revolution, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/7824- evolution-of-the-revolution/> (last accessed on June 22, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt52l) Ambeth Ocampo, Martial Law in 1896, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, December 18, 2009, <https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/philippine-daily-inquirer/20091218/283180079571432> (last accessed June 22, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt53l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt54l) Proc. No. 29 (1944). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt55l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt56l) Proc. No. 30 (1944). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt57l) PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY, Dr. Jose P. Laurel as President of the Second Philippine Republic, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/5237-dr-jose-p-laurel-as-president-of-the-second-philippinerepublic/# edn7> (last accessed July 3, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt58l) Proc. No. 30 (1944). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt59l) Proc.

No. l 081 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt60l) J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer .htm l?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /23165 8.pdt> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt61l) Id.

at 32-35.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt62l) Lagman Petition, Annex C, p. 2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt63l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt64l) Id. at 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt65l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, p.68.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt66l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, pp. 86-96. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt67l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, pp. 141-142. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt68l) RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, sec.

1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt69l) 281Phil.487-508 (1991) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt70l) Id.

at 495-496. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt71l) Lagasca v. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376-381 (1947) [Per J. Perfecto, First Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt72l) People v. Dunig y Rodriguez, 289 Phil. 949-956 (1992) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt73l) Joaquin v. Navarro, 99 Phil. 367-373 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt74l) People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499-514 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt75l) People v. Balanon, 304 Phil. 79-87 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt76l) G .R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017 <sc,judiciary.gov.ph?pdf?web?viewer.html?file=jurisprudence/2017 /214064.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt77l) Id. at 7.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt78l) 722 Phil. 743-763 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt79l) 543 Phil. 436-483 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt80l) 699 Phil. 205-235 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt81l) 317 Phil. 897 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt82l) Dissenting Opinion of J. Leanen in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017 /july2017 /231658 leonen.pdf > 54-55 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt83l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt84l) Id. at 56. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt85l) TSN dated January 16, 2018, pp. 61-64.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt86l) Monsod Petition, p. 13. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt87l) Rosales Petition, Annex E, p.

2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt88l) Lagman Petition, Annec C-2, p. 2.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt89l) Rosales Petition, Annex E, pp. 2-3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt90l) Lagman Petition, Annex C-1, p. 2.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt91l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 16.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt92l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 38. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt93l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 57. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt94l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 59.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt95l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 60. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt96l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 48. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt97l) Lagman Petition, Annex C-2, p.

3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt98l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 18. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt99l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 34.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt100l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 34. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt101l) Lagman Petition, Annex C-2, p. 4.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt102l) See OSG Annex in Lagman v. Medialdea, Significant Atrocities in Mindanao Prior to the Marawi City Incident. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt103l) See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231648, July 4, 2017 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /231658 leonen.pdf >[Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt104l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 33.

The slide shows a total membership of 185 individuals as of December 2017. However, the membership of local terror groups are only 137, the remaining 48 are accounted for as foreign terrorist fighters. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt105l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 32.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt106l) See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231648, July 4, 2017 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /231658 leonen.pdf > 75-76 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt107l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 26-28. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt108l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 21.

The original states, "both factions still reinforces each other." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt109l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, p. 56.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt110l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 48. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt111l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide. 46.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt112l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 34-36. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt113l) See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialde a, G.R. No. 231648, July 4, 2017 < http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer .html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /231658 leonen.pdf > 76 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt114l) Id. at 74. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt115l) Id.

at 75. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt116l) Rosales Petition, Annex E, p. 3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt117l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 23. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt118l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 25. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt119l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 32.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt120l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 58. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt121l) Rosales Petition, Annex E, p. 5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt122l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, p. 69. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt123l) Proc.

No. 216 (2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt124l) Proc. No. 216 (2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt125l) See OSG Memorandum in Lagman v. Medialdea, pp. 5-8. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt126l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, pp. 225-226. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt127l) Rosales Petition, Annex D. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt128l) Id.

at 2-3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt129l) Id. at 3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt130l) Rosales Petition, Annex E, pp. 4-5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt131l) TSN dated January 17, 2018, pp. 190-194. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt132l) Id.

at 225-226. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt133l) TSN dated January 16, 2018, pp. 70-71. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt134l) United States Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 238, June 2017 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new pubs/dictionary.pdf> (last accessed Feb 6, 2018).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt135l) Lagman Petition, Annex C, p. 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt136l) Lagman Petition, Annex C-2, p.

3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt137l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 63. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt138l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 62-71.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt139l) Cullamat Petition, p. 19 citing National Security Policy, 2017-2022 National Security Policy for Change and Well-Being of the Filipino People, <http://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP- 2017-2022.pdf> (last visited February 7, 2018) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt140l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 61. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt141l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 66.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt142l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 66, 70-71.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt143l) Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 69. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt144l) Brian Michael Jenkins, Fifteen Years On, Where are We in the "War on Terror"?, 9 CTC SENTINEL 7, 10-11 (September, 2016). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt145l) CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, pp. 40-42.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt146l) Id. at 40. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt147l) Id.

at 45. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt148l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt149l) Id.

at 40. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt150l) Id. at 59-60.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt151l) Id. at 80. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt152l) Id.

at 82. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt153l) Id. at 93.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt154l) Id. at 93-94. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt155l) Id.

at. 119. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt156l) 41 INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, POST-MARAWI LESSONS FROM DETAINED EXTREMISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 3 (2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt157l) Id. at 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt158l) Id.

at 10-11. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt159l) G .R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.htrnl?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /227757 .pdf > [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt160l) Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017 < http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer .html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017 /2277 57 leonen.pdf > 36-39 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt161l) Memorandum by Representative Lagman, Annex G. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt162l) TSN dated January 16, 2018, pp. 58-60.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt163l) Memorandum by Representative Lagman, pp. 5-6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt164l) TSN dated January 16, 2018, p. 27.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [![](https://lawphil.net/images/back.gif)](javascript:history.back$1$) [![](https://lawphil.net/images/top.gif)](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#top) DISSENTING OPINION JARDELEZA,J.: In my Separate Opinion(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1j) in Lagman v. Medialdea,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2j) I advanced the following views: (1) that a case filed under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is sui generis; (2) determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis is distinct from ascertaining whether there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) the standard of review for a proceeding under Section 18, Article VII should be reasonableness; and (4) the Government's presentation of evidence should, in the first instance, be conducted publicly and in open court.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3j) After examining the evidence then presented before us, I found "nothing incredulous or far-fetched"

about the Government's claims which, I also noted, were "not incompatible with local and foreign media reports and publicly available legal research." Thus, I concluded that there was an actual rebellion and the threat to public safety necessitated the President's declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. The Court's jurisdiction under Section 18, Article VII is again invoked, this time to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of the President's declaration.

If upheld, martial law will continue to be implemented and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended in the whole of Mindanao until December 31, 2018. The ponencia finds that there is sufficient factual basis for the extension. I dissent and write this Opinion to explain my conclusion.

I Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.) The text of the Constitution is clear.

Two conditions must concur before a President can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law: (1) actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) when public safety requires it. Much has been said about the concept of rebellion within the meaning of Section 18, Article VII.

I myself have advanced views on this matter.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4j) My present analysis is concerned not so much with the issue as to the existence of an actual rebellion as used under Section 18. In fact, given the facts and my proposed definition of rebellion within the meaning of Section 18,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5j) which is simply armed public resistance to the government, I find the Government's claim that actual rebellion is continuously being waged in Mindanao to be not unreasonable. I have very grave concerns, however, with the suggestion that the existence or persistence of a rebellion per se necessarily endangers public safety for purposes of Section 18, Article VII.

According to the Government: 84. Since Cullamat, et al. admit the existence of rebellion in Mindanao, they cannot begrudge the Congress from agreeing to the extension of the proclamation and suspension in the interest of public safety. The danger posed by rebellion on public safety cannot be discounted.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. xx x(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6j) Otherwise stated, the Government's proposition is that since a rebellion, by definition, is carried out by a "vast movement of men,"

any rebellion, regardless of scale, may call for an exercise by the President of his extraordinary powers. I strongly disagree. II It is my view that the second requirement of "when public safety requires it"

introduced a level of scale as to qualify the first requirement of the existence of an actual rebellion or invasion. "Scale" is defined as "the relative size or extent of something."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7j) It is synonymous with "scope, magnitude, dimensions, range, breadth, compass, degree, reach, spread, sweep."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8j) The public safety requirement under Section 18, Article VII operates to limit the exercise of the President's extraordinary powers only to rebellions or invasions of a certain scale as to sufficiently threaten public safety.

This conclusion, I find, is supported by: (a) the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission; (b) our law and jurisprudence on the concept of public safety as used in specific relation to the exercise of government powers which result in an impainnent of civil rights; and (c) the experience of the Court both in this case and in Lagman v. Medialdea where it upheld the President's original declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. A Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission A careful reading of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would clearly show that there was no intention to interpret the public safety requirement simply as a foregone consequence of the existence of the first requirement, i.e., actual rebellion or invasion. Rather, it seems that the intention was to qualify the first requirement such that not all cases of rebellion or invasion can be considered sufficient for purposes of the exercise of the President's extraordinary powers: MR.

DELOS REYES: As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident everybody knows what happened.

Would the Committee consider that an act of rebellion? MR. REGALADO: If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135.

I am not trying to pose as an expert about this rebellion that took place in the Manila Hotel, because what I know about it is what I only read in the papers. I do not know whether we can consider that there was really an armed public uprising. Frankly, I have my doubts on that because we were not privy to the investigations conducted there.

Commissioner Bernas would like to add something. FR. BERNAS: Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion.

Even if we will suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an actual rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ because the Constitution further says: "when the public safety requires it." So, even if there is a rebellion but the rebellion can be handled and public safety can be protected without imposing martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ, the President need not. Therefore, even if we consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was something which did not call for imposition of martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9j) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) The following exchange between Commissioners Jose N. Nolledo and Crispino M. De Castro further clarified that while the President can call out the armed forces to address actual rebellion or invasion, it is only when the situation has posed a severe enough threat to public safety is he empowered to resort to his extraordinary powers of declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: MR.

NOLLEDO: xx x Does Commissioner de Castro agree with me that the President need not declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if there is actual invasion [or] rebellion because he is authorized under Section 15 of the committee report to call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion? MR. DE CASTRO: We are talking of the next sentence with the words "in case of invasion or rebellion."

This becomes a useless sentence. In fact, the questions of Honorable Suarez and the statements of Honorable Ople do not fall on these two situations. MR.

NOLLEDO: No, the first sentence is very material because if there is an invasion, the President can immediately call upon the Armed Forces. xxx MR. DE CASTRO: That is why I said in case of actual invasion or actual rebellion.

[T]he President will have no more time to say "I declare martial law." He will just order the Armed Forces to go there and repel the enemy. MR.

NOLLEDO: Madam President, the argument of Commissioner de Castro seems to indicate that the President is powerless without declaring martial law. The first sentence is very clear, that in case of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the President may immediately call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress the same. And it is only when public safety requires it that the President may decide to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

So, I would like to correct the impression that the President has no power to meet the invasion or rebellion without declaration of martial law. xxx MR. GARCIA: x x x I also would like to remind ourselves that very often the doctrine of national security is given as a reason to impose extraordinary measures which, once begun, leads to many other violations.

I believe this is something that we must guard against from the very beginning.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10j) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Mere invocations of issues of national security and public safety, without more, are not enough.

The Constitution requires that there is sufficient factual basis to show not only that actual rebellion or invasion exists, but that the situation has reached such scale as to threaten public safety. B Public safety in Philippine law and jurisprudence There is no one concept of public safety in Philippine law and jurisprudence, but attempts have been made to arrive at accepted meanings of the term. Public safety, for example, has been interpreted to be "synonymous"

with the concept of "national security" and "security of the state,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11j) but narrower than those matters falling under the concept of "interest of the state."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12j) On the other hand, dangers to public safety have been held to include traffic congestion;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13j) hazards of traffic in the evening;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14j) business establishments which give rise to conflagrations and explosions;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15j) open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt16j) presence of motorcycles in toll ways;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17j) billboards and signages in times of typhoons;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt18j) unrestricted right to travel of court employees;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt19j) and the failure of railroad companies to install, maintain and repair safety equipment and signages.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt20j) For purposes of my analysis of "when public safety requires"

within the meaning of Section 18, Article VII, however, I find that the interpretation of "public safety" in relation to the impairment of the liberty of travel(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt21j) to be most proximate/appropriate in that both involve the derogation of civil rights to give way to a "higher" state interest.

In interpreting whether then President Corazon C. Aquino could legally ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, the Court in Marcos v. Manglapus,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt22j) voting eight to seven, upheld the restriction on the Marcoses' right to travel as part of the President's residual power as "protector of the peace."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt23j) For me, however, the gripping dissents made for a more compelling analysis on how public safety may, in a proper case, be invoked by the Government to curtail fundamental rights. Justice Teodoro Padilla, for example, opined that: Mr. Marcos, I repeat, comes before the Court as a Filipino, invoking a specific constitutional right, i.e., the right to return to the country. Have the respondents presented sufficient evidence to offset or override the exercise of this right invoked by Mr. Marcos?

Stated differently, have the respondents shown to the Court sufficient factual bases and data which would justify their reliance on national security and public safety in negating the right to return invoked by Mr. Marcos? I have given these questions a searching examination. I have carefully weighed and assessed the "briefing"

given the Court by the highest military authorities of the land last 28 July 1989. I have searched, but in vain, for convincing evidence that would defeat and overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as a Filipino to return to this country.

It appears to me that the apprehensions entertained and expressed by the respondents, including those conveyed through the military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to proportions of national security or public safety. They appear to be more speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Moreover, such apprehensions even if translated into realities, would be "under control,"

as admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given the resources and facilities at the command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people themselves, in my opinion, will know how to handle any situation brought about by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos' right to return, and his actual return, to this country. The Court, in short, should not accept respondents' general apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face value, in the light of a countervailing and even irresistible, specific, clear, demandable, and enforceable right asserted by a Filipino.

Deteriorating political, social, economic or exceptional conditions, if any, are not to be used as a pretext to justify derogation of human rights.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt24j) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted, italics in the original.) Similarly, in his Dissent, Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. stated that while there may be disturbances which may be directly attributable to the Marcoses' return to the country, they are "not of a magnitude as would compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of non-justiciability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of Rights guarantee:" And except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious of which were totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military was able to readily quell, the respondents have not pointed to any grave exigency which permits the use of untrammeled Governmental power in this case and the indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.

xxx Significantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national security and public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines.

It was only after the present petition was filed that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to( 1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. x x x Neither ground satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety.

The President has been quoted as stating that the vast majority of Filipinos support her position. x x x We cannot validate her stance simply because it is a popular one. Supreme Court decisions do not have to be popular as long as they follow the Constitution and the law.

The President's original position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be allowed to return at this time" has not changed. x x x On February 11, 1989, the President is reported to have stated that "considerations of the highest national good dictate that we preserve the substantial economic and political gains of the past three years"

in justifying her film refusal to allow the return of Mr. Marcos despite his failing health. x x x "Interest of the nation," "national good,"

and "preserving economic and political gains," cannot be equated with national security or public order. They are too generic and sweeping to serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional right.

The Bill of Rights commands that the right to travel may not be impaired except on the stated grounds of national security, public safety, or public health and with the added requirement that such impairment must be "as provided by law." The constitutional command cannot be negated by mere generalizations.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt25j) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics in the original.) Justice Isagani A. Cruz, for his part, found "mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions" to be insufficient to overcome the Marcoses' right to travel.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt26j) Justice Edgardo L. Paras, on the other hand, stated that while there may be some danger to national safety and national security as claimed by the Government, "there is no showing as to the extent"

as to warrant the curtailment of the Marcoses' rights.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt27j) Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento, Sr. similarly objects, thus, "[i]t is his constitutional right, a right that cannot be abridged by personal hatred, fear, founded or unfounded, and by speculations of the man's 'capacity' 'to stir trouble."'(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt28j) These dissents, to me, clearly present a powerful case to require of the Government a clear showing of danger to national security or public safety of such scale sufficient to defeat the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. I submit that no less than this same requirement should be demanded of the Government in this case. For, the powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus implicate not only one's right to travel, but many other basic civil liberties, including the most fundamental, namely, "individual freedom."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt29j) There was thus a conscious effort on the part of our Framers to reserve their exercise only in the direst of situations and under the strictest of conditions.

The realization that a declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus impacts our most basic and fundamental rights was foremost on the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission: FR. BERNAS: I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely, in proposing this, I am consciously proposing this as an exception to this practice because of the tremendous effect on the nation when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended and then martial law is imposed. Since we have allowed the President to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus unilaterally, we should make it a little more easy for Congress to reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of the people.

xxx MR. SARMIENTO: I thank Commissioner Monsod. May I join Commissioner Monsod and Commissioner Guingona that the Congress, voting jointly, should have the power to revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

In this way, we make it easy for the people's representatives to cut short a power which is very potent that could be the subject of abuse, and in the words of Commissioner Bennagen, could open the way for the resurgence of tyranny and dictatorship.xx x xxx MR. BROCKA: x x x We are talking about a possible situation, a declaration of martial law, wherein the very basic and fundamental rights of the citizens are involved, x x x. Whether martial law is declared for one day or 60 days, the fact is, when martial law is declared the very basic and fundamental human rights of the citizenry are taken away from them.

It does not matter whether it is one day, one hour, or 60 days.

So, I would like to express my agreement to Commissioner Monsod's amendment because yesterday we already took away the condition of prior concurrence of Congress; and now, Commissioner Monsod agrees that we have to provide a better safeguard by inserting this particular amendment of a joint decision of Congress.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt30j) (Emphasis supplied.) It stands to reason that the President may exercise his extraordinary powers only when the danger to public safety has reached such scale that some restriction of fundamental rights becomes constitutionally permissible, under the circumstances. C Appreciation of scale is evident in the experience of the Court in both martial law cases First. The characterization by the Government of the evidence they presented to justify the proclamation, and later, extension, of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus would show that it admits scale is an element of the public safety requirement.

In the presentation in this case made by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) before the Court, they described the manpower and number of firearms of the rebels/terrorist groups to be of such "magnitude" as to "endanger the public safety" in this wise: The magnitude as well as the presence of rebel groups endanger the public safety.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt31j) | REBEL/TERRORIST GROUPS | MANPOWER | FIREARMS | CONTROLLED BARANGAYS ---|---|---|--- Communist Rebels | 1,748 | 2,123 | 426 Dawlah Islamiyah | 137 | 162 | - BIFF | 388 | 328 | 59 ASG | 508 | 598 | 52 TOTAL | 2,781 | 3,211 | 537 Thereafter, the Government attempted to pack the record with statistics to show that the "magnitude of scope"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt32j) of the threat to public safety was such as to put the security of Mindanao at stake.

To support this conclusion about "magnitude" and "magnitude of scope," they presented specifics as to the number of violent incidents initiated by the different rebel groups,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt33j) the number of victims,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt34j) the amounts received as a result of kidnap-for-ransom activities,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt35j) intensification of recruitment activities,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt36j) and presence of foreign-trained terrorist fighters.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt37j) These, to me, show a clear admission on the part of the Government that the public safety requirement under Section 18, Article VII involves a showing of scale.

Second, the Court, in Lagman v. Medialdea, defined public safety as "involv[ing] the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt38j) Again, this clearly acknowledged scale by using the word "significant"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt39j) to qualify any existing danger, injury/harm or damage to public safety. While it would continue to state that "public safety is an abstract term" whose "range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt40j) the Court, after an analysis of all the evidence presented, nevertheless found that they have reached a level of danger sufficient to risk public safety: Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.

These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared: While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with.

Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt41j) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted.) Significantly, it appears to me that all the other members of the Court, including myself, who voted to sustain the President's proclamation of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ in Mindanao appreciated (whether instinctively or deliberately) to a certain extent the scale to which public safety has been endangered by the situation in Marawi City. Justice Tijam, in his Separate Concurring Opinion for example, also considered essentially the same circumstances to arrive at his conclusion that the President's proclamation was firmly grounded on the requirements of public safety, that is: (1) destruction of government and privately-owned properties; (2) significant number of casualties; (3) government inability to deliver basic services; (3) government inability to send troop reinforcements to restore peace in Marawi City; and (4) lack of easy access for civilians and government personnel to and from the City.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt42j) III Scale as a measure for determining the existence of the public safety requirement; Proposed indicators of scale The ponencia cites an Amicus Curae Brief submitted by esteemed constitutionalist Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt43j) to justify a "permissive approach"

to the President's assessment of the public safety requirement under Section 18, Article VII.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt44j) The portion quoted reads: From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present and iu the future arising from present and past acts.

Such nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility of determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code, whose concern is about past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the purpose of the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt45j) While I am in complete agreement with Father Bernas' statement, I disagree with the conclusion reached by the ponencia on account thereof. First, I believe Father Bernas' statement was given in the context of a discussion regarding the definition of "rebellion"

as it is used in the Constitution. The conclusion of the statement was that while the Revised Penal Code definition may be considered, the President is not bound to assume "the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt46j) It was not meant to define public safety requirements or otherwise proscribe the future provision of guidelines for its determination. Second.

Father Bernas' statement that the determination of the requirements of public safety "involves the verification of factors not as easily measurable"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt47j) is not conceptually incompatible or irreconcilable with the identification of minimum reasonable indicators, "verifiable through the visual or tactile sense,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt48j) through which to determine whether public safety requires the exercise of the President's extraordinary powers. Indeed, when our Framers tasked the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, it ce1iainly did not mean for the Court to verify only the factual bases for the alleged rebellion and "permissively" rely on the President's assessment of the public safety requirement given the facts presented.

For the Court to take such an approach goes against the very reason why it was given the specific mandate under Section 18, Article VII in the first place. Such an approach defeats the deliberate intent of our Framers to "shift [the] focus of judicial review to determinable facts, as opposed to the manner or wisdom of the exercise of the power" and "[create] an objective test to determine whether the President has complied with the constitutionally prescribed conditions."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt49j) In fact, I realize that I have previously articulated some views on public safety which may seem opposed to the views I now embrace.

I initially took the position that since the requirements of public safety appear to be phrased in discretionary terms, it would be difficult to set parameters in a vacuum as to what predicate facts should exist. The facts and experience from this case, however, have opened my eyes to the mischief that a "permissive" approach to the President's "prudential estimation"

of the public safety requirement can cause.

Permissive deference can be used to justify the imposition or extension of martial law by the simple expedient of alleging the existence or persistence of "rebel" groups capable of opposing the Government. I fail to see the difference between sustaining the extension of martial law based on the capability of hostile "rebel"

groups to sow discord against the Government and sustaining martial law on the basis of an imminent danger of rebellion. That would be a movement back to the Lansang formulation, and an abject abdication of this Court's "newly assumed power" to review the declaration, or extension, of martial law based on sufficiency of factual basis.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt50j) Worse, it would open the country to the possibility of a permanent state of martial law, as the Philippines has a long history of rebellions motivated by diverse religious, ideological, regional, and other interests.

That rebellion is a continuing crime is a handle for the prosecution of rebels wherever they may be. This criminal law doctrine, however, was never envisioned to be a justification to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus whenever and wherever a rebel may operate or be found. Our history and the evidence presented in this case and in Lagman v. Medialdea have shown that there are rebellions and rebellions.

Each rebellion is episodic and will have, as shown in the cases of the Maute Group, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the New People's Army (NPA), their ebbs and flows. I believe a proper and principled approach to deciding this and future cases require this Court to identify some reasonable indicators which can be used as guides to determine scale for purposes of the public safety requirement. Certainly, we will not be able to catalogue all indicators with mathematical precision.

Such an endeavor, while difficult, is nevertheless doable using all aids available to us, including interpretative aids and knowledge derived from past experience.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt51j) Surely, in deciding this and future cases, the Court is not limited in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the requirements of public safety to the extremes of an "I know it when I see it" and "the President knows better" analysis.

