182 v. Philippine Truth Commission Of 2010

En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7l) 63 Phil.139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8l) Id.

at 158. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9l) See J. Brion's concurring opinion in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833 April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 182, 217-218 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10l) Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 438 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc], citing Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 27 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc] and Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11l) Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 526-527 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, 732 Phil. 1, 120-121 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]; Arau/lo v. Aquino, 737 Phil. 457, 524-525 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12l) Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil 1, 42-43 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13l) See Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen's concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil 416, 670-671 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (1986) No. 27.

"[T]he role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the Solicitor General set up the defense of political questions and got away with it." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14l) CONST., art. VII, sec.

18. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15l) Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 204 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16l) RULES OF COURT.

Rule 3, sec. 2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17l) 684 Phil 526 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18l) Id. at 586, citing BERNAS, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS 474 (1995 ed.). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19l) Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 329-330 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20l) Roque, Jr. et al. v. Commission on Elections, 615 Phil. 149, 201 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21l) Francisco v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22l) See J. Leonen's Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil 416, 670-671 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (1986), No. 27.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23l) Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 207132 & 207205, December 6, 2016, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/december2016/207132.pdf> [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24l) Id. at 12.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25l) Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos.

225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/november2016/225973 .pdf> 15 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc], citing Almario, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., 714 Phil. 127, 169 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26l) 5 Phil 87 (1905) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27l) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28l) Id.

at 96. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt29l) Id. at 107.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt30l) Id. at 115. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt31l) 91 Phil 882 (1952) [Per J. Bengzon].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt32l) Id. at 887. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt33l) 91 Phil 882 (1952) [Per J. Bengzon].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt34l) In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang et al. v. Garcia, 149 Phil. 547, 585-586 (1971) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt35l) 149 Phil. 547 (1971) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt36l) Id.

at 585-586. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt37l) Id. at 586.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt38l) Id. at 591. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt39l) Id.

at 598-599. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt40l) In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benigno S. Aquino Jr. et al. v Enrile, 158-A Phil. I, 45 (1974) [Per C.J. Makalintal, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt41l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt42l) Id. at 49. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt43l) Id.

at 49-50. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt44l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt45l) Id.

at 47-48. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt46l) 206 Phil. 392 (1983) [Per J. De Castro, En Banc]. (Note: This case is more commonly referred to as Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt47l) Id.

at 431-432. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt48l) Id. at 453-454.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt49l) Id. at 454. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt50l) 206 Phil. 466 (1983) [Per J. Concepcion, Jr., En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt51l) Id. at 496. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt52l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt53l) David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/september2016/221538.pdt> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt54l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt55l) See Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 666- 667 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt56l) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt57l) Rep. Act No. 4864, sec. 7 or the The Police Act of 1966. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt58l) G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241 [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt59l) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt60l) 530 Phil. 399 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt61l) Id. at 420-422.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt62l) 690 Phil. 70 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt63l) Id. at 90-93.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt64l) 755 Phil. 296 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt65l) Id. at 311-316.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt66l) J.V. Capua The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to the Petition of Right, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 152 (1977). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt67l) 327 U.S. 304 (1946) [Per J. Stone] citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849) [Per J. Taney]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt68l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt69l) Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) [Per J. Davis] (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt70l) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt71l) Evolution of the Revolution, PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY <http://malacanang.gov.ph/7824- evolution-of-the-revolution/> (last accessed on June 22, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt72l) Ambeth Ocampo, Martial law in 1896. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, December 18, 2009, <https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/philippine-daily-inquirer/20091218/28318007957 l 432> (last accessed June 22, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt73l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt74l) Proc. No. 29 (1944).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt75l) Dr. Jose P. Laurel as President of the Second Philippine Republic, PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY <http://malacanang.gov.ph/5237-dr-jose-p-Iaurel-as-president-of-the-second-philippinerepublic/# edn7> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt76l) Proc. No. 30 (1944).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt77l) Proc. No. 1081 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt78l) Gen.

Order No. 1 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt79l) Gen. Order No. 2 (1972).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt80l) Gen. Order No. 3 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt81l) Gen.

Order No. 4 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt82l) Gen. Order No. 5 (1972).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt83l) Gen. Order No. 6 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt84l) Gen.

Order No. 5 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt85l) People of the Philippines v.Piedra, 403 Phil. 31 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt86l) 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt87l) Id. at 488.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt88l) 403 Phil. 31 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt89l) Id. at 47.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt90l) Id. at 47-48. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt91l) 421Phil290 (2001) [Per J. Belosillo, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt92l) Id. at 352. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt93l) Id.at351-352.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt94l) Id. at 352. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt95l) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt96l) Id.

at 492. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt97l) 727 Phil. 28(2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt98l) Id.

at 327. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt99l) Adiong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, 719 [Per Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt100l) G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712 [Per Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt101l) Id.at720-721. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt102l) 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio- Morales, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt103l) Id.

at 490. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt104l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt105l) 727 Phil. 28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt106l) Id. at 308-328. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt107l) 421 Phil. 290 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt108l) Id. at 354. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt109l) 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio- Morales, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt110l) Id. at 488. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt111l) Id.at490-491.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt112l) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 492-493 (2010) [Per J. Carpio- Morales, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt113l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt114l) OSG Memorandum, Annex 3, pp. 3-6 and 9.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt115l) 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio- Morales, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt116l) Id. at 492.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt117l) 727 Phil. 28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt118l) Id. at 121-122.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt119l) 545 Phil. 441 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt120l) Id. at 491-492.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt121l) 217 Phil. 302 (1984) [Per J. Plana, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt122l) Id. at 312.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt123l) 217 Phil. 302 (1984) [Per J. Plana, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt124l) Gen. Order No. 1 (2017), sec.

6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt125l) OSG Memorandum, Annex 3 of Annex 2, Operations Directive 02-2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt126l) OSG Memorandum, Annex 4 of Annex 2, Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Operational Directive 02- 17, p.

12. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt127l) Joson v. Mendoza, 505 Phil. 208, 219 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt128l) OSG Memorandum, pp. 51-55.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt129l) CONST., art. VII, sec. 18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt130l) CONST., art. VII, sec. 18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt131l) CONST., art. XI, sec. 2 provides: Section 2.

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution[.] (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt132l) See Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, January 6, 2017 <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA 2017 01.pdf> I (last visited June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt133l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt134l) Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, Confrontation or Collaboration?

Congress and the Intelligence Community, BELFER CENTER, <http://www. belfercenter .org/ sit es/ defau It/files/ fi Jes/pub I ication/inte 11 igence-basics. pdf> 4-5 (visited June 29, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt135l) Id. at 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt136l) Intelligence Branch, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadershipand- structure/intelligence-branch> (visited June 29, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt137l) Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community, BELFER CENTER <http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/intelligence-basics.pdf> 4 (last visited June 29, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt138l) Intelligence Branch, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadershipand- structure/intelligence-branch> (last visited June 29, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt139l) Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community, BELFER CENTER <http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/intelligence-basics.pdf> 4 (last visited June 29, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt140l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt141l) Intelligence Branch, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadershipand- structure/intelligence-branch> (visited June 29, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt142l) Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community, BELFER CENTER http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/intelligence-basics.pdf> 4 (visited June 29, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt143l) Id.

at 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt144l) Id. at 5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt145l) Intelligence Branch, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadershipand- structure/intelligence-branch> (visited June 29, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt146l) Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, January 6, 2017 <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA 2017 O l .pdf> 1 (last visited June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt147l) Chester L. Cooper, The CIA and Decision-Making, 50 FOREIGN AFF.

223, 224 (1972). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt148l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt149l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt150l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt151l) Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, January 6, 2017 <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA 2017 O l.pdf> 1 (last visited June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt152l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt153l) Id. at 1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt154l) Id.

at 13. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt155l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt156l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt157l) Id. at 1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt158l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt159l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt160l) Carmela Fonbuena, Zamboanga siege: Tales from the combat zone, RAPPLER, September 13, 20l4<http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/68885-zamboanga-siege-light-reaction-battalion> (last visited June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt161l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt162l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt163l) Ina Reformina, DOJ indicts 88 over Mamasapano carnage, ABS-CBN NEWS, August 15, 2016 <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/l 5/ 16/doj-indicts-88-over-mamasapano-camage> (last visited June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt164l) Cynthia D. Balana, Mamasapano clash: What happened according to the military, INQUIRER.NET, February 7, 2015 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/671126/mamasapano-clash-what-happened-accordingto- the-military> (last visited July 3, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt165l) Frances Mangosing, Its official: MILF killed Bas it Usman -AFP, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, May 6, 2015 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/689608/its-official-milf-killed-basit-usman-afp> (last visited July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt166l) Cynthia D. Balana, Mamasapano clash: What happened according to the military, INQUIRER.NET, February 7, 2015 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/671126/mamasapano-clash-what-happened-accordingto- the-military> (last visited July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt167l) Ina Reformina, DOJ indicts 88 over Mamasapano carnage, ABS-CBN NEWS, August 15, 2016 <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/l 5/ 16/doj-indicts-88-over-mamasapano-camage> (last visited June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt168l) Proc. No. 216 (2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt169l) Alexis Romero, 3 soldiers killed, 11 hurt in Lanao de!

Sur clash, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, February 26, 2016 <http://www.philstar.com/nation/2016/02/26/1557058/3-soldiers-killed- l l-hurt-lanao-del-surclash > (last visited June 28, 2017) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt170l) Proc. No. 216 (2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt171l) Agence France-Presse, Muslim extremists stage mass jailbreak in Marawi City, INQUIRER.NET, August 28, 2016 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/810455/muslim-extremists-stage-mass-jailbreak-inmarawi- city >(last accessed June 28, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt172l) Bobby Lagsa, Terror leader escapes in Lanao de! Sur jailbreak, RAPPLER, August 28, 2016 < http://www.rappler.com/nation/ 144405-prionsers-escape-jail-raid-lanao-del-sur> (last accessed June 28,2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt173l) Proc.

No. 216 (2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt174l) Jigger J. Jerusalem, Hospital in Marawi not taken over by Maute -medical center chief, INQUIRER. NET, May 28, 2017 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/900299/hospital-in-marawi-not-taken-over-by-mautemedical- center-chief> (last accessed June 28, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt175l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt176l) Gerry Lee Gorit, Marawi City hospital not overrun - official, THE PHILIPPINE ST AR, May 29, 2017 < http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/29/1704661 /marawi-city-hospital-not-overrun-official> (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt177l) Jigger Jerusalem, Hospital in Marawi not tuken over by Maute -medical center chief, INQUIRER.NET, May 28, 2017 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/900299/hospital-in-marawi-not-taken-over-by-mautemedical- center-chief >(last accessed June 28, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt178l) Gerry Lee Gorit, Marawi City hospital not overrun - official, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 29, 2017 < http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/29/1704661 /marawi-city-hospital-not-overrun-official> (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt179l) Janvic Mateo, FACT CHECK: inconsistencies in Duterte 's martial fow report, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 31, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines. 2017 /05/3111705369/fact-checkinconsistencies- dutertes-martial-law-report> (last accessed June 28, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt180l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt181l) Proc. No. 216 (2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt182l) Ver Marcelo, Gov'tforces, Maute group clash in Marawi City, CNN PHILIPPINES, May 23, 2017, < http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017 /05/23/marawi-city-clash.htm1 > (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt183l) Proc. No. 216 (2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt184l) Janvic Mateo, FACT CHECK: Inconsistencies in Duterte 's martial law report, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 31, 2017, <http://www.phi1star.com:8080/head1ines/2017/05/31/1705369/fact-checkinconsistencies- dutertes-martial-law-report> (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt185l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt186l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt187l) 3 fires break out in Marawi as clashes rage, RAPPLER, May 23, 2017 < http://www.rappler.com/nation/170738-fires-marawi-city-maute-attack> (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt188l) Proc. No. 216 (2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt189l) Maute Group waves !SIS black flag on Marawi streets, RAPPLER, May 23, 2017, < http://www.rappler.com/nation/170729-marawi-city-black-flag-maute> (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt190l) John Unson, Maute group frees 107 inmates amid clashes in Marawi City, THE PHILIPPINE ST AR, May24, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/24/1703188/maute-group-frees-107-inmatesamid- c1ashes-marawi-city> (last accessed June 28, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt191l) President's Report to Congress, p.

3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt192l) CNN Philippines Staff, Four more suspects in Davao City bombing arrested, CNN PHILIPPINES, October 29, 2016 <http://cnnphilippines.com/regional/2016110/29/Davao-City-bombing-suspectsarrested. html> (last accessed on June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt193l) President's Report to Congress, p. 3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt194l) John Unson, Cop hurt in North Cotabato roadside bombing, THE PHILIPPINE ST AR, May 26, 2017 <http://www.

philstar .com/nation/2017/05/26/1703 828/ cop-hurt-north-cotabato-roadside-bombing> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt195l) President's Report to Congress, p. 3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt196l) Edwin Fernandez, 8 hurt in Tacurong twin explosions, INQUIRER.NET, April 17, 2017<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/889856/8-hurt-in-tacurong-twin-explosions> (last accessed June 27, 2017) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt197l) President's Report to Congress, p. 3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt198l) John Unson, Basil an mayor survives roadside bomb attack, THE PHILIPPINE ST AR, February 4, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/02/04/1669016/basilan-mayor-survives-roadside-bomb-attack> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt199l) President's Report to Congress, p. 3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt200l) Ruth Abbey Gita, et al., Troops, Maute group clash in Marawi City; 3 dead, 12 injured, SUNST AR PHILIPPINES, May 23, 2017 <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cagayan-de-oro/localnews/ 2017 /05/25/troops-maute-group-clash-marawi-city-3-dead-l 2-injured-543446> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt201l) President's Report to Congress, p. 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt202l) Francis Wakefield, Maute, ASG gunmen clash with troops in Marawi; 5 soldiers wounded, MANILA BULLETIN, May 24, 2017 <http://news.mb.eom.ph/2017 /05/23/maute-asg-gunmen-clash-with-troopsin- marawi-5-soldiers-wounded/> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt203l) Audrey Morallo, AFP: Marawi clashes part of security operation, not terrorist attack, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 23, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/23/1702885/afp-marawi-clashespart- security-operation-not-terrorist-attack> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt204l) Francis Wakefield, Maute, ASG gunmen clash with troops in Marawi; 5 soldiers wounded, MANILA BULLETIN, May 24, 2017 < http://news.mb.corn.ph/2017 /05/23/maute-asg-gunmen-clash-with-troopsin- marawi-5-soldiers-wounded/> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt205l) President's Report to Congress, p.

4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt206l) John Unson, Maute group frees 107 inmates amid clashes in Marawi City, THE PHILIPPINE ST AR, May 24, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017 /05/24/1703188/maute-group-frees- l 07-inmatesamid- clashes-marawi-city> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt207l) President's Report to Congress, p.

4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt208l) John Unson, Maute group frees 107 inmates amid clashes in Marawi City, THE PHILIPPINE ST AR, May 24, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017 /05/24/1703188/maute-group-frees- l 07-inmatesamid- clashes-marawi-city> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt209l) President's Report to Congress, p.

4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt210l) DOE: Power supply in Marawi cut, SUNSTAR, May 25, 2017 <http://www.sunstar.com. ph/manila/local-news/2017 /05/25/doe-power-supply-marawi-cut-543 897> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt211l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt212l) President's Report to Congress, p. 4.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt213l) Regine Cabato, Marawi Mayor: Police station, city jail not burned, CNN PHILIPPINES, May 24, 2017 <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017 /05/24 /marawi-mayor-police-station-city-jail-not-burned.html> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt214l) Frances Mangosing, No takeover of gov 't facilities in Marawi by A bus, Maute - mayor, INQUIRER.NET, May 23, 2017 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/898833/no-takeover-of-govt-facilities-in-marawi-saysmayor> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt215l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt216l) President's Report to Congress, p. 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt217l) Chiara Zambrano, Maute terrorists still control key Marawi City bridges, ABS-CBN NEWS, May 31, 2017 <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/30/17i1naute-terrorists-sti11-contro 1-key-marawi-city-bridges> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt218l) President's Report to Congress, p. 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt219l) Regine Cabato, Marawi Mayor: Police station, city jail not burned, CNN PHILIPPINES, May 24, 2017 <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/24/marawi-mayor-po lice-station-city-j ai I-not-burned.

htm I> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt220l) Patricia Lourdes Viray, Bishop: Maute burned Marawi cathedral, abducted priest, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 24, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017 /05/24/1703149/bishop-maute-bumedmarawi- cathedral-abducted-priest> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt221l) Prelature of Marawi, CATHOLIC BISHOP CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES <http://www.cbcponline.net/marawi/html/parishes.html> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt222l) President's Report to Congress, p.

5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt223l) Janvic Mateo, FACT CHECK: Inconsistencies in Duterte's martial law report, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 31, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/2017/05/31/1705369/fact-checkinconsistencies- dutertes-martial-law-report> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt224l) President's Report to Congress, p.

5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt225l) Janvic Mateo, DepEd: Opening of classes in Marawi to push through, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 24, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/05/24/1703412/deped-opening-classes-marawi-pushthrough> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt226l) Janvic Mateo, FACT CHECK: Inconsistencies in Duterte 's martial law report, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 31, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/2017 /05/31/1705369/fact-checkinconsistencies- dutertes-martial-law-report> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt230l) President's Report to Congress, p. 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt231l) Gerry Lee Gorit, Marawi City hospital not overrun-official, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 29, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017 /05/29/1704661 /marawi-city-hospital-not-overrun-official> (last accessed June 27, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt232l) Janvic Mateo, FACT CHECK: Inconsistencies in Duterte's martial law report, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 31, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/2017/05/3 l/l 705369/fact-checkinconsistencies- dutertes-martial-law-report> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt233l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt234l) President's Report to Congress, p.

5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt235l) Janvic Mateo, FACT CHECK: Inconsistencies in Duterte's martial law report, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 31, 2017 <http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/2017/05/31/l 705369/fact-checkinconsistencies- dutertes-martial-law-report> (last accessed June 27, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt236l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt237l) Consolidated Comment, p. 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt238l) OSG Memorandum, p.

5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt239l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt240l) Id.

at 7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt241l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt242l) Harold D. Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, 21 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 627 (1927), also available in <https://www.jstor.org/stable/l9455l5?seq=1#fndtnpage scan tab contents> (last visited July 3, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt243l) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Pro-Isis Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia, Report No. 33, October 25, 2016, <http://file.understandingcontlict.org/file/2016/10/lPAC Report33.pdf> 3 (last accessed June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt244l) Id. at 4.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt245l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt246l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt247l) Id.

at 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt248l) Id. at 18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt249l) Id. at 18-19. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt250l) Id.

at 19. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt251l) Id. at 19.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt252l) Id. at 19. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt253l) Philippines kills leader of Islamic linked militant group in clash, REUTERS, January 5, 2017 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-security-idUSKBN 14Pl 7I> (accessed June 30, 2017); OSG Memorandum, p.

8. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt254l) OSG Memorandum, Annex 3 of Annex 2, Operations Directive 02-2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt255l) Appendix I (Joint Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B - Intelligence Support Plan to Operations Directive 02-2017.

Confidential Intelligence Document, which cannot be quoted in full but made available to all the Justices by the respondents. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt256l) OSG Memorandum Annex 2, Affidavit, General Eduardo M. Ano, Chief of Staff AFP, p. 3-5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt257l) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Pro-Isis Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia, Report No. 33, October 25, 2016, <http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/1 O/IPAC Report 33.pdt> 2 (last accessed June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt258l) OSG Memorandum, p. 6.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt259l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt260l) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Pro-Isis Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia <http://file. understandingconflict.org/file/2016/ 1 O/IPAC Report 3 3.

pdf> 3-4 (last accessed June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt261l) OSG Memorandum pp. 8-11. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt262l) OSG Memorandum, Annex 9 of Annex 2, Significant Atrocities in Mindanao Prior to the Marawi City Incident.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt263l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt264l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt265l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt266l) OSG Memorandum, p. 4. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt267l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt268l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt269l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt270l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt271l) Id. at 5-6.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt272l) Id. at 6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt273l) Id.

at 7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt274l) Id. at 7-8.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt275l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt276l) Id. at 8.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt277l) Id. at 5-6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt278l) Id.

at l2-13. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt279l) Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC, March 2015 <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-is is-really-wants/3 84980/> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt280l) HAFEZ, MOHAMMED M., SUICIDE BOMBERS IN IRAQ: THE STRATEGY AND IDEOLOGY OF MARTYRDOM, pp. 68-70.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt281l) Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC, March 2015 <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt282l) Franco, J., The Maute Group -New Vanguard of IS in Southeast Asia, RSIS COMMENTARY (2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt283l) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Pro-Isis Groups in Mindanao and their links to Indonesia and Malaysia <http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/1 O/IPAC Report33.pdt> 2 (last accessed June 30, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt284l) Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC, March 2015 <https://www .theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/3 84980/> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt285l) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Pro-Isis Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia <http://file. understandingconflict.org/file/2016/1 O/IP AC Report 3 3 .pdf.> 7 (last accessed June 30, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt286l) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Pro-Isis Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia <http://file. understandingconflict.org/file/2016/ 1 O/IPAC Report 33 .pdt> 4 (last accessed June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt287l) OSG Memorandum, p.

7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt288l) Rebecca Gould, Hijra Before ISIS, THE MONTREAL REVIEW (2015), <http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Hijra-before-ISIS.php >(last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt289l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt290l) OSG Memorandum, p. 69. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt291l) Id.

at 65. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt292l) OSG Comment, Annex 3, p. I. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt293l) Rebecca Gould, Hijra Before ISIS, THE MONTREAL REVIEW (2015), <http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Hijra-before-ISIS.php > (last accessed July 3, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt294l) W Graeme Wood, What !SIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC, March 2015 <https://www .theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt295l) Comm. Report No.

120, dated March 15, 2015, p. 50. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt296l) 22 U.S. Code section 2656f(D)(2) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt297l) United States Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 23 8 (June 2017), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new pubs/dictionary.pdf> (last accessed July 3, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt298l) Francois Lopez, lf Publicity is the Oxygen of Terrorism - Why Do Terrorists Kill Journalists?, 1 0 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/490/html> (last accessed on June 30, 2017) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt299l) UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (1994). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt300l) Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs, Various Definitions of Terrorism, <https:// dema.az.gov /sites/ default/files/Publications/ AR-Terrorism%20 Definitions-BORUNDA. pdf> (last accessed July 3, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt301l) Christian Walter, Defining Terrorism in National and International Law 5 (2003). <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/BiblioTerrDe(Walter2003.pdf> (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt302l) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt303l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt304l) Id. at 6-7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt305l) Noelle Higgins, The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National Liberation, JOURNAL OF HUMAN IT ARIAN ASSISTANCE 2 (2004).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt306l) Id. at 6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt307l) Id.

at 7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt308l) Id. at 8.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt309l) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. I (1977). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt310l) Noelle Higgins, The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National Liberation, JOURNAL OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 9 (April 2004) <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/al32.pdt> (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt311l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt312l) REV. PEN. CODE, art.

134. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt313l) See Justice Angelina Sandoval-Guttierez' Dissenting Opinion in Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 123 (2001) [Per J. Melo, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt314l) People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515, 535-536 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt315l) 267 Phil. 603 (1990) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc] (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt316l) Id. at 610-611. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt317l) 320 Phil. 481 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt318l) Id. at 489. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt319l) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt320l) People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 5 I 5, 549 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt321l) What is International Humanitarian Law?, International Committee on Red Cross, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/othcr/whatisihl.pdf.> (last accessed July 3, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt322l) Rep. Act No. 985 I, sec. 3 (c) provides: Section 3.

. . .

. (c) "Armed conflict" means any use of force or armed violence between States or a protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within that State: Provided, That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 194Q, including their common Article 3, apply.

Armed conflict may be international, that is, between two (2) or more States, including belligerent occupation; or non-international, that is, between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state. It does not cover internal disturbances or tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt323l) Additional Protocol II, art.

1, para. 1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt324l) Rep. Act No. 9851, sec.

3(c). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt325l) 392 Phil. 618 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt326l) Id.

at 636. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt327l) Id. at 643.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt328l) CONST., art. VII, sec. 18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt329l) 392 Phil. 618 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc]. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt330l) Id. at 640-642.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) DISSENTING OPINION CAGUIOA,J.: "In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance between freedom and order."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1c2) Petitioners come to the Court for the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the May 23, 2017 declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus via Proclamation No. 216.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2c2) The sufficiency of factual basis for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ is a justiciable question by Section 18's express provision.

At the outset, it cannot be gainsaid - indeed, it is now hornbook - that the constitutionality of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ is no longer a political question within the operation of the 1987 Constitution. No attempt should be countenanced to return to that time when such a grave constitutional question affecting the workings of government and the enjoyment by the people of their civil liberties is placed beyond the ambit of judicial scrutiny as long as the Court remains faithful to the Constitution. The declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ are justiciable questions by express authorization of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

The language of the provision and the intent of the framers(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3c2) clearly foreclose any argument of non-justiciability.

Moreover, the question before the Court does not squarely fall within any of the formulations of a political question.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4c2) Concretely, even as the first paragraph of Section 18 commits to the Executive the issue of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ, the third paragraph commits the review to the Court and provides the standards to use therein - unmistakably carving out the question from those that are political in nature. Clearly, no full discretionary authority on the part of the Executive was granted by the Constitution in the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ. As well, insofar as Section 18 lays down the mechanics of government in times of emergency, it is precisely the province of the Court to say what the law is.

The power of the Executive to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ, and the review by the Court of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof, are bounded by Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution: SEC. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

The third paragraph of Section 18 is a grant of jurisdiction to the Court. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and by law. Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution positively grants the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ; hence, there is absolutely no need to find another textual anchor for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court apart from Section 18's express conferment.

The Court has never attempted to draw distinctions or formulae to determine whether a provision that grants authority grants jurisdiction, or merely lays the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. To my mind, this is a distinction - semantic or philosophical - that is simply misplaced in this exercise. Thus, I agree with the ponencia that Section 18 contemplates a sui generis proceeding set into motion by a petition of any citizen.

Plainly, Section 18 is a neutral and straightforward fact-checking mechanism, shorn of any political color whatsoever, by which any citizen can invoke the aid of the Court - an independent and apolitical branch of government - to determine the necessity of the Executive's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ based on the facts obtaining. Given its sui generis nature, the scope of a Section 18 petition and the workings of the Court's review cannot be limited by comparison to other cases over which the Court exercises jurisdiction - primarily, petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Article VIII, Section 1. The review under the third paragraph of Section 18 is mandatory.

It has been proposed that the review is discretionary upon the Court, given the use of the word "may," and further supported by arguments that an interpretation that the review is mandatory will lead to absurdity, to clogging of the Court's dockets, and that the 30-day period to decide Section 18 petitions are taxing for the Court and executive officials. The argument is untenable - it reduces the provision to mere lip service if the Court can shirk its duty by exercising its discretion in the manner so suggested.

While the word "may" is usually construed as directory, it does not invariably mean that it cannot be construed as mandatory when it is in this sense that the statute (in this case, the Constitution), construed as a whole, can accomplish its intended effect.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5c2) I submit that the only reasonable interpretation within the context and object of the Constitution is that the review is mandatory. Keeping in mind that "under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, particularly of the allocation of powers, the guarantee of individual liberties and the assurance of the people's sovereignty,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6c2) the Court's review rises to the level of a public duty owed by the Court to the sovereign people - to determine, independent of the political branches of government, the sufficiency of the factual basis, and to provide the Executive the venue to inform the public.

A Section 18 proceeding filed by any citizen is sui generis, and entails a factual and legal review. I concur with the ponencia that a Section 18 petition may be filed by any citizen. The Court, as intimated above, should not add any qualification for the enjoyment of this clear and evident right apart from what is stated in the provision, especially when the intent of the framers was to clearly relax the question of standing.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7c2) In determining the nature and requirements of the Court's review, guidance can be had from the language of the provision and the intent of the framers.

Both show that the review contemplated is both factual and legal in nature. As the framers discussed: MR. NATIVIDAD.

And the Commissioner said that in case of subversion, sedition or imminent danger of rebellion or invasion, that would be the causus beli for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But I wonder whether or not the Commissioner would consider intelligence reports of military officers as evidence of imminent danger of rebellion or invasion because this is usually the evidence presented. MR.

PADILLA.

Yes, as credible evidence, especially if they are based on actual reports and investigation of facts that might soon happen. MR. NATIVIDAD.

Then the difficulty here is, of course, that the authors and the witnesses in intelligence reports may not be forthcoming under the rule of classified evidence or documents. Does the Commissioner still accept that as evidence? MR.

PADILLA. It is for the President as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces to appraise these reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ. After all, this can also be raised before the Supreme Court as in the declaration of martial law because it will no longer be, as the former Solicitor General always contended, a political issue.

It becomes now a justiciable issue. The Supreme Court may even investigate the factual background in support of the suspension of the writ or the declaration of martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8c2) (Emphasis supplied) The constitutional mandate to review, as worded and intended, necessarily requires the Court to delve into both factual and legal issues indispensable to the final determination of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ.

This cannot be resisted by the mere expediency of relying on the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts; indeed, even when it sits as an appellate court, the Court has recognized exceptions when examination of evidence and determination of questions of fact are proper.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9c2) Section 18, as a neutral and straightforward fact-checking mechanism, serves the functions of (1) preventing the concentration in one person - the Executive - of the power to put in place a rule that significantly implicates civil liberties, (2) providing the sovereign people a forum to be informed of the factual basis of the Executive's decision, or, at the very least, (3) assuring the people that a separate department independent of the Executive may be called upon to determine for itself the propriety of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Viewed in this light, the government is called upon to embrace this mechanism because it provides the Executive yet another opportunity to lay before the sovereign people its reasons for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, if it had not already done so. This requires the Executive to meaningfully take part in this mechanism in a manner that breathes life to the mandate of the Constitution. In the same manner, the Court is also mandated to embrace this fact-checking mechanism, and not find reasons of avoidance by, for example, resorting to procedural niceties.

Under Section 18, the Executive has the burden of proof by substantial evidence. Apropos to the question of the burden of proof and threshold of evidence under a Section 18 petition, I submit that fixing the burden of proof upon the petitioners in a neutral and straightforward fact-checking mechanism is egregious error because: First, there is nothing in the language of Section 18 or the deliberations to show that it fixes or was intended to fix the burden of proof upon the citizen applying to the Court for review; Second, a Section 18 petition is neither a civil action nor akin to one, but is in the nature of an application to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis. It is not required to carry a concurrent claim that there was lack or insufficiency of factual basis.

Hence, the fixing of burden of proof to the citizen constitutes undue burden to prove aclaim (positive or negative) when no claim was necessarily made; Third and most important, considering that the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ can only be validly made upon the concurrence of the requirements in the Constitution, the very act of declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ already constitutes a positive assertion by the Executive that the constitutional requirements have been met - one which it is in the best position to substantiate. To require the citizen to prove a lack or insufficiency of factual basis is an undue shifting of the burden of proof that is clearly not the intendment of the framers. In his dissenting opinion in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10c2) where former President Macapagal-Arroyo's proclamation of martial law in Maguindanao was questioned, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio opined that probable cause to believe the existence of either invasion or rebellion satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.

He explained: Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most practical, and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. Therefore, lacking probable cause of the existence of rebellion, a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ is without any basis and thus, unconstitutional. The requirement of probable cause for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ is consistent with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

It is only upon the existence of probable cause that a person can be ''judicially charged" under the last two paragraphs of Section 18, Article VII, to wit: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11c2) (Emphasis supplied) I concur with the ponencia's holding that the threshold of evidence for the requirement of rebellion or invasion is probable cause, consistent with Justice Carpio's dissenting opinion in Fortun.

It is sufficient for the Executive to show that at the time of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, there "[existed] such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense [rebellion] has been committed."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12c2) This standard of proof upon the Executive confirms my position that the burden of proof is originally and continually borne by the Executive throughout the entire fact-checking proceeding, for clearly, the petitioning citizen cannot be expected to prove or disprove the factual basis that is within the exclusive knowledge only of the Executive. For truly, the Executive does not receive evidence in determining the existence of actual rebellion - only such facts and circumstances that would lead to the belief that there is actual rebellion.

However, to satisfy the Court of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ (i.e. that indeed, probable cause to believe that actual rebellion existed at the time of the proclamation, and that public safety required it), the Executive must be able to present substantial evidence tending to show both requirements. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.

It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13c2) To me, the requirement of "sufficiency" in a Section 18 proceeding is analogous to the "substantial evidence" standard in administrative fact-finding.

The Executive needs to reveal so much of its factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ so that it produces in the mind of the Court the conclusion that the declaration and suspension meets the requirements of the Constitution. Otherwise, the Court's finding of sufficiency becomes anchored upon bare allegations, or silence. In any proceeding, mere allegation or claim is not evidence; neither is it equivalent to proof.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14c2) For the same reason, I submit that presumption of regularity or constitutionality cannot be relied upon, neither by the Executive nor the Court, to declare that there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ.

The presumption disposes of the need to present evidence - which is totally opposite to the fact-checking exercise of Section 18; to be sure, reliance on the presumption in the face of an express constitutional requirement amounts to a failure by the Executive to show sufficient factual basis, and judicial rubberstamping on the part of the Court. A Section 18 review is a test of sufficiency and not arbitrariness. The ponencia stated that one of the functions of Section 18 is to constitutionalize the holding in Lansang v. Garcia,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15c2) a case questioning the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

In Lansang, the Court inquired into the existence of the factual bases of the proclamation to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof and applied arbitrariness as a standard of review. It explained: Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.

However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check - not to supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin. Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative finding; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken.

The administrative finding can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, ~d said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases.

Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,"

even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence - in the sense in which the term is used in judicial proceedings - before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ.

Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v. New York, the view that: "x x x If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio... With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ... "

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General - "x x x that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily." No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same.

Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16c2) The standard of review in Lansang was sound, as situated in the context of Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution. At the time, the power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ was textually-committed to the Executive without a corresponding commitment to the Court of a review. Even then, on the basis of the principle of checks and balances, the Court determined the constitutionality of the suspension by satisfying itself of some existence of factual basis - or the absence of arbitrariness - without explicit authority from the Constitution then in force.

Lansang's holding that the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ is not a political question stands as stated in the third paragraph of Section 18. However, given the changing contours of and safeguards imposed upon the Executive's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ, Lansang is no longer the standard of review under the 1987 Constitution. Obviously, the mechanics under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions belong to different factual and legal milieu.

The 1987 Constitution now positively mandates the Court to review the "sufficiency of the factual basis" of the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ; the deliberations show an unmistakable and widely-held intent to remove the question of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ from the category of political questions that are beyond judicial scrutiny.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17c2) Lansang's test of arbitrariness as equated to the "existence" of factual basis is clearly a lower standard than the "sufficiency"

required in Section 18. The use of the word "sufficiency," signals that the Court's role in the neutral straightforward fact-checking mechanism of Section 18 is precisely to check post facto, and with the full benefit of hindsight, the validity of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, based upon the presentation by the Executive of the sufficient factual basis therefor (i.e., evidence tending to show the requirements of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ: actual rebellion or invasion, and requirements of public safety).

This means that the Court is also called upon to investigate the accuracy of the facts forming the basis of the proclamation - whether there is actual rebellion and whether the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ are necessary to ensure public safety. Thus, if the Executive satisfies the requirement of showing sufficient factual basis, then the proclamation is upheld, and the sovereign people are either informed of the factual basis or assured that such has been reviewed by the Court. If the Executive fails to show sufficient factual basis, then the proclamation is nullified and the people are restored to full enjoyment of their civil liberties.

Since Section 18 is a neutral straightforward fact-checking mechanism, any nullification necessarily does not ascribe any grave abuse or attribute any culpable violation of the Constitution to the Executive. Meaning, the fact that Section 18 checks for sufficiency and not mere arbitrariness does not, as it was not intended to, denigrate the power of the Executive to act swiftly and decisively to ensure public safety in the face of emergency. Thus, the Executive will not be exposed to any kind of liability should the Court, in fulfilling its mandate under Section 18, make a finding that there were no sufficient facts for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Accordingly, I disagree with the ponencia's statement that in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis, the Court can only consider the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration and that it is not allowed to undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The reliance on Macapagal-Arroyo(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18c2) and IBP v. Zamora(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19c2) is misplaced because these cases deal with the exercise of calling out powers over which the Executive has the widest discretion, and which is not subject to judicial review,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20c2) unlike the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ.

To recall, even then, the check on exercise of powers by the Executive was not merely arbitrariness, but "an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21c2) As well, in the same manner that the Court is not limited to the four comers of Proclamation No. 216 or the President's report to Congress, it is similarly not temporally bound to the time of proclamation to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for both the existence of rebellion and the requirements of public safety. In other words, if enough of the factual basis relied upon for the existence of rebellion or requirements of public safety are shown to have been inaccurate or no longer obtaining at the time of the review to the extent that the factual basis is no longer sufficient for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, then there is nothing that prevents the Court from nullifying the proclamation.

In the same manner, if the circumstances had changed enough to furnish sufficient factual basis at the time of the review, then the proclamation could be upheld though there might have been insufficient factual basis at the outset. A contrary interpretation will defeat and render illusory the purpose of review. To illustrate, say a citizen files a Section 18 petition on day 1 of the proclamation, and during the review it was shown that while sufficient factual basis existed at the outset (for both rebellion and public necessity) such no longer existed at the time the Court promulgates its decision at say, day 30 - then it makes no sense to uphold the proclamation and allow the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to continue for another thirty days, assuming it is not lifted earlier.

Conversely, if it was shown that while there was insufficient factual basis at the outset, circumstances had changed during the period of review resulting in a finding that there is now sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, then the Court is called upon to uphold the proclamation. In this sense, the evaluation of sufficiency is necessarily transitory.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22c2) Therefore, while I concur with the holding that probable cause is the standard of proof to show the existence of actual rebellion at the time of the proclamation, I submit that the second requirement of public safety (i.e., necessity) is a continuing requirement that must still exist during the review, and that the Court is not temporally bound to the time of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ in determining the requirements of public safety.

The factual basis for the declaration includes both the existence of actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety. Proceeding now to the crux of the controversy, the Court must look into the factual basis of both requirements for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ: (1) the existence of actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) the requirements of public safety. Necessity creates the conditions of martial law and at the same time limits the scope of martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23c2) This is apparent from the following exchange: > MR.

VILLACORTA. Thank you, Madam President. Just two more short questions.

Section 15, lines 26 to 28, states: The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces ... I wonder if it would be better to transfer the phrase "whenever it becomes necessary" after the phrase "armed forces,"

so that it would read: "The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and HE MAY CALL OUT SUCH ARMED FORCES WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." My point here is that the calling out of the Armed Forces will be limited only to the necessity of preventing or suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As it is situated now, the phrase "whenever it becomes necessary"

becomes too discretionary on the part of the President. And we know that in the past, it had been abused because the perception and judgment as to necessity was completely left to the discretion of the President. Whereas if it is placed in the manner that I am suggesting, the necessity would only pertain to suppression and prevention of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

May I know the reaction of the Committee to that observation? x x x x MR. VILLACORTA.

I see. Therefore, the Committee does not see any difference wherever the phrase "whenever it becomes necessary" is placed.

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference.

I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review.x x x(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24c2) (Emphasis supplied) Also: MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion.

Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident; everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?

MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135.

I am not trying to pose as an expert about this rebellion that took place in the Manila Hotel, because what I know about it is what I only read in the papers. I do not know whether we can consider that there was really an armed public uprising. Frankly, I have my doubts on that because we were not privy to the investigations conducted there.

Commissioner Bernas would like to add something. FR. BERNAS.

Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion. Even if we will suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an actual rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ because the Constitution further says: "when the public safety requires it." So, even if there is a rebellion but the rebellion can be handled and public safety can be protected without imposing martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ, the President need not.

Therefore, even if we consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was something which did not call for imposition of martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25c2) (Emphasis supplied) Rebellion under Section 18 is understood as rebellion defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. I concur with the ponencia that the rebellion mentioned in the Constitution refers to rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.

By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26c2) The crime of rebellion requires the concurrence of intent and overt act; it is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of Article 135. Both purpose and overt acts are essential elements of the crime and without their concurrence the crime of rebellion cannot legally exist.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27c2) Returning to Section 18, the powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ are further limited through the deletion of insurrection and the phrase "or imminent danger thereof' from the enumeration of grounds upon which these powers may be exercised, thereby confining such grounds to actual rebellion or actual invasion, when public safety so requires.

This is seen from the deliberations which show that the calling out powers of the President are already sufficient to prevent or suppress "imminent danger" of invasion, rebellion or insurrection, thus: MR. CONCEPCION.

The elimination of the phrase "IN CASE OF IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" is due to the fact that the President may call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress invasion, rebellion or insurrection. That dispenses with the need of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

References have been made to the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The 1935 Constitution was based on the provisions of the Jones Law of 1916 and the Philippine Bill of 1902 which granted the American Governor General, as representative of the government of the United States, the right to avail of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law in the event of imminent danger. And President Quezon, when the 1935 Constitution was in the process of being drafted, claimed that he should not be denied a right given to the American Governor General as if he were less than the American Governor General.

But he overlooked the fact that under the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill of 1902, we were colonies of the United States, so the Governor General was given an authority, on behalf of the sovereign, over the territory under the sovereignty of the United States. Now, there is no more reason for the inclusion of the phrase "OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" in connection with the writ of habeas corpus.

As a matter of fact, the very Constitution of the United States does not mention "imminent danger." In lieu of that, there is a provision on the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief to call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress rebellion or invasion and, therefore, "imminent danger" is already included there.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28c2) (Emphasis supplied) There is sufficient showing that, at the time of the proclamation, probable cause existed for the actual rebellion in Marawi City.

The armed public uprising in Marawi City is self-evident. The use of heavy artillery and the hostile nature of attacks against both civilians and the armed forces are strongly indicative of an uprising against the Government. The multitude of criminal elements as well as the concerted manner of uprising therefore satisfies the first element of the crime of rebellion.

Anent the second element of intent, the Executive's presentation of its military officials and intelligence reports in camera showed probable cause to believe that the intent component of the rebellion exists - that the Maute group sought to establish a "wilayah," or caliphate in Lanao del Sur of extremist network ISIS,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt29c2) which has yet to officially acknowledge the said group. The video footage recovered by the military showing the plans of the Maute· Group to attack Marawi City further evidences the plan to remove Marawi City from its allegiance to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt30c2) I adopt Chief Justice Sereno's findings of fact and find, based on the totality of the evidence presented, that it has been sufficiently shown that at the time of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the information known to the Executive constituted probable cause to believe that there was actual rebellion in Marawi City.

Needless to state, the finding of probable cause to believe that rebellion exists in this case is solely for the purpose of reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ; it does not serve to determine the existence of the separate criteria for an objective characterization of a non-international armed conflict. The application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a measure of prudence and humanity, and does not, in any way, legitimize these terrorist groups, to use the appropriate appellation. There is insufficient showing that the requirements of public safety necessitated the declaration of martial law over the entire Mindanao.

The second indispensable requirement that must be shown by the Executive is that public safety calls for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ. Here, there can be no serious disagreement that the existence of actual rebellion does not, on its own, justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ if there is no showing that it is necessary to ensure public safety. According to Fr.

Bernas: Martial law depends on two factual bases: (1) the existence of invasion or rebellion, and (2) the requirements of public safety. Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and at the same time limits the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a state of invasion would be different from those created by rebellion.

Necessarily, therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous executive action needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all conditions. They can only be analogous.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt31c2) Due to the incorporation of several safeguards, Philippine martial law is now subject to standards that are even stricter than those enforced in connection with martial law in sensu strictiore, in view of the greater limitations imposed upon military participation. Hence, to determine sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation 216 in a manner faithful to the 1987 Constitution, such determination must necessarily be done within this strict framework.

That necessity is part of the review is seen in the following: MR. VILLACORTA.x x x x x x x The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces ... I wonder if it would be better to transfer the phrase "whenever it becomes necessary"

after the phrase "armed forces," so that it would read: "The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and HE MAY CALL OUT SUCH ARMED FORCES WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." My point here is that the calling out of the Armed Forces will be limited only to the necessity of preventing or suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

As it is situated now, the phrase "whenever it becomes necessary" becomes too discretionary on the part of the President. And we know that in the past, it had been abused because the perception and judgment as to necessity was completely left to the discretion of the President.

Whereas if it is placed in the manner that I am suggesting, the necessity would only pertain to suppression and prevention of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. May I know the reaction of the Committee to that observation? x x x x FR.

BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence. When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review.

We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt32c2) (Emphasis supplied) While the ponencia holds that the scope of territorial application could either be "the Philippines or any part thereof' without qualification, this does not mean, as the ponencia holds, that the Executive has full and unfettered discretionary authority. The import of this holding will lead to a conclusion that the Executive needs only to show sufficient factual basis for the existence of actual rebellion in a given locality and then the territorial scope becomes its sole discretion.

Ad absurdum. Under this formula, the existence of actual rebellion in Mavulis Island in Batanes, without more, is sufficient to declare martial law over the entire Philippines, or up to the southernmost part of Tawi-tawi. This overlooks the public safety requirement and is obviously not the result intended by the framers of the fact-checking mechanism.

Indeed, the requirement of actual rebellion serves to localize the scope of martial law to cover only the areas of armed public uprising. Necessarily, the initial scope of martial law is the place where there is actual rebellion, meaning, concurrence of the normative act of armed public uprising and the intent. Elsewhere, however, there must be a clear showing of the requirement of public safety necessitating the inclusion.

There is insufficient showing that there was actual rebellion outside of Marawi City. Therefore, the Executive had the onus to present substantial evidence to show the necessity of placing the entire Mindanao under martial law. Unfortunately, the Executive failed to show this.

In fact, during the interpellations, it was drawn out that there is no armed public uprising in the eastern portion of Mindanao, namely: Dinagat Island Province, Camiguin Island, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Agusan, Zamboanga, Davao, Surigao, Pagadian, Dapitan.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt33c2) In this connection, it should be noted that even if principal offenders, conspirators, accomplices, or accessories to the rebellion flee to or are found in places where there is no armed public rising, this fact alone does not justify the extension of the effect of martial law to those areas.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt34c2) They can be pursued by the State under the concept of rebellion being a continuing crime, even without martial law. In the landmark case of Umil v. Ramos,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt35c2) rebellion was designated as a "continuing crime"

by the Court, wherein it sustained the validity of the arrest of a member of the NP A while the latter was being treated for a gunshot wound in the hospital. The accused therein, who was charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, was arrested for being a member of the NP A, an outlawed subversive organization, despite not performing any overt act at the time of his arrest. Said the Court, citing Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt36c2) : The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.

x x x As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing ~n offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

As stated by the Court in an earlier case: "From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

x x x x"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt37c2) (Emphasis supplied) Without a showing that normative acts of rebellion are being committed in other areas of Mindanao, the standard of public safety requires a demonstration that these areas are so intimately or inextricably connected to the armed public uprising in order for them to be included in the scope of martial law.

Otherwise, the situation in these areas merely constitute an "imminent threat" of rebellion which does not justify the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in said areas. In this sense, Justice Feliciano's observations in Lacson v. Perez(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt38c2) applies with greater force in this case, i.e., the concept of rebellion as a continuing crime does not thereby extend the existence of actual rebellion wherever these offenders may be found, or automatically extend the public necessity for martial law based only on their presence in a certain locality.

In Lacson, he said: My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime"

doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal detention or arson) but rather or such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization.

For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. x x x(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt39c2) (Emphasis supplied) Corollary to the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ having been issued in Mindanao without a showing of actual rebellion except in Marawi City, the Executive also failed to show the necessity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in the entire Mindanao to safeguard public safety. During the oral arguments, the Solicitor General, gave non-answers to questions relating to the requirements of public safety over the entire Mindanao: JUSTICE REYES: So if the actual rebellion happened in Mindanao or specifically in Marawi City, would it be, why is it that the declarations of martial law covered the whole Mindanao?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA: That was his political judgment at that time, Your Honor. And since our President comes from Davao City and has been mayor for so many years, he knows the peace and order situation in Davao. He has been talking to all the rebels of the other groups against government.

He has information that is made available to him or to anybody else, Your Honor. And therefore I trust his judgment, Your Honor.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt40c2) The presentation of military officials heard in camera was similarly vague when it came to establishing the necessity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in the entire Mindanao. Given that the only justification offered in these proceedings tends to show that the declaration of martial law(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt41c2) is merely "beneficial"

or "preferable," then the requirement of public safety is necessarily not met. That something is beneficial or preferable does not automatically mean it is necessary - especially where, as here, the government could not articulate what "additional powers"

it could or wanted to wield that Proclamation No. 55 (s.

2016)(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt42c2) did not give them. At this juncture, I submit that martial law grants no additional powers to the Executive and the military, unless the magnitude of the emergency has led to the collapse of civil government, or by the very fact of civil government performing its functions endangers public safety.43 This is the import of the fourth paragraph of Section 18. Perforce, the Bill of Rights remains in effect, and guarantees of individual freedoms (e.g.

from arrests, searches, without determination of probable cause) should be honored subject to the well-defined exceptions that obtain in times of normalcy. This is not to say, however, that the capability of the military to pursue the criminals outside of the area of armed public uprising should be curtailed. The Executive, prior to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ, had already exercised his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55 covering the entire island of Mindanao.

The military remains fully empowered "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion," as Proclamation No. 55 remains valid and is not part of the scope of this Section 18 review. The declaration of martial law is proper only -in Marawi City and certain contiguous or adjacent areas.

The ponencia authorizes the operation of martial law over the entire Mindanao based on linkages established among rebel groups. While the Court is not so unreasonable not to accept arguments that other areas outside of the place of actual rebellion are so intimately or inextricably linked to the rebellion such that it is required to declare martial law to ensure public safety in those areas, or of operational or tactical necessity, there has been no showing, save for conclusionary statements, of specific reasons for the necessity that would justify the imposition of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ over the entire island. Thus, I cannot agree with the ponencia that there is sufficient factual basis to declare martial law over the whole of Mindanao.

Verily, the existence of actual rebellion without the public safety requirement cannot be used as justification to extend the territorial scope of martial law to beyond the locale of actual rebellion. Extending martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even to contiguous or adjacent areas cannot be done without a showing of actual rebellion in those areas or a demonstration that they are so inextricably connected to the actual rebellion that martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ are necessary to ensure public safety in such places. Unfortunately, the Executive was not able to show the necessity of the declaration over the entire island of Mindanao.

However, I find that sufficient factual basis was shown for the necessity of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ only over Lanao del Sur and the other places identified by the Chief Justice in her separate dissenting opinion where she had shown the inextricable connection of these areas to the actual rebellion being waged in Marawi. Thus, I concur fully with the Chief Justice that sufficient factual basis has been shown to validate the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ over: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu. Conclusion There is no question that the rebellion waged in Marawi city, and the fighting still happening there to this day, has instilled a fair amount of fear and terror in the hearts of the normal Filipino.

There is no denying as well that the murders and atrocities being perpetrated by the Maute extremists, inspired by ISIS, evoke in the normal Filipino the urge for retribution and even create the notion that this group be exterminated, like the vermin that they are, at the soonest possible time and with all resources available, thus justifying a resort to martial rule not only in Marawi but over all of Mindanao. The members of the Court, being Filipinos themselves, are not immune from these emotions and gut reactions. However, the members of the Court are unlike the normal Filipino in that they have a duty to protect and uphold the Constitution - a duty each member swore to uphold when they took their oath of office.

That duty has come to the fore in a very specific manner - to embrace and actively participate in the neutral, straightforward, apolitical fact-checking mechanism that is mandated by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, and accordingly determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court, under Section 18, steps in, receives the submissions relating to the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, and then renders a decision on the question of whether there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Nothing more.

To be sure, the Court will even ascribe good faith to the Executive in its decision to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But that does not diminish the Court's duty to say, if it so finds, that there is insufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. That is the essence of the Court's duty under Section 18.

In discharging this duty, the Court does not assign blame, ascribe grave abuse or determine that there was a culpable violation of the Constitution. It is in the courageous and faithful discharge of this duty that the Court fulfills the most important task of achieving a proper balance between freedom and order in our society. It is in this way that the Court honors the sacrifice of lives of the country's brave soldiers - that they gave their last breath not just to suppress lawless violence, but in defense of freedom and the Constitution that they too swore to uphold.

Therefore, I vote to declare the proclamation of martial law over the entire Mindanao as having been issued without sufficient factual' basis. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Chief Justice that martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus can be justified only in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and.Sulu. ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA Associate justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1c2) William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (1998) at p.

222. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2c2) Proclamation No. 216, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p.

4 70 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4c2) As formulated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and In re McConaughy, 119 NW, 408 (1909) as adopted in this jurisdiction as early as Tanada v. Cuenca(1957), and Casibang v. Aquino(I 979), and Marcos v. Manglapus(1989). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5c2) Crawford, Statutory Construction, page 104: "A statute, or one or more of its provisions, may be either mandatory or directory.

While usually in order to ascertain whether a statute is mandatory or directory, one must apply the rules relating to the construction of statutes; yet it may be stated, as general rule, that those whose provisions relate to the essence of the thing to be performed or to matters of substance, are mandatory, and those which do not relate to the essence and whose compliance is merely a matter of convenience rather than of substance, are directory." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6c2) Dueñas, Jr. v. HRET, 610 Phil. 730, 742 (2009). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 386, 392 (l 986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8c2) Id. at 470. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9c2) Delos Reyes Vda.

Del Prado v. People, 685 Phil. 149, 161 (2012); Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 226 Phil. 496, 511-512 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10c2) 684 Phil. 526 (2012). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11c2) Id.

at 598. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12c2) Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597, 608 (1997), citing Al/ado v. Diokno, 302 Phil. 213 (1994). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13c2) Miro v. Vda.

De Erederos, 721 Phil. 772, 787 and 788-789 (2013). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14c2) See Sadhwani v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 54, 67 (1997). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15c2) 149 Phil. 547 (1971).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16c2) Id. at 592-594. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 470, 476 and 482 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18c2) David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19c2) 392 Phil. 618 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 409, 412 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21c2) David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 18, at 766. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 494 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23c2) Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 919 (2009 ed.). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 408-409 (1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25c2) Id.

at 412. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26c2) People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488 (1995). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27c2) People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 95 (1956).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28c2) I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 773-774 (I 986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt29c2) Respondents' Memorandum, pp. 5, 64-65. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt30c2) Id.

at 71. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt31c2) Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 903 (2009 ed.). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt32c2) II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 408-409 (1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt33c2) TSN, June 14, 2017, pp. 126-128. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt34c2) The June 6, 2017 arrest of Cayamora Maute, the father of the Maute brothers, in Davao City does not prove actual rebellion or public necessity of martial Jaw in Davao City - the elder Maute said that he only wanted to get himself treated at a hospital in Davao City because he had difficulty walking. The government had not offered any reason for the arrest.

Similarly, the June 10, 2017 arrest of Ominta Romato Maute, the mother of the Maute brothers, in Masiu, Lanao del Sur, also does not, on its own, constitute rebellion and public necessity of martial Jaw in Lanao del Sur. As well, the June 15, 2017 arrest of Mohammad Noaim Maute alias Abu Jadid, the alleged bomber of the Maute group, in Cagayan de Oro, could be justified under the concept of rebellion as a continuing crime, but does not show actual rebellion or public necessity of martial law in Cagayan de Oro. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt35c2) 265 Phil. 325 (1990).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt36c2) 206 Phil. 392 (1983). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt37c2) Umil v. Ramos, supra note 35, at 334-336. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt38c2) 410 Phil. 78 (2001).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt39c2) Id. at 109. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt40c2) TSN, June 14, 2017, pp. 136-137.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt41c2) TSN, June 15, 2017, pp. 53-54, 68-69 and 78. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt42c2) Proclamation No. 55, series of2016, entitled "Declaring A State of National Emergency on Account of Lawless Violence in Mindanao." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt43c2) Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 902 (2009 ed.), citing Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 323 (1946).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION VELASCO, JR.,J.: [I]f the principle be established that the commander who, under any circumstances whatsoever, assumed to enforce superior military power over the people and territory of his own country does so under ultimate legal responsibility for his acts, military rule is deprived of its terrors, and the law-abiding citizen sees in it nothing except the firm application for his benefit of the powerful military hand when civil institutions have ceased either wholly or at least effectively to perform their appropriate functions.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1v) - Brig. Gen. W.E. Birkhimer, former Associate Justice of this Court On the ground that the President correctly found probable cause of the existence of rebellion and that the public safety requires it, I concur in the ponencia sustaining the validity of Proclamation No.

216, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao." Martial Law is the law of necessity in the actual presence of an armed conflict.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2v) The power to declare it is exercised precisely upon the principle of self-preservation in times of extreme emergency. To an extent, the power to declare Martial Law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is similar to the citizen's right to self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as unquestionably a State may use its military power to put down a rebellion too strong to be controlled by the civil authorities(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3v) to preserve its "sovereignty ...

and the integrity of [its] national territory."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4v) As it is a necessity-the confluence of the existence of an actual rebellion or invasion and the requirements of public safety-that gives the power to the President to proclaim Martial Law, such necessity must be shown to exist before such proclamation. However, as discussed in the ponencia, in deciding upon the existence of this necessity, the facts as they were presented to the President at the moment he made the proclamation must govern; his decision must be scrutinized based on the information that he possessed at the time he made the proclamation and not the information he acquired later. Thus, if the facts that were presented to him would excite a reasonable and prudent mind to believe that actual invasion or rebellion existed and the public safety required the imposition of Martial Law, the President is justified in acting on such belief.

A subsequent discovery of the falsity of such facts will not render his act invalid at its inception.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5v) To this end, the President is not expected to act on proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the existence of actual invasion or rebellion and requirements of public safety. He must be able to act with urgency to best respond to the exigencies of the circumstances contemplated in Section 18, Article VII-actual invasion or rebellion. It should, therefore, be sufficient that he acts with the reasonableness and prudence of an average man to suitably respond to such events.

Thus, probable cause is the evidentiary measure for the discretion given to the President's decision to proclaim a Martial Law. As in Fortun v. Macapagal,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6v) I find the following excerpts from the Brief of Amicus Curiae of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. still instructive in this case: From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code.