As I have endeavored to show above, there were incidents which were considered by the ponencia in Lagman v. Medialdea as indicators of the scale of the danger to public safety which may justify a declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. These are: (1) "armed hostilities" directed not o!lly against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties; (2) bomb threats; (3) set up of road blockades and checkpoints by the hostile groups; (4) burning of schools and churches; (5) taking and killing of civilian hostages; (6) targeting of non-Muslims or Christians; (7) forced recruitment of young male Muslims; (8) hampering of the delivery of medical and other basic services; and (9) hindrance to movements of civilians and troop reinforcements.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt52j) Building on the indicators provided in Lagman v. Medialdea, there appears to be two minimum indicators of scale as to reasonably meet the public safety requirement necessary for a declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

These are: (1) the presence of hostile groups engaged in actual and sustained armed hostilities with government forces;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt53j) and (2) these groups have actually taken over, and are holding, territory.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt54j) Following our experience in Marawi, these indicators may further result in, or may be attended by, the interruption in the sending of troop reinforcements or local authorities being prevented, or unable to, perfonn their regular functions,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt55j) including law enforcement and the delivery of basic services. Bomb threats, burning of schools or churches, kidnapping of civilian hostages, and forced recruitment of young male Muslims only fall under the rubric of lawless violence; they do not, by themselves, satisfy the requirements of public safety.

When, as in the Marawi crisis, however, these acts of lawless violence are being committed at or about the same time, and within the same defined territory, they may indicate a significant enough breakdown of general peace and order as to reasonably meet the public safety requirement under Section 18, Article VII. The ponencia argues that "[t]he adoption of the extreme scenario as the measure of threat to public safety as suggested by petitioners is to invite doubt as to whether the proclamation of martial law would be at all effective in such case considering that enemies of the State raise unconventional methods which change over time."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt56j) It posits that to require parameters may result in a situation where the declaration of martial law "would be of no useful purpose and such could not be the intent of the Constitution.

"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt57j) Again, and with respect, I disagree. Our experience in Marawi has proven this to not be the case. At the time, armed hostile groups opposed to the government have already succeeded in overrunning a large part of the city.

They engaged government troops in sustained firefights, forcing many of the city's residents to evacuate their homes and flee to temporary shelters outside the city.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt58j) In the end, however, our military forces were still able to restore peace and order and not without great sacrifice. No "unconventional methods" were alleged to have been resorted to by these hostile groups which were beyond the experience and capacity of our government forces to meet.

The mere possibility that hostile groups may, in the future, be able to devise such unconventional methods is, however, not an acceptable reason to do away with reasonable proof of scale for purposes of the public safety requirement under Section 18, Article VII. The requisite scale of the danger to public safety must be shown in every exercise of the President's extraordinary powers, regardless of the unconventionality of their causing. Finally, that there are laws in place which would rectify possible abuses after the fact also does not justify this "permissive"

approach. The best safeguard is still vigilance on the part of the agencies tasked to check the exercise of the power in the first place. Ensuring that the President has enough flexibility and discretion on when to impose martial law is not sufficient justification for taking on a "permissive"

approach. If at all, the identification of reasonable indicators to determine whether the danger to public safety has reached such scale as to warrant the exercise of the President's extraordinary powers is recognition of the extreme nature of the extraordinary powers and its tremendous effect on civilian lives. IV Conclusion: No sufficient factual basis to show that public safety requires the continued implementation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao The weight of concerns about the continued implementation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao seem to stem from the absence of a categorical statement on the part of the Court on what martial law means under our Constitution.

It cannot mean the assumption by the military, headed by the President, of either judicial or legislative power, at least not in the sense that it was used and abused by the former President Marcos. The 1987 Constitution textually prohibited such results. What then does martial law entail?

Quoting Willoughby, Father Bernas enumerates three types of "martial law:" (I) Military Law Proper, that is, the body of administrative laws created by Congress for the government of the army and navy as an organized force; (2) the principles governing the conduct of military forces in time of war, and in the government of occupied territory; and (3) Martial Law in sensu strictiore, or that law which has application when the military arm does not supersede civil authority but is called upon to aid it in the execution of its civil functions.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt59j) According to Father Bernas, martial law as it is understood in our jurisdiction cannot refer to the first meaning because it "refers to a body of administrative laws which are operative all the time, whereas martial law in the Constitution can be operative only 'in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it."'(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt60j) After differentiating between the second (military government) and third (martial rule) types of martial law, he concludes that martial law under our Constitution is simply martial rule, that is, the military "takes the place of certain governmental agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt61j) It is a "public exigency which may rise in time of war or peace"

and "ceases when the district is sufficiently tranquil to permit the ordinary agencies of government to cope with existing situations."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt62j) Otherwise stated, martial law as allowed under our Constitution, is simply authority for the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an ordinary civil government. It is brought about by necessity,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt63j) an exigency brought about by extreme danger to public safety, that its object is simply the "preservation of the public safety and good order."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt64j) Since necessity calls it forth and defines its scope, it is imperative that the Government sufficiently establish the necessity. There must be proof of the graveness of the exigency confronting the Government as to call for the imposition of martial law.

Without this, the Court is obliged, if not compelled, to strike down its exercise. I have examined the written submissions of the Government and listened closely to the briefing provided by representatives from the AFP on the factual bases behind the continued implementation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. As earlier stated, the Government, through the AFP, sought to prove the "magnitude of scope"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt65j) of the threat to public safety was such as to put the security of Mindanao at stake.

Aside from the data on manpower, arms, and controlled barangays, the following 2017 statistics were also presented: (1) total of 116 BIFF-initiated violent incidents;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt66j) (2) total of 44 ASG-initiated violent incidents;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt67j) (3) total of 53 Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt68j) and (4) total of 422 communist-initiated incidents of rebellion in Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt69j) When tested, however, against the minimum reasonable indicators above proposed, none of the evidence presented were similar to, or at least somewhat approximating, the scale of the situation which obtained in Marawi City during the initial Proclamation.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt70j) There is nothing in the record to show that there are hostile groups engaged in actual and sustained armed hostilities with government forces.

Neither are there allegations, much less, proof of hostile groups actually taking over and holding territory, or otherwise causing a significant breakdown of the general peace and order situation as to prevent local civilian authorities from going about their regular duties. Neither is there evidence presented to support the claimed linkages with foreign terrorist groups. The Islamic State, with its blitzkrieg campaign for the re-founding of an Islamic caliphate, has seen a dramatic decline in its influence in 2017, with its last stronghold, the city of Raqqa, falling into the hands of US-led coalition of Syrian Kurdish and Arab fighters in October of last year.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt71j) And while several Philippine factions of radical Islamic leanings may have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, the APP has not presented evidence that the organization has reciprocated, or that the Islamic State has publicly acknowledged an official wilayat or franchise in the country, or extended logistical, financial, manpower, or armament supp01i to any, some or all of such factions.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt72j) Lest I be misunderstood, I am not discounting or belittling the damage to life, limb, and property caused by the reported continued attacks of the hostile groups.

Granting all of the Government's allegations to be true, however, I do not find these to be sufficient basis to warrant any continued restriction on or suspension of fundamental civil liberties. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, and 236155, and DECLARE INVALID Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Senate and the House of Representatives dated December 13, 2017, for failure to comply with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1j) Hereinafter "Separate Opinion."

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2j) G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, & 231774 July 4, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3j) Separate Opinion, pp. 4-13, 18-23. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4j) Separate Opinion, pp. 13-18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5j) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6j) Office of the Solicitor General Memorandum, pp. 34. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7j) English Oxford Living Dictionaries <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/scale> (last accessed February 6, 2018).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8j) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9j) RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 42 (July 29, 1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10j) RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 43 (July 30, 1986 ). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11j) In re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230, 237-238 (1948).

The Court held reporter Parazo in contempt for his refusal to reveal the sources for his article reporting leakage in the 1948 Bar Examinations. Invoking Republic Act No. 53, which provides that reporters cannot be compelled to reveal their confidential sources unless "such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state," Parazo contended that the phrase "interest of the state"

is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety." Since concerns regarding the alleged leakage do not qualify as national security matters, Parazo argued that he cannot be compelled to reveal the source of his news information.

The Court, however, found that while "security of the state" and "public safety" to be "synonymous phrases"

which involve matters of "national security," the term "interest of the state" referred to a much broader concept which includes "matters of national importance in which the whole state and nation, x x x is interested or would be affected, x x x"

such as protection of the integrity of the bar examinations and maintenance of the high standards for entry into the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12j) Id. at 239-241.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13j) Luque v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22545, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 408, 423. Thus, the Court there upheld the Public Service Commission's imposition of "measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares" by regulating the number of provincial buses and jeepneys allowed to enter Manila.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14j) Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489. The Court refused to sustain a challenge to the Reflector Law which required, for registration purposes, the installation of built-in reflectors and parking lights in vehicles. The Court therein held that "to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening xx x betrays Jack of concern for public safety."

(Emphasis supplied.) See also Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112, February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195, which dealt with a challenge to a rule issued by the Land Transportation Office requiring the procurement and use of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15j) In Uy Matia & Co. v. The City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300, 304 (1953), the Court upheld the local government's power to regulate and impose taxes and fees on copra warehouses on the finding that it is an establishment likely to endanger the public safety and give rise to conflagrations or explosions: "[O]nce ignited, the fire resulting therefrom, because of the oil it contains, is difficult to put under control by water and to extinguish it the use of chemicals would be necessary." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16j) Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, G .R. No. 121920, August 5, 2005, 466 SCRA 78, 87-89, citing Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N.Y. 506.

The Court held a local government unit liable for damages for its failure to "adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property" which resulted to injuries to a motorist.

According to the Court, the Municipality's obligation to constantly monitor road conditions to insure the safety of motorists includes the duty "to see that they are kept in a reasonably safe condition for public travel." (Emphasis supplied.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17j) Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. i58793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318, 349 & 343. The Court did not find unreasonable the regulation which prohibited motorcycles from traversing toll ways.

The Government there argued that the presence of motorcycles in the tollways "will compromise safety and traffic considerations." The Court upheld the Government's position, stating that "[pjublic interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it."

(Emphasis supplied.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18j) Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016, 808 SCRA 53, 57-58. The Court held that the DPWH's act of removing and confiscating billboards and signs which it determined to be "hazardous and pose imminent danger to life, health, safety and property of the general public" serve the overarching interest of public safety.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt19j) leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator v. Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 126, 137. Here, the Court justified the regulations of judicial employees' right to travel thus: "To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if not chaos, in the Judiciary and the society as well. In a situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice, litigants can get disappointed and disheartened.

If their expectations are frustrated, they may take the law into their own hands which results in public disorder undermining public safety. In this limited sense, it can even be considered that the restriction or regulation of a court personnel's right to travel is a concern for public safety, one of the exceptions to the non-impairment of one's constitutional right to travel." (Emphasis supplied.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt20j) Philippine National Railways Corporation v. Vizcara, G .R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 363, 379-380, citing Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 147 and Cusi v. Philippine National Railways, G.R. No. L-29889, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 357.

In finding negligence on the part of the Philippine National Railways in an action for damages for the death and injury of several civilians, the Court expounded on railroad companies' responsibility to secure public safety, that is, to "avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt21j) CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 6. This Section provides: "The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.

Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt22j) G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668; October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 760. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt23j) Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 760, 762.

Here, the Court resolved the issue of whether then President Corazon C.

Aquino gravely abused her discretion when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines posed a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino sought to justify her action "[i]n the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society x x x." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt24j) Manos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668, 719-720.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt25j) Id. at 703, 710-711. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt26j) Id.

at 715. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt27j) Id. at 717.

Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt28j) Id. at 729.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt29j) Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 53 SCRA 448, 471-476. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt30j) RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 44 (July 31, 1986). Here, the Constitutional Commission was debating whether to require a joint or separate vote by the two houses of Congress for purposes of revoking the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Members of the Constitutional Commission considered the effect of such action on civil rights. After a lengthy debate, the amendment to introduce joint voting by both houses of Congress was able to garner the majority of votes (25 in favor, 4 against, and I abstention). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt31j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 75.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt32j) AFP Briefing Paper on the Extension of Martial Law in Mindanao, p. 15. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt33j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide Nos. 19, 26, and 52.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt34j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 62. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt35j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 28. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt36j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 33.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt37j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 39-43. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt38j) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2 at 73. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt39j) The Oxford dictionary defines "significant'' as "Sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy."

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/significant> (last accessed February 6, 2018) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt40j) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt41j) Id. at 65-66.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt42j) Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Tijam, Lagman v. Medialdea, p. 16. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt43j) G.R No. 190293, March 20, 2012, 668 SCRA 504 (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt44j) Ponencia, p.

52. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt45j) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt46j) Dissenting Opinion, J. Velasco, Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra at 594-595.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt47j) Id. at 594.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt48j) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt49j) Separate Opinion, p. 10.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt50j) Separate Opinion, p. 9, citing Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 541.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt51j) The development of the standards for what constitutes obscenity comes to mind. In the 1957 case of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the United States Supreme Court was first confronted with the issue of "whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and press." While it acknowledged that the law on obscenity at the time was not as developed as to clearly/textually show that it was beyond the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the Court nevertheless found "sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and press."

Over the course of several years, and several cases later, the Court would continue to grapple with the "intractable obscenity problem," refining, testing and improving the Roth test until 1973, when it decided Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This experience of the U.S. Supreme Court is, to me, testimony that it is possible to arrive at principled parameters despite the seeming "novelty"

of the issue at hand, by utilizing relevant interpretative aids available. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt52j) Supra note 2 at 65. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt53j) In Marawi City, there was an actual shooting standoff between the military and the hostile elements.

There were also instances of the hostile groups attacking and occupying public and private establishments, such as schools and hospitals adversely affecting the delivery of their respective services. The city was overrun and local police were unable to restore peace and order. See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2 at 5-7.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt54j) Bridge and road blockades by hostile groups. Sustained occupation of government or civilian properties. Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt55j) "Law enforcement and other government agencies x x x face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. x x x [B]ridge and road blockades [were] set up by groups x xx. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the City is likewise hind1ered."

Supra note 2 at 8. citing the Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report to Congress. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt56j) Ponencia, p.

52. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt57j) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt58j) Maxine Betterige-Moes, What happened in Marawi?, October 30, 2017 <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html> (last accessed February 1, 2018).

Given the gravity of the situation, no member of the Court appeared to question the scale of the danger to public safety at the time. In fact, the debates mostly revolved around legal concepts: what is the nature of the action filed under Section 18, what is the scope of the Court's review, what is the proper standard to assess the President's action, and how to define rebellion. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt59j) Bernas, S.J ., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p.

899.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt60j) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt61j) Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 901.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt62j) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt63j) Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Stone in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 335 (1946), citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851); United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871); Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712 (1875); and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt64j) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt65j) AFP Briefing Paper on the Extension of Martial law in Mindanao, p. 15. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt66j) These incidents, broken down, are as follows: 3 ambuscades; I shelling/strafing; 64 firing/attacks upon government troops; 2 shootings; 4 liquidation/sniping; 2 arsons; 32 landmining and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and 8 grenade throwing/explosions.

See AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 19. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt67j) These incidents, broken down, are as follows: 13 kidnappings; 3 JED landmining/explosions; 17 attacks; 3 murders; 2 strafing; I liquidation; I shooting; 1 ambuscade; 1 arson; I firefight; and 1 grenade throwing. See AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 26.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt68j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 37. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt69j) AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 52. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt70j) It must be noted that reference to the Marawi Siege is especially relevant considering that what is at issue here is the extension of a declaration of martial law brought about by said incident.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt71j) BBC News, Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, January 10, 2018 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034> (last accessed on February 6, 2018). The city was the de facto capital of the caliphate the group declared. An intensive aerial bombardment by the US- led coalition helped secure victory in Raqqa for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which was formed in 2015 by the Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG) militia and a number of smaller, Arab factions.

Since early June, coalition planes have carried out almost 4,000 air strikes on the city. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt72j) Patrick B. Johnston and Colin P. Clarke, Is the Philippines the Next Caliphate?, November 28, 2017 <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/11/is-the-philippines-the-next-caliphate.html?> (last accessed February 6, 2018). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [![](https://lawphil.net/images/back.gif)](javascript:history.back$1$) [![](https://lawphil.net/images/top.gif)](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#top) DISSENTING OPINION CAGUIOA,J.: "At first all of it appeared to be idiotic in its impudent assertiveness.

Later on it was looked upon as disturbing, but finally it was believed."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1c2) Shorn of its legal niceties, martial law is an emergency governance response involving the imposition of military jurisdiction over civilian population, designed to complement the emergency armed force response to an actual armed uprising. Force is met with force.

The might of the military is summoned and flexed to prevent the dismemberment of the Republic caused by an actual rebellion or invasion, with martial law suspending certain civil liberties to facilitate the armed response. But, when the rebellion is quelled, or the invasion is repelled, the normal state of affairs must return. The declaration and extension of martial law in the absence of the exigencies justifying the same reduces such extraordinary power to a mere tool of convenience and expediency.

Thus, the baseless imposition of martial law constitutes, in itself, a violation of substantive and procedural due process, as it effectively bypasses, if not renders totally nugatory, the conditions and limitations explicitly spelled out in the Constitution for the protection of individual citizens. This violation merits consideration in the resolution of this Petition, for it stands independent of the acts of abuse that may be, or have been perpetrated in furtherance thereof. In these consolidated petitions, the Court reviews anew the sufficiency of the factual basis of the extension of martial law for one year in the entire Mindanao.

The power to extend is subject to constitutional conditions. Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution contains the standards with which all three coordinate branches of government must comply in relation to the declaration or extension of martial law, and its review. It enshrines the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) - (i) the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; (ii) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (iii) the power to proclaim martial law.

In Lagman v. Medialdea(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2c2) (Lagman) the Court characterized these powers as graduated in nature, such that each may only be resorted to under specified conditions. As for the declaration of martial law, the relevant portion reads: In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3c2) The Court, in Lagman, stated that Section 18, Article VII sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4c2) and thereupon proceeded with the analysis consistent with those standards.

Lagman also instructs that the President is given the prerogative to determine which extraordinary power to wield in a given set of circumstances, provided, however, that the conditions required by the Constitution for the use of these extraordinary powers exist, for while the exercise of the calling-out power is primarily left to the President's discretion,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5c2) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ and declare martial law are not. As for the extension by the Congress of the declaration of martial law, the same first paragraph of Section 18 provides: Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

Staying faithful to the above text and consistent with Lagman, the parameters of determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the extension requires the Court to examine whether (1) the invasion or rebellion persists, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power. Several points become instantly clear from a plain reading of the above text: (1) the invasion or rebellion furnishing the first requirement for the extension indubitably refers to the invasion or rebellion that triggered the declaration sought to be extended, and (2) the requirement of public safety must require the extension. The mere fact of a persisting rebellion or existence of rebels, standing alone, cannot be basis for the extension.

The Court's power and duty to review under Section 18 contemplates the determination of the existence of the conditions upon which the President's extraordinary powers may be exercised. In the context of an extension of a prior proclamation or suspension, the Court's duty thus equates to the determination of whether the factual basis therefor, then "sufficient, truthful, accurate, or at the very least, credible,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6c2) persists. The Executive and Legislative Departments bear the burden of proof to show sufficient factual basis.

The question of burden of proof in the review of the declaration of martial law has been settled in Lagman - the Executive bears the burden of proof. For the same reasons I stated in my Dissent in that case, given the nature of a Section 18 proceeding as a neutral fact-checking mechanism, the Executive and Legislative departments continually bear the burden of proving sufficient factual basis for the extension. The Court has recognized that martial law poses a severe threat to civil liberties;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7c2) fittingly, a review of its declaration or extension must require proof.

Even the less stringent review in Lansang v. Garcia(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8c2) required that minimum. Consequently - and I reiterate to the point of being tedious - the presumptions of constitutionality or regularity do not apply to the Executive and Legislative departments in a Section 18 proceeding. These presumptions cannot operate to require the petitioners to prove a lack or insufficiency of factual basis or to produce countervailing evidence because this amounts to an undue shifting of the burden of proof absent in the language of the provision, and clearly was not the intendment of the framers.

As well, while the Executive and Legislative departments cannot be compelled to produce evidence to prove the sufficiency of factual basis, these presumptions cannot operate to gain judicial approbation in the face of the refusal to adduce evidence, or presentation of insufficient evidence. For otherwise, the ruling that fixes the burden of proof upon the Executive and Legislative departments becomes illusory, and logically inconsistent: the Court cannot rule on the one hand that respondents in a Section 18 proceeding bear the burden of proof, and then on the other, rule that the presumptions of constitutionality and regularity apply. In short, the Court cannot say that the respondents must present evidence showing sufficient factual basis, but if they do not or cannot, the Court will presume that sufficient factual basis exists.

To insist otherwise is to argue the absurd. Indeed, if the Court needs to rely upon presumptions during a Section 18 review, then it only goes to show that the Executive and Legislative departments failed to show sufficient factual basis for the declaration or extension. Attempts at validation on this ground is equivalent to the Court excusing the political departments from complying with the positive requirement of Section 18.

The requirements for the extension of Proclamation 216 have not been met. Again, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis are now well-settled. As stated in Lagman, they are: (i) the existence of an actual rebellion or invasion; and (ii) that public safety necessitates such declaration or suspension.

I find that the extension fails the test of sufficiency of factual basis, as both these requirements do not exist to justify the extension. The existence of an actual rebellion was not established with sufficient evidence. A valid declaration of martial law presupposes the existence of rebellion as a matter of fact and law.

As defined in the Revised Penal Code (RPC),(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9c2) the following elements are necessary for the crime of rebellion to exist: First, that there be (a) a public uprising and (b) taking arms against the government; and Second, that the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to said government or its laws (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or (ii) any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. Simplified, the elements of rebellion are reducible to (i) an overt act of armed public uprising and (ii) a specific purpose. Both elements must concur and be proved independently of each other, as explained by the Court in People v. Lovedioro(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10c2) : From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven.

Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crimes. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11c2) Based on the foregoing standards, the point of inquiry therefore is whether the Congress had sufficient factual basis to conclude that rebellion persists - that the concurrence of the elements of rebellion obtaining during the time of the declaration still exists - thus justifying the extension of the proclamation of martial law.

Necessarily, the relevant window of time to be considered is shortly before the Congress' receipt of the President's Letter dated December 8, 2017. i. The element of an armed public uprising no longer exists My dissent is largely premised on a simple fact: there is no more armed public uprising - thus, it cannot be said that the rebellion necessitating the declaration persists.

In this regard, a review of the key evidence is in order. a. Letter dated December 8, 2017 (Subject Letter) and Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017 (Joint Resolution) In the Subject Letter that eventually formed the basis of the Joint Resolution, the narration of facts palpably demonstrates that the armed public uprising which necessitated the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 had already been subdued by government forces: I am pleased to inform the Congress that during the Martial Law period as extended in Mindanao, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has achieved remarkable progress in putting the rebellion under control.

General Rey Leonardo Guerrero, AFP Chief of Staff and Martial Law Implementor, has reported that a total of nine hundred twenty (920) DAESH-inspired fighters, including their known leaders, have been neutralized.

Clearing of the main battle area in Marawi City was fast-tracked, with at least one hundred thirty-nine (139) terrorists arrested, of which sixty-one (61) have been criminally charged. All these hastened the liberation of Marawi City on 17 October 2017, and paved the way for the initiation of efforts for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the city. On 04 December 2017 I received a letter from Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, as Martial Law Administrator, stating that "based on current security assessment made by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the undersigned recommends the extension of Martial Law for another twelve (12) months or one (1) year beginning January 1, 2018 until December 31, 2018 covering the whole island of Mindanao primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul lslamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other likeminded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters, and financiers x x x."