The concern of the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for Martial Law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts.

To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can def eat the purpose of the Constitution.

What all these point to are that the twin requirements of "actual rebellion or invasion" and the demand of public safety are inseparably entwined. But whether there exists a need to take action in favour of public safety is a factual issue different in nature from trying to determine whether rebellion exists.

The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of existing armed movements. Thus, in deciding whether the President acted rightly or wrongly in finding that public safety called for the imposition of Martial Law, the Court cannot avoid asking whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Such decision involves the verification of factors not as easily measurable as the demands of Article 134 of the Penal Code and can lead to a prudential judgment in favour of the necessity of imposing Martial Law to ensure public safety even in the face of uncertainty whether the Penal Code has been violated. This is the reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were reluctant to override the executive's judgment. In sum, since the President should not be bound to search for proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion and since deciding whether public safety demands action is a prudential matter, the function of the President is far from different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not.

Put differently, looking for rebellion under the Penal Code is different from looking for rebellion under the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7v) Certainly, the urgency of the circumstances envisioned under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution requires the President to act with promptness and deliberate speed. He cannot be expected to check the accuracy of each and every detail of information relayed to him before he exercises any of the emergency powers granted to him by the Constitution. The window of opportunity to quell an actual rebellion or thwart an invasion is too small to admit delay.

An expectation of infallibility on the part of the commander-in-chief may be at the price of our freedom. As I have pointed out in Fortun,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8v) "the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring Martial Law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion.

The President is called to act as public safety requires."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9v) A degree of trust must, therefore, be accorded to the discretion exercised by the officer upon whom the exercise of emergency powers has been confided by the Constitution. Notably, while Section 18, Article VII provides that "[t]he Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof," it does not specify the "appropriate proceeding"

that may be filed by a citizen for the purpose. Hence, in describing the nature of their petitions, petitioners Lagman, et al. and Cullamat, et al. would simply quote the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII. Only petitioners Mohamad, et al. ventured further and maintained that its recourse is a "special proceeding."

It would be problematic for this Court to pigeonhole a petition praying for an inquiry into the "sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law" under any of the rules issued by this Court.

Doing so may put undue procedural constraint on petitioners, defeating the intent underlying the provision. Given the exigencies of the circumstances considered in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, I concede that there is wisdom in the position that a petition praying for an inquiry into the "sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law" is sui generis.

This Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10v) however, that the sufficiency of the factual basis for an emergency power must be measured not according to correctness but arbitrariness. The Court held: As to how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily."

Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."

In line with this, the yardstick available to this Court in gauging "arbitrariness" is found in Section 1, Article VIII of 1987, which fortifies the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court and, thus, allows it to "review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. "(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11v) Section 1, Article VIU of the Constitution provides: SECTION 1.

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision's relation to the "appropriate proceeding"

mentioned in Section 18, Article VII was spelled out by former Chief Justice and Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion in his sponsorship speech. He said: The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it. The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political question and got away with it.

As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.

It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x x x x x Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.

This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12v) Thus, where a proclamation of Martial Law is bereft of sufficient factual basis, this Court can strike down the proclamation as having been made with "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Otherwise, the President's determination of the degree of power demanded by the circumstances must stand.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13v) Resolving a challenge against the exercise of an emergency power, this Court held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14v) On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.

In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country.

The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15v) On this score, the President did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Proclamation No. 216, given the facts he was confronted with, including but not limited to the following: 1.

A state of national emergency on account of lawless violence was declared in Mindanao on September 4, 2016; 2. The Maute Group published a video declaring their allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); 3. The Maute group attacked a military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016; 4.

The Maute Group caused a mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016; 5. A hospital was taken over by the Maute Group on May 23, 2017; 6.

Several government and private facilities were set ablaze by the Maute terrorist group; 7. Members of the Maute group hoisted the ISIS flag; 8. A city-wide power outage set in as sporadic gunfights ensued in Marawi City; 9.

Control over three bridges in Lanao de Sur fell to the Maute Group; 10.Hostages were taken from a church; 11. Young Muslims were forced to augment the Maute group. I further lend my concurrence to the view sustaining the coverage of Proclamation No. 216 to the entirety of Mindanao.

As pointed out by the ponencia, Marawi is in the heart of Mindanao and the rebels can easily join forces with the other rebel and terrorist groups and extend the scope of the theater of active conflict to other areas of Mindanao. And based on past events, such is the design of the multiple rebel and terrorist groups now presently in armed conflict with the Armed Forces in Marawi City. In fact, as shown by prior incidents, which include the following, the activities of these numerous rebel and terrorist groups are spread over different parts of the Mindanao: 1.

An improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated at a night market in Roxas Avenue, Davao City on September 2, 2016, causing the death of fifteen (15) people and injury to more than sixty (60) others; 2. On November 5, 2016, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) abducted a German national, Juergen Kantner off Tawi-Tawi; the remains of his wife, Sabine Merz, was found in Barangay Darul Akram, Sulu; 3. On December 28, 2016, members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) lobbed two grenades at the provincial office of Shariff Maguindanao; 4.

On January 13, 2017, an IED exploded in Baran gay Uno, Basilan thereby killing one civilian and injuring another; 5. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three (3) Indonesian crew members near Bakungan Island, Tawi-Tawi; 6. On January 19, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Basilan resulting in the death of two (2) children and the wounding of three (3) others; 7.

Military personnel were ambushed in Marawi City on February 16, 2017; 8. On February 16, 2017, the ASG beheaded its German kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner, in Sulu; 9. On March 15, 2017, Mrs. Omera Lotao Madid was kidnapped in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur by suspected Maute Group elements; 10.

The ASG beheaded kidnap victim Noel Besconde in Sulu; 11. There were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the BIFF all over Mindanao from February to May 2017; 12.Military intelligence disclose that the Maute Group had dispatched its members to the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cagayan de Oro to conduct bombing operations, carnapping and "liquidation" of AFP and PNP personnel in the said areas as early as April 18, 2017.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16v) It can only complicate the situation if the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216 will be limited only to Marawi City or some other provinces.

The Armed Forces must be given ample power to suppress or contain the rebellion as soon as possible under a singular rule of operational procedure regardless of territorial lines in Mindanao. To date, almost two-thirds of Marawi's population have left the city and are now scattered in different parts of Mindanao. Thousands of these displaced citizens-men, women, and children, young and old alike-are cramped in uncomfortable evacuation centers without any means of livelihood and with barely enough food to eat and survive in these crowded, and sometimes unsanitary, spaces.

Meanwhile, those who remain trapped in the ruins of the city are in danger of being caught in the line of fire and have scarcely any access to food or water. Martial Law is not the end in itself, it is a temporary means to achieve the paramount object of restoring peace under civilian authority.

With the breakdown of civilian government in Marawi at the hands of the Maute group, which has a reported culpable intention and capability to do the same to the rest of Mindanao, I find it proper that the President exercised his Martial Law powers to suppress the rebellion and temporarily replace the incapacitated civilian authorities with military men in the hopes of ending as soon possible this tragic humanitarian disaster. With our nation's dark experience under the 1972 Proclamation No. 1081, however, it is understandable that any Martial Law proclamation will be examined with extreme wariness. In fact, the common thread running through the three consolidated petitions is the implicit distrust of Martial Law.

Couched in the consolidated petitions challenging Proclamation No. 216 is the notion that the declaration of Martial Law is equivalent to a desecration of human rights and the automatic negation of Article III of the 1987 Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Even this very Court implied such sentiment. The Court's ruling in Fortun stated, thus: Two.

Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress.

No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days.

The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17v) Indeed, compared to the calling-out power of the President, the power to declare Martial Law is less benign and "poses the most severe threat to civil liberties."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18v) This Court's ruling in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19v) outlines the marked differences between the two emergency powers, thus: Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.

This involves ordinary police action x x x. x x x x The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement oflaw." In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice"

on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government.

It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides: x x x x Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20v) This Court in David would later cite Justice Vicente V. Mendoza when he stated that, specifically, the following powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus: "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; [and] (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21v) Truly, in the occasion of a rebellion or invasion, the paramount object of the State is the safety and interest of the public and the swift cessation of all hostilities; it is neither the adjustment to nor the accommodation of the unbridled exercise of private liberties.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22v) As Martial Law is borne out of necessity, interference of private rights may be justified.

This concept is not foreign and is recognized by our laws. The prime example is the inherent police power of the state, which can prevail over specific constitutional guarantees.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23v) As this Court elucidated, "the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24v) Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Article 432 of the New Civil Code (NCC) likewise flow from this principle. Respectively, they state: Article 11, RPC: ARTICLE 11.

Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First.

Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

x x x x 4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present: First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second.

That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Article 432, NCC: The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater.

The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him. But Martial Law is by no means an arbitrary license conferred on the President and the armed forces. As it is borne out of necessity, so it is limited by necessity.

Justice Teehankee eloquently explained this much: Necessity limits both the extent of powers that may be exercised under Martial Law, and the duration of its exercise. No life may be taken, no individual arrested or confined, or held for trial, no property destroyed, or appropriated, no rights of the individual may be curtailed or suspended except where necessity justifies such interference with the person or the property. Any action on the part of the military that is not founded on the reasonable demands of necessity is a gross usurpation of power, illegal, unjustified, and improper.

The broad mantle of Martial Law cannot cover acts illegal because not justified by necessity, nor proper under the circumstances. This principle is based not only upon the fundamental precepts of constitutionalism, but rests on sound reason - that where the action of the matter is not necessary for the public ends of the state they are illegal, and the mere fact that Martial Law exists will not be a ground for their justification.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25v) Intrusions into the civil rights must be proportional to the requirements of necessity. Only such power as is necessary to achieve the object of quashing the rebellion or thwarting the invasion and restoring peace can be used.

"It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power when the rights of the citizen are concerned shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26v) Anything in excess of what is considered "military necessity"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27v) or is markedly removed from what is "needed in order to head the [rebellion or invasion] off(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28v) will render liable the officer who committed such ultra vires act. Surely, an act against chastity and the desecration of women is unjustified even in times of war. Such and similar acts remain violative of the laws, which continue to be effective even after Martial Law is proclaimed.

The old maxim of inter arma silent leges(in times of war, the law falls silent) no longer holds true, especially given this clear expression of the uninterrupted superiority of the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: A state of Martial Law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt29v) This is in conformity with the observations made in the seminal case of Ex Parte Milligan(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt30v) where the United States' Supreme Court, through Justice Davis, held: x x x Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper, and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril unless established by irrepealable law.

The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.

Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false, for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence, as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority.

x x x x This nation, as experience has proved, cannot always remain at peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln, and if this right is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate. If our fathers had failed to provide for just such a contingency, they would have been false to the trust reposed in them.

They knew - the history of the world told them - the nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long continued human foresight could not tell, and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen. For this and other equally weighty reasons, they secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation. Not one of these safeguards can the President or Congress or the Judiciary disturb, except the one concerning the writ of habeas corpus.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt31v) The continuous operation of the 1987 Constitution, a safeguard embedded in the very provision bestowing upon the President the power to proclaim Martial Law, primarily ensures that no right will unnecessarily be obstructed or impaired during Martial Law and that "civilian authority is, at all times, superior over the military."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt32v) Notably, while Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of public emergency, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, there is no express authority allowing the suspension of the other guarantees and civil liberties.

Understandably, the question as to what can or cannot be done during Martial Law has long been discussed and debated over. As early as 1915, Henry Winthrop Ballantine posed the following questions in relation to the proclamation of Martial Law: I. What is the effect of a proclamation of martial law, does it suspend the constitution, and the laws of the State ... ?

II. Does the [President] of a state, by such proclamation, confer on himself, or on his military representatives, a supreme and unlimited power over all his fellow-citizens, within the space described, which suspends the functions of civil courts and magistrates and substitutes in their place the mere will of the military commander? III.

May the military disregard the writ of habeas corpus, or other process of the courts, if issued? Is the writ of habeas corpus in practical effect suspended by such proclamation? IV.

May a military commission, or summary courts, be established as a substitute for the ordinary civil courts, to try civilians for (a) felony, (b) misdemeanours, or (c) disobedience of orders and proclamations? V. If so, is there any limit to the punishments which may be prescribed and inflicted? May the military confiscate property and levy fines, as well as imprison and put to death at their discretion?

VI. If they take life, or injure person or property, are the military authorities immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution for unreasonable acts done in excess of authority? Are the ordinary courts without jurisdiction to inquire into and review the legality of military measures?

VII. May the military shoot persons caught looting or in the commission of other crimes? VIII.

May the military arrest without warrant, merely on suspicion of complicity in the rioting, or other disturbances? May theyforcibly enter and search private houses and seize property without a search warrant? IX.

May the military hold and detain persons so arrested on suspicion, for indefinite periods at their discretion, without charge of crime and without turning them over to the civil courts for trial? X. May the military issue executive orders and proclamations to the citizens generally, having the force of law? (a) x x x (b) May the military exercise a censorship over the press and suppress newspapers at their discretion?

(c) May the military limit the right or privilege of peaceable public assembly? (d) May the military prescribe to employers what classes of laborers they shall or shall not employ? (e) May the military establish "dead lines"

within which it is forbidden to civilians to go without a military pass, and so restrict the freedom of movement of peaceable citizens? (f) May the military confiscate arms, or forbid traffic in arms? (g) Will a sentry be justified in firing on a person disobeying his orders to halt, where such person is not attempting to carry out any felonious design?(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt33v) In answer, it was proposed that the source from which the power to proclaim Martial Law springs must be considered.

Hence, if there is no Constitutional provision or statute expressly allowing an intrusion or limitation of a civil liberty, then it is not and will not be allowed. Public defense can and should be attained without a total abrogation of all individual rights. Otherwise, "it could be well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt34v) Thus, while this Court recognized in David that "arrests and seizures without judicial warrants"

can be made during Martial Law, the circumstances justifying such warrantless arrests and seizures under the Rules of Court and jurisprudence must still obtain. Pertinently, Section 5, Rule 113 reads: SECTION 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful.

- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. As the basis for the declaration of Martial Law-rebellion-is a continuing crime,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt35v) the authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion under the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt36v) It must, however, be emphasized that the suspicion of rebellion upon which a warrantless arrest is made must be based on a probable cause, i.e., the ground of suspicion is supported by personal knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person sought to be arrested has "committed or is actually committing"

the crime of rebellion. Thus, parenthetically, the general arrest orders must be issued by the Armed Forces on the basis of probable cause. Alternatively, it must be shown that the person to be arrested was caught in flagrante delicto or has committed or is actually committing an overt act of rebellion or any other offense in the presence of the arresting officer.

In sustaining an arrest without a judicial warrant, Justice Holmes, in Moyer v.

Peabody, ratiocinated that the "public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt37v) However, I subscribe to the position that even during Martial Law, the jurisdiction of and inquiry by the courts are merely postponed, not ousted or superseded.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt38v) Hence, the same tests that would be applied by the civil courts in an inquiry into the validity of a government action must be applied by the military during a Martial Law. In line with this, searches and seizures without judicial warrants can only be had in the following cases: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (7) exigent and emergency circumstance;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt39v) and (8) search of vessels and aircraft,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt40v) where, again, probable cause exists that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In the restriction of the freedom of speech and of the press, the military must still be guided by the clear and present danger test-that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the military has a right to prevent.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt41v) Thus, the military can prohibit the dissemination of vital information that can be used by the enemy, e.g., they can ban posts on social media if there is a clear and present danger that such posts will disclose their location. The same test, the presence of clear and present danger, governs the power of the military to disperse peaceable assemblies during Martial Law. As this Court held, tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt42v) Otherwise stated, in the absence of clear and present danger, the military is bound by the rules of maximum tolerance(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt43v) under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 880, otherwise known as the "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

As to the "take-over of news media" mentioned in David, Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: "In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest." Prescinding therefrom, this Court, in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. ,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt44v) held that police power justifies a temporary "take over [of] the operation of any business affected with public interest"

by the State in times of national emergency: Temporary takeover of business affected with public interest in times of national emergency Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the State. Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."

It consists of two essential elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property.

Second, the power is exercised for the benefit of the common good. Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-encompassing and comprehensive embrace. It is and still is the "most essential, insistent, and illimitable"

of the State's powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation for its paramount consideration is public welfare. It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national emergency is the primary consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over or direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest.

The nature and extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms thereof. It is the State that prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation of the temporary takeover as dictated by the exigencies of the time. As we ruled in our Decision, this power of the State cannot be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for the State.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt45v) This Court, however, has held that it is the legislature, not the executive, which is the constitutional repository of police power,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt46v) the existence of a national emergency, such as a rebellion or invasion, notwithstanding.

Accordingly, the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business a(fected with public interest can only be done whenever there is a law passed by Congress authorizing the same. This Court, in David, explained as much: But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.

However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.

Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.

et al. v. Sawyer, held: x x x x The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.1âwphi1 The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war"

be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is ' a job for the nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.

In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.

The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ... " x x x x It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

In Araneta v. Dinglasan, this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis. x x x x Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

Indeed, the military must still be guided by law and jurisprudence and motivated by good faith in the exercise of the supreme force of the State even during a Martial law. Thus, in its endeavor to restore peace and preserve the state, the military must still make proper adjustments to the safeguards of constitutional liberty under the following legislations intended to protect human rights:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt47v) 1. Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof) 2.

Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) 3. Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness Week Act of 2002) 4. Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) 5.

Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) 6. Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) 7. Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007) 8.

Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women) 9. Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009) 10. Republic Act No.

9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity) 11. Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010) 12. Republic Act No. 10168 (I'he Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012) 13.

Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012) 14. Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012) 15. Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013) 16.

Republic Act No. 10530 (I'he Red Cross and Other Emblems Act of 2013) The continuous effectivity of the 1987 Constitution further provides a blueprint by which the military shall act with respect to the civilians and how it shall conduct its operations and actions during the effectivity of Martial Law. Under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the "generally accepted principles of international law [remains to be] part of the law of the land." Hence, conventions and treatises applicable to non-international armed conflicts including the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols continue to impose the limits on the power and discretion of the armed forces.

Notably, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions enumerates acts that remain prohibited despite the hostilities. It states: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt48v) Furthermore, the Fundamental Guarantees under Article 4 of the "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions x x x relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)" remain binding: 1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices.

They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors. 2.

Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) talcing of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: (a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care; (b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated; (c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities; (d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are captured; (e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt49v) These international commitments are incorporated into our laws not only by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, but also by the domestic legislations previously enumerated.

Without a doubt, state agents-the members of the armed forceswho abuse their power and discretion under the proclaimed Martial Law and thereby violate their duty as the "protector of the people and the State"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt50v) are criminally and civilly liable. And here lies the ultimate safeguard against the possible abuses of this emergency power-the ultimate responsibility of the officers for acts done in the implementation of Martial Law. To whom much is given, much will be required.

Our history justifies a heightened vigilance against the abuse of power, whether masked by Martial Law or otherwise. However, our fears should not hold us back from employing a power necessary to fight for our sovereignty and the integrity of our national territory under the auspices of democracy and civil authority. As we recognize the superiority of the 1987 Constitution even during Martial Law, so should we recognize and place our trust in the safeguards written and intertwined in the grant of the power to declare Martial Law.

Let us concede that the framers of our Constitution, informed by lessons of history, guarded the "foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt51v) WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petitions. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1v) Birkhimer, W.E., MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (3rd ed.

revised, 1914), Kansas City, Missouri; emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2v) See U.S. v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3v) See Luther v. Borden, 7 How.

1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4v) CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5v) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6v) 684 Phil. 526, 631 (2012).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7v) Emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8v) Supra note 6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9v) Emphasis supplied.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10v) 522 Phil. 705, 854 (2006). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11v) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12v) I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986); cited in Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 207132 & 207205, December 6, 2016.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13v) See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14v) 392 Phil. 618, 675 (2000).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15v) Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16v) See Respondents Memorandum dated June 19, 2017, pp. 10-11. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17v) Supra note 6.

Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18v) David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 10. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19v) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20v) Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21v) Supra note 10. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22v) Birkhimer, supra note 1.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23v) Nachura, Antonio E.B., OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 47; citing Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 272 and Quezon City v. Ericta, No. L- 34915, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 759. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24v) Jmbong v. Ferrer, 146 Phil. 30, 67 (1970); citing Gonzales v. Comelec, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 858; Justice Douglas in Eifbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11, 18-19, 1966. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25v) J. Teehankee's Dissenting Opinion inAquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, No. L-37364, 159-A Phil. 163-291 (1975); citing Santos, Martial Law, 2nd ed., pp. 17-78, citing Winthrop, p.

820; Fairman, p. 48; Wiener, p. 14.

Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26v) Raymondv. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27v) "The necessity of employing measures which are indispensable to achieve a legitimate aim of the conflict and are not otherwise prohibited by International Humanitarian Law." Republic Act No. 9851, Sec. 3(1). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28v) Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt29v) Emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt30v) 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.) (1866). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt31v) Emphasis supplied.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt32v) CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 3. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt33v) Ballantine, Henry Winthrop. "Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority."

Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 5, no. 5, 1915, pp. 718-743.

JSTOR www.jstor.org/stable/1132541. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt34v) Ex Parle Milligan, supra note 30. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt35v) Umilv.

Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 251.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt36v) Sanlakas v. Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 548 (2004). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt37v) 212 U.S. 78 (1909). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt38v) Ballantine, Henry Winthrop.

"Martial Law." Columbia Law Review, vol. 12, no.

6, 1912, pp. 529-538. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt39v) People v. Rom, 727 Phil. 587, 607 (2014); citing Dimacuha v. People, 545 Phil. 406 (2007); People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010, 637 SCRA 791; Caballes y Taiflo v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 290 (2002). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt40v) Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, 614 Phil. 236, 255 (2009).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt41v) Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, Jr., 222 Phil. 151, 169 (1985). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt42v) David, supra note 10. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt43v) BP 880, Sec. 3(c).

"Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree ofrestraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt44v) 465 Phil. 545, 586 (2004).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt45v) Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt46v) Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017; citinglchong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt47v) Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, etc., November 8, 2016.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt48v) Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt49v) Emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt50v) CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt51) Ex Parte Milligan, supra note 30. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.: I concur in the DISMISSAL of the Petitions filed in these consolidated cases but I am compelled to write this separate opinion to elucidate the grounds for my concurring vote which, in some respects, deviate from the grounds adduced by my colleagues who also belong to the majority. These three cases were denominated as petitions filed under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners collectively seek a ruling from this Court nullifying, for alleged lack of sufficient factual basis, Presidential Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017 which declared a state of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Proclamation No. 216 is quoted in full hereunder: PROCLAMATION NO. 216 DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao; WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that "x x x in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law x x x"; WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that ''the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives"; WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees; WHEREAS, today, 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanae del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim, as follows: SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof. SECTION 2.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law. DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Seventeen. As previously stated, petitioners base their separate actions on Section 18, Article VII (entitled "Executive Department"), which reads: Sec. 18.

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.) The above-quoted constitutional provision has laid to rest the issues that were the subject of lengthy debates in the cases of Lansang v. Garcia(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1d) and Aquino v. Ponce Enrile,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2d) including those touching on the political question doctrine; the nature, extent and scope of martial law; and the respective constitutional boundaries or spheres of competence of the Executive Department, the Legislative Department and the Judiciary in relation to the proclamation by the President of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Particularly, the 1987 Constitution categorically institutionalized (a) the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the said privilege; and (b) the power of Congress to revoke or, upon the initiative of the President, to extend the said proclamation and suspension. The 1987 Constitution expressly laid out as well the consequences or effects of a state of martial law, specifically that: the operation of the Constitution is not suspended; civil courts and legislative bodies shall continue to function; no jurisdiction is conferred on military courts or agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function; the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not automatically suspended by the declaration of martial law; and any citizen has legal standing to initiate before the Supreme Court an appropriate proceeding as the avenue for the exercise of the power of judicial review of the aforesaid Presidential actions.

The detailed provisions of the 1987 Constitution have thus eliminated many of the controversial issues that previously confronted the Court in the Marcos martial law cases, which were brought about by the obscurity of the concept of martial law, notwithstanding that unlike the United States Constitution, the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions already explicitly empowered the chief executive, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to proclaim martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Still, there are provisions in the 1987 Constitution that have engendered varying interpretations among the Members of this Court, which resulted in our differences in opinion on such issues as the nature of the "appropriate proceeding" where the Supreme Court may review the factual basis of the aforesaid Presidential actions, the test to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President, and the concept of "rebellion"

adverted to in Section 18, Article VII. Nature of the "appropriate proceeding" provided in Section 18, Article VII With respect to a preliminary and technical aspect of the consolidated petitions at bar, the Court is called upon to pass upon the issue of what constitutes "an appropriate proceeding"

as the means to secure a judicial review of the constitutional sufficiency of a martial law proclamation and/or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On one side, respondents claim that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII is a petition for certiorari on the theory that it is the most suitable remedy among the actions enumerated in Section 5(1), Article VIII(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3d) of the Constitution over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction.

On the other hand, petitioners posit that the appropriate remedy is a petition filed under Section 18, Article VII, a proceeding that they characterize as sui generis. In the resolution of this particular issue, I am of the opinion that Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII do not restrict the jurisdiction of the Court to the actions mentioned therein. Furthermore, petitioners may file with this Court an action denominated as a petition under Section 18, Article VII for it is the Constitution itself that (a) grants a judicial remedy to any citizen who wishes to assail the sufficiency of the basis of a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) confers jurisdiction upon this Court to take cognizance of the same.

The lack of any specific rules governing such a petition does not prevent the Court from exercising its constitutionally mandated power to review the validity or propriety of a declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Court may adopt in its discretion any rule or procedure most apt, just and expedient for this purpose. It is long settled in jurisprudence that independent of any statutory provision, every court has the inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4d) Relevantly, this doctrine is embodied in Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5d) which states: SECTION 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.

- When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules. (Emphasis supplied.) Nonetheless, I must register my vigorous objection to the implication that a petition under Section 18, Article VII is the only appropriate proceeding wherein the issue of sufficiency of the factual basis of a declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be raised. It is my considered view that this issue may be raised in any action or proceeding where the resolution of such issue is germane to the causes of action of a party or the reliefs prayed for in the complaint or petition.

The meaning and the import of the term "appropriate proceeding" are best understood in the context of the scope, extent, conditions and limitations of the exercise of governmental powers during martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I am in wholehearted agreement with the ponencia that the intent of the framers of our Constitution in expressly providing for judicial review under Section 18, Article VII is to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse of the executive power to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

However, I do not believe that the same framers, who are so zealously opposed to the rise of dictatorship, would limit our citizens' judicial remedies against an unconstitutional or oppressive martial law regime to a single type of "sui generis" action or proceeding that at the time of their deliberations was yet unnamed and unseen, and for which no specific rules of procedure had even been promulgated. A wide plethora of situations affecting the citizenry in general or specific individuals may arise from governmental actions taken or performed by the President or by the martial law administrator or by other government officials during the existence of the state of martial law.

Justice Claudio Teehankee in his separate opinion in the case of Aquino v. Ponce Enrile,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6d) stated: Pertinent to this question is the Court's adoption in Lansang of the doctrine of Sterling vs. Constantine enunciated through U.S. Chief Justice Hughes that even when the state has been placed under martial law "x x x (W)hen there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case, the Federal judicial power extends (Art. 3, Sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to its exercise. x x x.

(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.) A party may find cause to seek the nullification or prohibition of acts committed by government officials in the implementation of martial law on the ground of grave abuse of discretion in which case a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition may be his/her best judicial recourse. There is no constitutional or procedural bar for the issue of sufficiency of factual basis of a martial law proclamation to be raised in a petition for certiorari or prohibition should a party choose to avail of these remedies. It is jurisprudentially accepted that: With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution]. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts oflegislative and executive officials.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7d) Pertinently, Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8d) and its consolidated cases illustrate the diverse situations that may precipitate the filing of an "appropriate proceeding" under Section 18, Article VII.

These situations can be gleaned from certain questions identified by the Court for resolution in connection with the threshold issue of whether there is sufficient factual basis for the issuance by then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo of Proclamation No. 1959, which declared martial law within the Province of Maguindanao, except for certain excluded areas. These issues were: 3. Whether the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ authorizes warrantless arrests, searches and seizures; x x x x 6.

Whether this Court's determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ, which in the meantime has been lifted and restored, respectively, would be essential to the resolution of issues concerning the validity of related acts that the government committed during the time martial law was in force. (Emphasis supplied.) In Fortun and its consolidated cases, separate petitions for certiorari, petition for prohibition, and petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were filed assailing the validity of Proclamation No. 1959 for lack of factual basis. While the majority opinion dismissed the petitions for being moot and academic, the separate opinions, whether concurring or dissenting, tacitly admitted the availability of the aforesaid special civil actions in questioning the validity of Proclamation No. 1959.

This is implicit in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) that the aforesaid petitions in Fortun and its consolidated cases may "prosper" as "any citizen" is clothed with legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.

Justice Carpio also opined that the Court should exercise its review power in Fortun and its consolidated cases which were filed as special civil actions as exceptions to the requirement of an actual case or controversy.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9d) Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Justice Velasco) was also in favor of entertaining the petitions as exceptions to the requirement of an actual controversy in exercising the power of judicial review. Verily, at the time that the Court was deliberating on Fortun, it was never contemplated that the petitions therein were improper modes of invoking the Court's review power over a martial law declaration. To my mind, the Court may even review the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ in a habeas corpus proceeding.

This has judicial precedent in such cases as Lansang v.

Garcia(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10d) wherein the Court inquired into the "constitutional sufficiency" of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and Aquino v. Ponce Enrile(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11d) wherein the Court took cognizance of the issue of constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. In both instances, the issue of factual sufficiency was elevated to the Court through petitions for habeas corpus as petitioners therein uniformly asserted that they were illegally arrested and detained.

The importance of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a judicial remedy under martial law was discussed by Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado during the 1986 Constitutional Commission's deliberation, to wit: MS. QUESADA: But there is a possibility then that the Congress cannot be convened because many of its Members have already been arrested. MR.

RAMA: There is always that possibility; that is why I am narrowing that chance. x x x x MR.QUESADA: One of the assurances was that there were enough safeguards that the President would not just be able to use that power without some other conditions. So, are there any parts of the Constitution that would so protect the civilians or the citizens of the land?

MR. RAMA: Yes, there are safeguards. MR.

REGALADO: May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not exactly just standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members [of Congress] are detained, can immediately be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis. x x x.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12d) (Emphases supplied.) It would be unjust, unreasonable and contrary to the orderly administration of justice to require a person who might have been illegally detained under martial law to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus separately from a petition under Section 18, Article VII if he/she wishes to secure his/her liberty and at the same time question the constitutional validity of a proclamation of martial law or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

That would be an inimical consequence of a ruling by this Court that the "appropriate proceeding" envisaged by the framers of our Constitution under Section 18, Article VII refers solely to a petition filed specifically for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of a martial law proclamation or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As for concerns that a petition for certiorari, prohibition or habeas corpus imposes procedural constraints that may hinder the Court's factual review of the sufficiency of the basis for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, these may all be addressed with little difficulty.

In the hierarchy of legal authorities binding on this Court, constitutional provisions must take precedence over rules of procedure. It is Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which authorizes the Court to review factual issues in order to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of a martial law declaration or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, as discussed above, the Court may employ the most suitable procedure in order to carry out its jurisdiction over the issue as mandated by the Constitution.

Time and again, the Court has stressed that it has the inherent power to suspend its own rules when the interest of justice so requires.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13d) The Court should be cautious that it does not take a position in these consolidated cases that needlessly restricts our people's judicial remedies nor carelessly clips our own authority to take cognizance of the issue of constitutional sufficiency under Section 18, Article VII in any appropriate action that may be filed with the Court. Such would be antagonistic to the clear intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to empower our citizens and the Judiciary as a vital protection against potential abuse of the executive power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Sufficiency of Factual Basis of Proclamation No. 216 I find it crucial to point out at the outset the underlying rationale behind the constitutional provision conferring upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, three levels of emergency powers, such as (1) whenever necessary to call out such armed forces to prevent lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; or (2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or (3) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law both in case of invasion or rebellion.

In the past, a Member of this Court fittingly stated that: The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty.1âwphi1 To protect the nation's continued existence, from external as well as internal threats, the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions" (Mr. Justice Bradley, concurring in Legal Tender Cases[US] 12 Wall. 457, 554, 556, 20 L. ed.

287, 314, 315). To attain this end, nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. The constitutional power to act upon this basic principle has been recognized by all courts in every nation at different periods and diverse circumstances.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14d) The above-mentioned extraordinary powers vested by the Constitution urider Section 18, Article VII upon the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines implement the principle declared in Section 3, Article II of the Constitution, quoted below: Sec. 3.

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

In Carpio v. Executive Secretary,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15d) we held: [T]he President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-inChief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed on him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature."

His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. x x x." Rebellion, which is directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, is a ground for the exercise of the second and third levels of emergency powers of the President, the existence of which is now invoked by the issuance of Proclamation No. 216.

The Concept of Rebellion To determine the sufficiency or adequacy of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ, an understanding of the concept of "rebellion" employed in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is necessary.

The concept of rebellion in our penal law was explained in the leading case of People v. Hernandez,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16d) where the Court ruled that the word "rebellion" evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it; and that all other crimes, which are committed either singly or collectively and as a necessary means to attain the purpose of rebellion, or in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, constitute only the simple, not complex, crime of rebellion. The Court also underscored that political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order and that the decisive factor in determining whether a crime has been committed to achieve a political purpose is the intent or motive in its commission.

While rebellion is considered as an act of terrorism under the law,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17d) the latter can be used to achieve a political end, such as removing from allegiance to the State any part of the national territory or overthrowing the duly constituted authorities. Even so, such lawless elements engaged in terrorism will never acquire any status recognized under International Humanitarian Law. Yet, acts of terrorism may be taken into account in the context of determining the necessity for a declaration of martial law within our constitutional framework.

Plainly then, rebellion can be committed through an offense or a violation of any special law so long as it is done as a necessary means to attain, or in furtherance of, the purpose of rebellion. In Ponce Enrile v. Amin,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18d) the Court held that the offense of harboring or concealing a fugitive, or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829, if committed in furtherance of the purpose of rebellion, should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately. The Court explained: All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.

Thus: "This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x" [Citing People v. Hernandez] The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping, etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

In his dissenting opinion in Fortun, Justice Velasco states that the Constitution does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. In support of this, he cites an excerpt from the Brief of Amicus Curiae Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., as follows: From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code.

The concern of the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present and in the future arising from present and past acts.

Such nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the purpose of the Constitution. What all these point to are that the twin requirements of "actual rebellion or invasion"

and the demand of public safety are inseparably entwined. But whether there exists a need to take action in favour of public safety is a factual issue different in nature from trying to determine whether rebellion exists. The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense.

Its existence can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of existing armed movements. Thus, in deciding whether the President acted rightly or wrongly in finding that public safety called for the imposition of martial law, the Court cannot avoid asking whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such decision involves the verification of factors not as easily measurable as the demands of Article 134 of the Penal Code and can lead to a prudential judgment in favour of the necessity of imposing martial law to ensure public safety even in the face of uncertainty whether the Penal Code has been violated.

This is the reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were reluctant to override the executive's judgment. In sum, since the President should not be bound to search for proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion and since deciding whether public safety demands action is a prudential matter, the function of the President is far from different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not. Put differently, looking for rebellion under the Penal Code is different from looking for rebellion under the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19d) (Emphases supplied.) In Aquino, the Court expounded on the sophisticated and widespread nature of a modem rebellion, which rings more true today, in this wise: The state of rebellion continues up to the present.

The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.

Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and materiel, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence - all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts.

They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20d) To construe the existence of rebellion in the strict sense employed in the Revised Penal Code to limit martial law to places where there are actual armed uprising will hamper the President from exercising his constitutional authority with foreseeable dire consequences to national security and at great peril to public safety. Standard of Proof to Determine Sufficiency of Factual Basis and Manner by which Standard is Applied The Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the duty to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Presidential proclamation of martial law. The Constitution does not prescribe the quantum of proof to determine the "sufficiency"

or "adequacy" of the factual basis for such a proclamation. We can only rely on settled jurisprudence but bearing in mind the nature of the respective responsibilities lodged upon the President, the Legislature and the Judiciary under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, where the system of checks and balances, as a concomitant feature of the principle of the separation of powers, is made distinctly manifest.

There are seeming differences as to the standard or test to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for the Presidential Proclamation. This arises from the confusion as to two concepts: (1) the standard to be used and (2) the manner the standard shall be applied. In Lansang, the Court adopted this view: [T]hat judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21d) (Emphasis supplied.) Justice Antonio T. Carpio uses the test of "probable cause"

to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216, which in this case is the existence of rebellion in Mindanao. Justice Francis H. Jardeleza prefers to use "reasonableness," not arbitrariness.

Justice Carpio cites the definition of probable cause as follows: Probable cause has been defined as a "set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22d) (Emphasis supplied.) In a similar vein, Justice Jardeleza elucidated his view as follows: Accordingly, the standard of review in determining whether actual rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the extraordinary presidential action should likewise be guided by reasonableness. As well put in an American case, reasonableness is "what from the calm sea level of common sense, applied to the whole situation, is not illegitimate in view of the end attained." Since the objective of the Court's inquiry under Article VII, Section 18 is to verify the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's action, the standard may be restated as such evidence that is adequate to satisfy a reasonable mind seeking the truth (or falsity) of its factual existence.(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.) While I do not subscribe to the meaning of rebellion advanced by Justice Carpio, his view on the quantum of proof to sustain the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the writ, which is "probable cause,"

is consistent, I believe, with my view that the test to be applied to determine sufficiency of factual basis for the exercise of said Presidential power is reasonableness or the absence of arbitrariness.

"Probable cause" and "reasonableness" are two sides with almost the same meaning or with little difference in degree of proof necessary.

"Probable cause" and "reasonableness" are the same standards to sustain the assailed Presidential proclamation.

The various tests advocated by the Justices appear to use interchangeable terms. Notably, the term "arbitrary" is defined as "existing or coming about ...

as a capricious and unreasonable act ofwill."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23d) In Aquino v. Ponce Enrile,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24d) Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma described the arbitrariness test in this manner: The President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary. An arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of the actor (Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary, p. 110), one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason (Bedford Inv.

Co. vs. Falb, 180 P. 2d 361, 362, cited in Words & Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 3-A, p. 573), is without adequate determining principle, non-rational, and solely dependent on the actor's will.

(Sweig vs. US. D.C. Tex., 60 F. Supp. 785, Words & Phrases, supra, p.

562) x x x. (Emphases supplied.) Premises considered, there is an apparent consensus that "reasonableness" is the proper test to be used in these consolidated cases which is but the other side of the same coin as the "arbitrariness"

test: what is reasonable is not arbitrary. At this point, I express my reservation regarding the view of Justice Jardeleza which relates the concept of good faith with the arbitrariness standards as a basis for his objection to this test. He states: The danger of fusing the sufficiency-of-factual-basis test with the standard of arbitrariness/grave abuse of discretion is this: the sufficiency of the factual basis is being measured by grave abuse of discretion.

This is problematic because the phrase "grave abuse of discretion" carries a specific legal meaning in our jurisdiction. It refers to such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

While inquiry into the sufficiency of factual basis may yield a finding consistent with the accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion, such as when the presidential proclamation was totally bereft of factual basis or when such factual basis had been manufactured by the executive, the correlation is not perfect. Good faith reliance on inaccurate facts, for instance, does not strictly satisfy the "capricious and whimsical" or "arbitrary or despotic"

standard. By setting the sufficiency-of-factual-basis standard, the Constitution foreclosed good faith belief as an absolute justification for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Under Article VII, Section 18, the Court is vested with the power to revoke the proclamation, not because of grave abuse of discretion, but because of insufficiency of factual basis.

(Citations omitted.) The concept of "good faith" or "bad faith" should not be confused with the test of "arbitrariness."

"Good faith" or "bad faith" refers to the state of mind of a person.

It is a concept different from the exercise of one's sound judgment in a given situation. Good faith in declaring martial law which is not based on sufficient facts will not justify the existence or continuation of martial law. If at all, good faith may have a bearing only the accountability of the President who declared martial law which does not meet the constitutional sufficiency test.

The above-mentioned standards, which essentially are synonymous with "reasonableness," if applied as threshold requirements for a martial law declaration, oblige us to uphold the Presidential proclamation. Consistent with these standards, to nullify the proclamation must necessarily require proof that the action taken was capricious or arbitrary, which would amount to "grave abuse of discretion"

within the contemplation of Section 1, of Article VIII, which reads: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

In Maturan v. Commission on Elections,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25d) we explained: Grave abuse of discretion is committed "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Nevertheless, to discharge faithfully the Court's duty under Section 18, Article VII requires more than setting the test or standard.

What is equally important is adopting the process or the manner by which the test or standard is properly applied. Hence, Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma stressed the importance of how the test is applied in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26d) which I quote here: [W]hile that may be true, as it is the Lansang decision is a "giant leap" in the interest of judicial supremacy in upholding fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, for that reason I cannot agree that We discard said decision or emasculate it so as to render its ruling a farce.

The test of arbitrariness of executive action adopted in the decision is a sufficient safeguard; what is vital to the people is the manner by which the test is applied by the Court in both instances, i.e., suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or proclamation of martial law. (Emphasis supplied.) The procedure followed by the Court in Lansang was replicated in these cases where the Court assumed an active role in ascertaining whether or not there is evidence to show that the President's proclamation has sufficient or adequate factual basis. At its own initiative, the Court held a closed-door briefing by high-ranking defense and military officials in the presence of the Solicitor General and a representative of the petitioners, to be informed of classified information upon which the President acted.

This is judicial activism consistent with the intent of Section 18, Article VII. To comply with its constitutional duty under said provision, the Court may opt not to strictly apply the usual rules on burden of proof, if in its sound judgment, the procedure it used complied with the requirement of due process of law. The theoretical foundation of Lansang remains sound but perhaps what was lacking then was the judicial will to resolutely apply the theory and follow it to its logical conclusion.

While the Court should not pass upon whether the exercise of Presidential discretion is correct, we must nonetheless, as the present Constitution now demands, carefully weigh the facts before us to determine whether there is real and rational basis for the President's action.

Hence, it is necessary for the Court to carefully examine the facts cited by the respondents as basis for issuing Proclamation No. 216 to determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or capriciously. Do the facts presented to the Court show that the President acted as a "reasonably discreet and prudent man" such that he had reasonable factual basis when he issued Proclamation No. 216?

This is the next and final item in this judicial inquiry. Characterization of the armed hostilities averred in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress as actual Rebellion The facts relied upon by the President have demonstrated more than sufficient overt acts of anned public uprising in the island of Mindanao against the government. These have already been pointed out and extensively discussed by the ponencia of Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo).

Respondents had convincingly shown that the series of violent acts and atrocities committed by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups were "intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayah or province in Mindanao." These factual bases for the declaration of martial law in the island of Mindanao were confirmed by defense military officials during the closed-door briefing of the Court. AFP Chief of Staff Eduardo Afio informed the Court that he had briefed the President on the situation in Mindanao frequently and on a regular basis.

In its Memorandum dated June 19, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General amply recited past, current, and related events, prior to the declaration of martial law, that would support the factual claim that the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups are aiming to establish a wilayah in the island of Mindanao: 9. There are four ISIS-linked local rebel groups that operate in different parts of Mindanao. These groups have formed an alliance for the purpose of establishing a wilayah, or Islamic province, in Mindanao.

The four (4) groups, which find their roots in different parts of Mindanao, are as follows: a. The Abu Sayyaf Group from Basilan ("ASG-Basilan"), led by Isnilon Hapilon ("Hapilon"); b. Ansarul Khilafah Philippines ("AKP"), also known as the Maguid Group, from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat.

The group is led by Mohammad Jaafar Maguid; c. The Maute Group from Lanao del Sur led by Omar Maute; and d. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters ("BIFF"), based in the Liguasan Marsh, Maguindanao.

x x x x 13. [I]n April 2016, the ISIS' weekly online newsletter, Al Naba, announced the appointment of ASG-Basilan leader, Hapilon, as the emir or leader of all ISIS forces in the Philippines. The appointment of Hapilon as its Philippine emir was further confirmed in a June 21, 2016 online video by ISIS entitled "The Solid Structure."

The video hailed Hapilon as the mujahid authorized to lead the soldiers of the Islamic State in the Philippines. 14. The appointment by the ISIS of an emir in the Philippines furthered the unification of the local rebel groups.

Sometime in June 2016, members of the different ISIS-linked local rebel groups consolidated in Basilan where its new emir operates his rebel group. 15. On December 31, 2016, Hapilon and about thirty (30) of his followers, including eight (8) foreign terrorists, were surveilled in Lanao del Sur.

According to military intelligence, Hapilon performed a symbolic hijra or pilgrimage to unite with the ISIS-linked groups in mainland Mindanao. This was geared towards realizing the five (5)-step process of establishing a wi/ayah, which are: first, the pledging of allegiance to the Islamic State; second, the unification of all terrorist groups who have given bay 'ah or their pledge of allegiance; third, the holding of consultations to nominate a wali or a governor of a province; fourth, the achievement of consolidation for the caliphate through the conduct of widespread atrocities and uprisings all across Mindanao; and finally, the presentation of all of these to the ISIS leadership for approval or recognition. 16.

On the first week of January 2017, a meeting among these ISIS-linked rebel groups was supposed to take place in Butig, Lanao del Sur for the purpose of declaring their unified pledge of allegiance to ISIS and re-naming themselves as the Da 'wahtul Islamiyah Waliyatul Mashriq("DIWM"). This was, however, preempted by the death of Mohammad Jaafar Maguid (a.k.a. Tokboy), then leader of the AKP, coupled with the conduct of a series of military operations in the area.

17. The appointment by ISIS of an emir in the Philippines is already the third step in the establishment of a wilayah in Mindanao. Moreover, these groups now have the unified mission of wresting control of Mindanaoan territory from the government for the purpose of establishing a wilayah.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27d) These factual antecedents show that there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the series of violent acts and atrocities committed by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups are directed against the political order in Mindanao with no other apparent purpose but to remove from the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines the island of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety therein.

On the other hand, petitioners maintain that the facts relied upon by the President in support of his declaration of martial law are invariably false, simulated, and/or hyperbolic. However, the evidence presented by petitioners to bolster these claims consisted mainly of unverified news articles culled from news websites on cyberspace with nary an author or credible source presented in court or, who at the very least, executed an affidavit to corroborate what has been alleged. Jurisprudence has established that newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"

and are, therefore, not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all, whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28d) Therefore, given the inadmissibility and lack of probative value of petitioners' proffered evidence, the ponencia was correct in upholding the factual bases relied upon by the President - facts which are sourced from the entire intelligence-gathering machinery of the government itself and presented in utmost detail personally to the Members of this Court in closed session. With regard to the contention that since Marawi City is the epicenter of hostilities, it is therefore error on the part of the President to subject the entire Mindanao region under martial rule. Petitioners submit that the proper course of action should have been to declare martial law only in Marawi City and its immediate environs.

This contention is misplaced. The 1987 Constitution concedes to the President, through Section 18, Article VII or the Commander-in-Chief clause, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and I quote: [I]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.x x x (Emphasis supplied.) What is clear from this provision is a tacit acknowledgment that since the President possesses the means and wherewithal to access vital and classified information from the government's entire intelligence apparatus, he is given wide latitude to define the metes and bounds within which martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should take effect.

In the consolidated cases at bar, the intelligence report that was presented to the Members of this Court in closed session indicated that several local armed groups other than those presently engaged in the fighting in Marawi City have established alliances with the Maute group to form an ISIS-linked organization with the aim of establishing a wilayah in Mindanao and eventually dismembering the entire Mindanao region from Philippine territory. Prior and contemporaneous events likewise suggest that the same groups were committed to this concerted act of rebellion all over Mindanao. These said events include but are not limited to the following: a.

There had been six (6) kidnappings from January 2017 up to the present, resulting to sixteen (16) victims. Notably, three (3) of the victims were beheaded, five (5) were released and nine (9) others were rescued with twenty-seven (27) victims still being held in captivity; b. IED attack at a night market in Roxas A venue, Davao City on September 2, 2016, leading to the death of fifteen (15) people and the injury of more than sixty (60) others; c.

On November 5, 2016, the ASG [Abu Sayyaf Group] abducted a German national, Juergen Kantner, and killed his wife, Sabine Merz; d. Siege in Butig, Lanao del Sur from November 26 to December 1, 2016, which resulted in skirmishes with government troops and the eventual withdrawal of the group amid several fatalities; e. On December 28, 2016, the members of BIFF [Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters] lobbed two (2) grenades at the provincial office of Shariff, Maguindanao; f.

On January 12, 2017, an IED exploded in Barangay Campo Uno, Basilan thereby killing one (1) civilian and injuring another; g. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three (3) Indonesian crew members near Bakungan Island, Tawi-tawi; h. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Basilan resulting in the death of two (2) children and the wounding of three (3) others; i.

Ambush of military elements in Marawi City on February 16, 2017, to include MAJ JERICO P MAN GAL US PA and one (1) enlisted personnel; j. Carnapping in Iligan City on February 24, 2017 which led to government pursuit operations killing two (2) members identified as Azam Taher AMPATUA and @WOWIE and the apprehension of Eyemen Canulo ALONTO in Tagoloan, Lanao del Norte on the same day; k. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its German kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu; l.

On March 5, 2017, Mrs Omera Lotao MADID was kidnapped in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur by suspected Maute Group elements; m. On April 11, 201 7, the ASG infiltrated Inabanga, Bohol leading to firefights between the rebels and government troops; n. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSgt.

Anni Siraji and beheaded him three (3) days later; and, o. From February to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao.

This resulted in the death and wounding of several military and civilian persons.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt29d) Furthermore, the AFP Intelligence Report, entitled "Timeline of ASG and Maute Collaboration" discloses that as early as April 18, 2017, Abdullah Maute had dispatched his followers to the cities of Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro to conduct born bing operations, camapping, and "liquidation" of AFP and PNP personnel in the said areas.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt30d) These circumstances clearly indicate a concerted effort of formerly separate armed groups now united under an ISIS flag to essentially undertake a rebellion in the Mindanao region.

Beyond doubt, this is constitutionally satisfactory justification for the President to declare a state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus all over Mindanao. Hence, I fully concur with the conclusion of Justice Del Castillo as to the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petitions in these consolidated cases.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1d) 149 Phil. 547 (1971). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2d) 158-APhil.1, 132(1974). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3d) Section 5(1), Article Vlll of the 1987 Constitution provides: SECTION 5.

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4d) Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, 342 (1922). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5d) See Go Lea Chu v. Gonzales, 130 Phil. 767, 776-777 (1968) in relation to the counterpart Section 6, Rule 135 under the then prevailing Rules of Court.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6d) Supra note 2 at 132. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7d) Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8d) 684 Phil. 526, 584 (2012).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9d) Id. at 587-591. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10d) Supra note 1.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11d) Supra note 2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12d) Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission No. 044, Vol. II, July 31, 1986, pp. 503-504.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13d) See, for example, Strategic Alliance Development Corp. v. Radstock Securities Ltd., 622 Phil. 431, 475 (2009), citing Solicitor General v. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, 281 Phil. 925, 933 (1991). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14d) Justice Felix Q. Antonio, Separate Opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, supra note 2 at 288. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15d) 283 Phil. 196, 212 (1992).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16d) 99 Phil. 515, 520-521 (1956). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17d) Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 9372 "Human Security Act of2007." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18d) 267 Phil. 603, 611-612 (1990).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19d) Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 8 at 629-630. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20d) Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, supra note 2 at 48-49. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21d) Lansang v. Garcia, supra note 1 at 594.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22d) Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 8 at 597-598. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23d) Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986), p. 99.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24d) Supra note 2 at 483. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25d) G.R No. 227155, March 28, 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26d) Supra note 2 at 483.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27d) Memorandum of Respondents dated June 19, 2017, pp. 5-8. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28d) Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt29d) Memorandum of Respondents dated June 19, 2017, pp. 73-74.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt30d) Id. at 74, referring to Annex "7" of the Affidavit of Eduardo Aflo dated June 17, 2017.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION PERALTA,J.: On May 23, 201 7, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The proclamation cited the Maute terrorist group's efforts to "remove Marawi City from the allegiance to the Philippine Government" and to deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion.

On May 25, 2017, President Duterte submitted to Congress a Report relative to Proclamation No. 216. The document was received at 21:55 hours by respondents Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III and Speaker of the House of Representatives Pantaleon Alvarez.

On May 29, 2017, the House of Representatives resolved to constitute itself as a Committee of the Whole to formally receive and consider the Report on Proclamation No. 216. On May 31, 2017, the last day of its First Regular Session, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388, declaring Proclamation No. 216 as satisfactory, constitutional, and in accordance with the law. The Senate supported it fully as it found no compelling reason to revoke the same.

Likewise, a majority of the Senators voted to reject P.S. Resolution No. 390 entitled "Resolution to Convene Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation No. 216." On even date, the House of Representatives, led by Speaker Alvarez, convened itself as a Committee of the Whole to discuss President Duterte's Report. Thereafter, the Committee introduced to the plenary House Resolution No. 1050, expressing full support to President Duterte's declaration of Proclamation No. 216.

A majority of the representatives voted to adopt House Resolution No. 1050. On June 2, 2017, the First Regular Session of Congress adjourned. No joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives was convened.

Issues The issues, as stated in the revised Advisory, are as follows: 1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos.

231658, 231771, and 231774 are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated; 2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: a.

is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of the facts; b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported; 3.

Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately; 4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof? c.

What is the threshold of evidence? 5. Whether the exercise of the· power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of the graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely: calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law; 6.

Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of May 23, 2017 may be considered vague and thus null and void: a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups," or b.

since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region; 7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient basis: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; b.

for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region; 8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; 9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of May 23, 2017 will: a.

have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55, s. 2016; or b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the Armed Forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

In a democratic and republican State such as ours, everyone must abide by the Rule of Law. More so, in momentous events affecting the life of the nation and the welfare of its people it is imperative to properly determine how power is to be allocated, exercised and recognized vis-a-vis the competing mandate of the three equal branches of the government to safeguard the civil liberties of the sovereign from whom their authority emanates. That is the gist of the issues presented in this case.

Here, President Duterte, pursuant to his constitutional powers, has proclaimed martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Apparently, the Congress has manifested its approbation thereto. Now, the Court is pleaded to discharge its solemn duty, similarly conferred by the Fundamental Law, to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's action.

Indubitably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, is authorized to place the country or any part thereof under martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

The same provision of the organic act empowers the Supreme Court, upon the initiation of an appropriate proceeding by any citizen, to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of such action. There is no question then that this Court is mandated to determine the validity of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in the same way that the Congress is given the license to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The "appropriate proceeding"

under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution The preliminary issue to take into account is the nature of the "appropriate proceeding" by which the Court could exercise its prerogative and discharge its responsibility as well as the extent of such authority to look into the assailed actions of the President. While the present Constitution does not specifically state the kind of proceeding, the same could be ascertained from the antecedent of Section 18, Article VII in relation to the significant and novel feature of the 1987 Constitution that expands the concept of judicial power: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1p) The aforequoted provision constitutionalized the ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang et al.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2p) as it appears clear that paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution incorporates in the Fundamental Law the teaching therein.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3p) It was observed that: This new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as a means to avoid having to make decisions simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President or Congress, inordinately unpopular, or which may be ignored and not enforced.

The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power. x x x The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the political question doctrine.

We are compelled to decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4p) Given the Lansang background of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII, it is appropriate to echo what the Court said way back in 1971, which pronouncement finds vitality, illumination and relevance today as it was then, if not more in view of the many features of the present Constitution that were influenced by the Marcos martial law experience. We held in Lansang: The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker and reiterated in Montenegro v.

Castaneda, pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in the affirmative, the main issue in all of these cases, except L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance, said cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached, although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of them having previously expressed their views thereon.

Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that - x x x a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines, which area has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, Sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, Sec. 10, par.

2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the Court are not agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971at9:30 A.M. x x x x In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A x x x and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, Sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, Sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution x x x."

Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional.

The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion"

- or, under Art.

VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof' - "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.

And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right - which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order - is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law - such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion - there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent - no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be - for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse - when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied - to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize.

x x x x Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our· system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.

What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in tum, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check - not to supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative finding; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The administrative finding can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized.

This view has been adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence"

rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "'relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence - in the sense in which the term is used in judicial proceedings - before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v. New York, the view that: x x x If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, andjudicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio...

With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ... Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General - x x x that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test.

Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5p) The foregoing considered, it necessarily follows that the "appropriate proceeding" under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution refers to the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court where the inquiry is on whether the President acted arbitrarily.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6p) The proper role of the Supreme Court, in relation to what it has been given as a duty to perform whenever the Commander-in-Chief proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is merely to determine whether he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is not for Us to rule on whether he decided rightly or otherwise, but whether he acted without factual basis, hence, acted whimsically or capriciously. If he had factual basis, there was no arbitrariness. We cannot second guess what he should have done under the prevailing circumstances.

If the President was wrong in his assessment and in exercising his judgment call, he shall be answerable to the people and history and not to this Court. We are aware that our decision-making authority is based on considerations that are vastly different from what the political departments regard in arriving at their own, especially on discretionary acts for which the latter are basically accountable to the electorate. Particularly, when it comes to the exercise of a power lodged in the Commander-in-Chief, the Court is cognizant of the practical necessity that there are certain matters and pieces of information that may only be available to the President and no one else in view of their sensitivity as well as their effect to public safety and national security.

To make delicate matters available to the general public may compromise the ability of the government to do its job of protecting the Republic and its people. Confidentiality still has its place in a free and transparent society, otherwise greater danger may ensue. There is, therefore, a presumption in favor of the Chief Executive that he knows what he is doing, unless it could clearly be shown that he acted arbitrarily in the sense that he did not have any acceptable factual basis to justify what he did.