A copy of Secretary Lorenzana's letter (together with a copy of the letter of AFP Chief Guerrero) is attached for your convenient reference. The security assessment submitted by the AFP, supported by a similar assessment by the Philippine National Police (PNP), highlights certain essential facts that I, as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, have personal knowledge of First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their Groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion. You will please note that at least one hundred eighty-five (185) persons listed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at-large and, in all probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating their forces.

More specifically, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with their protectors, supporters and sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards radicalization/recruitment, financial and logistical build-up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan. These activities are geared towards the conduct of intensified atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in the whole of Southeast Asia. Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area.

Turaifie is said to be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. For this year, the BIFF has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassments and roadside bombings against government troops.

Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied with addressing the challenges posed by the DAESH-inspired DIWM and other Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NPA) took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12c2) (Emphasis supplied) Based on the contents of the Subject Letter, its plain import is that: (i) the rebellion that spawned Proclamation No. 216 is already "under control" as over 1,000 DAESH-inspired fighters have either been killed in combat or arrested; (ii) Marawi has been liberated; (iii) reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi is already underway; and (iv) the rebel groups have not yet been "totally eradicated"

as there are still "remnants" remaining. These claims are made in the face of statements made a month or two prior to this request for extension by key military and government officials in the media that Marawi has been liberated;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13c2) that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) attacks had no connection to the Marawi siege;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14c2) and that military operations have ceased because there are no longer militants in Marawi, and the remaining stragglers no longer affect the security in the area.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15c2) Interestingly, statements of military and government officials only took a turn and became consistent with the claims made in the Subject Letter at the start of 2018, after the filing of the consolidated petitions for review.

Now there are warnings of a repeat of the siege,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt16c2) and of a "continuing rebellion".(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17c2) Significantly, there is nothing in the Subject Letter that would show that the said rebellion has maintained or intensified in strength. On the contrary, the phrases "rebuild[ing] their organization," "presently regrouping and consolidating their forces,"

"radicalization/recruitment," "financial and logistical build-up," all connote that the armed public uprising had been quashed and that the rebel groups were recuperating or, at most, reduced to engaging in preparatory acts toward some unspecified end.

As if removing all doubt, the Subject Letter is couched in the future tense as it states that the activities of the DAESH-inspired fighters "are geared towards the conduct of x x x armed public uprisings" and that the Turaifie Group is "planning to conduct bombings." To state the obvious, to say that a rebel group is engaged in activities geared towards the conduct of an armed public uprising is to say that no armed public uprising is, as of yet, existing.

As well, to claim, as the respondents do, that the commission of acts preparatory to an armed public uprising a priori constitutes an actual rebellion is an argument in a circle. It is illogical and completely fails to persuade. While it is true that rebellion is characterized as a "continuing offense,"

which constitutes a series of repeated acts,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt18c2) it is equally true that these overt acts must be anchored on a common ideological base(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt19c2) and committed in furtherance thereof.

In the context of a martial law extension, this unity in purpose must be clearly ascertainable from the acts in question. Stated differently, there must be a clear showing that the acts cited as basis for the extension are in fact done in furtherance of the rebellion subject of the initial proclamation. Again, I echo the warning of Justice Feliciano in Lacson v. Perez(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt20c2) on this point: My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes,"

which has its own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer.

The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal detention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved.

Note, for instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association[.]"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt21c2) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Justice Feliciano's observations find particular relevance in this Petition, for unlike in Lagman where an armed public uprising was shown to have taken place in Marawi City, no such circumstance has been shown to persist in Marawi City or any part of Mindanao. As I had stated in my Dissent in Lagman, the concept of rebellion as a continuing crime does not thereby extend the existence of actual rebellion wherever these offenders may be found, or automatically extend the public necessity for martial law based only on their presence in a certain locality.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt22c2) The requirement of actual rebellion serves to localize the scope of martial law to cover only the areas of armed public uprising.

Necessarily, martial law is confined to the place where there is actual rebellion, meaning, concurrence of the normative act of armed public uprising and the specific purpose. Nevertheless, in the Joint Resolution, the Congress resolved to extend the proclamation of martial law over the entire Mindanao for the second time, based essentially on the same set of facts set forth in the Subject Letter. Thus: WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but nevertheless reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule; xx xx WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session, by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its Members, has determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety indubitably requires the further extension of the Proclamation of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao; x x x(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt23c2) (Emphasis supplied) It is not unusual - as it is, in fact, expected - that a defeated army will have its own share of survivors.

Our own colonial history bears witness to this fact. Hence, that some enemy fighters remain alive does not mean that a battle has not been won. In this case, to require first the "total eradication"

of rebel groups before a rebellion can be considered quelled goes against plain logic and human experience. Meaning to say, the rebels' survival and the concomitant perpetuation of their ideology do not ipso facto mean that there is still an armed public uprising. And where there is no more armed public uprising, there can be no rebellion persisting as contemplated in the Constitution.

Respondents attempt to cover up this gaping hole by extending, through some legal fiction, the rebellion subject of Lagman to the present case. Using the Court's declaration in Lagman that actual rebellion existed in Mindanao, respondents claim that the issue of whether rebellion still exists should have already been "laid to rest."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt24c2) In effect, respondents are telling the Court that the armed public uprising then existing during the first declaration of martial law on May 23, 2017 still persists, purportedly on the basis of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. This is egregious error.

As pointedly discussed in the ponencia, with which I fully agree, the issue in the earlier Lagman case refers to the existence of a state of rebellion that would call for the President's initial declaration of martial law, while in this case, the issue refers to the persistence of the same rebellion that would justify the extension of martial law by the Congress. Moreover, given the nature of an armed public uprising, it follows that the Court's judgment on the sufficiency of factual basis for the declaration of martial law is transitory(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt25c2) and relevant only to the state of affairs during that specific period in time. b.

Presentation of Respondents during the Oral Arguments held on January 17, 2018 Among the data presented by respondents are lists of violent incidents in Mindanao. It must be stressed, however, that most of the data presented are irrelevant for the simple reason that most of the attacks listed occurred during periods irrelevant to the controversy at hand.

Evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant to the fact in issue, that is, it must have a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt26c2) Again, the relevant window of time to be considered is shortly before the Congress' receipt of the President's letter dated December 8, 2017. Thus, events that took place: (i) prior to the declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7 being the set of facts that the President considered when he issued Proclamation No. 216; and (ii) the intervening period from May 23, 2017 to July 18, 2017, which is when the President requested a first extension from Congress and which in turn is the supposed set of facts that Congress considered when it extended Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017 are irrelevant for the purpose of showing that rebellion persists from the time martial law was first declared and extended.

Synthesizing the data, therefore, from the time Marawi was declared liberated on October 17, 2017, only seven (7) BIFF-initiated violent incidents were reported, all occurring within the Province of Maguindanao. The same can be said of the "Abu Sayyaf Rebel Group List of Violent Activities," which reported all incidents beginning January 6, 2017 until December 24, 2017.

Only five (5) ASG-related incidents were reported between October 17, 2017 (when Marawi was liberated) until December 13, 2017. To my mind, what stands out from the foregoing data is the apparent pattern of violence in Mindanao even before the "Marawi Siege." This glaring fact, in effect, dilutes respondents' claim that the incidents of violence following the declaration of martial law was in pursuance of the actual rebellion in Lagman.

Hence, without more, respondents' evidence remains ambiguous, to say the least. Meanwhile, without delving into specifics, respondents also introduced a list of pending criminal cases for rebellion. However, a cursory reading of the list would reveal that the most recent development was the issuance of a Resolution dated July 27, 2017, or almost three (3) months before Marawi's liberation, finding probable cause to indict several respondents for the crime of rebellion.

Clearly, this specie of evidence is irrelevant in the Congress' determination of whether there is sufficient factual basis to extend martial law from beyond its first extension of until December 31, 2017. In the same vein, the list of "Arrested Personalities" provided by respondents is likewise of no consequence.

As clearly stated in its heading, the said list only covers arrests "as of 23 October 2017," or a few days after Marawi's liberation, a date that is too far removed from the Congress' deliberation leading to the Joint Resolution. All things considered, I am fully convinced that respondents have failed to establish the persistence of an actual rebellion as a constitutional requirement for the extension of martial law.

While they argue that the rebellion in Lagman was still persisting at the time the Joint Resolution was issued, the evidence and their own admissions say otherwise - that is - that the armed public uprising has already ceased. Respondents can no longer resurrect what the law considers dead. ii.

The specific purpose Following Lovedioro,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt27c2) it must be proved that the armed public uprising was for any of the purposes enumerated in Article 134 of the RPC. Specific purpose is akin to intent, the existence of which, being a state of the mind, is proven by overt acts of the accused.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt28c2) Proceeding from the above discussion, the data in the presentation of respondents during the Oral Arguments held on January 17, 2018 failed to take into account the purpose for such violent incidents.

By merely listing attacks made by certain armed groups, respondents cannot summarily conclude that the same are geared towards the accomplishment of the purposes of rebellion under the RPC. Absent any more data indicating purpose, the Court cannot, without violating the standards of the Constitution, rely on surmises and hasty conclusions. To illustrate, the incidents are described as "IED attack,"

"attack," "grenade explosion," "kidnapping,"

"harassment," which are all highly generic terms, making it impossible to determine intent. Even the targets of these attacks were not supplied.

At most, only the data with respect to the pending criminal cases are competent to prove intent as there was already a finding of probable cause for the crime of rebellion. However, as already discussed above, the said information is inconsequential and could not have been used by Congress to determine the necessity of extending martial law. Another point.

The ponencia cites as basis for its conclusion that the rebellion persists is the reported increase in manpower of the "remnants" of the rebel groups. I submit, however, that respondents were unable to prove the component of specific purpose due to their own admissions to the contrary.

As quoted at length in the ponencia: After the successful Marawi Operation, the Basilan-based ASG is left with 74 members; the Maute Group with 30 members; the Maguid Group has 11; and the Turaifie Group has 22 members with a total of 166 firearms. However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the same strength that initially stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and decentralized recruitment of the Daesh-inspired groups at their respective areas of concentration. ASG Basilan-based recruited more or less 43 new members in Basilan; more or less 250 by the Maute Group in the Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid Group in Sarangani and Sultan Kudarat, and more or less 70 by the Turaifie Group in Maguindanao.

These newly recruited personalities were motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities; revenge for their killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; financial gain as new recruits were given an amount ranging from PhP15,000.00 to 50,000.00; and, as radicalized converts. These newly recruited members are undergoing trainings in tactics, marksmanships and bombing operations at the different areas of Mount Cararao Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high potentials [sic] were given instruction on !ED-making and urban operations.

Furthermore, the situation has become complicated with the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), capitalizing on the porous maritime boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and business men. As of this period, 48 FTFs were monitored joining the Daes-hinspired groups, particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and Turaifie Group in Central Mindanao. The closeness of these two groups is On Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents, these have increased to 100% for the 2nd Semester.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt29c2) (Emphasis supplied) As admitted by respondents themselves, the motivations of (i) clannish culture, (ii) revenge for their killed relatives, and (iii) financial gain, are not among the purposes contemplated in the RPC, which are, to repeat: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said government or its laws (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or (ii) any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

I also submit that the reliance of the ponencia on the atrocities committed by the New People's Army (NPA) in extending martial law stands on shaky ground. The Subject Letter reads in part: Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied with addressing the challenges posed by the DAESH-inspired DIWM and other Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NP A) took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule. This year, the NP A has perpetrated a total of at least three hundred eight-five (385) atrocities (both terrorism and guerilla warfare) in Mindanao, which resulted in forty-one ( 41) Killed-in-Action (KIA) and sixty-two (62) Wounded-in-Action (WIA) on the part of government forces.

On the part of the civilians, these atrocities resulted in the killing of twenty-three (23) and the wounding of six (6) persons. The most recent was the ambush in Talakag, Bukidnon on 09 November 2017, resulting in the killing of one (1) PNP personnel and the wounding of three (3) others, as well as the killing of a four (4)-month-old infant and the wounding of two (2) civilians. Apart from these, at least fifty-nine (59) arson incidents have been carried out by the NP A in Mindanao this year, targeting businesses and private establishments and destroying an estimated P2.2 billionworth of properties.

Of these, the most significant were the attack on Lapanday Food Corporation in Davao City on 09 April 2017 and the burning of facilities and equipment of Mil-Oro Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental on 06 May 2017, which resulted in the destruction of properties valued at ₱l.85 billion and ₱109 million, respectively. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution cannot be any clearer: the Congress may extend the President's proclamation of martial law if the same rebellion necessitating such proclamation shall persist. However, despite the express parameters of Section 18, the ponencia finds no error in the inclusion of the NPA in the Subject Letter as basis for the extension.

Indeed, it is incredible how a "decades-long rebellion" can be used as basis for extending Martial Law triggered by a rebellion that took place only months ago, especially considering that both movements were mounted by different groups inspired by distinct ideologies. If there is indeed an actual rebellion by the NP A as contemplated in Section 18, it must be covered by a new declaration.

In this scenario espoused by the ponencia, violent attacks by different armed groups could easily form the basis of an endless chain of extensions, so long as there are "overlaps" in the attacks. To this end, the ponencia is accommodating practical concerns over the clear mandate of the country's fundamental law.

This precedent dangerously supports the theoretical possibility of perpetual martial law. This precedent dangerously suggests a perpetual violation of people's Constitutional rights. As well, to anchor the Court's review to the fallback position that the "government can lift the state of martial law once actual rebellion no longer persists and that public safety is amply secured"

is to abdicate the duty of the Court to determine for itself the sufficiency of factual basis for the extension. Likewise, following the discussion above, the factual narration in the Subject Letter presented is highly ambiguous, if not amorphous. First, the timeline of the violent incidents is unclear as the information merely reflects the total number of the atrocities for "this year,"

which is the entire 201 7.

Again, these figures do not present an accurate picture because they include incidents already relied upon for the initial declaration and the first extension, and for that reason, are far-removed from the question of persistence of rebellion when Congress was deliberating on the second extension of martial law. Second, some details in the Subject Letter strongly negate rebellion as the attacks were described as "terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities," and "arson incidents x x x targeting businesses and private establishments."

Needless to state, terrorist acts and destruction of property, no matter how grave, are for entirely different ends than that of rebellion under Article 134. In fact, these and analogous factual bases have been relied upon by the Executive when it called out the armed forces in Proclamation No. 55, s. 2016,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt30c2) without any showing that there was an escalation of violence that necessitated the extension.

Third, the claim of "intensified" rebellion of the NP A is vague in light of the "decades-long rebellion" already existing.

Considering the known fact of protracted violence in different areas of Mindanao, the Subject Letter provides no standard by which Congress, and consequently, this Court, could determine whether indeed there is a considerable rise in violent incidents that make martial law a necessity. Without such standard, Congress will be left to guesswork and blind adherence to the word of the President. All told, weighing the totality of evidence adduced by respondents, I find that there is insufficient factual basis to justify an extension of martial law.

iii. The evidence suggests a mere threat of rebellion The foregoing discussion does not mean, however, that I am turning a blind eye to the situation in Mindanao. The facts, as they stand, while falling short of establishing an existing rebellion, indicate a threat thereof.

However, under the framework of our present Constitution, it is only in cases of an actual rebellion or insurrection that the President may, when public safety requires it, place the Philippines or any part thereof, under martial law. The threat of a rebellion, no matter how imminent, cannot be a ground to declare martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt31c2) The intent of the framers of the Constitution to limit the President's otherwise plenary power only to cases of actual rebellion is discernible from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, as cited by the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt32c2) : MR. NATIVIDAD.

First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the majority of the Members of Congress because the provision says "in case of actual invasion or rebellion." If there is Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension. And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time.

So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt33c2) xx xx MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion.

And in previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse.

It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates.

Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt34c2) xx xx MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion.

Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?

MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135.

x x x(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt35c2) Meanwhile, in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt36c2) the Court cited the following exchange: FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference.

I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xx xx FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: "The President ...

may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger. MR.

DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt37c2) xx xx MR.

CONCEPCION. The elimination of the phrase "IN CASE OF IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" is due to the fact that the President may call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

That dispenses with the need of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law in the event of imminent danger. And President Quezon, when the 1935 Constitution was in the process of being drafted, claimed that he should not be denied a right given to the American Governor General as if he were less than the American Governor General. But he overlooked the fact that under the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill of 1902, we were colonies of the United States, so the Governor General was given an authority, on behalf of the sovereign, over the territory under the sovereignty of the United States.

Now, there is no more reason for the inclusion of the phrase "OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" in connection with the writ of habeas corpus. As a matter of fact, the very Constitution of the United States does not mention "imminent danger."

In lieu of that, there is a provision on the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief to call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress rebellion or invasion and, therefore, "imminent danger" is already included there.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt38c2) (Emphasis supplied) The demonstrable capacity to launch a rebellion, absent an overt act in pursuance thereof, is not actual rebellion. As well, it is only if the actual rebellion or insurrection persists that the declaration of martial law may be extended.

The evidence presented by the respondents do not sufficiently prove the existence or persistence of an actual rebellion. It is in this light that I register my dissent to the finding of sufficiency of factual basis as to the first requirement. There is no evidence to show that the requirements of public safety necessitate the continued implementation of Proclamation No. 216 in any part of Mindanao.

Even assuming that the evidence presented by the respondents constitute sufficient proof of the existence of rebellion, I emphasize, as I did in my Dissent in Lagman,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt39c2) that the existence of actual rebellion does not, on its own, justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ if there is no showing that it is necessary to ensure public safety.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt40c2) To pretend that the analysis of the question before the Court turns only upon the fact of the existence of the Maute group, the NP A, the BIFF, Islamic fundamentalists and other armed groups that are on the loose, and their on-going plans to regroup and perceived capacity to sow terror upon our people in the future, is to deceive. As early as Lansang, the Court already recognized that the magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of the privilege - in this case, in the extension of the declaration of martial law - namely, that it be required by public safety.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt41c2) On this score, I maintain that the President's exercise of extraordinary powers must be measured against the scale of necessity and calibrated accordingly.

The Court's determination of insufficiency of factual basis carries with it the necessary implication that the conditions for the use of such extraordinary power do not exist. In making such a finding, the Court does not thereby assume to do the calibration in the President's stead, but only checks the said calibration in hindsight, as Section 18 empowers and mandates the Court to do. As correctly observed by petitioner Rosales, necessity, in the context of martial law, is dictated not merely by the gravity of the rebellion sought to be quelled, but also the necessity of martial law to address the exigencies of a given situation.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt42c2) The Constitutional deliberations elucidate: MR.

DE LOS REYES. But is not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law more of the preparatory steps before the President should call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief? In other words, before calling the Armed Forces of the Philippines should he not take the preparatory step of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or imposing martial law?

MR. REGALADO. As a matter of fact, the former President outlined the steps and we have put them here as follows: (1) When it is only imminent danger, although, of course, he did not use that term, he can already call out the Armed Forces just to prevent or suppress violence; (2) if the situation has worsened and there is a need for stronger measures, then aside from merely calling out the Armed Forces he goes into the suspension of the privilege of the writ; (3) but if both measures calling out the Armed Forces and the suspension of the privilege of the writ still prove unavailing in the face of developments and exacerbated situation, this time he goes to the ultimate which would be martial law.

MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion.

Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?

x x x Commissioner Bernas would like to add something. FR. BERNAS.

Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion. Even if we will suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an actual rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ because the Constitution further says: "when the public safety requires it." So, even if there is a rebellion but the rebellion can be handled and public safety can be protected without imposing martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ, the President need not.

Therefore, even if we consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was something which did not call for imposition of martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt43c2) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Lagman instructs that "necessity" should be understood as a standard that proceeds from the traditional concept of martial law under American Jurisprudence, that is, martial law in a theater of war.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt44c2) In turn, the conditions existing in a theater of war were clearly identified during the Constitutional deliberations, thus: MR. FOZ: xxx May I go to the next question?

This is about the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on page 7, on the second to the last paragraph of Section 15. Is it possible to delete the clause "where civil courts are able to function"? In the earlier portion of the same sentence, it says, "nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts ...

"I was just thinking that if this provision states the effects of the declaration of martial law - one of which is that it does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts - I cannot see how civil courts would be unable to function even in a state of martial law. xx xx FR. BERNAS.

This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area.

But in the general area where the civil courts are opened then in no case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function. MR.

FOZ.

It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical area. FR. BERNAS.

That is correct.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt45c2) (Emphasis supplied.) During the Oral Arguments, Commissioner Monsod further clarified the concept of necessity as a fixed standard, thus: CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: xx x Assuming there's rebellion or invasion done. The second part how do we interpret when the public safety requires it? Requires it means public safety requires the imposition of martial law, i.e.

[martial law] is necessary? xx xx CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: I'm just about the logical nexus. xx xx CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: Meaning it is not [that] rebellion always demands, always threatens public safety.

Because in the example given by Justice Carpio, if only two people rebel how can public safety be endangered. So there can be rebellion without [the] public [being] endangered. So the proper breeding of the second requirement is not that rebellion, rebellion is not required to be present (sic).

It must always be present but (sic) that public safety requires the imposition of martial law. In other words, you will still go back to the idea of the need to calibrate the powers sought to be exercised by the President. xx xx CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: xx x I was thinking that the proper interpretation is that rebellion is there, and therefore, public safety requires the imposition of martial law, rather the public safety requires the imposition of martial law in a situation where in the first place rebellion or invasion has been already established.

You get me? In other words, the calibration of the power is defined by the need to protect the public. xx xx CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: xx x May I request Commissioner Monsod please?

Chairman, can you tell me whether the better interpretation is that public safety requires it, public safety requires the imposition of martial law to address the rebellion or the invasion? ATTY. MONSOD: Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: Is that the correct interpretation? ATTY. MONSOD: Yes.

It's part, there has to be [a] condition of public safety requires it. Now, that includes, in other words, the citizens are exposed to all the dangers to their health or safety or security. It even includes the absence of social services.

It includes the police protection is no longer there, the military steps in. And that's the situation that is contemplated. It is a lack of government services whether protection of the police help (sic) and so on of the citizens and criminality and all that.

That's when the military comes in. xx xx ATTY. MONSOD: That's the standard.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: [Whenever you] talk about necessity, you always must x x x must always have a calibration exercise. ATTY. MONSOD: Yes.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: Because you are already talking of necessity, and of course, you measure. ATTY. MONSOD: Yes.

xx xx CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: So, the quote in the doctrine, well in the part of the decision, quoting [E]x-parte [M]illigan, "is the martial law where the military has jurisdiction in a theater of war." ATTY. MONSOD: Yes.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: You still believe that still has a bit of relevance in the matter of necessity. ATTY. MONSOD: Yes.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: In other words, that [E]x-parte [M]illigan quotation was basically a definition of the necessity for the military presence and in fact, jurisdiction. ATTY. MONSOD: Yes, still necessity.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt46c2) The rationale behind the lofty standard of "necessity"

is clear - the President is already equipped with sufficient powers to suppress acts of lawless violence, and even actual rebellion or invasion in a theater of war, through calling out the AFP to prevent or suppress such lawless violence.

The necessity of martial law therefore requires a showing that it is necessary for the military to perform civilian governmental functions or acquire jurisdiction over civilians to ensure public safety. This is consistent with my vote in Lagman wherein I found the existence of an actual rebellion but found that the requirement of public safety only necessitated the imposition of martial law over the areas of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu, as areas intimately or inextricably connected to the armed uprising then existing in Marawi City. Hence, I find as completely unfounded the assertion that the lifting of Proclamation No. 216 will render the Executive unable to meet the current situation in Mindanao.

As confirmed by Commissioner Bernas: FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: "The President ...

may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger. MR.

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt47c2) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The ponencia finds that the submissions of the respondents show that the continued implementation of martial law in Mindanao is necessary to protect public safety.

As basis, the ponencia cites the following events and circumstances disclosed by the President and AFP: (a) No less than 185 persons in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large. Remnants of the Hapilon and Maute groups have been monitored by the AFP to be reorganizing and consolidating their forces in Central Mindanao, particularly in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan, and strengthening their financial and logistical capability. (b) After the military operation in Marawi City, the Basilan-based ASG, the Maute Group, the Maguid Group and the Turaifie Group, comprising the DAESH-affiliate Dawlah Islamiyah that was responsible for the Marawi siege, was left with 13 7 members and a total of 166 firearms.

These rebels, however, were able to recruit 400 new members, more or less, in Basilan, the Lanao Provinces, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao. (c) The new recruits have since been trained in marksmanship, bombing and tactics in different areas in Lanao del Sur. Recruits with great potential are trained in producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and urban operations.

These new members are motivated by their clannish culture, being relatives of terrorists, by revenge for relatives who perished in the Marawi operations, by money as they are paid ₱15,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, and by radical ideology. (d) 48 FTFs have joined said rebel groups and are acting as instructors to the recruits. Foreign terrorists from Southeast Asian countries, particularly from Indonesia and Malaysia, will continue to take advantage of the porous borders of the Philippines and enter the country illegally to join the remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebel groups.

(e) In November 2017, 15 Indonesian and Malaysian DAESH-inspired FTFs entered Southern Philippines to augment the remnants of the Maguid group in Sarangani province. In December 2017, 16 Indonesian DAESH-inspired FTFs entered the Southern Philippines to augment the ASG-Basilan and Maute groups in the Lanao province. In January 2018, an unidentified Egyptian DAESH figure was monitored in the Philippines.

(t) At least 32 FTFs were killed in the Marawi operations.

Other FTFs attempted to enter the main battle area in Marawi, but failed because of checkpoints set up by government forces. (g) "The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and their allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi City." There were actually anned encounters with the remnants of said groups.

(h) "Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and Cotabato." (i) The Turaifie group conducts roadside bombings and attacks against government forces, civilians and populated areas in Mindanao. The group plans to set off bombings in Cotabato.

(j) The Maute Group, along with foreign terrorists, were reported to be planning to bomb the cities of Zamboanga, Iligan, Cagayan de Oro and Davao. (k) The remaining members of the ASG-Basilan have initiated five violent attacks that killed two civilians. (1) In 2017, the remnants of the ASG in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga Peninsula, conducted 43 acts of violence, including IED attacks and kidnapping which resulted in the killing of eight innocent civilians, three of whom were mercilessly beheaded.

Nine kidnap victims are still held in captivity. (m) Hapilon's death fast-tracked the unification of the Sulu and Basilan-based ASG to achieve their common goal of establishing a DAESH-ISIS wilayat in Mindanao. This likely merger may spawn retaliatory attacks such as IED bombings, in urban areas, particularly in the cities of Zamboanga, Isabela and Lamitan.

(n) By AFP's assessment, the ISIS' regional leadership may remain in the Southern Philippines and with the defeat of ISIS in many parts of Syria and Iraq, some hardened fighters from the ASEAN may return to this region to continue their fight. The AFP also identified four potential leaders who may replace Hapilon as emir or leader of the ISIS forces in the Philippines. It warned that the Dawlah Islamiyah will attempt to replicate the Marawi siege in other cities of Mindanao and may conduct terrorist attacks in Metro Manila and Davao City as the seat of power of the Philippine Government.

The country had been witness to these groups' capacity and resolve to engage in combat with the government forces, resulting in severe casualties among both soldiers and civilians, the displacement of thousands of Marawi residents, and considerable damage to their City. In a short period after the Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have managed to increase their number by 400, almost the same strength as the group that initially stormed Marawi. Their current number is now more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which had taken the AFP five months to neutralize.

To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these rebel groups before We consider them a significant threat to public safety is neither sound nor prudent. (o) Furthermore, in 2017 alone, the BIFF initiated 116 hostile acts in North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao, consisting of ambuscade, firing, arson, IED attacks and grenade explosions.

66 of these violent incidents were committed during the martial law period and by the AFP's assessment, the group will continue to inflict violence and sow terror in central Mindanao. (p) In 2017, the ASG, which is the predominant local terrorist group in the Southern Philippines based in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga, with its 519 members, 503 firearms, 66 controlled barangays and 345 watch-listed personalities, had perpetrated a total of 13 acts of kidnapping against 37 individuals, 11 of whom (including 7 foreigners) remain in captivity. Their kidnap-for-ransom activities for last year alone have amassed a total of ₱61.2 million.

(q) Mindanao remains the hotbed of communist rebellion considering that 47% of its manpower, 48% of its firearms, 51 % of its controlled barangays and 45% of its guerilla fronts are in this region. Of the 14 provinces with active communist insurgency, 10 are in Mindanao. Furthermore, the communist rebels' Komisyon Mindanao (KOMMID) is now capable of sending augmentation forces, particularly "Party Cadres,"

in Northern Luzon. (r) The hostilities initiated by the communist rebels have risen by 65% from 2016 to 2017 despite the peace talks. In 2017 alone, they perpetrated 422 atrocities in Mindanao, including ambush, raids, attacks, kidnapping, robbery, bombing, liquidation, landmine/IED attacks, arson and sabotage, that resulted in the death of 47 government forces and 31 civilians.

An ambush in Bukidnon in November 2017 killed one PNP personnel, two civilians and a four-month old baby. 59 incidents of arson committed by the Communist rebels against business establishments in Mindanao last year alone destroyed ₱2.378 billion worth of properties. Moreover, the amount they extorted from private individuals and business establishments from 2015 to the first semester of 2017 has been estimated at ₱2.6 billion.

(s) Among the most significant attacks by the communist rebels on business establishments took place in April and May 2017 when they burned the facilities of Lapanday Food Corporation in Davao City and those of Mil-Oro Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental, which resulted in losses amounting to ₱l.85 billion and ₱l09 million, respectively. According to the AFP, business establishments in the area may be forced to shut down due to persistent NPA attacks just like in Surigao del Sur. (t) By AFP's calculation, the aforesaid rebel groups (excluding the 400 newly recruited members of the Dawlah Islamiyah) are nearly 2, 781- men strong, equipped with 3,211 firearms and control 537 barangays in Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt48c2) (Emphasis supplied.) These events and circumstances, while worthy of severe condemnation, do not show the existence of an actual rebellion in a theater of war.

At most, as I stressed earlier, these indicate the threat of imminent danger brought about by the reorganization, consolidation, recruitment and reinforcement activities, as well as isolated planned attacks undertaken by various armed groups. Verily, in the absence of an armed public uprising which imperils the operation of the civil government, a declaration of martial law or any extension thereof necessarily fails the test of sufficiency, as such absence negates not only the existence of an actual rebellion, but also refutes the respondents' assertion that said declaration or extension is necessitated by the requirements of public safety. It is settled that the imminent danger of a rebellion, assuming one exists, cannot serve as sufficient basis for the proclamation of martial law; perforce, the threatened rebirth of a rebellion which the law considers dead cannot, with more reason, justify an extension thereof.

The continued implementation of martial law without sufficient basis constitutes a violation of due process. There appears to be no right more fundamental in a modem democracy than the right to due process.

In White Light Corp. v. City of Manila(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt49c2) (White Light), the Court explained how the concept of due process must be understood, thus: Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure.

Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State.

Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt50c2) (Emphasis supplied) In essence, the right to due process had been specifically adopted by the framers of the Constitution to protect individual citizens from the abuses of government. The importance that the Constitution ascribes to the right to due process is clear. As well, the need to afford primacy to due process in the resolution of this Petition is evident, if not compelling.

To recall, martial law operates to grant the AFP jurisdiction over civilians when and where the civil government is unable to function as a consequence of an actual rebellion or invasion. As exhaustively discussed, the imposition of martial law operates as a matter of necessity.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt51c2) The conditions necessary to authorize its imposition are not only fixed but also exacting, for the imposition of martial law constitutes an encroachment on the life, liberty and property of private individuals. To me, this is the significance of this case: as earlier stated, the imposition of martial law in the absence of the exigencies justifying the same reduces such extraordinary power to a mere tool of convenience and expediency.

The baseless imposition of martial law constitutes, in itself, a violation of substantive and procedural due process, as it effectively bypasses and renders nugatory the explicit conditions and limitations clearly spelled out in the Constitution for the protection of individual citizens. The Court must disabuse itself of the notion that martial law is required to quell the rebellion, or to empower the military and the police to engage the lawless elements in Mindanao.

The Executive is fully empowered to deploy the armed forces as necessary to suppress lawless violence, and even rebellion, whether actual or imminent, without martial law. Martial law is an emergency governance response that is directed against the civilian population - allowing the military to perform what are otherwise civilian government functions and vesting military jurisdiction over civilians. It is through this lens that the Court should view the pressing question of whether or not there was sufficient basis to extend Martial Law.

To stress, the Court's function in a Section 18 review is to be an avenue for the restoration of the normal workings of government and the enjoyment of individual liberties should there be a showing of insufficient factual basis.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt52c2) A ruling that sanctions the extension of martial law as a matter of expediency defeats this function and stands as a danger to public safety in itself, for it jeopardizes, for the sake of convenience, the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights - that from warrantless arrests and searches, without prior determination of probable cause.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt53c2) To be sure, what fans the flames of rebellion, whether a lasting peace is achievable in Mindanao, whether the military option is the way to address the violence in Mindanao - these are questions that can be debated ad nauseum.

Who the so-called enemies of the Republic are and who and what their targets may be will certainly be the subject of endless speculation. At present, there are the Mautes, BIFFs, ASGs, NPAs, and other armed groups. There may be others which have not been identified by the military.

Without doubt, the threats to the country's internal and external peace and security are incessant and always present. Armed hostilities in all the islands of the country exist and will continue to exist. There is as well the specter of terrorism throughout the world.

And yet, in the face of all these, what should not be forgotten, overlooked or considered trivial is that the present Constitution has excised "imminent danger" from its martial law provision. What is required by the Constitution is actual rebellion or invasion for martial law to be declared or to persist.

The respondents have not presented proof of actual rebellion, or any ongoing armed uprising between the government's armed forces and any of the so-called rebel groups, in any part of Mindanao. Even in Marawi City, the actual rebellion there no longer exists. To be sure, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi is already underway.

The respondents' proof, consisting of the presence of "remnants" of the Maute group that are carrying on recruitment and training of new forces, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces, and isolated attacks, as well as the increase in the Basilan-based ASG's manpower with its newly recruited members undergoing trainings in tactics, marksmanships and bombing operations, may present an "imminent danger" situation - but they do not rise to meet the Constitution's conditions.

In the end, as the country grapples with all these conflicts, it cannot fall into the slippery slope of expediency as the standard with which to attempt to solve these problems. No matter how beneficial or preferable the psychic effects the state of martial law may have upon government officials and the population at large, it cannot be wielded in the absence of the conditions required by the Constitution for its imposition. In the end, the fundamental law that binds all citizens of this country is the Constitution - one that demands public safety and necessity as basis for curtailing fundamental Constitutional freedoms.

That is what the Constitution mandates.

That, in turn, points the Court to where its duty lies - to ensure that the true state of facts is made known, that is, that the rebellion has not persisted, and that public safety does not require the extension anymore. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, and 236155, and DECLARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Senate and the House of Representatives dated December 13, 2017, for failure to comply with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1c2) Hitler, A. & Murphy, J. V. (1981), Mein Kampf Retrieved from [http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.

txt.](http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.%20txt.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2c2) G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017 [En Banc, Per J. Del Castillo]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3c2) Id. at 3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4c2) Id. at 51. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5c2) Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 640 (2000) [En Banc, Per J. Kapunan].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6c2) J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea (Resolution), G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, December 5, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7c2) David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 781 (2006) [En Banc, Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8c2) 149 Phil. 547 (1971) [Per C.J. Concepcion].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9c2) Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection.-How committed.- The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10c2) 320 Phil. 481 (1995).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11c2) Id. at 489. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12c2) Letter dated December 8, 2017, Annex "C"

of the Lagman Petition. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13c2) On October 17, 2017, President Duterte already declared that Marawi is free from "terrorist influence," as military operations continue to ensure that all terrorists have been flushed out.

This declaration was made a day after Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute were killed. The military clarified that the war is not yet over but it will only take a "matter of days." Article retrieved from CNN Philippines: <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017 /10/17 /Marawi-liberation-Duterte.html.> (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14c2) In June 2017, both Malacafiang and AFP claimed that the BIFF attack in Pigkawayan, North Cotabato during that time had no connection to the rebellion in Marawi.

Presidential spokesman Ernesto Abella dismissed the attack as a mere attempt to recover from more than two weeks of setbacks from ongoing military operations of the Army's 6th Infantry Division. Captain Arvin Encinas, Public Affairs Chief of the 6th Infantry Division said that they doubt the capability of the BIFF to proceed to areas far from central Mindanao to sow terror. Article retrieved from Philstar: <http://www.beta.philstar.com/headlines/2017 /06/23/1713103/biff-attack-not-connected-marawisiege- palace-military>.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15c2) On October 23, 2017, DND Secretary Lorenzana announced the termination of all combat operations against Daesh-inspired Maute-ISIS group in Marawi after the military killed the last remaining local and foreign terrorists in the city. He said that there are no more militants in Marawi City. Article retrieved from CNN Philippines: <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/23/Marawi-crisis.html>.

On November 3, 2017, Major Gen. Restituto Padilla, AFP spokesperson, in a press briefing held in the Palace insisted that there was no premature declaration of Marawi City's liberation from terrorists despite the presence of a small number of stragglers in the war-torn city. He said that the declaration was made when the stragglers in Marawi no longer have bearing to the security in the area, "they are leaderless, they have no direction, they are merely fighting for survival."

Article retrieved from Inquirer: <http://news info. inquirer.net/942686/afp-no-premature-declaration-of-l iberation-in-marawi- afp-marawi-padi lla-stragglers>. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16c2) On January 8, 2018, Secretary of National Defense (SND) Lorenzana ordered the troops to prepare for a repeat of the Marawi siege in "another city"

in the Philippines. Article retrieved from Rappler: <https://www.rappler.com/nation/ 193155-Jorenzana-warning-marawi-martial-law>. SND Lorenzana said that rebellion remains in Mindanao and that martial law will be necessary to quell it.

He also said that the main purpose of the extension is to eradicate the ISIS threat in the Philippines. Article retrieved from GMA: <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/638944/lorenzana-gov-t-verifying-report-onpresence- of-foreign-terrorists-in-mindanao/story/>. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt17c2) SND Lorenzana argued that there is a "continuing rebellion".

He said that "[i]t is the belief of the armed forces and the police that there is a continuing reorganization of rebellious forces." Article retrieved from Rappler: <https://www.rappler.com/nation/193155-lorenzana-warning-marawi-martiallaw>. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18c2) Leonor D. Boado, NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE 422 (2012).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt19c2) See Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266, 294-295 (1991) [En Banc, Per Curiam]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt20c2) Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78 (2001) [En Banc, Per J. Melo]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt21c2) J. Feliciano, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Lacson v. Perez, id.

at 109. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt22c2) J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017, pp. 20-21. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt23c2) Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt24c2) Memorandum for Respondents, p. 38. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt25c2) Fr.

Bernas, during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 494 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt26c2) Herrera v. Alba, 499 Phil. 185, 202 (2005) [First Division, Per J. Carpio]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt27c2) Supra note 10. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt28c2) See Venturina v.

Sandiganbayan, 271 Phil. 33, 39 (1991) [En Banc, Per J. Fernan]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt29c2) Ponencia, pp. 41-42, citing AFP's "briefing" Narrative (January 17, 2017 Oral Arguments), pp. 6-7.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt30c2) WHEREAS, Mindanao has had a long and complex history of lawless violence perpetrated by private armies and local warlords, bandits and criminal syndicates, terrorist groups, and religious extremists; WHEREAS, in recent months, there has been a spate of violent and lawless acts across many parts of Mindanao, including abductions, hostage-takings and murder of innocent civilians, bombing of power transmission facilities, highway robberies and extortions, attacks on military outposts, assassinations of media people and mass jailbreaks; WHEREAS, the valiant efforts of our police and armed forced to quell this armed lawlessness have been met with stiff resistance, resulting in several casualties on the part of government forces, the most recent of which was the death of 15 soldiers in a skirmish with the Abu Sayyaf Group in Patikul, Sulu on 29 August 2016; WHEREAS, on the night of 2 September 2016, at least 14 people were killed and 67 others were seriously injured in a bombing incident in a night market in Davao City, perpetrated by still unidentified lawless elements; WHEREAS, the foregoing acts of violence exhibit the audacity and propensity of these armed lawless groups to defy the rule of law, sow anarchy, and sabotage the government's economic development and peace efforts; WHEREAS, based on government intelligence reports, there exist credible threats of further terror attacks and other similar acts of violence by lawless elements in other parts of the country, including the metropolitan areas; (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt31c2) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt32c2) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2, at 36-37, 52. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt33c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 470 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt34c2) Id. at 476-477. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt35c2) Id.

at 412. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt36c2) Supra note 5, at 642-643. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt37c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 409, 412 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt38c2) I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIO" PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 773-774 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt39c2) J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 22.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt40c2) Id. at 17. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt41c2) Lansang v. Garcia, supra note 8, at 592.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt42c2) Memorandum for Petitioner Rosales, p. 17. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt43c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p.

412 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt44c2) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt45c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 401-402 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt46c2) TSN, January 16, 2018, pp. 149-153.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt47c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 412 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt48c2) Ponencia, pp. 50-54.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt49c2) 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [En Banc, Per J. Tinga]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt50c2) Id. at 461-462.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt51c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 412 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt52c2) J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea (Resolution), supra note 6, at 8.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt53c2) J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 22, at 22. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [![](https://lawphil.net/images/back.gif)](javascript:history.back$1$) [![](https://lawphil.net/images/top.gif)](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#top) CONCURRING OPINION VELASCO, JR.,J.: I adhere to the dismissal of the petitions and concur with the declaration of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 as constitutional. I would, however, like to make some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.

At the threshold of this opinion, I do not find it amiss to note that the Martial Law in Mindanao was extended for the first time up to December 31, 2017. And yet, not one of the petitioners questioned the validity of that extension. This neglect now estops the petitioners from questioning the basis for the presently assailed extension since it is merely a continuation of the extended Martial Law covered by Proclamation No. 216.

But be that as it may, in Lagman v. Medialdea,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1v) this Court found that rebellion exists in Mindanao and that public safety requires the exercise of the Martial Law powers. Thus, it concluded that Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the region, has sufficient factual basis. This Court held: ...

[T]he following facts and/or events were deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself: xx xx After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report: 1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion." 2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole."

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives." 4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao." 5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government."

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments." 7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions.

Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and order in the area.

Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered." 8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao." 9) "Considering the networkand alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.

These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity." Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists.

The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2v) Even petitioners at bar, as properly observed in the ponencia, concede the existence of rebellion that led to the declaration of Martial Law under Proclamation No. 216.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3v) The core of petitioners' contention is confined merely to the propriety of the further extension of the Martial Law in Mindanao. In substantiating their argument, however, petitioners neglect that rebellion is a continuing crime, the ultimate goal of which is to overthrow the government.

The nature of rebellion as a continuing crime has often been repeated by this Court. In Parong v. Enrile,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4v) this Court characterized rebellion as a continuing offense, viz: The last argument of petitioner, namely that the detainees were not caught in flagrante delicto and therefore the arrest was illegal was refuted in the Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses the point. As this Court correctly observed, the crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses.

Besides this point involves an issue of fact." A similar ruling was made in Umil v. Ramos(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5v) where this Court observed that: . .

. . [H]e (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested, because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership is penalized, and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense, thus: The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude ...

x x x Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6v) Further, while rebellion is the crime of the masses or multitudes, it is not perpetrated in one crowd action or in a single battle.

And while the crime of rebellion consists of many acts, involving a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7v) these acts are not usually committed in a single instance. Rather, rebellion is pursued and committed in sporadic crimes-murders, kidnappings, arsons, sabotages, raids, hit-and-run tactics, and small skirmishes with the military-mostly by a small group of combatants by what is termed as guerilla warfare. Rarely is rebellion now committed by a large group of identified men engaging the government in an all-out conventional war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

It would then be simply naive to dismiss, as the petitioners have, the remaining armed groups in Mindanao as but "phantom remnants" of the defeated terrorists and rebels. The fact that they do exist and still continue fighting is by itself proof of the subsistence of the condition that compelled the administration to proclaim Martial Law in Mindanao.

More importantly, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has sufficiently shown that the remaining members of the Maute group, which commenced the rebellion, has not dwindled. Far from it, they have regrouped, increased in number, have been augmented by foreign terrorist fighters and have established linkages with other terrorists and rebel groups. During the oral arguments, the AFP stated thus: After the successful Marawi Operation, the Basilan-based ASG is left with 74 members; the Maute Group with 30 members; the Maguid Group has 11; and the Turaifie Group has 22 members with a total of 166 firearms.

However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the same strength that initially stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and decentralized recruitment of the Daesh-inspired groups at their respective areas of concentration. ASG Basilan-based recruited more or less 43 new members in Basilan; more or less 250 members by the Maute Group in the Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid Group in Sarangani and Sultan Kudarat, and more or less 70 by the Turaifie Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities; revenge for their killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; financial gain as new recruits were given an amount ranging from PhP15,000.00 to 50,000.00; and, as radicalized converts.

These newly recruited members are undergoing trainings in tactics, markmanships and bombing operations at the different areas of Mount Cararao Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high potentials were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations. Furthermore, the situation has become complicated with the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), capitalizing on the porous maritime boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and businessmen.

As of this period, 48 FTFs were monitored joining the Daesh-inspired groups, particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and Turaifie Group in Central Mindanao. The closeness of these two groups is predominant with @Abu DAR who has historically established links with Turaifie. On Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents, these have increased to 100% for the 2nd Semester.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8v) Consequently, the burden is upon the petitioners to prove that the rebellion has been quelled by the government forces and has ceased to exist.

Petitioners, however, failed to discharge this burden. Instead, petitioners have presented nary a competent and adequate evidence that could refute the facts presented by the AFP and relied upon by the President in requesting the extension of Martial Law.

Bare allegations and unfounded conclusions, without more, cannot debunk the finding of both the executive and legislative branches of the government that rebellion continues to pose a danger to the public safety in Mindanao and requires the imposition of Martial Law. If this Court is to accord due regard to the principle of comity that should exist among the three branches of the Government, it must observe utmost restraint.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9v) It must not modify, much less annul, the action of the other two branches of government as embodied in the assailed Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, unless there is hard and strong evidence that the extension has no factual basis. As no such evidence was presented by the petitioners, there is nothing to offset the "presumption of constitutionality"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10v) of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

Surely, as an act of both the executive and the legislative branches, Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11v) which was explained by this Court as follows: .... This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.

This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12v) The burden of proving the invalidity of this joint exercise of discretion that is the extension of Martial Law rests on those who challenge it.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13v) In this case, petitioners failed to present any proof, much less clear and convincing evidence, that will convince this Court beyond reasonable doubt of the nullity of the assailed Resolution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14v) Hence, in the absence of the required proof of the unequivocal infraction of the Constitution committed by the President and both houses of Congress, this Court will indulge the presumption of constitutionality of the assailed Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

The validity of the extension of Martial Law embodied therein must perforce prevail. Past experiences under Martial Law may have led the petitioners to doubt its necessity, efficacy, and the good that it may serve. However, the stark realities of the moment should temper our wariness of the Martial Law powers.

We need not fear employing them when necessary for the promotion of public safety and the promotion of public welfare. After all, it is not a power that can be employed without corresponding responsibility.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15v) In the vein of my opinion in Lagman, Martial Law is by no means an arbitrary license conferred on the President and the armed forces. As it is borne out of necessity, so it is limited by necessity.

To assuage the fears stoked by the implementation of Martial Law, I deem it proper to restate my opinion in Lagman discussing some of the safeguards and constraints that bind the hands of the President and the military that employ the Martial Law powers: . . .

the source from which the power to proclaim Martial Law springs must be considered.