Presumably, the Office of the President is equipped with facilities where the implications of certain facts and circumstances could be appreciated and acted upon in a holistic manner. Existence of actual rebellion defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code The factual basis of the President in declaring martial and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is the rebellion being committed by the Maute terrorist group. The elements of the crime are as follows: 1.

That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking arms against the Government. 2. · That the purpose of the uprising or movements is either - a.

To remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws: (1) The territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) Any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or b. To deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. In my interpellation during the oral argument, it has been established that public uprising and taking arms against the government are present, thus: JUSTICE PERALTA: For clarification, Congressman.

Now, you could not admit that there is now public uprising in the Marawi City? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: There is public uprising, Your Honor, but there is no ... JUSTICE PERALTA: Yah, there is also taking up arms rebellion against the government, you also admit that?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor, we agree to that. JUSTICE PERALTA: What we are saying is that, because you believe that, what we are saying is that there are essential elements of rebellion: one, public uprising; two is taking up arms against the . government.

What you are disputing is that, the focus of public uprising and taking up arms against the government is not political? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: No, we are saying that essential element of culpable purpose is not present. JUSTICE PERALTA: That's correct, that's what I'm saying.

So, the purpose of the violence or the taking up arms against the government is not political in nature? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor, we can say that because it is merely to saw fear and apprehension, Your Honor. JUSTICE PERALTA: When do you say the purpose is not political?

May I know why you are saying that the purpose of the violence or taking up arms against the government is not political? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Well, we just agreed with your statement, Your Honor, but if you see the context of the present violence in Marawi City, there is no culpable purpose of removing Marawi City from the allegiance to the Republic or there is no culpable purpose of depriving the President to exercise its powers and prerogatives because the channels of civilian and Military authority is not destructive. JUSTICE PERALTA: By the extent of the violence committed, Mr. Congressman, the Chief Executive is deprived of his power to enforce the laws in Marawi City?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: At the time the proclamation was issued, Your Honor, there was no such kind of multitude in the violence, no less than the Military officials hours before the President issued the Proclamation said that the situation is under control. What this abuse in the mind of the public, Your Honor, is that what is happening now in Marawi City is the aftermath of the declaration of martial law, which was not the reality of the ground when martial law was imposed. JUSTICE PERALTA: The Chief ...

XXXX CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: So, we can now resume the interpellation of Justice Peralta. Thank you. JUSTICE PERALTA: We, therefore, agree, Congressman, that there are two political purposes of rebellion.

One is the removal of the allegiance from the government or any part of its laws, that's number one. Number two, is the deprivation of the Chief Executive or the Legislator in the exercise of its powers and prerogatives. Am I correct?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE PERALTA: And then you said that presently, there is now a factual basis of the existence of rebellion, because it is now impossible for the President to exercise its power or the power enforcing the laws in Marawi, because of the extent of violence, did I heard (sic) you right? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Your Honor, I think that was not my statement.

There is now a factual basis for rebellion. JUSTICE PERALTA: Now, do you agree now that the President can now exercise ' its power to enforce the laws because of the extent of violence in Marawi City? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Well, even without declaring martial law, Your Honor, the violence in Marawi City did not prelude the President from exercising its powers and prerogatives, because the channels of civilians and military authority are there.

JUSTICE PERALTA: But I thought you said a while ago that there is no question that there is now public uprising. You also said that the violence, the taking up arms against the government is already there? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor ...

JUSTICE PERALTA: So, all these essential elements are already present? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: The culpable purpose is not there. JUSTICE PERALTA: So, what was the culpable purpose?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: The culpable purpose, Your Honor, of rebellion, is to remove the Philippines or part thereof from allegiance to the republic or to prevent the President from the legislator from exercising its powers and prerogatives. JUSTICE PERALTA: So, what would you like the President to do under the circumstances? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Under the circumstances, Your Honor, he has done what is supposed to do, except the fact that he declared martial law, because he could call the armed forces of the Philippines to subdue this terrorism being perpetrated.

JUSTICE PERALTA: Despite the presence of public uprising and taking up arms against the government? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Your Honor, the presence of an uprising, the presence of taking arms against the government is only one of the elements. JUSTICE PERALTA: That's what I was saying.

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: It does not conclude or presume that the other element is present. JUSTICE PERALTA: That's what I was saying. How can the President exercise or execute the laws under the circumstances?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Your Honor, he can, and he must be doing that, Your Honor. JUSTICE PERALTA: How? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Because the channels of civilian and military commands [have] not been broken, Your Honor.

As a matter of fact, the DND ofMarawi City, the LGUs of the entire Mindanao region are existing and operational. He can exercise his prerogatives and powers through the channels of these local government units, including the functioning departments of the government.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7p) Although petitioner Lagman did not agree that the element of culpable purpose is present, his adamant position is contrary to what is actually happening in Marawi City. As pointed out by the OSG, the siege in the City cannot be characterized as merely a result of counter-measures against the government's pursuit of Isnilon Hapilon, but is, in fact, a strategic and well-coordinated attack to overthrow the present government and to establish a wilayah in Mindanao.

Needless to say, the Marawi siege shows a clear purpose to take over a portion of the Philippine territory. Validity of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao In view of President Duterte's possession of information involving public safety which are unavailable to us, the Court cannot interfere with the exercise of his discretion to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The OSG, representing the public respondents, averred that the Maute Group has.

banded with three other radical terrorist organizations, namely: the ASG from Basilan headed by Hapilon, the AKP (formerly known as the Maguid Group) from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat, and the BIFF from Maguindanao. These groups are also affiliated with local cell groups located throughout the country. Even prior to the Marawi siege, the ASG, AKP, Maute Group, and BIFF as well as the numerous ISIS cell groups have already committed numerous bombings, assassinations, and extortion activities in the country, especially in Mindanao.

These violent activities are widespread in several areas of Mindanao, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga, Davao Del Norte, Lanao Del Sur, and Maguindanao. The AFP intelligence reports also disclosed that as early as April 18, 2017, Abdullah Maute had dispatched his followers to the cities of Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro to conduct bombing operations, carnapping and "liquidation" of AFP and PNP personnel in the areas.

As the OSG emphasized, the primary goal of the ISIS-linked local rebel groups is to establish a wilayah in Mindanao. In a video retrieved by the AFP, Abdullah Maute was shown saying: "O kaya, unahin natin dit x x x tapos sunodsunod na ito x x x 0 kaya unahin natin ditto x x x at separate natin dito isa (circled Marawi) para may daanan tayo." Based on these, it cannot be said that the danger to public safety is isolated and contained only in Marawi City.

At the very least, the danger stretches in the entire Mindanao. I cannot accede to petitioner Lagman's proposition that it is only when the acts of rebellion are actually committed outside Marawi City that the President could declare martial law or suspend the privilige of the writ of habeas corpus in other affected towns or cities. Quoted below is my interpellation during the oral argument: JUSTICE PERALTA: Okay, I'll go to another point.

Do [you] agree that the crime of rebellion is a continuing offense? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Well, yes, there are jurisprudence to that effect, Your Honor. JUSTICE PERALTA: In other word ...

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: But I would say that rebellion should not be extrapolated. JUSTICE PERALTA: No, I'm not after that. The other meaning of continuing offense is that; several acts are committed in different places, but their purpose is the same, do you agree with that?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor, but in this particular case, the acts are not committed in other places. JUSTICE PERALTA: No, I'm not going to that yet, I will ask that question later, Congressman. What is the principle of continuing offense, you agree with that, the other principle of continuing offense?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE PERALTA: That several acts might be committed in different places? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: But the purpose is the same? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE PERALTA: Now, if assuming this is hypothetical, assuming that there is rebellion in Marawi City, and some of the acts are committed outside Marawi City, supposing the guns come from the nearby town of Marawi City and the other members of the rebel groups are based in that place and they bring their guns inside Marawi City.

Will that not be rebellion in the other place? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: In the first place, Your Honor, that hypothetical question is not actually happening in Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao region. JUSTICE PERALTA: Supposing it happens, will it not be covered by the principle of continuing offense?

If the acts are committed in another place and the actual rebellion takes place in another place, all of them will be liable under the theory of conspiracy. CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: When we say, Your Honor, that it's a continuing offense, that rebellion is a continuing offense, it assumes that the inculpatory elements of rebellion are present. JUSTICE PERALTA: Of course, we assume that, that's why it's hypothetical.

Now, if there's a rebellion, I will not use anymore Marawi City, because you might be presuming that I'm referring martial law in Marawi. Supposing in one place, there is a rebellion ongoing, the declaration is to cover the whole area, outside the place where the actual rebellion is happening, can the President likewise cover the other areas nearby, as part of the declaration of rebellion? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Your Honor, that may not be legally possible because with respect to the other areas, there is only an imminent danger of a rebellion and imminent danger has been deleted ...

JUSTICE PERALTA: What I understand from the deliberations of an imminent danger is, the initial declaration of martial law should not be based on imminent danger. Because if there is already a declaration of rebellion, you need not anymore ask or require imminent danger, because if there is a rebellion in one place, let's say in Marawi City, and then the rebels will go to the other place committing rebellion, the President will issue again a proclamation in that place? And then declare martial law in order to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in other place?

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: While we say, Your Honor, that the President declares martial law, or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there must be an actual rebellion in the place occurring. When there is no actual rebellion in the other place because there is only a possibility that it is cover, I think that would, the imminent danger is not anymore ground. JUSTICE PERALTA: Can he not declare rebellion in Mindanao?

Because Marawi City is part of Mindanao? You are suggesting that for every town that there is rebellion and declaration should be made? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes, Your Honor, martial law can only be declared where there is actual rebellion in the coverage of President's proclamation.

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yeah, because what I understand from the imminent danger as the reason why the possibility is that, in the initial proclamation of rebellion, under the old law, you can use that as a ground, but if the initial, if the proclamation is rebellion, that's it. It's covered in the Constitution. CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Rebellion, Your Honor, with respect to the place it is covered by marital law, not to other places where there is no rebellion or there is only a threat.

JUSTICE PERALTA: But if the President declares Mindanao and Marawi City is part of Mindanao, what's wrong with it? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Your Honor, Marawi City is only 0.0% of the entire Mindanao. JUSTICE PERALTA: But the groups who are involved are located in several places in Mindanao, some are based in Lanao, based in Davao, based in Basilan, based in Sulu, all of these places.

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: That is only a threat, because of their presence there, but they have not activated, Your Honor. The word "a threat" is a key to imminent danger, it is not a ground.

JUSTICE PERALTA: That's not what I mean, what I mean is that the President declares martial law in Mindanao, will that not cover the whole Mindanao because rebellion is taking place in Mindanao? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Your Honor, that has no factual basis, the sufficiency of the basis of that declaration is not there because there is no rebellion in the other parts of Mindanao, particularly the areas mentioned yesterday by some members of this Honorable Court. JUSTICE PERALTA: Okay, so, the President should specifically declare certain place[ s] where the actual rebellion is happening.

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Yes ... JUSTICE PERALTA: So, if the rebellion will spread to the other towns, the President must declare, must again come out with the proclamation, declaring martial law in that place, is that your theory? CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Where there is actual rebellion in that place, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yeah, there is actual rebellion in the other place, so, the rebels are now in certain place[s]. They now expand the rebellion in the nearby town, so the President will declare another proclamation in that nearby town. If we follow the theory, that there is no imminent danger, [then] he can only declare martial law, when the actual rebellion already takes place in that nearby town.

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: We are just following the intention of the Constitution, Your Honor, that there must be actual rebellion as the basis for the declaration of martial law. JUSTICE PERALTA: Of course, that's always the requirement, that there must be actual rebellion. Thank you, thank you, Congressman.

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8p) To limit the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City alone where there is actual rebellion verges on the absurd. If we are to follow a ''piece-meal" proclamation of martial law, the President would have to declare it repeatedly.

Where there is already a declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, considering that rebellion is a continuing crime, there is no need for actual rebellion to occur in every single town or city of Mindanao in order to validate the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire island. Indeed, there is no need for a separate declaration because the declaration itself already covers the whole of Mindanao. The validity of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao is further bolstered by the fact that rebellion has no "predetermined bounds."

Quoting People v. Lovedioro,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9p) the OSG raised: The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.

This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez, thus: In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance 'to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,' then it becomes stripped of its "common"

complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10p) Consistent with the nature of rebellion as a continuing crime and a crime without borders, the rebellion being perpetrated by the ISIS-linked rebel groups is not limited to the acts committed in Marawi City. The criminal acts done in furtherance of the purpose of rebellion, which are absorbed in the offense, even in places outside the City are necessarily part of the crime itself. More importantly, the ISIS-linked rebel groups have a common goal of taking control of Mindanao from the government for the purpose of establishing the region as a wilayah.

This political purpose·, coupled with the rising of arms publicly against the government, constitutes the crime of rebellion and encompasses territories even outside Marawi City, endangering the safety of the public not only in said City but the entire Mindanao. It is true that the 1987 Constitution has a number of safeguards to ensure that the President's exercise of power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus will not be abused. Nonetheless, it does not do away with the powers necessarily included in the effective exercise of such authority.

Indeed, certain things taken for granted during times of peace and quietude may have to adapt to meet the exigencies of the moment. What may be considered as unreasonable during normal times may become justifiable in cases of invasion or rebellion. When the threat to society becomes evident, there must be corresponding adjustments in the manner by which the government addresses and responds to it.

For instance, would ordinary rules regarding visual search or inspection in checkpoints still be reasonable if vehicles are used as car bombs? Or should appropriate remedial measures be adopted to ensure that the lives of the people are not unwittingly exposed to such danger, such as undertaking more comprehensive inspections and not just relying on the apparent, if not deceptive, appearances of the vehicles and their occupants? The Constitution is a living, responsive, and adaptable instrument for effective governance.

It should not be seen as providing permanently framed and fossilized rules. The nation could not stand still and be a helpless victim of ordinary crimes, terrorism, rebellion or invasion. It has its own defenses and means to protect itself, which are primarily entrusted to the President who remcrins to be accountable to the sovereign people.

The Court also has its part in that duty, yet it can only do so within the confines of its own constitutionally vested authority, including the limitation not to overstretch itself and encroach on the domain of the Executive Department. Wherefore, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1p) 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par.

2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2p) 149 Phil. 547 (1971). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3p) See Ma,caH.

Mang/apur, QR. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668, 696 (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4p) See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in Marcos v. Mang/apus, at 708. Likewise, In his separate opinion in Arau/lo v. Aquino III(G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA I, 249), Justice Arturo D. Brion observed that "[t]his addition was apparently in response to the Judiciary's past experience of invoking the political question doctrine to avoid cases that had political dimensions but were otherwise justiciable.

The addition responded as well to the societal disquiet that resulted from these past judicial rulings." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5p) In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, et al., supra note 2, at 577-594. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6p) Cf Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 177 Phil. 205, 222-224 (1979), the Court, after noting the change in the phraseology in the 1973 Constitution, as against the 1935 Constitution, with regard to review of COMELEC decisions, pointed out: Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and extent of the Supreme Court's power ofreview in the premises.

The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec "committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight specifications. On the other hand, the Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction.

In other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review. This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court"

(Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review" shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3, Rule 43), and such' provisions refer not only to election contests but even to pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof' (Section 11, Article XII), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials"

(Section 2.) x x x x We hold, therefore, that under the existing constitutional and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We shall proceed to examine the opposing contentions of the parties in these cases. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7p) TSN, Oral Arguments, June 14, 2017, pp. 41-49.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8p) Id. at 49-54. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9p) G.R. No. 112235, November 29, 1995, 250 SCRA 389.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10p) People v. Lovedioro, GR. No. 112235, Novembe.29, 1995, 250 SCRA 389, 394-395. (Emphasis ours) The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION MENDOZA,J.: Once again the Court is confronted with an issue raised to test the constitutional safeguards against abuses put in place by the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in response to the experiences of the nation during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Martial law is a polarizing concept. On the one hand, it is an extraordinary constitutional power conferred on the president, which he may exercise when there is invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it. Martial law is not merely an implied or necessary power, but a power expressly and categorically entrusted by the people to the president.

Yet, an invocation of the said power generates a dissonant reaction from various sectors of the citizenry-some are downright antagonistic. They still vividly recall how, during the Marcos regime, martial law was utilized, not as a shield to protect the sovereignty from both foreign and local threats, but as a mechanism to stifle dissent, to oppress the opposition, and to plunder the economy. The same power intended to protect the citizenry from danger was instead used to violate their constitutional and human rights.

The present controversy stemmed from the issuance of President Rodrigo Duterte (President Duterte) of Proclamation No. 216, which placed several islands comprising Mindanao under martial law. Considering the trauma sustained by the people during the Marcos regime, the Court understands the skepticism of some sectors of society. In case of invasion or rebellion and when the public safety requires it, however, the Court cannot just enjoin the implementation of martial law.

It can only do so if the sufficiency of the factual bases for such declaration cannot be proven in an appropriate proceeding. This case is the appropriate proceeding. It is sui generis in the absence of a corresponding specific procedure promulgated by the Court.

The Factual Antecedents As early as November 2014, certain groups in Mindanao pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Caliphate.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1m) The four groups coming from different parts of Mindanao were (1) the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) from Basilan, headed by Isnilon Hapilon (Hapilon);(2) the Dawlah Islamiya or the Maute Group from Lanao del Sur, headed by Omar Maute; (3) the Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), also known as the Maguid Group from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat, led by Mohammad Jaafar Maguid; and (4) the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), based in Maguindanao. In 2016, Hapilon was appointed as the Emir in the Islamic State of the Philippines. The groups intended to establish Marawi City in Lanao del Sur as their capital as it is the central point from which other areas in Mindanao can be easily accessed.

In the first quarter of 2017, due to the heightened frequency of the armed attacks in Mindanao, the quality of the weapons used by the armed groups, and the evident political intention to dismember Philippine territory and deprive the President of his powers in Mindanao, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana (Secretary Lorenzana) and National Security Adviser General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (General Esperon), during security briefings and cabinet meetings, expressed to the President the advisability of declaring martial law. Martial Law Administrator, Armed Forces Chief General Eduardo Afi.o (General Ano), confirmed that he had been briefing the President at least three (3) times a day on the situation in Mindanao, which was getting critical every day. Sometime before May 23, 2017, the Maute Group, the ASG, the BIFF, and the AKP, who all vowed to overthrow the government and establish a wilayah(province) in Mindanao, met and discussed how to execute their plan to realize their aspirations.

This has been validated by a video(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2m) showing Hapilon and the Maute brothers discussing their strategy on how to attack Marawi City. On May 23, 2017, acting on intelligence so far gathered, the police, with the assistance of the military, moved out to serve a warrant of arrest on Hapilon, who was reported to be in a safe house of the Maute Group. A firefight between the military and the rebels ensued, but the latter, following their then secret plan, simultaneously laid siege to Marawi City in an unprecedented scale, occupied strategic positions therein, set up their own checkpoints, and virtually paralyzed the city.

Several government and private infrastructures were destroyed and the operations of the local government were crippled. The ISIS-inspired local rebel groups had indeed succeeded in terrorizing the entire city of Marawi on the very first day of Ramadan with the goal of establishing a wilayah in Mindanao. On the same day, May 23, 2017, acting on validated intelligence reports, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law in the entire Mindanao.

Hence, these consolidated petitions. Overall, the petitioners challenge President Duterte's declaration of martial law on the ground that it is constitutionally infirm primarily because there is no actual rebellion, and even if there is, he should have exercised his calling out powers only. Martial Law Powers under the 1987 Constitution The power of the president to declare martial law is specifically provided under Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution ("Commander-in-Chief"

Clause), viz: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

[Emphases and underscoring supplied] As explained by revered constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas (Fr. Bernas), the martial law contemplated under the present Constitution pertains to the traditional concept of martial law as espoused in American Jurisprudence.

Thus: FR. BERNAS: That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies ...

The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the case Aquino vs. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers. The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war.

In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theatre of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law.

In other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theatre of war.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3m) [Emphases supplied] Justice Isagani Cruz wrote that "the declaration of martial law has no further legal effect than to warn the citizens that the military powers have been called upon by the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order and that while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any act which will in any way render difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. When martial law is declared, no new powers are given to the executive; no extension of arbitrary authority is recognized; no civil rights of the individuals are suspended. The relation of the citizens to their State is unchanged.

"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4m) It is to be noted that the Constitution does not define what martial law is and what powers are exactly granted to the president to meet the exigencies of the moment. Fr. Bernas merely described it as one similar to the martial law of the American legal system.

Thus, martial law is a fluid and flexible concept, which authorizes the president to issue orders as the situation may require. For said reason, it can be said that the president possesses broad powers, which he may exercise to the best of his discretion. To confine martial law to a particular definition would limit what the president could do in order to arrest the problem at hand.

This is not to say, however, that the president has unrestricted powers whenever he declares martial law. Compared to the past constitutions, the president's discretion has been greatly diminished. In the exercise of his martial law powers, he must at all times observe the constitutional safeguards.

In crafting the provisions, the Framers sought to establish equilibrium between the protection of the public from possible abuses and the president's prerogative to wield the martial law power. The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Sumulong is quite enlightening, viz: The Committee on the Executive has the honor to submit, for consideration and approval, Proposed Resolution No. 517, proposing to incorporate in the new Constitution an Article on the Executive. This Article on the Executive is based mainly on the many resolutions referred to our Committee for study and report.

The members of the Committee have studied and discussed these resolutions which dealt with concrete instances of misuse and abuse of executive power during the Marcos regime especially after the declaration of martial law. The members of the Committee made an intensive and exhaustive study on the constitutional proposals contained in those resolutions intended to prevent a repetition of the misuse and abuse of executive power. At the same time, the members of the Committee were always on guard and careful in their intense desire to undo and correct the misdeeds and mistakes of the Marcos regime, because we might impose safeguards and restrictions which may be unreasonable and unduly harsh and which might emasculate our future presidents in the exercise of executive power.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5m) [Emphasis supplied] Clearly, the Framers were cognizant of the past abuses prevalent during the Marcos regime when they laid down the powers of the president under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.

At the same time, they recognized the necessity to provide the president sufficient elbow room to address critical situations. Thus, the present Constitution is more stringent and more precise in contrast to past provisions because it imposed limitations on the exercise of the martial law power.

As can be gleaned from the Constitution, it did not define what martial law is in order to make it flexible enough to be an effective tool to address extraordinary needs during extraordinary times. To my mind, in not giving a positive definition on what martial law is and merely providing specific restrictions, the Framers were striking a balance between the right of the State to protect itself from local and foreign threats and the concern of the public over the abuse in the exercise of such potent power. The Framers deemed it wise to impose safeguards to curtail possible abuses of the martial law powers without categorically defining martial law as not to unduly restrict the president.

It must be borne in mind that it is the people, through the Constitution, who entrusted to the president their safety and security. They gave him enough latitude and discernment on how to execute such emergency powers. If the Framers did not so cramp him, it is not for the Court to impose restrictions.

To do so is dangerous for it would tie up the hands of future presidents facing the same, if not more serious, critical situations. At any rate, the Framers have put in place several safeguards to prevent violations of the constitutional and other human rights. Constitutional Safeguards As above-stated, the harrowing experience of the Filipino people during the Marcos regime did not escape the minds of the Framers.

It is for this reason that numerous safeguards were put in place to prevent another dictator from abusing the said power. The present government is very much aware of these restrictions. Thus, the Department of National Defense (DND), in its May 24, 2017 Memorandum, cited the constitutional safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, particularly: (1) the continuing operation and supremacy of the Constitution; (2) military authority not supplanting Congress or the Judiciary; and (3) the military courts not acquiring jurisdiction over civilians, where civilian courts are fully functioning.

Stated differently, the president and the armed forces cannot issue orders violative of the Constitution. Otherwise, they may be held accountable to be determined in a separate action. Pursuant thereto, the DND enjoined the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and all its officers and personnel to faithfully observe the rule of law in places where martial law has been in effect.

It is an assurance by the government that it would adhere to the constitutional safeguards in place and would not countenance any violation or abuse of constitutional or human rights. Martial Law justified in cases of Rebellion or Invasion and when Public Safety requires it One of the important reforms in the present charter is the removal of the phrase "imminent danger." Thus, at present, martial law may be declared only when following circumstances concur: (1) there is actual rebellion or invasion; (2) and the public safety requires it.

The initial determination of the existence of actual rebellion and the necessity of declaring martial law as public safety requires rests with the president. The following discussions of the Framers are enlightening, viz: MR. REGALADO: If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135.

I am not trying to pose as an expert about this rebellion that took place in the Manila Hotel, because what I know about it is what I only read in the papers. I do not know whether we can consider that there was really an armed public uprising. Frankly, I have my doubts on that because we were not privy to the investigations conducted there.

Commissioner Bernas would like to add something. FR. BERNAS: Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion.

Even if we will suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an actual rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ because the Constitution further says: "when the public safety requires it." So, even if there is a rebellion but the rebellion can be handled and public safety can be protected without imposing martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ, the President need not. Therefore, even if we consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was something which did not call for imposition of martial law.

xxx MR. REGALADO: It becomes a matter of factual appreciation and evaluation. The magnitude is to be taken into account when we talk about tumultuous disturbance, to sedition, then graduating to rebellion.

All these things are variances of magnitude and scope. So, the President determines, based on the circumstances, if there is presence of a rebellion. MR.

DE LOS REYES: With the concurrence of Congress. MR. REGALADO: And another is, if there is publicity involved, not only the isolated situations.

If they conclude that there is really an armed public uprising although not all over the country, not only to destabilize but to overthrow the government, that would already be considered within the ambit of rebellion.If the President considers it, it is not yet necessary to suspend the privilege of the writ. It is not necessary to declare martial law because he can still resort to the lesser remedy of just calling out the Armed Forces for the purpose of preventing or suppressing lawlessness or rebellion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6m) [Emphases supplied] Rebellion, as understood in the Constitution, is similar to the rebellion contemplated under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in order for the president to declare martial law, he must be satisfied that the following requisites concur: (1) there must be a public uprising; (2) there must be taking up arms against the government; (3) with the objective of removing from the allegiance to the government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces; (4) the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, is deprived of any of their powers or prerogatives;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7m) and (5) the public safety requires it.

In tum, the initial determination of the president must be scrutinized by the Court if any citizen challenges said declaration. The President has Wide Discretionary Powers The Commander-in-Chief Clause granted the president a sequence of graduated powers, from the least to the most benign, namely: (1) the calling out power; (2) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (3) the power to declare martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8m) In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (Zamora),(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9m) We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.

The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of .ioint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority.

It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.

It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10m) [Emphases supplied] Under the calling-out-power, the president merely summons the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11m) The military merely supplements the police forces, with the latter having supervision over the former.

It is not, however, required that the president must first resort to his calling out power before he can declare martial law. Although the Commander-in-Chief Clause grants him graduated powers,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12m) it merely pertains to the intensity of the different powers from the least benign (calling out powers) to the most stringent (the power to declare martial law), and the concomitant safeguards attached thereto. The Constitution does not require that the different powers under the Commander-in-Chief Clause be exercised sequentially.

So long as the requirements under the Constitution are met, the president may choose which power to exercise in order to address the issues arising from the emergency. In other words, when there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law, the president can resort to the most awesome power granted under the Commander-in-Chief Clause. He cannot be faulted for not resorting to his calling out power if he finds that the situation requires a stronger action.

When the president declares martial law, he, in effect, declares that the military shall take a more active role in the suppression of invasion or rebellion in the affected areas. The armed forces can conduct operations on their own without any command or guidance from the police. At any rate, prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 201 7, the President already opted to choose and exercise the most benign action - the calling out power.

This is found in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Unfortunately, the calling out power was ineffective in pre-empting the brewing rebellion. When such power was deemed ' inadequate, the President resorted to the declaration of martial law because public safety already required it in the face of the overwhelming attack against Marawi and the government forces.

Judicial Review Another significant constitutional safeguard the Framers have installed is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The intent of the Framers to delimit the prerogative of the president to declare martial law is clear, to wit: MR. NATIVIDAD: First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the majority of the Members of Congress because the provision says "in case of actual invasion and rebellion."

If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is need for immediate response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or barricaded. They say that in case of a rebellion, one cannot even take his car and go to the Congress, which is possible because the roads are blocked or barricaded.

And maybe if the revolutionaries are smart, they would have an individual team for each and every Member of the Congress so he would not be able to respond to a call for a session.

So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all the Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it. Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension. And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time.

So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. I notice in the Commissioner's proposal that he is requiring less factors for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus than for the declaration of martial law. Is that correct?

MR. PAD ILLA: That is correct. Xxx MR.

MONSOD: Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos, he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitutfon now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens.

And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13m) [Emphases supplied] As can be gleaned from the deliberations, the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law was precisely included to remove from the president the unbridled prerogative to determine the necessity thereof. It is a precautionary measure to prevent a repeat of possible abuses in cases where the awesome 'Power to declare martial law rests only on one individual. Consequently, the Executive Department cannot hide behind the cloak of the political question doctrine because the Constitution itself mandated the review, thus, unquestionably justiciable.

The question as to the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the manner by which the president executes it pursuant to such declaration are entirely different. The Court, upon finding that the factual basis is sufficient, cannot substitute the president's judgment for its own. "In times of emergencies, our Constitution demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive, but at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14m) In Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15m) it was written: Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.

Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart.

The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. xxx If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16m) I agree with the ponencia that this should be set aside. There is nothing in the constitutional provisions or the deliberations which provide that it is only after Congress fails or refuses to act can the Court exercise its power to review.

I am of the position that the Court can act on any petition questioning such sufficiency independently of the congressional power to revoke. Burden of Proof re Sufficiency of Factual Basis rests on the Government In this appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,the burden to prove the same lies with the government. If it were otherwise, then, the judicial review safeguard would be rendered inutile considering that ordinary citizens have no access to the bulk of information and intelligence available only to the authorities.

Indeed, "he who alleges, not he who denies, must prove."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17m) This rule, however, exists in recognition of the fact that in most court proceedings, he who puts forth an allegation is, in all probability, in possession of documents or other pieces of evidence to substantiate his claim. It is not, however, without an exception. If a party's case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative fact.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18m) To put it in another way, when the parties are not in an equal position with respect to the evidence to prove a negative fact, then, the party denying the negative fact is bound to establish its existence.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19m) Doubtless, the petitioners do not have access to the intelligence gathered by the military.

Instead, they principally rely on information provided by the Office of the President and reports from mainstream media and social media. For said reason, it is readily apparent that the petitioners are not in an equal position with the government, which has a trove of intelligence reports, security briefings and other vital information at its disposal. Threshold of Evidence re Sufficiency of the Factual Basis In the ponencia, it has been written that probable cause is the allowable standard of proof as the President needs only to convince himself that there is evidence showing that, more likely than not, a rebellion has been committed or being committed.

Others are of the view that as the Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction, the point to determine should be arbitrariness, as enunciated in Lansang v. Garcia.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20m) In this regard, I share the view of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe that it is neither. I agree with her that there is no action, but a proceeding, a sui generis one, to ascertain the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation, and that the Constitution itself provided the parameter for review - sufficient factual basis, which means that there exists clear and convincing proof (1) that there is invasion or rebellion; and (2) that public safety requires the proclamation of martial law.

The threshold is reasonableness. On probable cause, I concur with her that the purpose and vantage point of a prosecutor or judge in the determination of probable cause are fundamentally different from those of the president when he proclaims martial law. She cited Fr.

Bernas who, as the then amicus curiae of the Court, wrote that "the function of the President is far from different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21m) "For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22m) Accordingly, in a criminal case, it is necessary that a crime has been committed.

In contrast, the president establishes the existence of rebellion or invasion, not as a crime for purposes of prosecution against the accused, but merely as a factual occurrence to justify his declaration of martial law. If the president has sufficient and strong basis that a rebellion has been planned and the rebels had started to commit acts in furtherance thereof, he can already command the military to take action against the rebels. This is to say that the president is afforded much leeway in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law.

Unlike in the executive or judicial determination of probable cause, the president may rely on information or intelligence even without personally examining the source. He may depend on the information supplied by his subordinates, and, on the basis thereof, determine whether the circumstances warrant the declaration of martial law. While the president is still required to faithfully comply with the twin requirements of actual rebellion and the necessity of public safety, he is not bound by the technical rules observed in the determination of probable cause.

As to arbitrariness, suffice it to say that the Framers did not refer to it as one akin to a certiorari petition. They were silent on it because they really intended it to be a unique proceeding, a sui generis one, with a different threshold of evidence. Sufficiency of the Factual Basis Guided by the above-mentioned standard, I fully concur with the ponencia that the proclamation of martial law by the President has sufficient factual basis.

First, it has be.en unquestionably established that the ISISlinked local groups had planned to, and did, invade Marawi City. Second, they were heavily armed and posed a dangerous threat against government forces. Third, the occupation by the ISIS-linked groups paralyzed the normal functions of Marawi and caused the death and displacement of several Marawi residents.

Fourth, they sought to sever Marawi from the allegiance of the government with the goal of establishing a wilayah in the region. The intention of the rebels to isolate and sever Marawi from the government is evident from the video retrieved by the military from their initial operations in Marawi. In the said video,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23m) it can be seen that Hapilon, together with other unidentified members, were listening in closely as Abdullah Maute was giving directions or suggestions on how to commence and execute their planned offensive.

In particular, they sought to isolate Marawi so that it could be used as their center of operation to access all points in Mindanao. It need not be repeated that the ISIS-linked group attacked, stormed and rampaged all over Marawi City, terrorizing the whole populace, killing soldiers, policemen and civilians, effecting the escape of inmates from the Marawi City jail, taking over hospitals and other similar centers, controlling the business district, major thoroughfares and three bridges, burning Dansalan College, setting fire to the Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, kidnapping and taking hostages, and ransacking banks and residences. They also commandeered police and other vehicles, planted ISIS flags on them and rambled around the city, displaying their intimidating presence and power.

Further, the requirement of public safety has been met considering the capability of the rebel group to wreak more havoc on the region. The petitioners argue that what the group has launched does not amount to an actual rebellion. The contrary, however, has been sufficiently established.

At the time Proclamation No. 216 was issued, the Maute-led group had already commenced their offensive in Marawi. Their past actions, validated by subsequent events, serve as indicia of their ability to wage a protracted war and shed more blood. To date, 82 soldiers have given up their lives and the government is still not in total control of Marawi.

The military has confirmed that there are already 39 dead civilians, not to mention those wounded, displaced and missing. The nation is fortunate that the country has a decisive president who took immediate action to prevent the expansion of the rebellion to other areas. At a great price, its spread to other areas was checked.

If it has indeed been contained, the Court, however, cannot order the authorities to lift martial law in this appropriate proceeding because the judicial review, provided in the Constitution as a mechanism to check abuses, is limited only to the ascertainment of the sufficiency of the factual basis. When there is no longer any basis to continue the imposition of martial law, the remedy is to file a certiorari petition to question the arbitrariness of the assessment to prolong the period. At any rate, General Afio gave his assurance that when the situation becomes normal, he will recommend the lifting of martial law.

Territorial Coverage of the Proclamation Under the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the president may declare martial law in the Philippines or in any part thereof. Thus, it is understood that the president has the discretion to determine the territorial scope of the coverage as long as the constitutional requirements are met. In other words, there must be concurrence of an actual rebellion or invasion and the necessity for public safety.

There is no constitutional provision suggesting that martial law may only be declared in areas where actual hostilities are taking place. The president must be given much leeway in deciding what is reasonably necessary to successfully quash such rebellion or invasion. As Commander-in-Chief, he has under his command the various intelligence networks operating in the country and knows what is needed and where it is needed.

To limit the coverage of martial law to Marawi City only is unrealistic and impractical. As can be gleaned from the records, ISIS-linked local groups came from different places in Mindanao. The ASG, headed by Hapilon, came from Basilan; the Maute Group, from Lanao del Sur; the AKP or the Maguid Group, from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat; and the BIFF, from Maguindanao.

These rebels previously wreaked havoc on other parts of Mindanao. Thus, President Duterte cannot be faulted for declaring martial law all over Mindanao because public s·afety would be greatly imperilled if these rebel groups would be able to expand their operations beyond Marawi City.

Their capability to launch further attacks from Marawi City, serving as a spring board to extend their influence over other areas, impelled President Duterte to act swiftly and decisively. Further, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that several members of the rebel groups had been apprehended in areas other than Marawi, such as Iligan City and Cagayan de Oro City. In fact, the father of the Maute brothers, Casamora Maute, was arrested at a Task Force Davao checkpoint in Sirawan, Toril District, Davao City.

Their mother, Omenta Romato Maute, also known as Farhana, was apprehended in Masiu, Lanao Del Sur, beyond Marawi City. Others were intercepted in far away Bacolod City. The fear of the petitioners that the constitutional rights of the people of the rest of Mindanao would be violated is unfounded.

As earlier pointed out, the DND reminded the AFP and all its officers and personnel to faithfully observe the rule of law. As provided in the Constitution itself, The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24m) Restricting the operation of the armed forces within the confines of Marawi City would be ineffective in quelling the uprising. The insurgents would simply cross city borders and be beyond the reach of the martial law authorities, who would not be able to exercise martial law powers.

They will not be able to arrest any of them, unless they have personal knowledge of what the rebels have just committed, are committing or about to commit. Certainly, this is not what the Framers intended in including the martial law provisions in our Constitution. First and foremost in their minds were the security, safety, and territorial integrity of the country.

To ignore the reality is to dishonor the memory of the 82 soldiers who gallantly sacrificed and gave up their lives so that this country may still be one. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss all the petitions. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1m) The word 'Caliph' means successor, and designates the political leader of the Islamic community, or ummah.

By using the language of Caliph and Caliphate, ISIS is attempting to establish itself as the leader of a worldwide Muslim movement and mobilize a broad coalition of support by erasing national boundaries. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/what-is-a-caliphate-meaning n5543538.html) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2m) Annex "B," Consolidated Comment.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3m) Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 42. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4m) Cruz, Philippine Political Law (2002 Ed.), p. 227 citing Willoughby, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1056, pp. 1591-1592.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5m) Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 42. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6m) Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 42. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7m) Article 134, Book II of the RPC.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8m) SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482, 510-511 (2004). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9m) 392 Phil. 618 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10m) Id.

at 645-646. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11m) David v. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 780 (2006). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12m) Supra note 8.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13m) Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 43. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14m) Supra note 11, at 744. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15m) 684 Phil. 526 (2012).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16m) Id. at 558-561. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17m) Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla, 450 Phil. 598, 612 (2003).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18m) Spouses Cheng v. Spouses Javier, 609 Phil. 434, 441 (2009). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19m) Apines v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 202114, November 9, 2016. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20m) 149 Phil. 547, 592-594 (1971).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21m) Cited in the Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco in Fortun, supra note 15, at 629. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22m) People v. Borje, G.R. No. 170046, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 399, 409. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23m) Annex "B"

of the Consolidated Comment. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24m) Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION REYES,J.: "The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty.

To protect the nation's continued existence, from external as well as internal threats, the government 'is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions. "'(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1r) The government, particularly the President, should be accorded extensive authority and discretion when what is at stake is the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. The measures undertaken by the President in such cases should enjoy the widest latitude of constitutional interpretation, tempered only by reason, lest the government be stymied and rendered inutile.

I. At the center of the controversy in this case is a proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2r) which outlines the President's Commander-in-Chief powers, i.e.,first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to declare martial law; and third, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The power to call out the armed forces may only be exercised if it is necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. On the other hand, the power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus entails a more stringent requisite - it necessitates the existence of actual invasion or rebellion and may only be invoked when public safety necessitates it.

There is invasion when there is a hostile or forcible encroachment on the sovereign rights of the Philippines.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3r) On the other hand, the term rebellion in Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution must be understood as having the same meaning as the crime of rebellion defined and punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4r) which reads: Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

In rebellion, it is not enough that there be a public uprising and taking arms against the Government, it must be shown that the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: first, to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or second, to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5r) It is in the President alone that the Constitution vests the powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus subject to the aforementioned requisites. Accordingly, contrary to the petitioners' suppositions, the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) or of any other high-ranking officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is not a condition precedent to the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Further, when the President declares martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he is inevitably exercising a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The President, as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive on whom is committed the responsibility of preserving the very survival of the State, is empowered, indeed obliged, to preserve the State against domestic violence and foreign attack. In the discharge of that duty, he necessarily is accorded a very broad authority and discretion in ascertaining the nature and extent of the danger that confronts the nation and in selecting the means or measures necessary for the preservation of the safety of the Republic.

Indeed, whether actual invasion or rebellion exists is a question better addressed to the President, who under the Constitution is the authority vested with the power of ascertammg the existence of such exigencies and charged with the responsibility of suppressing them. His actions in the face of such emergency must be viewed in the context of the situation as it then confronted him.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6r) In this regard, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President only needs to be convinced that there is probable cause of the existence of an invasion or rebellion. To require a higher standard of evidence would amount to an unnecessary restriction on the President's use of exclusive prerogatives under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty.

It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7r) It is enough that it is believed, given the state of facts, that an actual invasion or rebellion indeed exists. Corollary to the foregoing, the petitioners' claim that the President should have exercised his calling out power instead of declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to address the armed uprising of the Maute group in Marawi City is plainly untenable. To stress, the President, in case of the extraordinary circumstances mentioned in Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution, has broad discretionary powers to determine what course of action he should take to defend and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State or any part thereof.

Thus, it would be unreasonable and utterly baseless to require the President to first exercise his calling out power and treat the same as a condition precedent to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The imposition of martial law, however, "does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function x x x."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8r) It does involve the substitution of the military in the civilian functions of govemment,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9r) except, by express terms of the Constitution, the performance of legislative and judicial functions.

In other words, martial law entails a substitution of the military in the performance of executive functions, including the maintenance of peace and order and the enforcement of laws relative to the protection of lives and properties, which is normally a function of the Philippine National Police (PNP).(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10r) Otherwise stated, during a state of martial law, the military personnel take over the functions, inter alia, of the PNP. II. Although the President is accorded wide discretion in ascertaining the nature and extent of the danger that confronts the State, as well as the course of action necessary to deal with the same, his exercise of the powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution is nevertheless subject to certain constitutional limitations pursuant to the system of separation of powers and balancing of powers among the three great departments.

Thus, the President is required to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thereupon, congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In the same manner, Congress may likewise extend such proclamation or suspension upon request by the President if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11r) Further, the Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12r) I agree with the majority opinion that the term "appropriate proceeding," refers to a sui generis proceeding, which is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction of the Court laid down under Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, contrary to the respondents' assertion, the term "appropriate proceeding"

under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution could not have referred to a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The "appropriate proceeding" under Section 18, unlike a certiorari suit, must be resolved by the Court within 30 days from the institution of the action.

More importantly, as articulated by Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. What is at issue in the "appropriate proceeding" referred to under Section 18 is only the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Thus, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the Court, once the "appropriate proceeding" is commenced, is mandated to examine and sift through the factual basis relied upon by the President to justify his proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to determine whether such factual basis is sufficient or insufficient. Also, as already stated, the petitioners have burden of proof to show that the President's declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lacks sufficient factual basis.

First, as a general rule, official acts enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the presumption may be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary. When an act is official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the assumption that the law tells the official what his duties are and that he discharged these duties accordingly.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13r) The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14r) Second, it is elementary that he who alleges a fact must prove it, and a mere allegation is not evidence,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15r) and since the petitioners allege that there is no factual basis to support the said declaration and suspension, they are bound to prove their allegations. III. The petitioners failed to prove that the President had insufficient basis in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

It is incumbent upon the petitioners to present credible evidence to prove that the President's declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had insufficient basis.

However, a perusal of the petitioners' allegations shows that the same are merely based on various newspaper reports on the ongoing armed fighting in Marawi City between the government forces and elements of the Maute group. However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16r) A newspaper article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated, but not as to the truth of the matters stated therein.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17r) Hearsay evidence is that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit to be attached to the witness himself, but rests also in part on the veracity and competency of some other person from whom the witness received his information.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18r) By itself, and as repeatedly conveyed by jurisprudential policy, hearsay evidence is devoid of merit, irrespective of any objection from the adverse party.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19r) The declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are official acts of the President, exercised pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief powers accorded to him by no less than the Constitution.

As such, the same enjoys the presumption of regularity, which is conclusive unless clear and convincing evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty is adduced. There is none in this case, however, except for hearsay evidence consisting of the unverified newspaper articles; the petitioners' allegations vis-a-vis the supposed irregularity in the declaration and suspension cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction. IV.

The petitioners' attempt to convince the Court that no rebellion is happening in Marawi City fails miserably in light of the factual milieu on the ground. The fact of the Maute group's uprising and armed hostility against the government is not disputed. The petitioners, nevertheless, contend that the armed uprising undertaken by the Maute group in Marawi City is not for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof from the allegiance to the Government or its laws or depriving the President or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

The supposed lack of culpable purpose behind a rebellion enumerated under Article 134 of the RPC is more apparent than real. It is a mere allegation unsupported by any evidence. The aforementioned culpable purpose, essentially, are the political motivation for the public uprising and taking arms against the Government.

However, motive is a state of mind that can only be discerned through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the malefactors at the time of the armed public uprising and immediately thereafter. Based on the President's report to Congress relative to Proclamation No. 216, at around 2:00 p.m. on May 23, 2017, members of the Maute group and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) commenced their attack on various public and private facilities in Marawi City; they forcibly opened the gates of the Marawi City Jail and assaulted personnel thereof; they took over three bridges in Lanao del Sur to pre-empt military reinforcements; they set up road blockades and checkpoints and forcibly occupied certain areas; they attacked and burned several schools, churches, and hospitals; they hoisted the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas in Marawi City.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20r) Further, military intelligence reports had previously confirmed that the grand plan of the Maute group and other rebel groups in Mindanao is to raze the entire city of Marawi City, that would have served as a precursor for other terrorist groups to stage their own uprising across Mindanao in a bid to establish a wilayah or a province of the ISIS in the region.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21r) Simple logic would dictate that the foregoing circumstances points to no conclusion other than that the political motivation behind the armed public uprising by the Maute group has for its purpose the removal of Marawi City and, consequently, the whole of Mindanao, from the allegiance to the Government or, at the very least, deprive the President of his powers and prerogatives.

Also, the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindat;tao, had probable cause to believe that the armed insurgents in Marawi City and the rest of Mindanao are mounting a rebellion against the State and are not merely engaged in armed hostilities. It should be noted that the President had previously issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, which declared a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. Part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22r) Further, based on the ISIS' propaganda material Dabiq, which was obtained by the AFP, as early as November 2014, a number of local rebel groups in Mindanao, particularly the Maute group, the ASG, the Ansarul Khilafah Philippines, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, have already pledged their allegiance to the ISIS caliphate.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23r) In April 2016, the ISIS' weekly online newsletter Al Naba announced the appointment of ASG's leader Isnilon Hapilon (Hapilon) as the emir or leader of all ISIS forces in the Philippines.

Hapilon's appointment as emir is confirmed by the ISIS' June 21, 2016 online video entitled "The Solid Structure," which hailed Hapilon as the mujahid authorized to lead the soldiers of the Islamic State in the Philippines.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24r) What is clear from the foregoing circumstances is that the rebel groups in Mindanao already have the organization and manpower to realize their goal of removing the whole of Mindanao from the allegiance to the Government. Prior to the siege of Marawi City on May 23, 201 7, the rebel groups in Mindanao had perpetrated several crimes and hostilities such as kidnapping and beheading victims, attacks on several military installations, bombing public places, attacks on several government offices, and ambush of military personnel.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25r) The President, at the time of the issuance of Proclamation No. 216, has knowledge of the foregoing military intelligence reports, including the ultimate goal of the rebels to establish an ISIS caliphate in Mindanao.

Indeed, as early as the first quarter of 2017, DND Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and National Security Adviser General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.

have submitted to the President thick briefers outlining the political motivation of the said rebel groups and a list of the armed attacks against the government in Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26r) Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the President had reasonable belief that the hostilities in Marawi City is not merely an armed public uprising, but is already a realization of the rebel groups' plan to mount a full scale rebellion in Mindanao. Surely, the President may not be faulted for using everything in his arsenal of powers to deal with the exigencies of the situation; more so considering that what is at stake is the very sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which the President is duty-bound to preserve and protect. It would be unreasonable to wait for a territory of the Philippines to be actually removed from the allegiance to the Government before the President may be authorized to exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers.

In this regard, the contention that the coverage of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should have been limited only to Marawi City is utterly baseless. To stress, the conduct of the rebel groups at the time of the siege of Marawi City, and even prior thereto, coupled with the aforementioned military intelligence reports in the possession of the President, are sufficient bases to engender a reasonable belief that the Marawi City is but a staging ground for the widespread armed attacks in the whole of Mindanao, with the ultimate objective being the establishment of an ISIS caliphate therein and, thus, removing Mindanao from the allegiance to the Government. Given the foregoing considerations, it would be the height of absurdity to expect the President to dawdle around and wait for the armed attacks by the rebel groups to reach the neighboring cities of Marawi and the rest of the provinces of Mindanao before he exercise his power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The continued armed attacks by the Maute group and other rebel groups not only in Marawi City, but as well as in the rest of Mindanao, indubitably affects the residents therein who are forced to flee from their respective homes to avoid being caught in the cross-fire. Also, the said rebel groups, even prior to the siege of Marawi City, have been perpetrating several activities aimed at terrorizing the residents of Mindanao, such as bombing, kidnapping and attacks on military and government installations. The members of the PNP, who are generally tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties and the maintenance of peace and order,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27r) are way in over their heads in dealing with the rebel groups' attacks against the civilian populace in Mindanao.

Indubitably, public safety necessitated, nay required, the President's declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. V. It cannot be emphasized enough that sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are in danger of being undermined in cases of invasion or rebellion, are indispensable to the very existence of the State. It is therefore the primordial duty of the President, within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, to exercise all means necessary and proper to protect and preserve the State's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The President should thus be allowed wide latitude of discretion dealing with extraordinary predicament such as invasion or rebellion.

The petitioners' apprehensions regarding the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is quite understandable given the abuses that were committed when the same measures were implemented in the Philippines a few decades back supposedly to address the threat of communist insurgency. Nevertheless, the ghosts of the past should not impede the resolution of our current predicament. The country is facing an actual rebellion in Mindanao; no amount of denial would make the rebellious insurgency in Mindanao wither away.

The President's powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are retained in the 1987 Constitution by the framers thereof for a reason - they are effective measures to quell invasion or rebellion and are thus necessary for the protection and preservation of the State's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In any case, whatever the misgivings the petitioners may have as regards the present declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, suffice it to say that the 1987 Constitution, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has placed enough safeguards to ensure that the ghosts of the past would no longer return to haunt us. ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, there being sufficient factual basis for the issuance by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1r) Separate Opinion of J. Antonio in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, 158-A Phil. 1, 288 (1974), citing Mr. Justice Bradley, concurring in Legal Tender Cases[US] 12 Wall. 457, 554, 556, 20 L. ed. 287, 314, 315.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2r) Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

x x x x The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. x x x x (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3r) See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 843.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4r) See Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio in Fortun, et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., 684 Phil. 526, 591-592 (2012). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5r) See Lad/adv. Senior State Prosecutor Velasco, 551 Phil. 313, 329 (2007).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6r) See Separate Opinion of J. Antonio in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, supra note 1.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7r) See Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Hon. Gonzales, et al., 602 Phil. 1000, 1009 (2009). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8r) 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9r) See Dissenting Opinion of J. Tinga in Prof David v. Pres.

Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 830 (2006). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10r) Republic Act No. 6975 known as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", Section 24. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11r) 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12r) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13r) Reyes, Jr. v. Be/isario, et al., 612 Phil. 936, 960 (2009). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14r) Bustillo, et al. v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15r) Garcia v. Philippine Airlines and/or Trinidad, 580 Phil. 155, 176 (2008). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16r) See Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17r) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18r) See Peralta, Jr., Perspectives of Evidence, 2005 ed., p. 269, citing 2 Jones Evidence, p. 514.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19r) Id. at 275. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20r) President's Report relative to Proclamation No. 216, pp. 4-5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21r) Office of the Solicitor General's Memorandum, p. 66. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22r) Proclamation No. 216, fourth whereas clause.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23r) Office of the Solicitor General's Memorandum, p. 5. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24r) Id.

at 7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25r) Id. at 9-11.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26r) Id. at 11. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27r) Republic Act No. 6975, Section 24.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION TIJAM,J.: I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice Del Castillo in his ponencia. I submit this opinion to offer my views concerning certain issues. All three petitions seek this Court's judicial review of Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017 (Proclamation), pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which reads: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

Although mere citizenship gives locus standi, there must be prima facie showing of insufficiency of the factual basis for the Proclamation.

As a rule, a party must be able to establish a direct and personal interest in the controversy to clothe him with the requisite locus standi. He must be able to show, not only that the government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1t) The Constitution, however, has relaxed this rule with respect to petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, requiring only that the petitioner be any Filipino citizen. The exception was so provided to facilitate the institution of any judicial challenge to such proclamation or suspension.

This is just one of the several safeguards placed in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution to avert, check or correct any abuse of the extraordinary powers, lodged in the President, of imposing martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, this should not result in the Court taking cognizance of every petition assailing such proclamation or suspension, if it appears to be prima facie unfounded. That the Court has the authority to outright deny patently unmeritorious petitions is clear from the above-quoted provision, which uses the permissive term "may"

in referring to the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review. The term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2t) When used in law, it is directory and operates to confer discretion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3t) Indeed, given that any citizen can file the action, it must be required that the petition ·should allege sufficient grounds for the Court to take further action.

For instance, a petition that simply invokes the court's judicial power to review the proclamation without alleging specific grounds, or is based on a general, unsubstantiated and conclusory allegation that the President was without or had false factual basis for issuing the proclamation or suspension, could be dismissed outright. Otherwise, in the absence of a personal stake or direct injury which will ordinarily infuse one with legal standing to file the case, the Court can theoretically be saddled with hundreds of petitions and be compelled to entertain them simply because they were filed. The requirement of a prima facie showing of insufficiency of the factual basis in the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus becomes even more important if, as the ponencia declares, this Court's review is to be confined only to the Proclamation, the President's Report to Congress, and the pleadings.

Action questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Proclamation is sui generis. I am in agreement with the ponente in treating the proceedings filed pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 18, Rule VII of the 1987 Constitution as sui generis. The action questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither a criminal nor a civil proceeding.

Its subject is unique unto itself as it involves the use of an extraordinary power by the President as Commander-in-Chief and matters affecting national security. Furthermore, the exercise of such power involves not only the executive but also the legislative branch of the government; it is subject to automatic review by Congress which has the power to revoke the declaration or suspension. To ensure that any unwarranted use of the extraordinary power is promptly discontinued, the Constitution limits the period for the Court to decide the case.

And to facilitate a judicial inquiry into the declaration or suspension, the Constitution allows any citizen to bring the action. The Constitution likewise specifies the ground upon which this particular action can be brought, i.e. the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration or suspension.

As an express exception to the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts, the Court is asked to make a factua1 determination, at the first instance, of whether the President had adequate reasons to justify the declaration or suspension. Moreover, as an exception to the doctri'ne of hierarchy of courts, the Constitution provides that the case be filed directly with this Court. Finally, the Court's jurisdiction was conferred as an additional safeguard against any abuse of the extraordinary power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Taken together, these elements make the Court's jurisdiction under Section 18 sui generis. Verily, considering the magnitude of the power sought to be checked or reviewed, bearing in n1ind the evil sought to be prevented by constitutionalizing the Court's power to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration or suspension, and taking into account the requirements specified by the Constitution for such review, an action brought pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indeed a class of its own. Accordingly, any action that invokes this Court's jurisdiction under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to detennine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, satisfies the constitutional requirement that the challenge be made "in an appropriate proceeding."

That a proceeding under Section 18, Article VII is not included in the enumeration of actions over which the Court has jurisdiction under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution is of no moment. After all, the Court's judicial power, as defined in the same Article, is not an exhaustive list of this Court's jurisdiction. The definition provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandahlc and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

It, therefore, does not preclude this Court from assuming such jurisdiction as may have been confrrred elsewhere in the Constitution but not specifically indicated in Article VIII. Congress' action precedes the Court's review but Congressional imprimatur is not conclusive on the Court. The Court's independence is not necessarily compromised by awaiting Congressional action.

Addressing respondents' assertion that due deference must be given to the actions of the two co-equal branches of government - the President's resort to martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and Congress' support thereof, the ponencia stresses the independence of this Court's judicial review and holds that such review can be made simultaneously with and independently from Congress' power to revoke. The ponencia, thus, would have the Court re-examine, reconsider and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4t) that the Court "must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers," and should hear petitions challenging the President's action only when Congress defaults in its duty to review the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

I agree with the Fortun pronouncement insofar as it instructs that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers ahead of the Court's inquiry.

I do not agree, however, that the Court can "step in" only when Congress defaults in its duty to review. The Court can inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension not only when Congress fails to undertake such review, but also if it decides to support the proclamation or suspension as in this case.

The Court is not bound by Congress' decision not to revoke the proclamation or suspension. The system of checks and balances as built in Section 18, Article VII demands that the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be within reach of judicial scrutjny. It is only when Congress decides to revoke the proclamation or suspension that the Court shall withhold review as such revocation will render any prayer for the nullification of the proclamation or suspension moot; and, even if the Court finds the existence of the conditions for the proclamation or suspension, it cannot require or compel the President to exercise his martial law or suspension power.

The exercise by the President, Congress and the Court of their powers under Section 18, Article VII is sequential. Accordingly, Congress' review must precede judicial inquiry, for the fo1lowing reasons: First. As observed in Fortun, the President's power to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially shared with Congress.

Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to revoke the declaration or suspension, and the President is absolutely without authority to set the revocation aside. As stated in Fortun, since only Congress can maintain the declaration or suspension based on its own evaluation of the facts, the President and Congress, in a sense, exercise the martial law and suspension power jointly. Thus, Congress' review of the declaration or suspension must perforce take place before the Court's judicia] examination of the factual basis of the President's action.