Hence, if there is no Constitutional provision or statute expressly allowing an intrusion or limitation of a civil liberty, then it is not and will not be allowed. Public defense can and should be attained without a total abrogation of all individual rights. Otherwise, "it could be well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation."

Thus, while this Court recognized in David that "arrests and seizures without judicial warrants" can be made during Martial Law, the circumstances justifying such warrantless arrests and seizures under the Rules of Court and jurisprudence must still obtain. Pertinently, Section 5, Rule 113 reads: SECTION 5.

Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. As the basis for the declaration of Martial Law - rebellion - is a continuing crime, the authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion under the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court.

It must, however, be emphasized that the suspicion of rebellion upon which a warrantless arrest is made must be based on a probable cause, i.e., the ground of suspicion is supported by personal knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person sought to be arrested has "committed or is actually committing" the crime of rebellion. Thus, parenthetically, the general arrest orders must be issued by the Armed Forces on the basis of probable cause.

Alternatively, it must be shown that the person to be arrested was caught in flagrante delicto In sustaining an arrest without a judicial warrant, Justice Holmes, in Moyer v. Peabody, ratiocinated that the "public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process." However, I subscribe to the position that even during Martial Law, the jurisdiction of and inquiry by the courts are merely postponed, not ousted or superseded. Hence, the same tests that would be applied by the civil courts in an inquiry into the validity of a government action must be applied by the military during a Martial Law.

In line with this, searches and seizures without judicial warrants can only be had in the following cases: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (7) exigent and emergency circumstance; and (8) search of vessels and aircraft, where, again, probable cause exists that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the restriction of the freedom of speech and of the press, the military must still be guided by the clear and present danger test - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the military has a right to prevent. Thus, the military can prohibit the dissemination of vital information that can be used by the enemy, e.g., they can ban posts on social media if there is a clear and present danger that such posts will disclose their location.

The same test, the presence of clear and present danger, governs the power of the military to disperse peaceable assemblies during Martial Law. As this Court held, tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Otherwise stated, in the absence of clear and present danger, the military is bound by the rules of maximum tolerance under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 880, otherwise known as the "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

As to the "take-over of news media" mentioned in David, Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: "In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest." Prescinding therefrom, this Court, in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., held that police power justifies a temporary "take over [of] the operation of any business affected with public interest"

by the State in times of national emergency: xx xx This Court, however, has held that it is the legislature, not the executive, which is the constitutional repository of police power, the existence of a national emergency, such as a rebellion or invasion, notwithstanding. Accordingly, the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest can only be done whenever there is a law passed by Congress authorizing the same. This Court, in David, explained as much: xx xx Indeed, the military must still be guided by law and jurisprudence and motivated by good faith in the exercise of the supreme force of the State even during a Martial law.

Thus, in its endeavor to restore peace and preserve the state, the military must still make proper adjustments to the safeguards of constitutional liberty under the following legislations intended to protect human rights: 1. Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof) 2. Republic Act No. 8371 (1he Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) 3.

Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness Week Act of 2002) 4. Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) 5. Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) 6.

Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) 7. Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007) 8. Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women) 9.

Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009) 10. Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity) 11. Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010) 12.

Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012) 13. Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012) 14. Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012) 15.

Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013) 16. Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems Act of 2013) The continuous effectivity of the 1987 Constitution further provides a blueprint by which the military shall act with respect to the civilians and how it shall conduct its operations and actions during the effectivity of Martial Law.

Under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the "generally accepted principles of international law [remains to be] part of the law of the land." Hence, conventions and treatises applicable to non-international armed conflicts including the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols continue to impose the limits on the power and discretion of the armed forces. Notably, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions enumerates acts that remain prohibited despite the hostilities.

It states: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. Furthermore, the Fundamental Guarantees under Article 4 of the "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions x x x relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)" remain binding: 1.

All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental wellbeing of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 3.

Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: (a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care; (b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated; (c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities; (d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are captured; (e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.

These international commitments are incorporated into our laws not only by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, but also by the domestic legislations previously enumerated. Without a doubt, state agents - the members of the armed forces - who abuse their power and discretion under the proclaimed Martial Law and thereby violate their duty as the "protector of the people and the State" are criminally and civilly liable.

And here lies the ultimate safeguard against the possible abuses of this emergency power - the ultimate responsibility of the officers for acts done in the implementation of Martial Law. To whom much is given, much will be required. In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1v) G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2v) Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3v) See pp. 29-31 of the ponencia. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4v) 222 Phil. 170, 180 (1985). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5v) 279 Phil. 266-344 (1991).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6v) Emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7v) People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8v) AFP's briefing presented during the January 17, 2018 Oral Arguments, pp. 6-7.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9v) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455 etc., August 25, 1994. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10v) See Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 128 Phil. 473-484 (1967). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11v) Cawaling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 420 Phil. 524-537 (200l).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12v) Id. Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13v) Spouses Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749-756 (2002).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14v) See also Board qfOptometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187-120 (1996). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15v) Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat, 19 (25 U.S.); Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns., N.Y., 150, cited in Barcelonav. Baker, Jr., 5 Phil. 87-120 (1905).

216, Series of 2017, entitled Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018." However, for the same reason that I adduced in my Separate Concurring Opinion in the case of Lagman v. Medialdea,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1dc) I wish to restate here that a special civil action such as a petition for certiorari is one of the appropriate proceedings to question the factual basis of a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension of such declaration and/or suspension. In the said Separate Concurring Opinion I stated: As for concerns that a petition for certiorari, prohibition or habeas corpus imposes procedural constraints that may hinder the Court's factual review of the sufficiency of the basis for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, these may all be addressed with little difficulty.

In the hierarchy of legal authorities binding on this Court, constitutional provisions must take precedence over rules of procedure. It is Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which authorizes the Court to review factual issues in order to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of a martial law declaration or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, as discussed above, the Court may employ the most suitable procedure in order to carry out its jurisdiction over the issue as mandated by the Constitution. Time and again, the Court has stressed that it has the inherent power to suspend its own rules when the interest of justice so requires.

The Court should be cautious that it does not take a position in these consolidated cases that needlessly restricts our people's judicial remedies nor carelessly clips our own authority to take cognizance of the issue of constitutional sufficiency under Section 18, Article VII in any appropriate action that may be filed with the Court. Such would be antagonistic to the clear intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to empower our citizens and the Judiciary as a vital protection against potential abuse of the executive power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Citation omitted.) Joint Resolution No. 4 of both Houses of Congress, implements the provision of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which vests upon the Congress the power to extend the presidential proclamation of martial law as follows: Sec. 18.

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.) The above-quoted provision of Section 18, Article VII unequivocally empowers Congress, upon the initiative of the President, to extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the following conditions: (1) the invasion or rebellion shall persist or continue; (2) the public safety requires it; and (3) the extension is decided, by a joint majority vote of Congress in a regular or special session. Regarding the first two requirements to justify the extension of said proclamation or suspension, it is appropriate to reiterate my disquisition in my Separate Concurring Opinion in Lagman, to wit: The concept of rebellion in our penal law was explained in the leading case of People v. Hernandez, where the Court ruled that the word "rebellion"

evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it; and that all other crimes, which are committed either singly or collectively and as a necessary means to attain the purpose of rebellion, or in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, constitute only the simple, not complex, crime of rebellion. The Court also underscored that political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order and that the decisive factor in determining whether a crime has been committed to achieve a political purpose is the intent or motive in its commission. While rebellion is considered as an act of terrorism under the law, the latter can be used to achieve a political end, such as removing from allegiance to the State any part of the national territory or overthrowing the duly constituted authorities.

Even so, such lawless elements engaged in terrorism will never acquire any status recognized under International Humanitarian Law. Yet, acts of terrorism may be taken into account in the context of determining the necessity for a declaration of martial law within our constitutional framework. Plainly then, rebellion can be committed through an offense or a violation of any special law so long as it is done as necessary means to attain, or in furtherance of, the purpose of rebellion.

In Ponce Enrile v. Amin, the Court held that the offense of harboring or concealing a fugitive, or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829, if committed in furtherance of the purpose of rebellion, should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately. The Court explained: All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus: "This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

x x x" (Citing People v. Hernandez) The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping, etc.

as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. In his dissenting opinion in Fortun, Justice Velasco states that the Constitution does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion.

In support of this, he cites an excerpt :from the Brief of Amicus Curiae Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., as follows: From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past.

But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future· and can defeat the purpose of the Constitution.

What all these point to are that the twin requirements of "actual rebellion or invasion" and the demand of public safety are inseparably entwined. But whether there exists a need to take action in favour of public safety is a factual issue different in nature from trying to determine whether rebellion exists.

The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of existing armed movements. Thus, in deciding whether the President acted rightly or wrongly in finding that public safety called for the imposition of martial law, the Court cannot avoid asking whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Such decision involves the verification of factors not as easily measurable as the demands of Article 134 of the Penal Code and can lead to a prudential judgment in favour of the necessity of imposing martial law to ensure public safety even in the face of uncertainty whether the Penal Code has been violated. This is the reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were reluctant to override the executive's judgment. In sum, since the President should not be bound to search for proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion and since deciding whether public safety demands action is a prudential matter, the function of the President is far from different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not.

Put differently, looking for rebellion under the Penal Code is different from looking for rebellion under the Constitution.

x x x.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2dc) (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.) I also cited the case of Aquino v. Ponce Enrile,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3dc) where the Court expounded on the sophisticated and widespread nature of a modern rebellion, which has now even exacerbated with the advancement of technology. Aquino relevantly discussed: It [rebellion] does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.

Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and materiel, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence - all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context. Rebellion in contemporary times has acquired a graver complexion.

In Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 9372, the "Human Security Act of 2007," rebellion is considered as an act of terrorism. Acts of terrorism can be directed towards the attainment of political objectives just as in the case of rebellion namely, to remove the allegiance to the State of any part of the national territory or to overthrow the duly constituted authorities.

It is within the context of the ever increasingly ominous global threat posed by terrorism to national sovereignty and public safety that the sufficiency of the factual grounds invoked by the President and sustained by Congress must be evaluated by the Court. Particularly, the factual basis is encapsulated in the preambulatory clause of Joint Resolution No. 4 of Congress quoted below: WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but neverthess reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the new People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule[.] There is evident constitutional basis to sustain the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as well as their extension outside of the existence of or the absence of a "theater of war"

where civilian authorities are unable to function.

This is found in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which pertinently provides that "a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of civil courts, or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction and military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ." Furthermore, it should be stressed that Congress is empowered by the aforecited Section 18, Article VII to determine the period of extension of the martial law proclamation or suspension of the privilege of the writ, in like manner that it can exercise its power to revoke such proclamation or suspension. Thus, both the aforesaid revocation and extension shall be done by the "Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority or all its Members in regular or special session."

The underlying reason articulated in the course of the deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of the manner of voting is to avoid the possibility of deadlock and to facilitate the process of revocation.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4dc) Presumably, the Constitutional Commission adopted the same manner of voting for the extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the same reason, that the Congress may with facility and without the possibility of a stalemate decide on the said extension. The ponencia of the Honorable Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam has detailed the sufficient factual bases undeniably demonstrating that rebellion persists and that public safety requires the extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018.

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives decisively resolved to extend Presidential Proclamation No. 216 by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes. The collective decision of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Government to extend for one (1) year the said proclamation, which was arrived at through a constitutionally mandated process can be the long awaited strong political will that will restore the elusive peace and promote prosperity in the whole of Mindanao. Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145 and 236155.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1dc) G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2dc) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3dc) 158-A Phil. 1, 48-49 (1974).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4dc) Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 23 I 671, July 25, 2017. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [![](https://lawphil.net/images/back.gif)](javascript:history.back$1$) [![](https://lawphil.net/images/top.gif)](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#top) CONCURRING OPINION I concur with the findings and conclusions of the ponencia upholding the constitutionality of Resolution of Both Houses No, 4, which extended the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao from January 1 to December 31, 2018. In the earlier case of Lagman v. Medialdia,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1dc2) the Court upheld the constitutionality of Proclamation No, 216, declaring a.

state of martia1 law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

The Court, in that case, found that "the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus [i.e. 1) actual rebellion or invasion; and 2) public safety requirement] have been properly and fully complied with."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2dc2) Hence, the Court ruled that, "Proclamation Ng. 216 has sufficient factual basis, there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists, and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3dc2) Using the same parameters as in Lagman, the Court is now tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual bases of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, further extending the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao from January 1 to December 31, 2018, to wit: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao tmd North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerrilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4dc2) Existence of Actual Rebellion In Lagman, the Court found that actual rebellion existed in the whole of Mindanao.

In this case, the question is whether the same rebellion still exists. I am convinced that it does as the ''liberation of Marawi" did not end the rebellion, Marawi, as found by the Court in Lagman, was only the staging point of the rebellion as the target was the whole of Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5dc2) The fact that the surviving members of the Maute group have not surrendered and are even recruiting new members despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers clearly proves that the rebellion persists.

The violent incidents perpetrated by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BTFF) in Mindanao likewise negate petitioners' position that the rebellion has been quelled by the "liberation of Marawi." Thus, I believe that while, the government may have won the battle in Marawi, the war against the rebellion is still ongoing. Moreover, I agree with the ponencia that the inclusion of the New Peoples Army (NPA) as basis for the further extension will not render void Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

Although the NPA group was not expressly included in Proclamation No. 216 as one of the "other rebel groups," their attacks may nevertheless be used as factual bases for the extension considering that these contributed to the violence and even aggravated the situation in Mindanao. To put things in perspective, let us say Country A invades Mindanao and immediately thereafter, the President issues a proclamation declaring martial law in the entire Mindanao.

After two weeks, Country B then decides to join the war in the hope of taking over a portion of Mindanao.

Under the circumstances, is the President still required to make another proclamation for the invasion by Country B? Obviously not - as it would be superfluous and impractical considering the President already declared martial law to stop the invasion of Mindanao. So, instead of promulgating a separate declaration of martial law, the President may just ask Congress for an extension based on the original invasion, which continues to exist, with the invasion by Country B as an additional factual basis for the extension.

In this case, the attacks carried out by the NPA are but additional factual bases which may be used to support the findings of the President and the Congress that the rebellion persists in the whole of Mindanao. In fact, whether or not the NPA group was used as a basis for the extension does not change the fact that the rebellion struted by Hapilon and the Maute brothers continues to exist in Mindanao. Theater of War Citing portions of the deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners Rosales, et al. and Monsod, et al. advance the theory that for martial law to be valid, it must be in the context of an actual "theater of war"

due to a rebellion or invasion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6dc2) Under this theory, martial law can only be declared in an area where there is actual armed conflict.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7dc2) There is, however, nothing in the deliberations to support their theory. Quoted below are the pertinent portions of the deliberations; SR. TAN: Yes.

Thank you. The other question is also on the same section. Would martial law automatically give the President the power of legislation through decrees?

MR. SUMULONG: We will ask Commissioner Concepcion to answer. MR.

CONCEPCION: It is stated in Section 15; A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts. . .

The Commissioner's question is whether martial law decreases or increases the power of the President? SR. TAN: Decreases?

MR. CONCEPCION: Not necessarily. SR.

TAN: So, what specific power is necessary before the President can proclaim martial law? MR. CONCEPCION: In general, in case of invasion, the President would have all the powers of a general in the army.

MR. SUMULONG: We ask Commissioner Bernas to answer. FR.

BERNAS: That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies ... The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court.

I think it is the case Aquino vs. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the com,1itution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers.

The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theatre of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law.

In other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional. concept of martial law as it was developed especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theatre of war. SR.

TAN: Thank you.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8dc2) xx xx MR. FOZ: Thank you, Madam President. May I go to the next question?

I was just thinking that if this provision states the effects of the declaration of martial law - one of which is that it does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts- I cannot see how civil courts would be unable to function even in a state of martial law. MR. SUMULONG: May we refer that interpellation to Commissioner Bernas?

FR. BERNAS: This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function.

If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are opened then in no case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.

MR. FOZ: It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical area FR. BERNAS: That is correct.

MR. FOZ: And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. FR.

BERNAS: It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The understanding here is that the phrase "nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians" has reference to the practice under the Marco$ regime where military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians.

We say here that we will never allow that except in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes necessary for some kind of court to function. MR. FOZ; Thank you, Madam President.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9dc2) It appears that Father Bernas mentioned the concept of the "theater of war"

twice during the deliberations, First was in answer to the question of"[whether] martial law automatically give[s] the President the power of legislation through decrees,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10dc2) to which Father Bernas answered in the negative. He explained that, "the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war.

In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theatre of war, not in the situation we had during the period of [Marcos] martial law."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11dc2) Simply put, Father Bernas mentioned the ''theater of war" only to make it clear that under the 1987 Constitution, a declaration of martial law does not automatically grant the President the power to legislate, as the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that "a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12dc2) Second was in response to the suggestion of deleting the phrase "where civil courts are able to function."

Father Bernas rejected this suggestion as the phrase delimits the effects of martial law so that the "practice under the Marcos regime where military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13dc2) would not happen again. He explained that during martial law, the Commander-in-Chief has no power to confer jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians, except in a "theater of war" or in the area where there is actual war because of which the civil courts are unable to function.

Considering that the framers of the 1987 Constitution only mentioned the term "theater of war" in the context of describing and defining the powers of the President during martial law, it is highly specious for petitioners to use the same to support its theory. In fact, the Court in Lagman quoted the same portions of the deliberations only to describe what happens during a state of martial law.

Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution that limits the scope of martial law to the actual "theater of war." As the Court has declared in Lagman, the discretion to dete1mine the territorial coverage of martial law lies with the President,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14dc2) subject of course to the safeguards laid down in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Public Safety Requirement As to the second requirement, petitioners assert that the public safety contemplated in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution "entails a breakdown of civilian government"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15dc2) or "a vacuum in civilian authorities."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt16dc2) Such assertion has no legal basis as there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution and in the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission to indicate that such was the intended definition of the framers.

Besides, unless technical terms are employed, words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning and as much as possible its language should be understood in its common usage.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17dc2) Thus, in Lagman, the Court defined public safety simply as one that "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt18dc2) With this definition and in light of the factual circumstances indicated in the letter of the President and the Resolution of Both Houses No.

4, I believe that public safety requires the extension of martial law. Undeniably, the acts of violence committed, and being comn1itted, by the rebels in various areas in Mindanao continue to endanger the lives of the people in Mindanao. Period of Extension Finally, as to the period of extension, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution states that, "upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it."

The provision is clear: the determination of the period of the extension, as well as the number of extensions, lies with the Congress. In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions and AFFIRM the constitutionality of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4. Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1dc2) Lagman v. Medialdea.

G.R, Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2dc2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3dc2) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4dc2) Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, dated December 13, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5dc2) Supra note I. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6dc2) Memorandum for Petitioners Rosales, et al., pp. l 4-16and Memorandum for Petitioners Monsod, et al., pp. 50-54. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7dc2) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8dc2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 398 (July 29, 1986) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9dc2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 401-402 (July 29, 1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10dc2) Supra note 8. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11dc2) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12dc2) Paragraph 4 of Section l 8, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13dc2) Supra note 9 at 402. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14dc2) Supra note I. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15dc2) Memorandum for Petitioners Monsod, et al., pp. 51-54.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16dc2) Memorandum for Petitioners Rosales, et al., pp. 17-19. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt17dc2) Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18dc2) Supra note 1.

The said letter, in turn, was based on the letters of AFP General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero (General Guerrero) and Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1g) (Secretary Lorenzana), which state: The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the foregoing assessment, the following are cited as justification for the recommended extension, to wit: The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western, and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi City; Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as [the] BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and Cotabato; The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political mobilization (army, party and mass base building, rallies, pickets and demonstrations, financial and logistical build up), terrorism against innocent civilians and private entities, and guerilla warfare against [both] the security sector, and public government infrastructures; The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order to defeat their strategy, stop their extortion, defeat their armed component, and to stop their recruitment activities; The threats being posed by the CTs, ASG, and the presence of remnants, protectors, supporters and sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders the speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao; The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will significantly help not only the AFP, but also the other stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and stability in Mindanao; and In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to perform anew its mandated task in the same manner that it had dutifully done so for the whole duration of Martial law to date, without any report of human rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2g) During the oral arguments, General Guerrero presented data which justified the further extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao, to wit: After the successful Marawi Operation, the Basilan-based ASG is left with 74 members; the Maute Group with 30 members; the Maguid Group has 11; and the Turaifie Group has 22 members with a total of 166 firearms.

However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the same strength that initially stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and decentralized recruitment of the Daesh-inspired groups at their respective area[s] of concentration. ASG Basilan-based recruited more or less 43 new members in Basilan; more or less 250 by the Maute Group in Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid Group in Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat, and more or less 70 by the Turaifie Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities; revenge for their killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; financial gain[s] as new recruits were given an amount ranging from Phpl5,000.00 to 50,000.00; and as radicalized converts.

These newly recruited members are undergoing trainings in tactics, marksmanships and bombing operations at different area of Mount Cararao Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high potentials [sic] were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations.

On Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents, these have increased to 100% for the 2nd Semester.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3g) As gleaned above, the approval of the extension of martial law in Mindanao is not arbitrary but has sufficient factual basis. It must be remembered that in Lagman v. Medialdea(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4g) (Lagman), the Court held that there was sufficient factual basis that actual rebellion exists in Mindanao and that public safety requires martial law, particularly in Marawi where there was intensive firefighting initiated by the Maute Group. Notably, even after President Duterte declared the liberation of Marawi City on October 17, 2017, the Maute Group was still able to recruit new members and increase their number to 250 as of December 2017.

Other terrorist groups in Mindanao were able to increase their memberships as well. General Guerrero stated that the said increase in membership was due to several factors, such as the clannish culture of the groups; revenge for their fallen relatives; and financial gain ranging from ₱15,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. He also pointed out that foreigners have been joining these terrorists group in guise of businessmen or tourists, particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and Turaifie Group in Central Mindanao.

Indeed, with these factual bases, the military needs to intensify their efforts against these terrorist groups through the continued imposition of martial law. Lifting martial law would remove the leverage of the military against these terror groups during their on-going operations and would weaken the rigorous campaign against them and allow them to continuously threaten the civilian population. These facts establish a prima facie case in justifying the extension of the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao because actual rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

The petitioners failed to impeach the factual basis and prima facie case presented by the respondents. Notably, in this sui generis petition to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for an extension of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the movants should focus on assailing the factual basis to support such declaration. Regrettably, instead of citing specific factual allegations to counter the respondents' position, the petitioners resorted to raising questions of law and even questions regarding the wisdom in extending martial law.

Such issues, however, should not be raised in this present sui generis proceeding. Rebellion as a continuing offense As stated in Umil v. Ramos(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5g) (Umil), a case decided under the 1987 Constitution, the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, such as adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base, which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6g) It was also established in Umil that the arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing nonviolent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.

Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7g) The Court stressed in Umil that arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing nonviolent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8g) Consequently, even if the firefighting stopped temporarily, offenders could still be arrested by State agents if they continue to perform non-violent acts in furtherance of the rebellion, such as recruitment of members, financing of rebellious groups, or planning the next unlawful attack.

In spite of the cessation of firefighting, the crime of rebellion is continuing because the ideological base persists, which requires the repetition of the acts of lawlessness and violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government is realized. Thus, hostilities and acts of terrorism committed afterwards, pursuant to the ideological purpose, continue to form part of the crime of rebellion. In this case, while the firefighting in Marawi City have ceased, the goal of the Maute Group to overthrow the government remains.

Their continuing goal is evident in the incessant recruitment of members in the Lanao area and the financing of the rebel group. While non-violent, these acts are still considered in the furtherance of rebellion. Indeed, these acts are part and parcel of the crime of rebellion seeking to achieve their illegitimate purpose.

Thus, as of December 2017, General Guerrero reported to the Court that the Maute Group has recruited a total of 250 members, a significant number capable of committing other atrocities against the civilian population. Aside from the Maute Group, the Turaifie Group in the Cotabato Area; the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; the Abu SayaffGroup in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi; and the New People's Army are continuing their rebellious goals through their rampant recruitment and clashes with the military. Notably, the New People's Army engaged in armed conflict with the government even though there were ongoing peace negotiations.

These continued firefighting threaten the general populace in Mindanao, which affects public safety.

In the course of the oral arguments, General Guerrero stated that rebellion in Mindanao is still on-going in spite of the culmination of the Marawi siege, viz: JUSTICE BERNABE: Now, why is the second extension significantly longer than the first when in fact it was already publicly declared that Marawi City has been liberated from the Maute? GENERAL GUERRERO: As I've said, Your Honor, Marawi is just a part of the whole problem. After the liberation of Marawi, there are still other areas that we need to address.

xxx JUSTICE BERNABE: I mean, Marawi City had already been liberated so there is this escalating conflict already, shouldn't this diminish the public safety needed to continue with martial law over the entire Mindanao? GENERAL GUERRERO: The conflict in Marawi is distinct and separate from what is happening in the other parts of the area, in the Lanao, particularly. Although, as I have said, the conflict in Marawi has already been resolved but still there are some elements there that continue to operate.

As I have said, we had just addressed the armed component and for as long as we have not addressed the other factors that have brought this conflict into existence they will still be able to continue to recruit other rebels and continue with the atrocities, Your Honor. xxx JUSTICE BERNABE: What is the objective behind this extension of martial law, the oneyear extension? Is it still to quell the Maute-Japilon led rebellion?

GENERAL GUERRERO: Yes ... JUSTICE BERNABE: Or is it generally put an end to all communist or terrorist activities in the entire Mindanao? GENERAL GUERRERO: The rebellion has not been quelled, Your Honor.

What we have done is we have been able to resolve the Marawi conflict but the rebellion continues to exist. JUSTICE BERNABE: So, the objectives are both, to still quell the Maute-Japilon led Rebellion and as well as to put an end to all communist or terroristic activities? GENERAL GUERRERO: That is the objective, Your Honor, to address the other rebel groups.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9g) Certainly, with these set of facts and with the concept of rebellion as a continuing offense, there is sufficient factual basis that actual rebellion in Mindanao persists and public safety requires the extension of the period of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, as reasonably authorized by Congress.

Current concept of rebellion The petitioners argue that the US cases of Ex Parte Milligan(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10g) (Milligan) and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, Sheriff(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11g) (Duncan), which required that there must be an actual theater of war to justify the President's declaration of martial law, must be applied by the Court. I disagree. In Milligan, martial law was declared because there was an on-going rebellion in the Confederate states.

The US Court held that martial law is the will of the commanding officer of an armed force or of a geographical military department, expressed in time of war, within the limits of his military jurisdiction, as necessity demands and prudence dictates, restrained or enlarged by the orders of his military or supreme executive chief. It was also ruled therein that the military tribunals only have jurisdiction where civil courts are not functioning. But where the civil courts are functioning and there is no need for bayonets or military aid to execute its jurisdiction, military tribunals cannot try civilians.

Similarly, in Duncan, martial law was declared because Hawaii was in an actual theater of war arising from the Japanese armed invasion on December 7, 1941 and there was, at all times, a danger of invasion in the nature of commando raids or submarine attacks.

The US Court ruled therein that since the civil courts were opened later on February 24, 1944, the petitioners could not be tried by military courts under martial law. In the case at bench, the concept of actual invasion or rebellion is not the same as that of Milligan, decided in 1866, and Duncan, decided in 1946. During those times, the actual invasion or rebellion was appreciated in the traditional sense where the enemies use bayonets, cannons, commando raids or submarine attacks and conflicts were concentrated within a specific location or state.

However, during the deliberations of the present Constitution, the framers discussed the possibility of modem tactics in rebellion or invasion, to wit: MR. DE LOS REYES. I ask that question because I think modern rebellion can be carried out nowadays in a more sophisticated manner because of the advance of technology, mass media and others.

Let us consider this for example: There is an obvious synchronized or orchestrated strike in all industrial firms, then there is a strike of drivers so that employees and students cannot attend school nor go to their places of work, practically paralyzing the government. Then in some remote barrios, there are ambushes by so-called subversives, so that the scene is that there is an orchestrated attempt to destabilize the government and ultimately supplant the constitutional government. Would the Committee call that an actual rebellion, or is it an imminent rebellion?

MR. REGALADO: At the early stages, where there was just an attempt to paralyze the government or some sporadic incidents in other areas but without armed public uprising, that would only amount to sedition under Article 138, or it can only be considered as a tumultuous disturbance. MR.

DE LOS REYES: The public uprising are not concentrated in one place, which use to be the concept of rebellion before. MR. REGALADO: No. MR.

DE LOS REYES: But the public uprisings consists of isolated attacks in several places - for example in one camp here; another in the province of Quezon; then in another camp in Laguna; no attack in Malacañang - but there is complete paralysis of the industry of the whole country. If we place these things together, the impression is clear- there is an attempt to destabilize the government in order to supplant it with a new government. MR.

REGALADO: It becomes a matter of factual appreciation and evaluation. The magnitude is to be taken into account When we talk about tumultuous disturbance, to sedition, then graduating to rebellion. All these things are variances of magnitude and scope.

So, the President determines, based on the circumstances, if there is presence of rebellion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12g) (emphases supplied) The Constitutional framers foresee the possibility that modem rebellion will involve a more sophisticated manner of execution with the use of advanced technology and even mass media. They discussed the possibility that rebels may conduct isolated attacks in different places but would be orchestrated to paralyze the country and destabilize the government. In such case, Justice Regalado suggested it would be a matter of factual appreciation and evaluation of the President, based on the circumstances, in determining if rebellion exists.

Thus, the traditional concept of rebellion where there must be actual use of weapons concentrated in a single place is not the sole concept of actual rebellion envisioned under the 1987 Constitution. Defanged Martial Law Martial law, while it has no precise definition, is employed to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the State against actual rebellion or invasion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13g) In the Philippines, the power to declare martial law rests in the hands of the President.

History dictates that the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed the President to exploit its power in declaring martial law due to the following reasons: 1. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; 2. That the President as Commander-in-Chief can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a world recession, inflation or economic crisis; 3.

That the President, as legislator during the period of martial law, can legally create military commission or court martials to try not only members of the armed forces but also civilian offenders for specified offenses.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14g) Thus, when the framers of the present Constitution discussed the power of the President to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, they ensured that such abuses would not be repeated. Commissioner Monsod even noted that the martial law of then President Marcos was an aberration in history and that the grounds for the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege were reduced, and that should a second Marcos arise, there would be enough safeguards in the new Constitution to take care of such eventuality. Accordingly, the following safeguards are now in place to limit the Chief Executive's power to declare martial law: 1.

The initial declaration of martial law has a time limit of sixty ( 60) days; 2. The President is required to submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress to substantiate his declaration of martial law; 3. There is a process for its review and possible revocation of Congress; 4.

There is also a review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court based on the sufficiency of factual basis; 5. The removal of the phrases "imminent danger thereof' and "insurrection" as grounds for declaring martial law; 6.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function. Thus, during the martial law, the President can neither promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees when legislative assemblies are functioning nor create military courts to try civilians when the civil courts are open. 7.

The declaration of martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; 8. During the suspension of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. 9.

The extension of the declaration of martial law initiated by the President shall only take effect when approved by Congress for a period reasonably determined by it. The numerous safety measures embodied under the present Constitution ensure that the President cannot abuse its power anymore to the detriment of the citizens. The said measures defanged martial law.

As can be gleaned in Lagman, the safeguards and processes were fully operational and the declaration of martial law by President Rodrigo Duterte over the whole Mindanao was thoroughly scrutinized by Congress and the Court. In said case, the Court concluded that the President, in issuing Proclamation No.

216, had sufficient factual bases to show that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. During the oral arguments, it was confirmed by Commissioner Monsod, one of the petitioners, that martial law under the Constitution has been restricted, to wit: JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Okay, I will agree for the moment with you. But the thing is, you have a version of martial law that does not replicate the Marcos version, it is now emasculated.

Is that, will you agree with that? CHAIRMAN MONSOD: Yes. JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Emasculated.

CHAIRMAN MONSOD: Not emasculated, there's a narrowed discretion of the President because ... JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Narrowed, restricted to tie the hands of the President, if I may put it that way. It cannot be anymore as pervasive as the martial law that was under the 1935 Constitution because we had no other experience in martial law since that time, since that time.

CHAIRMAN MONSOD: Yes, Your Honor.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15g) It was also discussed that martial law under the present Constitution is unique because it does not confer additional powers to the President, the Constitution is continuously upheld, the agencies of the government and the courts continue to function, and human rights and international humanitarian laws are still observed.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt16g) General Guerrero also shared his view that the only benefits generated by the present declaration of martial law are the immediate arrest of the rebels;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17g) civilian authorities are readily compliant with the requests of the APP;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt18g) increased military presence;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt19g) and logistical benefit due to the increased information gathering and dissemination.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt20g) Flexibility in Extending Martial Law The petitions at bench also question the procedural validity of the extension of martial law.

Under the Constitution, the said extension is different from the initial proclamation of martial law, to wit: SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

(emphasis and underscoring supplied) As stated above, in the initial declaration of martial law, it is the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines that declares martial law for a maximum period of sixty (60) days. Upon its declaration, it shall become immediately effective. It is subject to a review by Congress within forty-eight (48) from its declaration.

With respect to the extension of martial law, the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 18 clearly states that Congress is empowered to extend the duration of martial law. The President's only role in such an extension is that he is the one who initiates it. Notably, even if the President initiates the said extension, it is not immediately effective.

It is only when Congress grants the extension, after determining that invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it, that it becomes operational. Evidently, the power of Congress is more potent than that of the President when it comes to the extension of martial law. Stated differently, when there is an extension of the duration of martial law, the Constitution confers on Congress the authority to grant or deny it.

If Congress does not find any basis to grant the requested extension, then it shall not exceed the sixty (60) day period of its initial declaration. Congress' power to extend the proclamation of martial law is observed in the following Constitutional deliberations: MR. REGALADO | In the first situation where the President declares martial law, there had to be a prescribed period because there was no initial concurrence requirement.

And if there was no concurrence, the martial law period ends at 60 days. Thereafter, if they intend to extend the same suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation of martial law, it is upon the initiative of the President this time, with the prior concurrence of Congress. So, the period of extension has already been taken into account by both the Executive and the Legislative, unlike the first situation where the President acted alone without prior concurrence.

The reason for the limitation in the first does not apply to the extension.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt21g)xxx ---|--- MR. SUAREZ | That is correct. I think the two of them must have to agree on the period; but it is theoretically possibly that when the President writes a note to the Congress because it would be at the instance of the President that the extension have to be granted by Congress, it is possible that the period for the extension may be there.

It is also possible that it may not be there. That is the reason why we want to make it clear that there must be a reasonable period for the extension. So, if my suggestion is not acceptable to the Committee, may I request that a voting be held on it, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS | Madam President, may I just propose something because I see the problem. Suppose we were to say "or extend the same FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY CONGRESS"

- that gives Congress a little flexibility on just how long the extension should be. MR.OPLE | Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective judgment of that point upon the expiration of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative, the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ. FR.

BERNAS | Yes, participation of the President is there but by giving the final decision to Congress, we are also preserving the idea that the President may not revoke what Congress has decided upon. MR. OPLE | The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of these encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion and rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection.

That is the reason I am in favor of the present formulation. However, if Commissioner Suarez insists on his amendment, I do not think I will stand in the way. Thank you.

Madam President.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt22g)xxx MR.

CONCEPCION | If I may add a word. The one who will do the fighting is the executive but, of course, it is expected that if the Congress wants to extend, it will extend for the duration of the fighting. If the fighting goes on, I do not think it is fair to assume that the Congress will refuse to extend the period, especially since in this matter the Congress must act at the instance of the executive.

He is the one who is supposed to know how long it will take him to fight. Congress may reduce it, but that is without prejudice to his asking for another extension, if necessary.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt23g) (emphases supplied) The framers of the Constitution gave Congress flexibility on the period of the declaration of martial law. It was emphasized therein that the final decision to extend the said declaration rests with Congress.

Whether the President states a specific period of extension or not, Congress ultimately decides on the said period. Until it grants the extension, the sixty (60) day period of the initial declaration of martial law prevails. In effect, by becoming the granting authority, Congress limits the President's power to extend the period of martial law.

During the Constitutional deliberations, it was recognized that there are many limitations and encumbrances in the President's power to declare martial law. Commissioner Ople even raised apprehension that the encumbrances of martial law under the constitutional provision may compel the President to simply declare a revolutionary government. However, such apprehension did not prevail because the present wording of the Constitution grants Congress the ultimate authority to decide whether the period of martial law should be extended.

Manifestly, there is no specific period stated in the extension of the period of martial law because the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide the reasonable period for such an extension. In the event that the President requires more time to quell a rebellion or invasion beyond the granted period of extension, then his remedy is to ask for another extension from Congress. Manifestly, as discussed by Commissioner Concepcion, the framers also considered the possibility that there will be more than one (1) extension should the first extension be insufficient.

Thus, Congress has the prerogative to determine for itself the period of the extension of martial law. In this case, it used the flexibility granted to it by the Constitution to determine that the reasonable period of extension of martial law over Mindanao should be for one (1) year or until December 31, 2018. The petitioners cannot deny the flexibility of Congress in determining the extended period for martial law.

They should have focused on assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis for extending the period of martial law. However, as discussed supra, the petitioners failed to assail the said factual basis. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the reasonable period of extension as determined by Congress must stand.

Extent of review of Congress and the Supreme Court differs The role of Congress in granting the extension of martial law is vital. Due to the essential authority of Congress, it is proper to examine the review it can undertake to determine the propriety of granting such extension initiated by the President. It was thoroughly discussed in Lagman that the power of Congress to review a declaration of martial law is independent from that of the Court.

Congress has a greater scope of review compared to the Court, to wit: The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt24g) In this case, the President sent a letter dated December 8, 2017, to the Senate President and House Speaker requesting further extension of the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ.of habeas corpus in Mindanao for an additional year. The letter contained several grounds justifying the extension.

On December 12, 2017, the AFP officials presented and explained the different justifications of the request for the extension of martial law before the Senate and the House of Representatives.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt25g) On December 13, 2017, Congress held a joint session to discuss whether the extension of martial law in Mindanao was warranted. Each member of Congress was granted a maximum of three (3) minutes to explain his allotted time pursuant to Section 7 of Rule IV of the Joint Session of Congress.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt26g) The said three (3) minute rule excluded the time given to resource persons. After thorough discussion and extensive debates, two hundred forty (240) members of Congress affirmed that rebellion persists and that public safety requires the further extension of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for one (1) year in Mindanao.

I concur with the ponencia that Congress complied with its constitutional duty to review the extension of martial law before granting the same. From the onset, the Constitutional framers intended that the procedure of review by Congress under Section 18 should be accelerated and simplified due to the pressing need of the President and the people when there is actual invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it, to wit: FR. BERNAS | I quite realize that there is this recourse to the Supreme Court and there is a time limit, but at the same time because of the extraordinary character of this event when martial law is imposed, I would like to make it easier for the representatives of the people to review this very significant action taken by the President.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt27g) (emphasis supplied) ---|--- The three-minute rule provided for each member of Congress to speak before the Joint Session is reasonable pursuant to the constitutional intent to accelerate the proceedings for review under Section 18.

The said congressional rule even excluded the time allocated to resource speakers invited by Congress.

To hold otherwise, where each member of Congress is given an unlimited time to interpolate, will no longer serve the purpose of expediently resolving the extension of martial law. Verily, as long as the members of Congress are all given equal opportunity to voice their opinions, then they can effectively review the significant action taken by the President. Moreover, the procedure laid down by the Joint Session Rules of Congress is pursuant to its power to determine its own rules of proceedings.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt28g) The rule-making power of Congress is a grant of full discretionary authority in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules.

As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt29g) Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate or the House of Representatives is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt30g) Here, the petitioners failed to specify how Congress, in the joint session, violated its own rules of procedure or how the said rules were violative of the right to due process even though each member of Congress was given the opportunity to be heard.

Absent any evidence of arbitrariness, the proceedings during the joint session of Congress on December 13, 2017 must be upheld. Pursuant thereto, Congress properly issued the Resolution of Both Houses No. 4,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt31g) viz: WHEREAS, in a communication addressed to the Senate and the House of Representatives, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte requested the Congress of the Philippines "to further extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, from 01 January 2018 to 31 December 2018, or for such other period of time as the Congress may determine, in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution[;]" WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but nevertheless reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in- Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayaff Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with communist rule; xxx WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session, by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its Members, has determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety indubitably requires the further extension of the Proclamation of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole Mindanao: Now, therefore, be it Resolve by the Senate and the House of Represenatives in a Joint Session Assembled, To further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole of Mindanao"

for a period of one (1) year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt32g) For failure of the petitioners to overcome the prima facie case establishing the factual basis presented by the respondents in necessitating the extension of the period of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao for one (1) year, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1g) Memorandum of the OSG, pp. 4-5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2g) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3g) Oral Arguments- En Banc, January 17, 2018, pp. 59-60. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4g) G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5g) 265 Phil. 325 (1990).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6g) Umil v. Ramos (Resolution), 279 Phil. 266, 295 (1991). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7g) Supra note 5 at 336-337. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8g) Id.

at 336. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9g) Oral Arguments - En Banc, January 17, 2018, pp. 154-155. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10g) 71U.S.2 (1866) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11g) 327 U.S. 304 (1946).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12g) Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, pp. 412-413. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13g) Duncan v. Sheriff Kahanamoku, supra note 10.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14g) See Gumaua v. Espino, 185 Phil. 283 (1980); and Bernas, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government Part I, 2010 ed., p. 473. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15g) Oral Arguments - En Banc, January 16, 2018, p.

115. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16g) Oral Arguments - En Banc, January 17, 2018, pp. 146-147. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt17g) Id.

at 136. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18g) Id. at 148.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt19g) Id. at 150. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt20g) Id.

at 151. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt21g) Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, p.

507. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt22g) Id. at 508-509.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt23g) Id. at 510.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt24g) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt25g) Oral Arguments - En Banc, January 17, 2018, p. 99.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt26g) Petition in G.R. No. 235935, p. 17. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt27g) Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol.

II, p. 494. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt28g) SECTION 16.

Xxx (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt29g) Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee on the Whole, 660 Phil. 202, 220 (2011).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt30g) Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 598 Phil. 981, 986 (2009). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt31g) Memorandum of the OSG, pp. 23-24. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt32g) Id.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [![](https://lawphil.net/images/back.gif)](javascript:history.back$1$) [![](https://lawphil.net/images/top.gif)](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION PERLAS-BERNABE,J.: I concur. Before the Court are consolidated petitions(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1pb) which assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2pb) dated December 13, 2017,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3pb) that further extended the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4pb) entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5pb) from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

Pertinent portions of this Resolution read: WHEREAS, in a communication addressed to the Senate and the House of Representatives, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte requested the Congress of the Philippines "to further extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, from 01 January 2018 to 31 December 2018, or for such other period of time as the Congress may determine, in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution"; WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but nevertheless reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule; xx xx WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session, by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its Members, has determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety indubitably requires the further extension of the Proclamation of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in a Joint Session Assembled, To further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao"

for a period of one (1) year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. I. Parameters of Review. At the onset, it should be pointed out that the Court's parameter of review over this case remains the same as its p.arameter of review over President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's (the President) initial proclamation of martial law, as was undertaken by this Court in the consolidated cases of Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Salvador C. Medialdea, Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 (Lagman v. Medialdea).(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6pb) Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution (Section 18, Article VII) vests unto this Court special jurisdiction to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, not only the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law, but also "the extension thereof,"

viz.: Section 18. x x x. xx xx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

(Emphases and underscoring supplied) In my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, I have explained that the term "sufficient factual basis" under Section 18, Article VII is a conceptually novel and distinct parameter of review, which should not be equated to the gauge of arbitrariness (as in the standard of grave abuse of discretion in certiorari cases) but should, instead, be construed in its generic sense - that is, adequate proof of compliance with the constitutional requisites. Thus, insofar as reviewing the President's proclamation of martial law, the parameter and its underlying considerations were summed up as follows: [T]he parameter "sufficient factual basis"

under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution simply means that there is adequate proof to show that the President had complied with the two requisites to impose martial law. These requisites are: (1) that there exists an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) that the public safety so requires the same. There is adequate poof that the President complied with the first requisite if the elements of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the RPC concur; this means that the rebellion is not merely imminent but has been actually consummated.

On the other hand, there is adequate proof that the President complied with the second requisite if it is shown that the public safety demands the imposition of martial law under a particular territorial extent; since public safety is a malleable concept, the Court should then gauge whether or not there is a reasonable need to impose martial law in light of the exigencies of the situation and concomitantly, whether its territorial extent is rationally commensurate to the said exigencies.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7pb) Although the parameter of review remains the same, the object of review in this case is different. Here, the object of review is not the President's initial proclamation of martial law - as in Proclamation No. 216 decided in Lagman v. Medialdea - but rather, the Congress' extension of the President's martial law proclamation, as embodied in Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017.

As such, there is no reason to apply the principle of conclusiveness of judgment as respondents would suppose.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8pb) Notably, while Congress had, in fact, earlier extended Proclamation No. 216(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9pb) through Resolution of Both Houses No. 2(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10pb) dated July 22, 2017,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11pb) the Constitution does not proscribe any limitation on either (a) the number of times an extension may be made, or (b) the duration of time for which a particular extension may be made. Thus, contrary to petitioners' postulation,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12pb) Congress is not precluded from either extending martial law for a second time or extending martial law for a period of more than sixty (60) days.

Pursuant to Section 18, Article VII, the power to extend martial law belongs to Congress; however, the exercise of this power is "[u]pon the initiative of the President": Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Being a power specifically conferred unto Congress, it is not bound by the recommendation of the President regarding any proposed extension; thus, it may engage in its own independent examination on the matter, and consequently, may arrive at its own reasons in deciding on whether or not to extend martial law. In this sense, Congress - being composed of the duly-elected representatives of the people - acts as a legislative body in deciding whether or not to extend martial law in our country, and necessarily, if an extension is so decided, sets the extension's terms as it deems fit.

However, as observed during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, Congress' decision-making process would necessarily be in consultation with the President.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13pb) This is because it is the President who not only seeks the proclamation's extension but also ultimately possesses the information and expertise to deal with a persisting invasion or rebellion. As pointed out in Lagman v. Medialdea: "It is for the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence or documents/] reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ." Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents is accorded even "when the authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed."

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14pb) While Congress makes the final decision, this necessary interaction between the political branches of government shows that the entire process of extending the proclamation of martial law is - as described by the Framers - a "joint executive and legislative act,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15pb) animated by the "principle of collective judgment."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt16pb) Meanwhile, same as reviewing the President's power to proclaim martial law, the Court acts as a check to the Congress' power to extend martial law.

In the latter respect, the Court's task, upon the institution of the appropriate proceeding by any citizen, is to determine if there is sufficient factual basis to show that: (a) the invasion or rebellion still persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension. Pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, these two (2) requirements ought to be satisfied by Congress before it may properly decree a martial law extension. II.

Persistence of Rebellion. In my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, I have discussed the unique nature of rebellion and in such light, broached how the concept of "actual rebellion" should be understood under the Constitution's martial law provision: [I]n light of the nature of rebellion (1) as a movement, (2) as a complex net of intrigues and plots, (3) as a continuing crime, and (4) as a political offense, it is my view that this Court cannot confine the concept of rebellion to the actual exchange of fire between the accused rebels and the forces of the government.