Second. As a measure to rein in the President's use of the extraordinary powers under Section 1 8, Article VII, the framers of the 1987 Constitution originally intended for the martial law and suspension power to be exercised by the President with the concurrence of Congress.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5t) They intended for Congress to act, not even sequentially, but jointly, in the President's exercise of the martial law or suspension power. In lieu of such concurrence, however, they ultimately settled on Congress' revocation power, taking into account that the President would need-to act immediately if there is indeed rebellion or invasion and public safety is endangered.

That the framers of the Constitution, if not for such time element, would have Congress take part in the decision whether to exercise the martial law or suspension power, supports the view that Congress' action should precede judicial inquiry. Third. The Constitution requires the President to submit his Report to Congress, either in person or in writing, within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

After receiving the President's Report, Congress' review of the proclamation or suspension is automatic. Judicial review, on the other hand, has to be initiated by a citizen. The imposition on the President of a duty to report to Congress within such a short period from the proclamation or suspension, and Congress' automatic review of the Report, show that Congress is expected to initially act on the President's proclamation or suspension for the purpose of deciding whether it must continue.

Fourth. As safeguards or remedies against an unjustified use of the extraordinary powers under Section 18, Article VII, the Constitution provides for both Congressional review, which is automatic, and judicial review, which must be initiated by any citizen.

Being automatic, Congressional review of the proclamation or suspension is instantly an available remedy to address any misuse of the extraordinary powers under Section 18, Article VII. With its power of revocation which the President cannot set aside, Congress' action offers an adequate remedy against any unwarranted use of the martial law and suspension power. To ensure an orderly procedure and in the interest of preserving comity with a co-equal branch of the government, Congressional review of the proclamation or suspension must be allowed to take place before the Court intervenes.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6t) Indeed, it is sound practice to exhaust all available and adequate remedies before resort to judicial review.

Fifth. The Court should not pre-empt Congress' possible revocation of the President's proclamation or suspension. Furthermore, conflicting decisions from the Court and Congi;ess, which will not be in the interest of judicial stability or Congressional independence, will be avoided.

Indeed, it will not promote judicial stability if Congress can still exercise its power to revoke notwithstanding a decision from this Court finding sufficient factual basis for the proclamation or suspension. Furthermore, if the Court decides to nullify the proclamation or suspension ahead of Congress' action, Congress may still assert its independence to evaluate the President's decision. These may lead to a constitutional crisis involving two (2) co-equal branches of government, each endowed with power to review the President's action.

Thus, for the sake of orderly procedure, one must precede the other, and since the Court has been considered as the "last bulwark of justice and democracy,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7t) it is but logical that it should undertake its review after the legislature has performed its duty. This is consistent with the principle of separation of powers which has been explained as follows: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.

Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an daborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

x x x And 1he judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effecthrely checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8t) (Emphasis supplied) However, consistent with Fortun, should Congress procrastinate or default on its duty to review, the Court will proceed to hear petitions challenging the President's action. To be sure, legislative imprimatur on the proclamation or suspension will not consequentially bring such proclamation or suspension outside the ambit of judicial review. It should be noted that under Section 18, Article VII, even extensions of the proclamation or suspension, which only Congress can declare upon the President's initiative, can be the subject of this Courf s inquiry in an appropriate proceeding that questions the factual basis thereof.

It must he stressed, too, that the Court's independence will not be compromised by allowing Congressional review to take place before the Court exercises its judicial authority.

This Court's independence will still be preserved as it will not be bmmd by the findings of Congress but will have to make an independent assessment of the facts upon which the President relied in issuing his proclamation or suspension. There is no abdication of duty on the part of the Court as it will proceed to hear the case if Congress decides not to revoke the Proclamation. Any concern that the Comi may not be able to decide within the thirty-day (39) period (from filing of the appropriate proceeding), as fixed by the Constitution, if the exercise of the powers under Section 18, Article VII is to be sequential, has been addressed in Fortun.

The Court explained that since Congress is expbctcd to act swiftly upon submission of the President's Report, the 30-day period would be enough for the Court to exercise its review power, and in any case, the expiration of the period would not di vest the Court of its jurisdiction since jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has heen tenTLinated. At this jilncture, it bears noting that while the Fortun pronouncement, as quoted iri the ponencia, speaks of the Court's intervention taking place only when Congress defaults on its duty to review the President's action, subsequent statements in the. Fortun Decision suggests that the Court would still hear petitions questioning the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension even after Congress' review, thus: But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without pre-empting congressional action.

Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the Presidents proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress.

Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court sufficient ti,me to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of tbe proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, based on the entirety of its Decision in Fortun, it cannot be said that the Court has, as the ponencia states, "abdicated from its bounden duty to review" the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, or "surrendered the same to Congress."

The Court cannot supplant the President's choice of which of the three powers under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution to use. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution gives the President, under prescribed conditions, the powers to call out the armed forces, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. I agree with the ponente in holding that this Court's review cannot extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which of said powers to avail given a set of facts or conditions.

It is not within this Court's power to rule that the President should have used his "calling out" powers instead. To do so is to encroach on an entirely executive prerogative and violate the principle of separation of powers.

It is not this Court's duty to supplant the President's decision but merely to determine whether it satisfies the conditions prescribed in the Constitution for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9t) Recommendation of or consultation with the Defense Secretary or other high-ranking military officials is not a condition imposed by the Constitution. Indeed, as the ponencia holds, a plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution will n.weal no such cqndition for the President's exercise of the power to proclairn martial law ori to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

lt should also be pointed out that as the Chief Executive, the President has access to all kinds of information, not necessarily from the military. Furthermore, the President himself is from Mindanao and has served as n local chief executive of Davao City for many years. It cannot be said, therefore, that he is not privy to the realities on the ground in Mindanao and that his knowledge is superficial or will not enable him, absent a recommendati1m frorn or consultation with military officials, to make an informed judgment in the exercise of the martial law and suspension powers under Section 18, Article VIL Constitutionality of the Proclamation is determined under the sufficiency of factual basis test.

Based on the ponencia, there are two (2) tests to determine the constitutionality of a declaration of martial law or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: the arbitrariness test, as applied in the 1971 case of Lansang v. Garcia,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10t) and the sufficiency of factual basis test, introduced in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 18, however, specifies the scope of this Court's judicial review, i.e., the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis, as provided in the Constitution, lies in the existence of an actual rebellion or invasion where public safety requires the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas cOJpus.

The Court's review is, thus, confined to the detennination of whether the facts upon which the President relied in issuing such declaration or suspension show a case of actual rebellion or invasion that poses a danger to public safety. The Constitution does not require the Court to look into the fairness or arbitrariness of such imposition or suspension. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have stated so, considering that they introduced the concept of judicial review of grave abuse of discretion under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution.

In other words, in reviewing the President's Proclamation, this Court's criterion is factual and will not involve a determination of whether the President acted in a whimsical, capricious or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Petitioners have the burden of proving insufficiency of factual basis.

Under our Rules of Cmirt, it is presumed that an official duty has been regularly performed.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11t) It has likewise been held that a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12t) It is also a settled rul.e that he who alleges must prove,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13t) and the rule applies even to negative assertions.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14t) Thus, the burden of proving that the President's factual basis for declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao was insufficient, lies with the petitioners. Notably, in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15t) involving President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration of a state of rebellion, the Court decided the case on the premise that petitioners therein had the burden of proving that the President exceeded her authority as Chief Executive or Commander-in-Chief in issuing such declaration and in calling out the armed forces to suppress the rebellion, thus: It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.

While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of diScretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. x x x x The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executjve and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

In t he same vein, the Court, in Ampatuan v. Puno,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16t) involving President Macapagal-Arroyo's Proclamation 1946 which placed the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency, and called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence therein, the burden of proof was likewise placed upon the petitioners questioning the President's decision, thus: Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato Chy, as well as the President's exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state-of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

x x x x Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President's actions. Considering that the foregoing cases also involve the exercise of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief and they likewise inquire into the factual basis of the executive action, the Court's ruling that the burden of proof lies with the petitioners impugning the exercise of such power, should similarly apply to the instant case. Petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof.

Petitioners were unable to show that the President had no sufficient factual basis in issuing Proclamation No. 216. The attempt of petitioners in G.R. No. 231658 and 231771 to discredit some of the President's reasons for issuing his Proclamation must perforce fail as it was based merely on news articles they found online. Such news reports amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"

and are, therefore, "not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17t) Indeed, it appears that not even an effort to verify said news reports was made, or affidavits of witnesses presented, to directly refute the President's factual assertions. In any event, of the several incidents mentioned by the President in his Proclamation and Report to Congress, petitioners in G.R. No. 231658 imputed falsity and inaccuracy only to some of the events so stated. Granting arguendo that the President's claims as regards these events were inaccurate or false, the other incidents enumerated in the President's Proclamation and Report to Congress still establish conditions upon which the President can exercise his martial law and suspension powers.

Furthermore, reliance of petitioners, in G.R. No. 231658, on the maxim offalsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is greatly misplaced. Firstly, their allegation of falsehood, based on mere newspaper reports, is unsubstantiated. Secondly, the legal maxim of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18t) Thirdly, it has been held that said principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19t) It has not been shown, however, that there was a self-contradiction or an inconsistency in the President's rationale for issuing Proclamation No. 216.

Finally, for the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus to apply, there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20t) Petitioners have not been able to establish that there was at least a conscious and deliberate intention on the part of the President to falsify his reasons for declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report to Congress sufficiently establish the existence of actual rebellion that endangers public safety. The conditions prescribed in the Constitution for a valid proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are as follows: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) public safety requires the proclamation or suspension.

I agree that considering the urgency of the situation, which may not give the President opportunity to veri(y with precision the facts reported to him, the President only needs to be satisfied that there is probable cause to conclude that the aforesaid conditions exist. As a standard of proof, probable cause has been defined thus: x x x Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circwnstances, which would lead a reasonably discreet and prndent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In detennining probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.

He relies on common sense.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, but it requires less than evidence that would justify a conviction.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21t) (Emphasis supplied) There was probable cause for the President to believe that rebellion was being committed. The facts, upon which the President based his Proclamation and which have not been satisfactorily controverted, show that more likely than not, there was rebellion and public safety required the exercise of the President's powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.

Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, defines "rebellion" as follows: Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection - How committed.

- The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. (Emphasis supplied.) That there is an armed uprising in Marawi City is not disputed. The bone of contention lies in the element of culpable purpose.

However, the facts and incidents, as put forward by the President in his Proclamation and Report to Congress, show that there is probable cause to conclude that the uprising is aimed at removing Mindanao from its allegiance to the Philippine Government and depriving the President of his powers over the territory. As reported by the President, the Maute Group, along with the Abu Sayyaf Group and their sympathizers, attacked, laid siege and burned both government and privately-owned facilities in Marawi City, including hospitals and schools, and caused casualties to both government personnel and civilians. They took hostages and searched for Christians to execute.

They prevented Maranaos from leaving their homes, and forced young male Muslims to join their groups. They occupied several areas in Marawi City and set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction. These acts, viewed in the light of the Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to the DAESH(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22t) and.

their brazen display of the ISIS(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23t) flag in several areas in Marawi City, sufficiently establish the Group's intention to remove the City's allegiance to the Philippine Gove1nment, to reinforce their Group and create a stronghold in Marawi City, and to establish a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao. Furthermore, as the President stated in his Report to Congress, the Maute Group and their sympathizers had been responsible for cutting vital lines of transportation and power, which prevented the government from delivering basic services and from sending troop reinforcements to restore peace in Marawi City. By such act, the Maute Group and their cohorts clearly intended to prevent the Executive from exercising its functions to deliver basic services and to maintain peace and order in Marawi City.

Clearly, therefore, by the standard of probable cause, the culpable purpose required under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code has been shown to exist. Petitioners in G.R. No. 231658 also argue that the alleged siege of Marawi City was actually an armed resistance, not to remove the City'sallegiance from the Republic, but to shield a high profile terrorist, Isnilon Hapilon, following a government operation to capture him. The argument, however, fails to persuade.

The acts perpetrated by the Maute Group are more consistent with the intention to establish a seat of power in Marawi City, than an effort to shield Hapilon from capture. Indeed, it taxes credulity to assume that the act of setting a school on fire, or of recruiting young male Muslims to strengthen the group's force, or the killing of teachers, as cited in the President's Report, is simply for the purpose of shielding the group's leader. Thus, if anything, the government operation only set in motion the group's plan to lay siege and take over Marawi City for and in the name of ISIS.

In fact, the group's resources and weapons, which have enabled them to continue fighting the Philippine military more than a month since Proclamation No. 216 was issued, confirm that they were preparing to carry out an armed uprising to establish a DAESH wilayat. The same petitioners likewise maintain that the Maute Group's act of hoisting the DAESH flag is mere cheap propaganda and is not indicative of removing Marawi City from its allegiance to the Republic or of depriving the President of his powers and prerogatives. On the contrary, this act, in light of the group's declaration of allegiance to DAESH, demonstrated an intention to subject the city to the DAESH's rule.

It is not even necessary that the DAESH recognize the group or acknowledge its allegiance; what matters is the group's intent to bring the City under its regime. The brazen display of the DAESH flag in several areas of Marawi City cannot but be considered as laying claim over the City for and on behalf of DAESH. To dismiss it as cheap propaganda may not be prudent and may not serve the best interest of national security.

Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The events as reported by the President to Congress show that the violent attacks of the Maute group and its sympathizers have resulted in destruction of government and privately-owned properties as well as human casualties. The government has been prevented from delivering basic services and from sending troop reinforcements to restore peace in Marawi City.

Civilians and government personnel have no easy access to and from the City. All of these were taking place as part of the plan of the Maute Group and its sympathizers to establish their seat of power in Marawi City and create a DAESH wilayat in Mindanao. Clearly, the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been firmly grounded on the requirements of public safety.

Scope of Review I agree that past events may be considered in justifying the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if they are connected or related to the situation at hand. Such events may also be considered if material in assessing the extent and gravity of the current threat to national security. In Proclamation No. 216, the President averred that the Maute terrorist group who attacked government and private facilities, inflicted casualties, and hoisted the DAESH/ISIS flag in several areas, in Marawi City, on May 23, 2017, is the very same group that had been responsible for a series of violent acts for which the President issued Proclamation No. 55 in February 2016, declaring a state of emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao.

These violent acts included an attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the killing and wounding of several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 which freed the group's comrades and other detainees. These past incidents are clearly relevant to the assessment of the Maute group's intention and capability to implement a plan of establishing a DAESH wilayat in Mindanao.

Similarly, events subsequent to the issuance of the proclamation or suspension may be considered in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis. Subsequent events confirm the existence or absence of the conditions for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. I have my reservations, however, as regards the statement in the ponencia that the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The accuracy or veracity of the information upon which the President based his decision, if properly challenged before the Court, would have to be passed upon and determined. Rebellion and Terrorism It is true, as Mr. Justice Leonen pointed out, that martial law is not a constitutionally prescribed solution to terrorism. This is so, however, because terrorism was not as pronounced or prevalent when the 1987 Constitution was drafted as it is today.

I reckon that if it were, it would have been considered and indeed included by the framers of the Constitution among the conditions for the exercise of the martial law power, given that like rebellion or invasion, it is inimical to national security, and because it is, as described in Republic Act No. (RA) 9372,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24t) a crime against the Filipino people and against humanity.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25t) Terrorism, under RA 9372 is committed when specific crimes under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or special laws, are perpetrated, thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. Rebellion under .Article 134 of the RPC, as well as murder, kidnapping and arson, are some of the offenses subsumed in the crime of terrorism.

However, while rebellion is included in the crime of terrorism under RA 9372, said law did not have the effect of obliterating-rebellion as a crime in itself. Thus, even as rebellion can qualify as an act of terrorism, it does not cease to be a ground for the declaration of martial law if the elements under the RPC are present. In this case, it has been established by the standard of probable cause that the armed uprising of the Maute group and its sympathizers is for the purpose of establishing as DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.

The argument, therefore, that the acts of the Maute group and their sympathizers constitute mere acts of terrorism, outside the ambit of the martial law power, will not hold water. In fact, RA 9372 specifically states that "(n)othing in (said) Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." It can be deduced, therefore, that even if rebellion qualifies as terrorism, the President is still empowered to exercise the martial law and suspension powers under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

"(A)s set of rules and principles, (the International Humanitarian Law) aims, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26t) If the reason for the law is to protect human rights and to promote human welfare, it cannot possibly be a source of protection for the acts of rebellion perpetrated by the Maute group and its cohorts since their acts constitute or qualify as acts of terrorism. Terrorism is the very antithesis of human rights.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27t) Proclamation covering the entire Mindanao has sufficient factual basis. In his Report to Congress, the President, in part, stated: (a) The attacks of the Maute group and their sympathizers on May 23, 2017 constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the group's seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.

(b) The acts of the Maute group and their sympathizers have emboldened other armed groups in Mindanao, resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Mindanao, and compromised the security of the entire Mindanao. (c) Their occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines and backdoor passages.

(d) The Maute terrorist group is composed of 263 fully armed members (as of the end of 2016). It chiefly operates in Lanao del Sur but has extensive networks with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujadin lndonesia Timur and the Abu Sayyaf Group. It adheres to the principles of DAESH and has declared its allegiance to the DAESH.

Reports show that the group receives financial and logistical support from foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS in particular, and from illegal drug money. And, (e) Considering the network .and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital step towards achieving absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. In arriving at these conclusions, the President is presumed to have taken into account intelligence reports, including classified information, regarding the actual situation on the ground.

Absent any countervailing evidence, these statements indicate a plan and an alliance among armed groups to take over and establish absolute control over the entire Mindanao. Thus, there appears to be sufficient basis for the imposition of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao. In their Consolidated Comment, respondents averred that the intelligence reports submitted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the President showed that the Maute Group has banded with three other radical terrorist organizations (the Abu Sayyaf Group from Basilan, Ansarul Khilafah Philippines from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters from Maguindanao); that due to their uniform pledge of allegiance to ISIS and a common purpose of establishing an ISIS wilayah in Mindanao, an alliance was formed among these rebel groups; that Hapilon was appointed emir or leader of all ISIS forces in the Philippines and hailed as the mujahid or leader of the soldiers of the Islamic State in the Philippines; that Hapilon performed a symbolic hijra or pilgrimage to unite the ISIS-inspired groups in mainland Mindanao; that after Hapilon was appointed as emir, multiple atrocities, including bombings, abductions and beheadings, were committed in the wake of the consolidation of the forces of said rebel groups and foreign terrorists; that these widespread atrocities were to fulfill the· last ·Step before they are presented to the ISIS for approval and recognition; and that said rebel groups chose Marawi City as the starting point of establishing its wilayah in Mindanao because it is at the heart of Mindanao, within reach of nearby provinces and cities, and because of its cultural and religious significance to Muslims.

It does not appear that chc admissibility, weight or credibility of these reports have been challenged in such manner as to override the presumption of regularity in the exercise of the President's power to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, a demand for respondents to validate these findings or reports does not appear to have been made.

As they stand, these findings will reasonably engender a belief that the rebel groups seek and intend to make Mindanao an ISIS wilayah or province, with Marawai City, given its strategic location and cultural and religious significance, as the starting point of their occupation in the name of ISIS. Considering the alliance of these rebel groups, the violent acts they have perpetrated in different parts of Mindanao for the shared purpose of establishing an ISIS wilayah, and the extent of the territory they intend to occupy in the name of ISIS, it cannot be said that the imposition of martial law over the entire Mindanao is without factual basis. The location of the armed uprising should not be the only basis for identifying the area or areas over which martial law can be declared or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended.

Thus, that the subject armed uprising appears to be taking place only in Marawi City should not be a reason to nullify the declaration or suspension over the rest of Mindanao. Foremost, it has been shown that there is factual basis to include the rest of Mindanao in the Proclamation. So also, the Constitution does not require.

that the place over which the martial law or suspension will be enforced, should be limited to where the armed uprising is taking place, thus, giving the President ample authority to determine its coverage. Furthermore, as noted in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28t) modem day rebellion has other facets than just the taking up of arms - including financing, recruitment and propaganda that may not necessarily be found or occurring in the place of the armed conflict, thus: x x x The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing.

It includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence - all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature arc usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.

Moreover, the geography of Marawi City provides easy access for rebels to escape to nearby provinces or cities. If martial rule will be limited to Marawi City, rebels may simply move to neighboring areas to elude arrest. The recent apprehension of the parents of the Maute brothers in Davao City and Lanao del Sur, under Arrest Order No. 1, and of another suspected rebel, Sultan Fahad Salic, in Misamis Oriental, indicates that rebels may already be taking advantage of the easy access afforded by Marawi's location.

These arrests, made outside Marawi City, lend support to the President's decision to make Proclamation No. 216 apply to the whole of Mindanao. Proclamation No. 216 is not void for vagueness for the absence of guidelines/operational parameters. The validity of a proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is to be measured against the conditions set in the Constitution, The only conditions prescribed in the Constitution are that actual rebellion or invasion exists and public safety requires the proclamation or suspension.

There is nothing in the Constitution that requires that guidelines or operational parameters be included in the proclamation.

Thus, the proclamation cannot be voided on the ground that they are not set out therein. Besides, as noted by Mr. Justice Del Castillo in his ponencia, guidelines or operational parameters are merely tools for the implementation of the proclamation. Furthennore, as the situation calls for immediate action, the President cannot be expected to at once specify the guidelines and operational parameters in the proclamation.

In any event, safeguards have been incorporated in the Constitution to ensure that rights are protected. Thus, Section 18, Article VII, in part, states: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Conclusion Martial law is not intrinsically wrong. If it were, the framers of the Constitution composed of staunch nationalists and defenders of human rights, would have deleted it altogether from the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

These learned men understood that martial law was a necessary constitutional weapon to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic. Those who criticize martial law are haunted by the abuses of the past and fearful of the potential dangers it may entail. But these apprehensions have no bearing when the noble objectives sought to be accomplished are the protection of the people and the defense of the state.

The foregoing considered, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions. NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1t) Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July l, 2014. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2t) Social Security Commission v. Court ojAppeals, G.R. No. 152058, September 27, 2004.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3t) See Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4t) G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5t) Deliberations on the 1987 Con'ititution, Vol.

IL pp. 485 & 732 (Explanations of Commissioners Sarmiento and Quesada on their votes). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6t) The same principle has been arp!ied in upholding the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7t) Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., G.R. No. 152072, July 12, 2007.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8t) Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9t) Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10t) G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11t) Section 2(m), Rule 131. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12t) Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13t) Republic v. Roque, Jr., G.R. No. 203610, October 10, 2016.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14t) People v. Castillo, G.R. No. (Unreadable text) - February 15, 2000; Cheng v. Javier, G.R. No. 182485, July 3, 2009. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15t) G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16t) G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17t) Feria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18t) Northwest v. Chiong, G.R. No. 155550, January 31, 2008. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19t) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20t) People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No l 80417, July 27, 2011. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21t) Clay & Feather international, inc. v. Lichaytoo, G.R. No. 192105, May 30, 2011.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22t) Acronym of a group's full Arabic name, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, translated as "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23t) Islamic State of fraq and Syria. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24t) Human Security Act of 2007.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25t) Section 2, RA 9pm. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26t) <http://www.ijrcenter.org/international-humanitarian-law/> (Last accessed July 5, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27t) "A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights March 25, 2003,"

<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf> (Last accessed July 5, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28t) G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, l 974. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE OPINION BERSAMIN, J.: I CONCUR.

I hereby substantiate my concurrence in order to express my views on certain issues that I deem to be of greatest significance. I The 1987 Constitution is often described. as an anti-martial law fundamental law.

This may most probably be because the Filipino people have thereby firmly institutionalized solid safeguards to ensure against the abuse of martial law as a response to any internal or external threats to the stability of the Republic. I think, however, that the description may not be entirely apt. Martial law had theretofore no generally accepted definition, much less precise meaning.

The lack of an accepted or constant definition and precision has been recognized in this jurisdiction for some time now.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1b) The need for the Court to enlighten our people through a higher understanding of the concept of martial law thus exists even today. But the problem is not only about the meaning; it is also about the scope of martial law. Such understanding is essential to the determination of the serious issues that have been presented in these consolidated cases.

There is much about martial law that is mysterious probably because of its extraordinary and uncommon effects on civilians used to a rule by civil authority. The traditional concept of martial law is its not being law in the usual sense but the will of the military commander, to be exercised by him or her only on his or her responsibility to his or her government or superior officer; when once established, it applies alike to citizen and soldier.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2b) In its comprehensive sense, the term martial law is that which is promulgated and administered by and through military authorities and agencies for the maintenance of public order and the protection of persons and property in territory wherein the agencies of the civil law usually employed for such purposes have been paralyzed, overthrown, or overpowered, and ary unable, for the time being, fully to operate and function.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3b) In its strict and absolute sense, however, martial law supersedes all civil authority during the period in which it is in operation.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4b) The latter sense is not true under the 1987 Constitution.

The majority opinion, ably written for the Court by Justice Del Castillo, adverts to the discussion among the members of the Constitutional Commission on the added powers of the President during martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5b) As can be gathered from the discussion, martial law does not automatically vest legislative power in the President; and does not supplant the functioning of civil courts. During martial law, the President is granted the powers of a commanding general in a theater of war, and, as such, becomes authorized to issue orders that have the effect and force of law strictly in the theater of war. The reference to the theater of war manifests the intent of the framers to revert to the traditional concept of martial law as developed in American juFisprudence.

Ex parte Milligan,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6b) decided around the end of the American Civil War, stands among the earliest cases explaining the necessity for martial rule to substitute civil authority during an invasion or civil war, when it is impossible to administer justice according to law. It is worthy to note that Ex parte Milligan referred to a theater of active of military operations or the locality of actual war in relation to martial rule, to wit: If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.

As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war.

Another American case - Duncan v. Kahanamoku(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7b) - became the occasion to clarify that martial law, "while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals." The right to proclaim, apply and exercise martial law is one of the rights of sovereignty, and is as essential to the existence of a nation as the right to declare and carry on war.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8b) In republican Philippines, the power to proclaim martial law has always been lodged in the Presidency. This is by no means either odd or unwelcome.

The necessity that can justify the wielding of the power looks to the President as the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the State to respond swiftly and capably to any internal or external threats. Giving to the bicameral Congress the right to exercise the power may be cumbersome, inconvenient and unwieldy, and is anathema to the notion of responding to the critical emergency that directly and immediately threatens to diminish, if not destroy, the sovereignty of the State itself over the territory and population of the country. Indeed, of the three great branches of the Government, it is the President, as the Chief Executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who has the ability and competence and the means to make the timely and decisive response.

II Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Under the provision, the President has the leeway to choose his or her responses to any threat to the sovereignty of the State.

He or she may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; or, in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he or she may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law for a period not exceeding 60 days. These consolidated cases focus on the proclamation of martial law by President Duterte over the entire Mindanao through Proclamation No. 216.

The herein petitioners essentially seek the review by the Court, pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 18, of the "sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law." The review is a legal duty of the Court upon the filing of the several consolidated petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law. There is no question to me that the third paragraph of Section 18, supra, vests in the Court the unqualified duty to review the factual sufficiency of the declaration of martial law, and the necessity for the declaration.

Invoking the paragraph, the petitioners insist that the action they have initiated is a sui generis proceeding, different from the Court's certiorari powers stated in the second paragraph of Section 1,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9b) Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and those enumerated under Section 5(1),(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10b) Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that it is insufficient for the petitioners to merely invoke the third paragraph of Section 18 in order to enable the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual bases of Presidential proclamation No. 216 because they should also invoke the expanded judicial power of the Court to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion under the second paragraph of Section 1, in relation to Section 5(1).

Equating the appropriate proceeding under the third paragraph of Section 18 with the special civil action of certiorari under Section 5(1), the OSG theorizes that the third paragraph of Section 18 requires the petitioners to anchor their petitions on the existence of grave abuse of discretion because the appropriate proceeding under the third paragraph of Section 18 should be brought under the second paragraph of Section 1. The majority opinion adopts the position of the petitioners. It holds that to equate the appropriate proceeding mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 18 with the certiorari action under Section 5(1) in relation to the second paragraph of Section 1 is to "emasculate the Court's task under Section 18, Article VII."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11b) I agree with the majority opinion.

The third paragraph of Section 18 suffices to confer on the Court the exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law. To equate the appropriate proceeding to the certiorari action authorized under Section 5(1), in relation to the second paragraph of Section 1, is erroneous. As earlier pointed out, the third paragraph of Section 18 defines the legal duty to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law upon the filing of the petition for the purpose by any citizen.

The Court has then to discharge the duty. The silence of Section 5(1) on what the appropriate proceeding is should be of no consequence because Section 5 is not the sole repository of the cases or situations coming under the Court's jurisdiction. The check-and-balance constitutional design set down in Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution establishes a structure of collaboration among the three great branches of the Government in the matter of the proclamation of martial law.

Although the power of proclaiming martial law over the country or any part of it is exclusively lodged in the President, he or she is nonetheless required to report to Congress on the proclamation, and Congress shall then decide whether to revoke or extend the state of martial law.

The Court, being a passive institution, may be called upon to review and determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation, and whether the public safety requires it, only upon the petition for the purpose by any citizen. The invocation of the third paragraph of Section 18 by the petitioning citizen suffices to initiate this Court's power to review the sufficiency of the factual bases of the declaration of martial law. This initiation, which triggers the inquiry or review by the Court, albeit unique, conforms to the constitutional design.