As above-intimated, the taking up of arms against the government is only what consummates the crime of rebellion in order to prosecute those accused thereof under the RPC. However, up until that movement stops (for instance, when the rebels surrender or are caught by government operatives), it is my opinion that the rebellion continues to survive in legal existence. xx xx [T]he crime of rebellion defies our ordinary impression that a crime's occurrence can be pinpointed to a definite territory, much less its existence bounded to a particular moment in time.

Because of its nature, rebellion is hardly compatible with the norms of spatial and temporal limitability, as usually applied in our criminal law.

It is in this specific light that we should understand the concept of an actual rebellion under the Constitution's martial law provision.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17pb) As above-highlighted, it has been my position that a rebellion, because of its peculiar conceptual features, survives in legal existence up until the rebellious movement stops, such as when the rebels have already surrendered or that they are caught by government operatives. As it may, however, be impractical, if not impossible, to accurately ascertain if all the members of a rebel movement have surrendered or have been killed or captured at a certain point in time, then a satisfactory showing of the rebel movement's substantial inactivity or loss of capability to mount a public uprising would reasonably suffice. In this case, however, there is no evidence to show that the rebel movement in Mindanao, comprised of the Maute-Hapilon Group and other rebel groups under the DAESH/ISIS(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt18pb) front, has been substantially inactive or has lost the capability to mount a public uprising.

On the contrary, respondents have competently proven that these rebels have, in fact, regrouped, thereby demonstrating that the rebellion still persists. Records show that respondents' determination was arrived at based on field reports and technical data coming from no less than the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The information gathered by our troops on the ground was then conveyed by the President in his December 8, 2017 letter to Congress: On 04 December 2017[,] I received a letter from Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, as Martial Law Administrator, stating that "based on current security assessment made by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the undersigned recommends the extension of Martial Law for another twelve (12) months or one (1) year beginning January 1, 2018 until December 31, 2018 covering the whole island of Mindanao primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other likeminded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters, and financiers x x x."

A copy of Secretary Lorenzana's letter (together with a copy of the letter of AFP Chief Guerrero) is attached for your convenient reference.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt19pb) In the same letter, the President summed up the security assessment of the AFP, as supported by the PNP, into five (5) integral points. These points constitute the reasons which impelled the President to seek a further extension of martial law from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018: The security assessment submitted by the AFP, supported by a similar assessment by the Philippine National Police (PNP), highlights certain essential facts that I, as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, have personal knowledge of. First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their Groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion.

More specifically, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with their protectors, supporters and sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards radicalization/recruitment, financial and logistical build-up, as well as in their consolidation/ reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan. These activities are geared towards the conduct of intensified atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in the whole of Southeast Asia. Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area.

Turaifie is said to be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH [Wilayat] in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) [continues] to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. For this year, the BIFF has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassments and roadside bombings against government troops.

Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security concern. Reports indicate that this year they have conducted at least forty-three (43) acts of terrorism, including attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), harassments, and kidnappings which have resulted in the killing of eight (8) civilians, three (3) of whom were mercilessly beheaded. Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied with addressing the challenges posed by the DAESH-inspired DIWM and other Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NPA) took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule.

x x x x(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt20pb) (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Notably, Congress adopted these same considerations as evinced from the text of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4: WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but nevertheless reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting, the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters [continues] to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule[.] As correctly observed by the ponencia, "[t]he reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension [of martial law] indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its 'remnants' have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces[,] and continued attacks."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt21pb) These "remnants", as explained by the respondents, "are capable of launching retaliatory attacks against the Government and sowing acts of terrorism against the civilian population to wrest control of Mindanao and continue their bid to establish a wilayah in the region.

In addition, they have established linkages with other rebel groups such as the BIFF, AKP, ASG, DI Maguid, DI Turaifie who are capable of perpetrating strategic and well-coordinated mass casualty attacks to overthrow the present government."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt22pb) As further elaborated upon by the APP during the oral arguments of this case, the manpower of the Daw/ah Jslamiyah, which is the DAESH-affiliate organization in the Philippines responsible for the Marawi Siege and is composed of several local terrorist groups, "increased by more or less 400, with almost the same strength that initially stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and decentralized recruitment of the [DAESH]-inspired groups at their respective areas of concentration."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt23pb) "These newly recruited personalities were motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities; revenge for their killed relatives and parents during the Marawi operations; financial gain as new recruits were given an amount ranging from Phpl5,000.00 to Php50,000.00; [and] as radicalized converts."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt24pb) Furthermore, the AFP has expressed concerns that "the situation has [in fact] become [more] complicated with the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), capitalizing on the porous maritime boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and business men.

As of this period, 48 [FTFs] were monitored joining the [DAESH]-inspired groups, particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and Turaifie Group in Central Mindanao. The closeness of these two groups is predominant with Abu DAR who has historically established link with Turaifie."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt25pb) Based on this information, it is thus highly apparent that the rebellion subject of Proclamation No. 216 still persists. Petitioners did not only fail to refute the data presented to this Court by the government, but more so, have mistakenly equated the end of the rebellion with the so-called liberation of Marawi City.

While it is true that the President had himself declared the liberation of Marawi City on October 17, 2017,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt26pb) this declaration only signifies the fact that the actual firefighting between the rebels and government forces in the said city had been halted. However, as stated in my Separate Opinion in Lagman v.

Medialdea, the rebellion survives in legal existence up until the rebellious movement stops.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt27pb) The cessation of the actual exchange of fire between the rebels and government forces is not enough to declare an end to the rebellion as these rebels may as well regroup and shore up their strength, as in fact, what happened in this case. Besides, as aptly noted by the ponencia, the announced liberation of Marawi City (on October 17, 2017) was made "nearly two months before the President's request for extension in December 2017. Such declaration does not preclude the occurrence of supervening events as the AFP discovered through its monitoring efforts."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt28pb) As held in Lagman v. Medialdea, "Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt29pb) To clarify, these supervening events should not only pertain to the regrouping efforts of the aforestated rebel "remnants"

but also the inclusion of other rebel groups, such as the BIFF, the Turaifie Group and the NPA, whose rebellious activities during the supervening period may have amplified - if not, complicated - the situation. As the Constitution reads, the persistence of an invasion or rebellion (together with the public requirement) is sufficient for an extension to be decreed. Nowhere has it been required that the extension should solely relate to the supervening activities of the same rebel group covered by the initial proclamation.

If such were the case, then (a) the Constitution would have so stated or the Framers would have so discussed this requirement; or (b) the President would have to impractically issue a separate martial law proclamation just to cover the supervening activities of other rebel groups when, in reality, the government has to deal with the entire impact of a state of rebellion. Besides, while not specifically identified in Proclamation No. 216, the President mentioned of "other rebel groups" therein and had, in fact, considered the siege of Marawi City as a demonstration of the capability of the Maute Group, as well as of these "other rebel groups"

"to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt30pb) As such, it can be reasonably inferred that the identification of the Maute Group in Proclamation No. 216 was not meant to be exclusive. In this relation, the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea, had, in fact, recognized "the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups," concluding that "the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt31pb) Thus, the President and the Congress' consideration of these other rebel groups, while not specifically named in Proclamation No. 216, should be deemed as reasonable.

Finally, while the NPA has been recognized to be a "decades-long rebellion," the ponencia correctly states that its '"intensified' insurgence clearly bears a significant impact on the security of Mindanao and the safety of its people, which were the very reasons for the martial law proclamation and its initial extension."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt32pb) Thus, the NPA's inclusion should not render the subject extension void. III.

Public Safety Requires the Extension of Martial Law. The Constitution not only requires the persistence of rebellion but also, that public safety still requires its extension.

As earlier stated, not only does Congress have the power to decide whether or not to extend a proclamation of martial law, it also has the power to dictate the terms of extension, which includes, of course, the extension's length. In my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, I have discussed that "the second requirement [on public safety] is a more malleable concept of discretion, whereby deference to the prudential judgment of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to meet the exigencies of the situation should be properly accorded."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt33pb) However, I have qualified that "our deference x x x must be circumscribed within the bounds of truth and reason[:]"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt34pb) truth relates to the Court's duty to ascertain the veracity of the facts presented by the government, whereas reasonableness may be determined through an overall appreciation of the surrounding circumstances.

With respect to the latter, the Court may consider "the reported armed capabilities, resources, influence, and connections of the rebels"; "the historical background of the rebel movement"; and further, "the President's estimation of the rebels' future plan of action. If the estimation, when taken together with all the foregoing factors, does not seem implausible or farfetched, then this Court should defer to the President's military strategy."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt35pb) In this case, the President requested Congress to extend martial law over the entire Mindanao from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 based on his prudential estimation that it would take such period of time to quell the rebellion: A further extension of the implementation of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will help the AFP, the [PNP], and all other law enforcement agencies to quell completely and put an end to the on-going rebellion in Mindanao and prevent the same from escalating to other parts of the country.

Public safety indubitably requires such further extension, not only for the sake of security and public order, but more importantly to enable the government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the bigger task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic growth and development. For all these reasons, I ask the Congress of the Philippines to further extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, from 01 January 2018 to 31 December 2018, or for such other period of time as the Congress may determine, in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt36pb) After due deliberation, Congress had overwhelmingly acceded to this request, thereby showing its deference to the President as this country's chief military strategist: WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session, by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its Members, has determined that rebellion persists,' and that public safety indubitably requires the further extension of the Proclamation of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in a Joint Session Assembled, To further extend Proclamation No.

216, Series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a period of one (1) year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt37pb) As explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F Leonen in his Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, "Congress deals primarily with the wisdom behind the proclamation xx x" and "[m]uch deference is xx x accorded to [it] x x x when it comes to determining the wisdom behind the imposition or continued imposition of martial law or the suspension of the writ."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt38pb) The ponencia finds that "[t]he facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt39pb) As detailed in the ponencia, the following circumstances and events demonstrate the public necessity to extend martial law over the entire Mindanao: (a) No less than 185 persons in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large.

Remnants of the Hapilon and Maute groups have been monitored by the AFP to be reorganizing and consolidating their forces in Central Mindanao, particularly in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan, and strengthening their financial and logistical capability. (b) After the military operation in Marawi City, the Basilan-based ASG, the Maute Group, the Maguid Group and the Turaifie Group, comprising the DAESH-affiliate Dawlah Islamiyah that was responsible for the Marawi siege, was left with 137 members and a total of 166 firearms. These rebels, however, were able to recruit 400 new members, more or less, in Basilan, the Lanao Provinces, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao.

(c) The new recruits have since been trained in marksmanship, bombing and tactics in different areas in Lanao del Sur. Recruits with great potential are trained in producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and urban operations. These new members are motivated by their clannish culture, being relatives of terrorists, by revenge for relatives who perished in the Marawi operations, by money as they are paid ₱15,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, and by radical ideology.

(d) 48 FTFs have joined said rebel groups and are acting as instructors to the recruits. Foreign terrorists, from Southeast Asian countries, particularly from Indonesia and Malaysia, will continue to take advantage of the porous borders of the Philippines and enter the country illegally to join the remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebel groups. (e) In November 2017, 15 Indonesian and Malaysian DAESH-inspired FTFs entered Southern Philippines to augment the remnants of the Maguid group in Sarangani province.

In December 2017, 16 Indonesian DAESH-inspired FTFs entered the Southern Philippines to augment the ASG-Basilan and Maute groups in the Lanao province. In January 2018, an unidentified Egyptian DAESH figure was monitored in the Philippines. (f) At least 32 FTFs were killed in the Marawi operations.

(h) "Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype [Turaifie], and the ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including the cities ·of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga, and Cotabato." (i) The Turaifie [G]roup conducts roadside bombings and attacks against government forces, civilians and populated areas in Mindanao. The group plans to set off bombings in Cotabato.

Nine kidnap victims are still held in captivity. (m) Hapilon's death fast-tracked the unification of the Sulu and Basilan-based ASG to achieve the common goal of establishing a DAESH-ISIS wilayat in Mindanao. This likely merger may spawn retaliatory attacks such as IED bombings, in urban areas, particularly in the cities of Zamboanga, Isabela and Lamitan.

With the spotlight on terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Southeast Asia following the Marawi siege, the AFP likewise indicated that the influx of FTFs in the Southern Philippines will persist. The AFP further referred to possible lone-wolf attacks and atrocities from other DAESH-inspired rebel groups in vulnerable cities like Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan and Zamboanga.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt40pb) Petitioners, for their part, have failed to disprove the occurrence of the foregoing circumstances and events. They instead, harp on the allegation that due to the liberation of Marawi City, martial law is not anymore necessary to preserve the public's safety.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt41pb) Clearly, such narrow reasoning cannot prevail over the President and the Congress' holistic appreciation of the case.

With intelligence reports showing that the Maute Group has, in fact, regrouped and that other rebel groups have either linked with the DAESH/ISIS front or have taken advantage of the situation and intensified their operations, the threat to public safety undoubtedly remains present. As to whether or not the objective of resolving such threat can be achieved in one (1) year - to my mind - this Court is hardly competent to provide a precise estimation. The Court's task is to determine the sufficiency of the extension's factual basis and in so doing, (a) vet if the facts presented are true, and (b) assess if the decreed extension is reasonable.

As earlier intimated, if the President's estimation does not appear to be implausible or farfetched, then this Court should defer to his plan of action, especially so since Congress has further given its assent.

Notably, APP Chief of Staff General Rey Leonardo Guerrero asked this Court during the oral arguments of this case to trust their years of experience on the ground, their expertise in military strategy, and their capacity to make split-second decisions which may spell the difference between life and death.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt42pb) In this case, no cogent cause has been shown for this Court to deny this trust to its co-equal branches of government. Thus, considering that there exists sufficient factual basis to show that the rebellion still persists and that public safety requires the extension of martial law under the terms stated in Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1pb) There are four (4) petitions filed assailing the martial law extension.

The Petition in G.R. No. 235935 was filed on December 27, 2017, while the Petition in G.R. No. 236061 was filed on January 8, 2018. Petitions in G.R. No. 236145 and G.R. No. 236155 were both filed on January 12, 2018. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2pb) Entitled "RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES FURTHER EXTENDING PROCLAMATION No. 216, SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED "DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"

FOR A PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR FROM JANUARY 1, 2018 TO DECEMBER 31, 2018." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3pb) See Annex "A" of Memorandum for the Petitioner in G.R. No. 236145 dated January 24, 2018.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4pb) Issued on May 23, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5pb) See Annex "l" of the Comment of respondents dated January 8, 20-18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6pb) See Decision in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, July 4, 2017. The Resolution on the motion for reconsideration was promulgated on December 5, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7pb) See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, id., p.

22. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8pb) See Comment of respondents dated January 8, 2018; pp. 8-10; and Memorandum for the Respondents dated January 24, 2018, pp. 38-40. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9pb) Proclamation No. 216 was to end on July 22, 2017, or the last day of the sixty (60)-day period provided under Section 18, Article VII.

Pursuant to Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 dated July 22, 2017, Proclamation No. 216 was originally extended until December 31, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10pb) Entitled "RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES EXTENDING UNTIL 31DECEMBER2017 PROCLAMATION No. 216, SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED "DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11pb) See Annex "B"

of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12pb) See discussions in the Petitions: G.R. No. 235935, pp. 20-25; and G.R. No. 236061, pp. 28-30. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13pb) THE PRESIDENT.

Commissioner Azcuna is recognized. MR. AZCUNA.

Thank you, Madam President. I would like to offer an amendment to Section 15, line 7 of page 7. After the word "or,"

insert a comma (,) and add the phrase: AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT, so that the amended portion will read: "may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President, or AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. May we know the reaction of the Committee? The reason for this, Madam President, is that the extension should not merely be an act of Congress but should be requested by the President.

Any extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should have the concurrence of both the President and Congress. Does the Committee accept my amendment? MR.

REGALADO. The Committee accepts that amendment because it will, at the same time, solve the concern of Commissioner Suarez, aside from the fact that this will now be a joint executive and legislative act. xx xx MR.

OPLE. May I just pose a question to the Committee in connection with the Suarez amendment? Earlier Commissioner Regalado said that that [sic] point was going to be a collective judgment between the President and the Congress.

Are we departing from that now in favor of giving Congress the plenipotentiary power to determine the period? FR. BERNAS.

Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing this in consultation with the President, and the President would be outvoted by about 300 Members. MR. OPLE.

Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective judgment of that point upon the expiration of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative, the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ. FR. BERNAS.

Yes, the participation of the President is there but by giving the final decision to Congress, we are also preserving the idea that the President may not revoke what Congress has decided upon. (II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 507-509 [July 31, 1986]; emphases and underscoring supplied) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14pb) See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 68.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15pb) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 508 (July 31, 1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16pb) Id. at 509.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt17pb) See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, pp. 16 and 18. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18pb) Acronym of the group's full Arabic name, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, translated as "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." (See Letter to Congress of the President dated July 18, 2017, Annex "D"

of the Petition in G.R. No. 236145). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt19pb) See Letter dated December 8, 2017 of the President; Annex "E" of the Petition in G.R. No. 236145, p.

2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt20pb) See id. at 2-3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt21pb) Ponencia, p. 40. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt22pb) See Memorandum for the Respondents dated January 24, 2018, p.

30. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt23pb) Statement of AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Major General Fernando Trinidad during a Power Point briefing in the Oral Arguments, TSN, January 17, 2018, pp. 58-59. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt24pb) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt25pb) Id. at 60. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt26pb) Petition (G.R. No. 235935), p.

4; Petition (G.R. No. 236061), p. 10; Petition (G.R. No. 236145), p. 5; and Petition (G.R. No. 236155), p.

12.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt27pb) See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 16. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt28pb) Ponencia, p.

43. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt29pb) See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 28.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt30pb) WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. (See Proclamation No. 216.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt31pb) See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 78.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt32pb) Ponencia, p. 49. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt33pb) See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p.

12. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt34pb) See id. at 20.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt35pb) See id. at 21. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt36pb) See Letter dated December 8, 2017 of the President, Annex "E"

of the Petition in G.R. No. 236145, p. 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt37pb) See Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017, Annex "A"

of the Memorandum for the Petitioner in G.R. No. 236145. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt38pb) See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 20; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt39pb) Ponencia, p. 57. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt40pb) Id.

at 50-53. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt41pb) See Petition (G.R. No. 235935), p. 4; Petition (G.R. No. 236061), p.

10; Petition (G.R. No. 236145), p. 5; and Petition (G.R. No. 236155), p. 12.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt42pb) General [Rey Leonardo] Guerrero: Thank you, Your Honor. Ifl may be allowed to respond[.] Yes, Your Honor, it has been a challenge[.] [I]t's been challenging to answer to [sic] your questions propounded here before me because, clearly, Your Honor, what is expected of me is to try to dissect definitions of sections about how the military operates[,] [ w ]hen in truth and in fact, Sir, the military operates in a manner that is hard to explain to legal minds, [and] to people from the other professions. We based our decisions partly on information that we gather[.] [I]n some instances, [they] are imperfect.

We take risks[-] calculated risks, and normally we also rely on our gut feel, which is for many people probably would not understand. But our gut feel is based on our years of experience in the field, in combat[,] or we make decisions in a split of a second. Our decision could necessarily result in the loss of lives, destruction of property.

This afternoon, Your Honors, we presented to you the reasons why we [are] recommending for the extension of martial law. We provided you with the factual basis of the existence of rebellion in Mindanao. And as to the powers that you are referring to, the powers that we need, it is upon you, what powers you will give us.

We are not asking for any powers, Your Honor. But clearly[,] with the implementation of m'artial law, you have been abled us, you have been able to provide us with the much needed support that we have been longing for, for us to be successful in our campaign and we have done that in Marawi.

And if you will allow us, we will continue to do that and finish our job. We are not asking for any extra powers, Your Honors. xx xx What we are asking is for you to trust us[, t]he people in Marawi, the people in Mindanao[, t]hat we have been able to talk to clearly understand the situation of the military in so far as our performance of our mission is concerned.

We hope that your will also understand our situation. xx x. (TSN, Oral Arguments dated July 17, 2018, pp. 157-158.) The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [![](https://lawphil.net/images/back.gif)](javascript:history.back$1$) [![](https://lawphil.net/images/top.gif)](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#top) SEPARATE OPINION BERSAMIN,J.: I CONCUR.

The Majority opinion ably written for the Court by Justice Tijam reflects my personal persuasion that sufficient facts existed to justify the extension for a period of one year of the proclamation of martial law over Mindanao made by the Congress. The continuing existence of actual rebellion has justified the extension. I write this Separate Opinion to express my views on the nature and coverage of the term appropriate proceedings used in the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as well as on certain procedural matters dealt with in the Majority opinion that I believe need to be clarified.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: x x x The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege 9f the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis Supplied] In explaining the nature and scope of this power of the Court to review the factual sufficiency of the Presidential declaration of martial law and the Congressional concurrence to any extension thereto, the Court said in Lagman v.

Medialdea (Lagman I):(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1b) All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.' During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The Court agrees.

a) Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution.

It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist. A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

b) "In an appropriate proceedinb" does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII. It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceedinb"

would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension.

It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari , the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII. In my Separate Opinion in Lagman I, I agreed with the proposition that the appropriate proceeding mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is different and distinct from the proceeding relating to the Court's exercise of the power of judicial review, whether traditional or expanded.

I explicitly indicated then: The third paragraph of Section 18 suffices to confer on the Court the exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law. To equate the appropriate proceeding to the certiorari action authorized under Section 5(1), in relation to the second paragraph of Section 1, is erroneous. As earlier pointed out, the third paragraph of Section 18 defines the legal duty to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law upon the filing of the petition for the purpose by any citizen.

The Court has then to discharge the duty. The silence of Section 5(1) on what the appropriate proceeding is should be of no consequence because Section 5 is not the sole repository of the cases or situations coming under the Court's jurisdiction.

xx xx The check-and-balance constitutional design set down in Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution establishes a structure of collaboration among the three great branches of the Government in the matter of the proclamation of martial law. Although the power of proclaiming martial law over the country or any part of it is exclusively lodged in the President, he or she is nonetheless required to report to Congress on the proclamation, and Congress shall then decide whether to revoke or extend the state of martial law. The Court, being a passive institution, may be called upon to review and determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation, and whether the public safety requires it, only upon the petition for the purpose by any citizen.

The invocation of the third paragraph of Section 18 by the petitioning citizen suffices to initiate this Court's power to review the sufficiency of the factual bases of the declaration of martial law. This initiation, which triggers the inquiry or review by the Court, albeit unique, conforms to the constitutional design. The appropriate proceeding, once commenced, should not focus on whether the President gravely abused his or her discretion or not in determining the necessity for proclaiming martial law.

Instead, the 1987 Constitution mandates the Court to examine and sift through the factual basis relied upon by the President to justify his proclamation of martial law and to determine whether the factual basis is sufficient or not. To rule that a finding of grave abuse of discretion is essential is to confine the discharge of the duty by the Court within limits not considered at the time of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Doing so may also produce impractical results.

Consider this hypothetical scenario. Supposing that the President cites 10 factual bases for his proclamation of martial law, and the Court, upon its assiduous review of the factual bases, considers nine of the 10 as manufactured or fabricated or inadequate, leaving but one as true or authentic. Under the thesis of the OSG, the Court would necessarily nullify the proclamation simply because the President was found to have gravely abused his or her discretion.

The Court would thereby act indifferently towards the one true or authentic justification on the ground that the grave abuse of discretion as to the nine tainted the proclamation. Moreover, the determination of sufficiency or insufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law is usually a matter of validating the good judgment of the President of the facts or information known to or made available to him or her. This goes without saying that such facts must have occurred prior to or about the time the determination by the President is made.

Whether or not such facts are later shown by subsequent events to be fabricated or false or inadequate is not a decisive factor unless the President is credibly shown to have known of the fabrication or falsity or inadequacy of the factual bases at the time he or she issued the proclamation of martial law. In that situation, the main consideration is definitely not whether or not grave abuse of discretion intervened. My reading of the third paragraph of Section 18 tells me that the term appropriate proceeding is different from the proceedings or actions that the Court may take cognizance of under Section 5( 1) or Section 1.

My foremost reason for so holding is that the third paragraph of Section 1 8 textually mandates the Court to be a trier of facts, an office and function that the Court is not generally called upon to discharge under either Section 5(1) or Section 1. It is true that the Court is not always precluded from reviewing facts. There are occasions when it assumes the role of a trier of facts, like, to name some, in criminal appeals; in appeals from rulings of the Court of Appeals in proceedings for the writ of amparo; or when it sits as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

In fine, I deem it to be plainly erroneous to subsume the appropriate proceeding allowed in the third paragraph of Section 18 to the certiorari jurisdiction vested by Section 5(1) in relation to the expanded jurisdiction defined in second paragraph of Section 1. The Majority opinion adopts several procedural steps that, to me, are not relevant or controlling in this kind of proceedings. The Majority opinion takes issue with the fact that all petitions except that in G.R. No. 2236145 (Rosales petition) did not implead the Congress despite its being an indispensable party.

The Majority opinion states that impleading an indispensable party is jurisdictional, and insists that any proceeding undertaken without an indispensable party is null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the unimpleaded party but even as to the party impleaded; and that impleading an indispensable party is not a trivial matter. I do not share the view stated in the Majority opinion. In my humble view, the requirement of the Rules of Court for the joinder of the indispensable party is not applicable in this kind of proceeding wherein the Court is called upon by the 1987 Constitution to exercise a special and exclusive jurisdiction that is different from the exercise of the Court's judicial power vested under either Section 1, Article VIII or Section 5(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

The requirement of impleading an indispensable party, which is found in Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, demands that a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as a plaintiff or a defendant. Hence, the joinder of the indispensable party is mandatory. Without the presence of the indispensable party, no judgment of a court exercising judicial power can attain real finality because the controversy is not at all thereby resolved, or because the relief proper for the case is not granted.

The absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent acts of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Yet, the requirement of impleading the indispensable party can be true only in proceedings in which the courts exercise judicial power under either Section 1, Article VIII or Section 5(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, not to the present proceedings under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The distinction arises from the fact that the former are proceedings instituted to resolve actual controversies between litigants holding or asserting adverse rights and interests in property or other matters, while the latter are proceedings that focus only on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of the declaration of martial law made by the Congress and do not involve any actual controversy or dispute about rights and interests of parties in interest.

In short, the present proceedings are not concerned with rights and interests, thereby removing the need for the mandatory impleading of any person or entity. NONETHELESS, I vote to DISMISS the petitions. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1b) G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.

In his letter(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt1m) addressed to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte), thru the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero (Gen. Guerrero) recommended, for compelling reasons based on current security assessment, the further extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for twelve (12) months beginning 1 January until 31 December 2018 in the whole island of Mindanao. The reasons cited by Gen.

Guerrero in his letter to justify his recommendation were as follows: 1. The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western, and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi City; 2. Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraifie, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga, and Cotabato; 3.

The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political mobilization (army, party, and mass base building, rallies, pickets and demonstrations, financial and logistical buildup), terrorism against innocent civilians and private entities, and guerilla warfare against the security sector and public government infrastructures; 4. The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order to defeat their strategy, stop their extortion, defeat their armed component, and to stop their recruitment activities; 5. The threats being posed by the CTs, the ASG, and the presence of remnants, protectors, supporters and sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders the speedy 6.

The second extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will significantly help not only the AFP, but also the other stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the ongoing DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety and stability in Mindanao; and 7. In seeking another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to perform anew its mandated task in the same manner that it had dutifully done for the whole duration of Martial Law to date, without any reported human rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority. On 1 December 2017, DND Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana (Sec. Lorenzana) wrote President Duterte recommending the further extension of martial law for a period of one year beginning 1 January until 31 December 2018 "covering the whole island of Mindanao primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters, and financiers, to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development, and prosperity in Mindanao."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt2m) In his letter(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt3m) dated 8 December 201 7, President Duterte informed the Senate and the House of Representatives about the letters he received from Sec. Lorenzana and Gen.

Guerrero. President Duterte stated in his letter that, as Commander in Chief, he has personal knowledge of the security assessment submitted by the AFP and which was supported by a similar assessment by the Philippine National Police (PNP), to wit: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion. You will please note that at least one hundred eighty-five (185) persons listed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large and, in all probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating their forces.

More specifically, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with their protectors, supporters, and sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards the radicalization/recruitment, financial and logistical build up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly in the Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area. Turaifie is said to be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the martial law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato.

For this year, the BIFF has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassment and roadside bombings against government troops. Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security concern. Reports indicate that this year they have conducted at least fortythree (43) acts of terrorism, including attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), harassments, and kidnappings which have resulted in the killing of eight (8) civilians, three (3) of whom were mercilessly beheaded.

Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied with addressing the challenges posed by the DAESH-inspired DIWM and other Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NP A) took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule. xxx Corollary to the above assessments, President Duterte asked that the Congress further extend martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, i.e., from 1 January to 31 December 2018, or for such other period of time as the Congress may determine in accordance with Section (Sec.) 18, Article (Art.) VII of the 1987 Constitution.

President Duterte offered the following explanation: A further extension of the implementation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will help the AFP, the x x x PNP, and all other law enforcement agencies to quell completely and put an end to the ongoing rebellion in Mindanao and prevent the same from escalating to other parts of the country. Public safety indubitably requires such further extension, not only for the sake of security and public order, but more importantly to enable the government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the bigger task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic growth and development. In the Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 4,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt4m) dated 13 December 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives approved President Duterte's request for another extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the period 1 January to 31 December 2018.

Hence, the present petitions. In G.R. No.

235935, petitioners anchored their petition on the following: I. The leadership and supermajority of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines baselessly and with brazen alacrity acceded to the President's initiative of extending the duration of martial law in Mindanao for one full year by relying on the mere say-so of the military and police authorities on the purported "continuing rebellion" by remnants of terrorist groups in Mindanao. II.

The leadership of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, as supported by the supermajority, unduly constricted the period of deliberation and interpellation on the President's request for extension of martial law to an indecent three hours and 35 minutes for considering favorably an extension which will endure for 8, 760 hours in 2018 in the entire Mindanao. III. The threats of violence and terrorism alleged by the President, Philippine National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from remnants of the terrorist groups do not constitute a constitutional ground for the re-extension of martial law in Mindanao.

IV. The extension of one year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 of the period of martial law in Mindanao defies the Constitution's unmistakable mandate of a limited duration of the declaration of martial law and its extension. V. The leadership and supermajority of both Chambers of the Congress of the Philippines wantonly violated and exceeded the congressional authority under the Constitution for a one-time extension of the original proclamation (Proclamation No. 216), and not to re-extend a previous extension or grant a series of extensions amounting to "perpetuity."

VI. Verily, the approval of the extension of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao utterly lacks sufficient factual basis because there is no actual rebellion in Mindanao and the re-extension is extremely long even as the approval was made with undue haste and unscrupulous imprudence. VII.

The leadership and supermajority of both Chambers of the Congress of the Philippines in extending martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. VIII. While martial law does not confer any significant additional powers to the President as well as to the military and police establishments, its imposition and extension emboldens government forces to indiscriminately attack and kill perceived enemies of the State and conduct warrantless arrests, searches and seizures even as the civilian courts are functioning.

IX. Without extending martial law in Mindanao, the President has the constitutional power as Commander in Chief to call out all the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion in Mindanao. In G.R. No. 236061, petitioners raised this sole issue: THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE ENTIRE MINDANAO.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 236145 tried to fortify their petition through the following premises: I. THE INST ANT PETITION SATISFIES THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. II. THE HONORABLE COURT MUST TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXTENSION OF PROCLAMATION NO.

216 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF MARTIAL LAW AS INTENDED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, AND AS ARTICULATED BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN LAGMAN V MEDIALDEA. III. ABSENT AN ACTUAL INVASION OR REBELLION, THERE CAN BE NO SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CONTINUED IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN MINDANAO In G.R. No. 236155, the petitioners raised the following justifications to grant their petition, to wit: A. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS THE POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL MANDA TE TO INDEPENDENTLY DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASES FOR THE EXTENSION OF PROCLAMATION NO.

216 AND IF IT SO DETERMINES, NULLIFY THE SAME. B. THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR, AND CONGRESS' SUBSEQUENT JOINT RESOLUTION TO FUTHER EXTEND THE EFFECTIVITY OF PROCLAMATION NO. 216 UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2018, LACK SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS, AND ARE THEREFORE NULL AND VOID.

DISCUSSION The President is immune from suit during his tenure. We note that in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145, President Duterte was named as a respondent. Jurisprudence dictates that the presidential immunity from suit remains preserved in the system of government of this country, even though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt5m) Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.

Joaquin Bernas, SJ., observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt6m) The President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the position of Chief Executive of the Government requires all of the office-holder's time and demands undivided attention to his duties as Head of State.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt7m) This ruling was further amplified in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt8m) viz: Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. Considering the foregoing, President Duterte should be dropped as respondent in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145.

The act of declaring martial law differs from the act of extending martial law. Sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Section 18. The President shall be the Commander in Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

The act pertaining to the declaration of martial law differs from the extension of martial law. The act of declaring martial law is an executive act, i.e., the President as the Commander in Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, whenever it becomes necessary, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The act of declaring martial law is the sole prerogative of the President.

The act of extending martial law on the one hand, is a joint executivelegislative act brought into motion by the initiative of the President. The extension of martial law is given life because the Congress voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, has determined that actual invasion or rebellion persists, and that public safety requires it. This conforms to the constitutional requirement that it should be "in the same manner"

that the Congress undertook its legislative review of the declaration of martial law that it should determine whether or not to extend martial law. It must be stressed, however, that Congress cannot motu proprio extend martial law as it must first await the request of the President stating the need for the extension, i.e., upon the initiative of the President. On record is Proclamation No. 216(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt9m) issued by President Duterte, on 23 May 2017, through Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, declaring the state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a ,period not exceeding sixty days.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt10m) On the one hand, in view of the President's initiative, the Congress issued RBH Nos. 2 and 4(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt11m) whereby the Senate and the House of Representatives resolved to further extend Proclamation No. 216 until 31 December 2017, and from 1 January to 31 December 2018, respectively.

The act of declaring martial law is subject to an automatic review by Congress, i.e., The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Hence, extant from the records are Senate Resolution No. 49(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt12m) and House Resolution No.

1050(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt13m) which documented the final determination of both bodies, in the exercise of their automatic review power, not to revoke Proclamation No. 2016. Since the matter of extending martial law is an act of Congress, it would be absurd that the same body would subject its determination to its own review. It is only logical to deduce that the Congress, voting jointly, had already threshed out all the issues and concerns before coming to a decision on whether or not to extend martial law.

The duration of martial law as declared by the President should not exceed sixty (60) days, while the life span of an extension of martial law would be subject to its determination by Congress. But whether it is an executive or joint executive-legislative act, martial law can only be justified by the existence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety should require it. It is in this stage that the wisdom of the Court is summoned when it is asked to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the extension thereof.

Thus, whether it is an executive act of declaration of martial law or the executive-legislative act for the extension thereof, the Court can always be called upon to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or extension of martial law. The requisites for the extension of martial law Considering that the term "rebellion" has not been defined in the Constitution, the Court has deferred to the definition in the Revised Penal Code, viz: Art. 134.

Rebellion or insurrection; How committed - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. In Lagman v. Medialdea,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt14m) the Court held that for rebellion to exist the following must be present: (1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

The Court has ruled that in "determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt15m) It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed xx x by the accused."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt16m) It is in view of this required standard that the Court established the metes and bounds to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of martial law, viz: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt17m) Having ascertained that it is upon the initiative of the President that Congress undertake a determination on whether the extension of martial law is warranted, the issue that comes to the fore is the resolution of the parameter that should be observed by the august body in making such determination.

To restate, Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: "x x x Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it." In observing this provision, there is certainty that the same parameter used in determining the sufficiency of factual basis in the declaration of martial law equally applies to its extension, i.e., 1) actual rebellion or invasion persists as required by the Constitution; 2) public safety requires the extension, with the first two requirements present; and 3) there is probable cause for the President and the Congress to believe that actual rebellion or invasion persists. a.

Actual rebellion persists. Petitioners invariably claim that there is no actual rebellion to support the extension of martial law. It must be emphasized that in extending martial law, the President and the legislators need only to convince themselves that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not the rebellion persists.

In his letter dated 8 December 2017, President Duterte stated that the grounds on which he anchored his request for the extension of martial law from 1 January to 31 December 2018 were based on the security assessment submitted by the AFP and the PNP. He claims that he has personal knowledge of the circumstances constituting the security assessment. He clearly acknowledged the persistence of rebellion when he stated that the extension of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus will help the AFP, the PNP, and other law enforcement agencies to quell completely the ongoing rebellion in Mindanao and prevent its escalation to other parts of the country.

Additionally, the recent developments involving the National Democratic Front, the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the New People's Army (NDF-CPP-NPA) portend intensified armed hostilities, which together with the other security concerns continue to make Mindanao a hotbed for rebellion. On the one hand, after four hours of discussion and extensive debate, the Congress, in a joint session with two hundred forty affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its members, determined that rebellion persists and that public safety indubitably required the further extension of martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt18m) At this point, there is a need to repeat the ruling in Lagman that "the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists."

That same purpose applies to the present judicial review insofar as it would determine the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President and the Congress that there is probable cause that rebellion persists. The records confirm that the President and the Congress have separately determined and were convinced that rebellion persists in Mindanao. The Court cannot supplant its own findings with those made by the President and the Congress because to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the well-safeguarded and independent dominion of the executive and the legislature.

The contention of the petitioners that the President should have exercised his extraordinary power of calling out the armed forces instead of requesting the extension of martial law, has no basis. The Court cannot tread on this issue as it clearly recognizes that its power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision as to which extraordinary power to avail of given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be an incursion into the exclusive domain of the executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt19m) In the same vein, the issue as to the duration of the martial law extension is better left to the decision of the Congress considering that the Constitution plainly provides that the august body, in resolving whether or not to extend martial law, shall likewise determine the period for the extension.

The contention that the congressional authority is for a one-time extension of the original proclamation, is without basis. A reading of Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution evinces that there is nothing that would indicate such limitation. For sure, even the contention that the series of extensions may amount to "perpetuity"

is specious considering that there are established parameters for Congress in extending martial law, which extension may even be subject to the Court's judicial review. b. Public safety requires the extension of martial law.

"Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, 'involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/hann, or damage, such as crimes or disasters.' Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt20m) The letter of Pres. Duterte detailing the security assessment by the AFP and the PNP satisfies the public safety requirement for the extension, viz: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion.

You will please note that at least one hundred eighty-five (185) persons listed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large and, in all probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating their forces. More specifically, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with their protectors, supporters, and sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards the radicalization/recruitment, financial and logistical buildup, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan. These activities are geared towards the conduct of intensified atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in the whole of Southeast Asia.

Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area. Turaifie is said to be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the martial law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato.

For this year, the BIFF has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassments and roadside bombings against government troops.

Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security concern. Reports indicate that this year they have conducted at least forty-three (43) acts of terrorism, including attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), harassments, and kidnappings which have resulted in the killing of eight (8) civilians, three (3) of whom were mercilessly beheaded. Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied with addressing the challenges posed by the DAESH-inspired DIWM and other Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NPA) took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist rule.

(italics supplied) Petitioners averred that even President Duterte, in his letter requesting for the extension of martial law, referred to "remnants" of the terrorist groups purportedly recruiting fighters to launch new attacks. Petitioners claimed that "(A)lmost comically, martial law is extended in Mindanao to subdue residual phantoms."

True, the word "remnants" was used by President Duterte in his letter, but this does not mean that the remaining forces of the terrorist groups were not as powerful, or even more powerful as its founders and original fighters. It cannot even be validly claimed that the resolve of the "remnants"

to establish a global Islamic caliphate and a Wilayat had lessened or was completely shattered when the DAESH-inspired fighters and their leaders were neutralized. On the contrary, the death of their fighters and leaders could even have wrongly enlightened the remnants of the alleged nobleness of their cause and would have converted this belief into a stronger resolve to continue to fight the government. The remnants are not specters who do not deserve any attention from the government.

The immense havoc created by the DAESH-inspired DIWM, BIFF, and ASG in Marawi is real. The huge number of dead civilians and military personnel, and the vast amount of funds needed to rebuild Marawi cannot be denied. There is the lingering plausibility that greater massive destruction would result after these groups would have regrouped and consolidated their forces.

There is even the possibility that the NDF-CPP-NPA, which have successfully sown acts of terrorism in different parts of the country, and the Turaifie group, the potential successor of Hapilon as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia, would join the remnants, albeit these groups do not gravitate towards the same goal. And with the assistance of well-funded and highly equipped foreign terrorist groups, it is undeniable that the "remnants" would be a formidable force to reckon with.

Equally significant is the actual need of the government to forthwith contain these terrorist groups in specific areas rather than allow them all over the country. It cannot be denied that it took the government five months to neutralize the DAESH-inspired fighters despite the fact that the terrorist attacks were mostly confined in Marawi. The number of dead civilians and military personnel as well as the huge amount of funds needed to weed out the terrorist groups easily defused whatever victory the government had claimed in neutralizing this terrorist group.

Indeed, the ruins in Marawi are painful reminders to the government that its success sadly mirrors the great failures behind it. The volatile situation in Mindanao right now spawns a good breeding ground for terrorists and their coddlers, supporters, and financiers. The government cannot sit idly by and wait for these terrorist groups to make their move.

The arduous task of crushing the terrorist groups must start posthaste otherwise, another victory, though bittersweet it may be, may not be possible at all for the government if these groups are allowed to proliferate all over the country. The Court has emphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt21m) Considering that an extension of martial law is ineludibly moored on the existence of an actual rebellion that persists and that public safety requires it, there is a paramount urgency for the President and Congress to act quickly to protect the country. c.There is probable cause for the President and the Congress to believe that actual rebellion persists.

Records will confirm that both the President and the Congress have separately determined whether actual rebellion persists in Mindanao, and in the process are convinced that there exists probable cause that actual rebellion persists. Worth noting, the President has a wide range of information available to him, and that he has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt22m) The President has the prerogative to share these information with Congress in fortifying his request for the extension of martial law, which information the Court may not even be privy to. Likewise, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President; thus, it is restrained in the exercise of its judicial review power not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt23m) In stark contrast, petitioners have miserably failed to present evidence that would controvert the records that have swayed the President and the Congress to conclude that rebellion persists.

In fine, the President and the Congress have successfully discharged their burden as to the sufficiency of the factual basis that convinced them that there was probable cause that rebellion persists. Judicial review of the declaration of martial law and its extension is pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. J urisprudence(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt24m) has settled that the "appropriate proceedinm"

referred to in Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution does not refer to a petition for certiorari pursuant to Sec. 1 or 5 of Art. VIII, viz: It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceedinm" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions.

Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VIL Clearly, petitioners erred when they invoked Sections 1 or 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in mooring their assertion that the Senate and the House of Representatives committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of their functions.

Congress is clothed by the Constitution with the authority to determine its rules of proceedings. Sec.

16(3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. It was obviously pursuant to this constitutional provision that the Congress had adopted the rules that governed the Joint Session when it resolved to extend martial law from 1 January to 31 December 2018.

Accordingly, the issues raised by the petitioners insofar as they are specifically anchored on the propriety of the rules, are beyond the judicial review of this Court, viz: The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus: First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.

" This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt25m) (emphasis supplied) Petitioners can very well raise the issue on the propriety of the rules of Congress or violation thereof by its members in a proper proceeding, but definitely the present petitions filed pursuant to the Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution could not be the proper vehicle. It is for this reason that the Court necessarily has to defer to its abovequoted ruling and decline to rule on whether Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in extending martial law.

Finally, the query: Who is afraid of martial law? The fear that the present martial rule in Mindanao may lead to a dictatorial regime similar to what transpired when the late President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the entire Philippines in 1972 is speculative and unfounded. The factual milieu and legal environment surrounding the present martial law in Mindanao are totally different from those prevailing during martial rule in 1972.

The declaration of martial law in 1972 was premised on the alleged intensified communist insurgency and perceived threat by the NP A as shown by the alleged series of bombings and assassination attempts throughout the country.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt26m) This was permitted by Article VII, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution which provided for justifications for declaration of martial law not present under the 1987 Constitution.

In particular, under the 1935 Constitution, the President of the Philippines, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law when there is lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. On the other hand, the present martial law in Mindanao is based on the actual threat presented by a local terrorist group aligned with a foreign terrorist organization when they attacked government and other vital facilities, and took over Marawi City. These facts led President Duterte to believe that there was an armed public uprising with the purpose of removing a portion of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines from its allegiance thereto.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt27m) Further, while Article VII, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution gave the President virtually unbridled powers under Martial Law, the same cannot be said under the present Constitution.

Indeed, the unrestricted commander in chief powers under the 193 5 Constitution allowed then President Marcos to, among others, place the entire Philippines under martial law for more than eight (8) years from 23 September 1972, until it was officially lifted on 17 January 1981, with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, series of 1981; to arrogate unto himself the powers of the legislature; and to authorize military courts to have jurisdiction over civilians. The opportunities for such abuses have been curtailed by the present Constitution. The 1987 Constitution has already established sufficient safeguards and parameters to prevent government abuse during martial law from happening again.

First, the 1987 Constitution mandates that any declaration of martial law shall be valid only for sixty (60) days and any extension thereof shall require the concurrence of Congress voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its members.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt28m) The present martial law in Mindanao was extended twice following this rule. Second, the President, even during the effectivity of martial law, cannot assume the legislative powers of Congress, or give the military courts jurisdiction over civilians because a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt29m) And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt30m) The President, through the DND, recognized such limitation and even reminded the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, that "any arrest, search, and seizure executed or implemented in the area or place where Martial Law is effective, including the filing of charges, should comply with the Revised Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#fnt31m) This directive only indicates the disposition and willingness of the present administration to follow the rule of law despite the declaration of martial law, and there is no reason for the Court to believe otherwise, unless convincing evidence to the contrary is shown.

In fine, the extraordinary powers enjoyed by President Marcos during the 1972 martial law are no longer available under the 1987 Constitution and therefore could not be applied by President Duterte.

Any submission that the present martial rule in Mindanao may just be the means to start a dictatorial regime is speculative at best. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt1m) Annex "C-2" of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt2m) Annex "C-1" of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt3m) Annex "E"

of the Petition in G.R. No. 236145. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt4m) Annex "5" to the Consolidated Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General in G.R. Nos. 236061, 236145, and 236155.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt5m) Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, 29 November 2016. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt6m) Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37 (2010). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt7m) Aguinaldo v. Aquino, supra note 5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt8m) 522 Phil. 705 (2006). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt9m) Entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt10m) Annex "l"

to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 235935. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt11m) Entitled "Resolution of both Houses Further Extending Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao' for a period of one year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt12m) Entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate not to revoke at this time Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017 Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao.'"

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt13m) Entitled "Resolution expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216 Entitled 'Declaring a state of Martial Law and suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao."' (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt14m) G.R. No. 231658, 4 July 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt15m) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt16m) Id., citing the dissenting opinion of J. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526 (2012).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt17m) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt18m) RBH No. 4, supra note 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt19m) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 14.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt20m) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt21m) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt22m) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt23m) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt24m) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt25m) Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole, 660 Phil. 202(2011).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt26m) Proclamation No. 1081, series of 1972.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt27m) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 14. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt28m) 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 18, par. I. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt29m) Sec. 18, par.

4, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt30m) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 14. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/feb2018/gr235935so2018.html#rnt31m) Department of National Defense Memorandum, dated 24 May 2017.