The appropriate proceeding, once commenced, should not focus on whether the President gravely abused his or her discretion or not in determining the necessity for proclaiming martial law. Instead, the 1987 Constitution mandates the Court to examine and sift through the factual basis relied upon by the President to justify his proclamation of martial law and to determine whether the factual basis is sufficient or not. To rule that a finding of grave abuse of discretion is essential is to confine the discharge of the duty by the Court within limits not considered at the time of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Doing so may also produce impractical results. Consider this hypothetical scenario. Supposing that the President cites 10 factual bases for his proclamation of martial law, and the Court, upon its assiduous review of the factual bases, considers nine of the 10 as manufactured or fabricated or inadequate, leaving but one as true or authentic.

Under the thesis of the OSG, the Court would necessarily nullify the proclamation simply because the President was found to have gravely abused his or her discretion. The Court would thereby act indifferently towards the one true or authentic justification on the ground that the grave abuse of discretion as to the nine tainted the proclamation. Moreover, the determination of sufficiency or insufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law is usually a matter of validating the good judgment of the President of the facts or information known to or made available to him or her.

This goes without saying that such facts must have occurred prior to or about the time the determination by the President is made. Whether or not such facts are later shown by subsequent events to be fabricated or false or inadequate is not a decisive factor unless the President is credibly shown to have known of the fabrication or falsity or inadequacy of the factual bases at the time he or she issued the proclamation of martial law. In that situation, the main consideration is definitely not whether or not grave abuse of discretion intervened.

My reading of the third paragraph of Section 18 tells me that the term appropriate proceeding is different from the proceedings or actions that the Court may take cognizance of under Section 5(1) or Section 1. My foremost reason for so holding is that the third paragraph of Section 18 textually mandates the Court to be a trier of facts, an office and function that the Court is not generally called upon to discharge under either Section 5(1) or Section 1. It is true that the Court is not always precluded from reviewing facts.

There are occasions when it assumes the role of a trier of facts, like, to name some, in criminal appeals; in appeals from rulings of the Court of Appeals in proceedings for the writ of amparo; or when it sits as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12b) In fine, I deem it to be plainly erroneous to subsume the appropriate proceeding allowed in the third paragraph of Section 18 to the certiorari jurisdiction vested by Section 5(1) in relation to the expanded jurisdiction defined in second paragraph of Section 1.

Nonetheless, considering that the appropriate proceeding under the third paragraph of Section 18 is initiated by a petition filed by any citizen, the Court need not be hamstrung by the foregoing differentiation. In discharging its constitutional duty of reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law, the Court should be least curtailed by form and formality. It should dutifully undertake the review regardless of form and formality.

It should also eschew the usual judicial tools of avoidance, like locus standi and justiciability, because the task at hand is constitutionally inevitable for the Court. Until adequate rules for the regulation of the appropriate proceeding under the third paragraph of Section 18 are crafted and promulgated, the Court should be content with the petitions as they have been filed in these consolidated cases. In this connection, I have no hesitation in adopting the caution that our colleague, Justice Leonardo-De Castro, has written so clearly in her Separate Concurring Opinion herein, to wit: The Court should be cautious that it does not take a position in these consolidated cases that needlessly restricts our people's judicial remedies nor carelessly clips our own authority to take cognizance of the issue of constitutional sufficiency under Section 18, Article VII in any appropriate action that may be filed with the Court.

Such would be antagonistic to the clear intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to empower our citizens and the Judiciary as a vital protections against potential abuse of the executive power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. One noticeable area of disagreement between the OSG and the petitioners is the burden of proof. This disagreement has to arise because the Court's task to be presently discharged requires the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the necessity for martial law.

The petitioners' argument that the burden of proof immediately falls on the Government is difficult to accept. My view is that the burden of proof to show that the factual basis of the President in proclaiming martial law was insufficient has to fall on the shoulders of the citizen initiating the proceeding. Such laying of the burden of proof is constitutional, natural and practical - constitutional, because the President is entitled to the strong presumption of the constitutionality of his or her acts as the Chief Executive and head of one of the great branches of Government;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13b) natural, because the dutiful performance of an official duty by the President is always presumed;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14b) and practical, because the alleging party is expected to have the proof to substantiate the allegation.

For purposes of this proceeding, President Duterte, by his proclamation of martial law, discharged an official act. He incorporated his factual bases in Proclamation No. 216 itself as well as in his written report to Congress. The petitioners have come forward to challenge the sufficiency of the factual bases for the existence of actual rebellion and for the necessity for martial law (i.e., the public safety requires it).

It was incumbent upon the petitioners to show why and how such factual bases were insufficient. Although there may be merit in the urging of the petitioners that the Government carried the burden of proof on the basis of the proclamation of martial law being a derogation of civil rights and liberties, I persist in the view that the burden of proof pertained to the petitioners considering that despite embedding numerous safeguard mechanisms, the 1987 Constitution has not dissolved the presumption of good faith in favor of the President.

In other words, we should presume that the President, in proclaiming the state of martial law, did so in good faith.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15b) Nonetheless, I also suggest future consideration that where the petitioning citizen has incorporated or stated in the petition those of the factual bases that he or she admits, and those that he or she denies because he holds them to be false or fabricated, or inadequate to justify the proclamation, specifying the reasons for the denial or for holding such factual bases as false, fabricated or inadequate, then the burden of evidence - as distinguished from the burden of proof - may be shifted to the Government. This process, known in civil procedure as the specific denial,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16b) may be very useful in allocating the duty to come forward with the evidence.

V The Government has convincingly shown that the President had sufficient factual bases for proclaiming martial law over the entire Mindanao. Indeed, the facts and events known to the President when he issued the proclamation provided sufficient basis for the conclusion that an actual rebellion existed. The point has been made that the proclamation of the state of martial law should be confined to the areas of Mindanao under armed conflict.

After accepting the factual premises based on the existence of an actual rebellion fueled by the movement for secession, and knowing that the rebellion has been happening in various areas of Mindanao for a long time already, I agree with the majority that the proclamation of martial law over the entire Mindanao was warranted. Indeed, the local armed groups had formed linkages aimed at committing rebellion throughout Mindanao, not only in Marawi City, which was but the starting point for them. Verily, the rest of Mindanao, even those not under armed conflict at the moment of the proclamation, were exposed to the same positive danger of the rebellion that gave rise to the necessity for the proclamation.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17b) I VOTE TO UPHOLD the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216 over the entire Mindanao.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1b) See the concurring opinion of J. Barredo in Aquino v. Enrile, No. L-35546 September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, which noted: Martial law pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, however, does not completely follow the traditional forms and features which martial law has assumed in the past. It is modem in concept, in the light of relevant new conditions, particularly present day rapid means of transportation, sophisticated means of communications, unconventional weaponry, and such advanced concepts as subversion, fifth columns, the unwitting use of innocent persons, and the weapons of ideological warfare. The contingencies which require a state of martial law are time-honored.

They are invasion, insurrection and rebellion. Our Constitution also allows a proclamation of martial law in the face of imminent danger from any of these three contingencies. The Constitution vests the power to declare martial law in the President under the 1935 Constitution or the Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution.

As to the form, extent, and appearance of martial law, the Constitution and our jurisprudence are silent. Martial law pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 has, however, deviated from the traditional picture of rigid military rule super-imposed as a result of actual and total or near total breakdown of government. Martial law was proclaimed before the normal administration of law and order could break down.

Courts of justice were still open and have remained open throughout the state of martial law.

The nationwide anarchy, overthrow of government, and convulsive disorders which classical authors mention as essential factors for the proclamation and continuation of martial law were not present. More important, martial law under Proclamation No. 1081 has not resulted in the rule of the military. The will of the generals who command the armed forces has definitely not replaced the laws of the land.

It has not superseded civilian authority. Instead of the rule by military officials, we have the rule of the highest civilian and elective official of the land, assisted by civilian heads of executive departments, civilian elective local officials and other civilian officials. Martial law under Proclamation No. 1081 has made extensive use of military forces, not to take over civilian authority but to insure that civilian authority is effective throughout the country.

This Court can very well note that it has summoned and continues to summon military officers to come before it, sometimes personally and at other times through counsel. These military commanders have been required to justify their acts according to our Constitution and the laws of the land. These military officers are aware that it is not their will much less their caprice but the sovereign will of the people under a rule oflaw, which governs under martial law pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2b) Id., citing Johnson v. Jones, 44 III 142. In addition, Thurman Arnold wrote about Martial Law in the Encyclopaedia ofSocial Sciences, viz.: Martial law is a legal concept by which Anglo-American civil courts have sought in times of disorder to define the limits of executive or military control over citizens in domestic territory. It is analyzed in so many different ways, and there are so many theories as to its sanction that no definition can do more than express the most current legal impressions.

Martial law is regarded as the substitution of the will of the executive or military commander for the process of the courts. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3b) Id., citing State ex rel. O'Connor v. District Court in Shelby County, 219 Iowa 1165, 260 NW 73, 99 ALR 967; Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont 454, 143 P 947; State ex rel.

Grove v. Mott, 46 NJL 328. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4b) Id., citing Exparte Minigan, 71US2; Martin v. Mott, 25 US 19; Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill 142; State ex rel. O'Connor v. District Court in Shelby County, 219 Iowa 1165, 260 NW 73, 99 ALR 967;Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont 454, 143 P 947; Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W Va 713, 108 SE 428, 24 ALR 1178.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5b) Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 042,[July 29, 1986]: FR. BERNAS: That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies ...

The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the case Aquino vs. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers. The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war.

In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theatre of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed · especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theatre of war. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6b) 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7b) 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8b) 53A Am Jur 2°d, Section 437, citing Luther v. Borden, 48 US 1.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9b) Section 1. x x x Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10b) Section 5.

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. x x x x (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11b) See the majority opinion, p.

22. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12b) The 2010 Rules ofthe Presidential Electoral Tribunal (A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC dated May 4, 2010). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13b) A bakada Gura Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251, 272.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14b) Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15b) Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 318. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16b) Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recites: Section 10.

Specific denial. -A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.

Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. (10a) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17b) Lieber, G. Norman, What is the Justification of Martial Law?, The North American Review, Vol. 163, No. 480 (Nov., 1896), pp. 549-563 (published by the University of Northern Iowa), quoting Dr. Francis Lieber' s manuscript note entitled "Instructions for the government of the armies of the United States in the field,"

to wit: It has been denied that the government has any right to proclaim martial law, or to act according to its principles, in districts distant from the field of action, or declare it in larger districts than either cities or counties. This is fallacious. The only justification of martial law is the danger to which the country is exposed, and as far as the positive danger extends, so far extends its justification.

(Bold underscoring supplied) The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE OPINION PERLAS-BERNABE,J.: These consolidated petitions assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao," issued by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) on May 23, 2017. I. Nature of the Proceeding/Parameter of Review Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vests unto this Court special jurisdiction to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law, viz.: Section 18.

x x x. x x x x The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. As Section 18, Article VII confers unto this Court the power to review a particular class of cases, i.e., the factual basis of a martial law proclamation, it is clearly a jurisdiction-vesting provision, and not one that merely affects the exercise of jurisdiction.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1b2) As explicitly worded, Section 18, Article VII does not merely pertain to the Court's "decision of x x x questions arising in the case;"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2b2) nor "the correctness or righteousness of the decision or ruling made by [it]."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3b2) Rather, it provides the "authority to hear and determine a cause - the right to act in a particular case."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4b2) The nature and import of the phrase "appropriate proceeding"

as well as the parameter "sufficiency of factual basis" under Section 18, Article VII are unique constitutional concepts that have yet to be elucidated, much less defined, in our existing rules of procedure and jurisprudence. That being said, the Court is now confronted with the delicate task of fleshing out these concepts in light of their true constitutional intent.

It is my view that the term "appropriate proceeding" can only be classified as a sui generis proceeding that is exclusively peculiar to this Court's special jurisdiction to review the factual basis of a martial law declaration. Being a class of its own, it cannot therefore be equated or even approximated to any of our usual modes of review, such as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (which is an appeal) or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (which is a special civil action).

Clearly, a petition based on Section 18, Article VII is not an appeal to review errors committed by a lower court; neither is it a special civil action for it is in fact, attributed as a type of "proceeding." Under Section 3 (a), Rule I of the Rules of Court: Section 3. Cases governed.

- These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings. (a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special.

Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. x x x x A petition under Section 18, Article VII is not one whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

In fact, there is no cause of action(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5b2) in this type of proceeding, as it is only intended to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of a proclamation. In this limited sense, it can be argued that this proceeding, at most, resembles - albeit cannot be classified as - a special proceeding, which under the Rules of Court is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish [among others] a particular fact"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6b2) (that being the factual basis of a martial law proclamation). That a petition anchored on Section 18, Article VII is a case originally filed before this Court, or that it would eventually result in the nullification of a governmental act does not - as it should not - mean that it can be classified as an action for certiorari.

The similarities between the two begin and end there. As earlier stated, a Section 18, Article VII petition carries no cause of action and is instead, a proceeding meant to establish a particular factual basis. This fundamental difference alone already precludes the above-supposition.

Besides, other cases, such as for prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, are equally impressed with the feature of being originally filed before the Court, yet their nature and parameters remain conceptually distinct from one another. Meanwhile, the resulting nullification of a martial law proclamation (if so found by this Court to rest on insufficient factual basis) is not a conclusion exclusive to an action for certiorari; rather, the proclamation would be nullified on the ground that it violates the requirements of the Constitution. In fine, the cosmetic similarities between a Section 18, Article VII proceeding and a certiorari action are not valid reasons to confound the nature of the former with the latter.

Since Section 18, Article VII petition is a sui generis proceeding, the usual standards of review, such as to determine errors of judgment in a Rule 45 petition, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in a Rule 65 petition, should therefore find no application. The standards used in Rule 45 and Rule 65 petitions trace their jurisdictional bases from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which pertinently reads: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari , as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. x x x x To my mind, the Court's jurisdiction in these cases should be considered to be general in nature as compared to its special jurisdiction under Section 18, Article VII, the latter being utilized only in one specific context, i.e., when the factual basis of a martial law declaration is put into question.

In this relation, the rule in statutory construction of lex specialis derogat generali, which conveys that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7b2) ought to apply. In fact, the textual placement of Section 18, Article VII fortifies the sui generis nature of this "appropriate proceeding." It may be readily discerned that Section 18, Article VII is only one of two provisions relative to a Supreme Court power that is found in Article VII (Article on the Executive Department), and not in Article VIII (on the Judicial Department) of the 1987 Constitution.

The other one is found in Section 4, Article VII, which states that "[t]he Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." Similar to it acting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET),(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8b2) the 'Court is tasked to thresh out the factual issues in the case, as if acting as a trial court; thus, Section 18, Article VII's peculiar standard of "sufficiency of factual basis." The provision's location in Article VII on the Executive Department reveals the correlative intent of the Framers to instill the proceeding as a specific check on a particular power exercised by the President.

In this regard, the Court is not called on to exercise its expanded power of judicial review to determine "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government";(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9b2) rather, the Court is called to exercise its special jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the President's factual basis in declaring martial law. This parameter of review is not only explicit in Section 18, Article VII; it is, in fact, self-evident. Thus, all the more should this Court debunk the notion that the "appropriate proceeding"

under Section 18, Article VII is a certiorari action with the parameter of grave abuse of discretion. The parameter of review denominated as "sufficient factual basis" under Section 18, Article VII is both conceptually novel and distinct.

Not only does it defy any parallelism with any of the Court's usual modes of review, but it also obviates the usage of existing thresholds of evidence, such as the threshold of substantial evidence as applied in administrative cases, preponderance of evidence in civil actions, and proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Concomitantly, the burdens of proof utilized in these cases should not apply. The same holds true for the evidentiary threshold of probable cause, which is but "the amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10b2) Probable cause is ascertained from the vantage point of a "reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11b2) "In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.

He [merely] relies on common sense."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12b2) While it had been previously opined that probable cause, being merely "premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most practical, and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13b2) it is my view that the purpose of and vantage point assumed by a prosecutor or judge in a determination of probable cause are fundamentally different from the purpose of and vantage point assumed by the President when he proclaims martial law. Verily, the standard of probable cause cannot be applied to the decision-making process of the highest-ranking public official in the country, who, through credible information gathered by means of the executive machinery, is not only tasked to determine the existence of an actual rebellion but must also calibrate if the demands of public safety require a martial law proclamation.

Commissioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), acting as amicus curiae in the case of Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14b2) (Fortun), had occasion to explain that "the function of the President is far different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not": From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code.

The concern of the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts.

To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the purpose of the Constitution. What all these point to are that the twin requirements of "actual rebellion or invasion" and the demand of public safety are inseparably entwined.

But whether there exists a need to take action in favour of public safety is a factual issue different in nature from trying to determine whether rebellion exists. The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of existing armed movements.

Thus, in deciding whether the President acted rightly or wrongly in finding that public safety called for the imposition of martial law, the Court cannot avoid asking whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such decision involves the verification of factors not as easily measurable as the demands of Article 134 of the Penal Code and can lead to a prudential judgment in favour of the necessity of imposing martial law to ensure public safety even in the face of uncertainty whether the Penal Code has been violated. This is the reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were reluctant to override the executive's judgment.

In sum, since the President should not be bound to search for proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion and since deciding whether public safety demands action is a prudential matter, the function of the President is far different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not. Put differently, looking for rebellion under the Penal Code is different from looking for rebellion under the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15b2) (Emphasis supplied) It is my opinion that Fr. Bernas' reasoning is equally relevant when comparing the function of the President under Section 18, Article VII to the functions of a prosecutor or a judge who determines probable cause to respectively file a criminal case in court or issue a warrant for the arrest of an accused.

Hence, however reasonable, practical or expedient it may seem, it is my position that this Court should not apply the probable cause standard in a Section 18, Article VII case. For another, the Office of the Solicitor General has invoked the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16b2) (Lansang), as affirmed in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17b2) (Aquino, Jr.) and thereby, argues that the parameter of "sufficient factual basis" is equivalent to the gauge of arbitrariness (in contrast to correctness).(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18b2) However, as will be gleaned below, these are not proper authorities to construe the term "sufficient factual basis"

since the provision regarding the power of the Court to check the President's declaration of martial law never existed in the past Constitutions under which these two cases were decided. To briefly contextualize, Lansang is a 1971 case, decided under the 1935 Constitution, which involved the propriety of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In that case, the Court held that it had the "authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19b2) The Court cited and affirmed Lansang in Aquino, Jr., which was a case decided in 1974 under the 1973 Constitution.

There, this Court ruled: The recognition of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely whether he (the President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The test is not whether the President's decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20b2) (Emphasis supplied) The pertinent provisions on martial law under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions respectively read: Section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution Section 10. x x x.

x x x x (2) The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law. x x x x Section 12, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution Section 12.

The Prime Minister shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. As above-mentioned, these past constitutional provisions on martial law do not reflect the Court's power to "review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof' under the 1987 Constitution.

Clearly, the variance in the constitutional context under which Lansang and Aquino, Jr. were decided negates the notion that the Framers of the 1987 Constitution applied the pronouncements made in those cases when they were crafting a novel constitutional provision which had no existing equivalent at that time. Thus, it is my impression that there could have been no contemporary construction of the term "sufficient factual basis" in reference to the Lansang and Aquino, Jr. pronouncements.

At any rate, the deliberations, and more significantly, the actual text of Section 18, Article VII do not reflect the insinuation that the term "sufficient factual basis" is equivalent to the gauge of arbitrariness, as espoused in Lansang and Aquino, Jr. If such was their intention, then the Framers should have so indicated. Instead, the Framers created a new safeguard under Section 18, Article VII to effectively prevent the aberration of a Marcosian martial law from again happening in our country: Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible Presidential abuse in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph Section 18, Article VII. This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus: MR.

SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase.

May we be informed of his good and substantial reasons? MR. MONSOD: This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion.

And in previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse.

It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.

MR. SUAREZ: Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to determine these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E.

Marcos in his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution: x x x x And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habes corpus and declare martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress"? MR.

MONSOD: Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos, lie is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitutions is supposed to balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens.

And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21b2) To adopt and validate the gauge of arbitrariness in a Section 18, Article VII case would dangerously emasculate this Court's power to serve as a potent check against the possible abuses of martial law. This is because the gauge of arbitrariness is the substantial equivalent of the concept of grave abuse of discretion which is one of the most difficult thresholds for a citizen-petitioner to hurdle since it denotes an abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act [at all] in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22b2) Notably, Fr.

Bernas, one of the Framers of the new Constitution, stated that the new provision means more than just empowering the Court to review the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as held in Lansang. More significantly, he expressed that "[t]he new text gives to the Supreme Court the power not just to determine executive arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the suspension but also the power to determine 'the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension"': What is the scope of this review power of the Supreme Court[?] It will be recalled that in Lansang v. Garcia the Supreme Court accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that the Court 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.

Is this all that the 1987 provision means? The new provision quite obviously means more than just the empowerment in Lansang. The new text gives to the Supreme Court the power not just to determine executive arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the suspension but also the power to determine 'the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension.

Hence, the Court is empowered to determine whether in fact actual invasion and rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the suspension.

Thus, quite obviously too, since the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the executive department, the executive department, if the President wants his suspension sustained, will have to open whatever findings the department might have to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Supreme Court's task of verifying the sufficiency of the factual basis for the suspension will not be as difficult as under the old system because the 1987 Constitution has radically narrowed the basis for suspension.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23b2) In fine, the parameters under our usual modes of review, much more the pronouncements in Lansang and Aquino, Jr., are clearly inappropriate references for this Court to divine the meaning of the term "sufficient factual basis" as a parameter in resolving a Section 18, Article VII petition.

In light of this legal lacuna, I submit that this Court should therefore construe the term "sufficient factual basis" in its generic sense. "[T]he general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle construction.

Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24b2) Moreover, "a word of general signification employed in a statute should be construed, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as well. This rule of construction, known as progressive interpretation, extends by construction the application of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into existence subsequent to its passage, and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25b2) "Sufficient" commonly means "adequate";(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26b2) it may also mean "enough to meet the needs of a situation or a proposed end."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27b2) Logically, the "end"

to be established in a petition under Section 18, Article VII is the factual basis of a proclamation of martial law. Martial law can only be proclaimed legally under the 1987 Constitution upon the President's compliance of two (2) conditions, namely: (1) that there exists an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) that the public safety so requires the same. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that "sufficient factual basis,"

as a parameter of review under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, should simply mean that this Court has been satisfied that there exists adequate proof of the President's compliance with these two (2) requirements to legally proclaim martial law. This parameter of review should not be diluted by bringing in the need to prove arbitrariness. As a fact-finding tribunal operating under a special kind of jurisdiction, this Court is therefore tasked to ascertain, plain and simple, if there indeed exists (1) an actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) that public safety requires the proclamation of martial law.

As will be discussed below, the first requirement is a more concrete question of law that may be resolved by applying existing legal principles. On the other hand, the second requirement is a more malleable concept of discretion, whereby deference to the prudential judgment of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to meet the exigencies of the situation should be properly accorded.

Being a proceeding directly meant to establish the factual basis of a governmental action, it follows that the government bears the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of the Constitution for clearly, the petitioner, who may be any citizen, does not have possession of the information used by the President to justify the imposition of martial law. Nonetheless, the petitioner has the burden of evidence to debunk the basis proffered by the government and likewise, prove its own affirmative assertions. II.

Requirements to Proclaim Martial Law. The above-stated requirements for the President to legally place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law are found in the first paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28b2) this Court explained that: [U]nder Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces.

The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt29b2) The deliberations of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution make it sufficiently clear that there must be an actual rebellion and not merely an imminent danger thereof, which was formerly, a ground to impose martial law under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but demonstrably deleted in the present Constitution.

Fr. Bernas explained that the phrase "imminent danger thereof' "could cover a multitude of sins and could be a source of a tremendous amount of irresistible temptation. And so, to better protect the liberties of the people, we preferred to eliminate that."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt30b2) Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado (Commissioner Regalado) adds that: There is a fear that the President could base the suspension of the writ on alleged intelligence reports which cannot be looked into and the veracity of which is dependent on the classification by the military.

This could lead to a situation where these reports could easily be manufactured and attributed to anybody, without even the judiciary being in a position to refuse or look into the truth of the same.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt31b2) In his opinion in the case of Fortun, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio elucidated that the "[t]he term 'rebellion' in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution must be understood as having the same meaning as the crime of 'rebellion' that is defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt32b2) Among others, he properly reasoned that: [T]he Revised Penal Code definition of rebellion is the only legal definition of rebellion known and understood by the Filipino people when they ratified the 1987 Constitution. Indisputably, the Filipino people recognize and are familiar with only one meaning of rebellion, that is, the definition provided in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code.

To depart from such meaning is to betray the Filipino people's understanding of the term "rebellion" when they ratified the Constitution. There can be no question that "the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt33b2) The same thought is reflected in the exchange between Commissioners De Los Reyes and Regalado: MR.

DE LOS REYES: As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting, or actual attack on the legislature or Malacafiang, for example? x x x.

MR. REGALADO: If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising, for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt34b2) Under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 6968,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt35b2) rebellion is committed in the following manner: [B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt36b2) In People v. Lovedioro,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt37b2) this Court stated that "[t]he gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.

By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt38b2) Rebellion is, by nature, not a singular act, like the other common crimes under the RPC such as murder or rape, which place of commission can be situated in a particular locality. Rather, rebellion is "a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt39b2) However, the gravamen of rebellion is the armed public uprising against the government. "Gravamen"

is defined as "the material or significant part of a grievance or complaint."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt40b2) This means that while rebellion is, by nature a movement, the significant aspect thereof to prosecute the same is that the men involved in this movement actually take up arms against the government; otherwise, rebellion under the RPC is not deemed to have been consummated and the persons accused thereof cannot be penalized/convicted of the same. The nature of rebellion as a movement is the reason why, as jurisprudence states, this crime "cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds." A "movement"

has been defined as "a series of organized activities working toward an objective; also: an organized effort to promote or attain an end."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt41b2) Complementary to this attribution, rebellion has been also classified as a "continuing crime." A continuing crime or delito continuado is "a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt42b2) In Gamboa v. Court of Appeals,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt43b2) this Court expounded on the concept of a continuing crime: Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado" or "continuous crime."

This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt44b2) Anent its temporality, a "continuing offense"

has been characterized as "a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt45b2) It is "[o]ne consisting of a continuous series of acts which endures after the period of consummation x x x."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt46b2) Being a movement involving a plurality of acts, which, however, is animated by a single criminal resolution or intent, common crimes committed in furtherance of the rebellion are deemed absorbed. In the landmark case of People v. Hernandez,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt47b2) this Court classified rebellion as a political crime and explained the doctrine of absorption: [P]olitical crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.

The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said offense becomes stripped of its "common"

complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

x x x x Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense [such as rebellion], are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequent,ly, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt48b2) Accordingly, in light of the nature of rebellion (1) as a movement, (2) as a complex net of intrigues and plots, (3) as a continuing crime, and (4) as a political offense, it is my view that this Court cannot confine the concept of rebellion to the actual exchange of fire between the accused rebels and the forces of the government.

As above-intimated, the taking up of arms against the government is only what consummates the crime of rebellion in order to prosecute those accused thereof under the RPC. However, up until that movement stops (for instance, when the rebels surrender or are caught by government operatives), it is my opinion that the rebellion continues to survive in legal existence. For instance, when rebels temporarily cease with their offensive and later on regroup, it is illogical to posit that the rebellion had already ended.

Skirmishes at various places, at different times, are common occurrences in a surviving rebellion. This reality had, in fact, been the subject of the exchange of Commissioners De Los Reyes and Regalado, wherein it was conveyed that isolated attacks in different provinces, despite the lack of any attack on the capital, are enough to show that an actual rebellion exists, provided, however, that there is clearly an attempt to destabilize the government in order to supplant it with a new government: MR. DE LOS REYES: The public uprisings are not concentrated in one place, which used to be the concept of rebellion before.

MR. REGALADO: No. MR. DE LOS REYES: But the public uprisings consist of isolated attacks in several places - for example in one camp here; another in the province of Quezon; and then in another camp in Laguna; no attack in Malacafi.ang - but there is complete paralysis of the industry in the whole country.

If we place these things together, the impression is clear - that there is an attempt to destabilize the government in order to supplant it with the new government.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt49b2) Likewise, we should not lose sight of a rebellion's intricate workings. Reconnaissance of government movement and espionage on military strategy are very well essential to both a brooding and an ongoing rebellion. The establishment of outposts and installations, escape routes and diversion points, all spread over numerous areas of interest, also entails tactical activity to further the rebellion.

In the same vein, the recruitment/radicalization of conscripts and the resupply of provisions and arms, are incidents to a rebellion whose wheels have been put into motion. In Aquino, Jr., the Court pointed out that: The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modem setting.

It does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and materiel, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence - all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts.

They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt50b2) We need not look any further than the published chronicles about the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) - currently led by Isnilon Hapilon (Hapilon) and affiliated with the Maute Group - to paint a picture of how a rebellion may intricately operate: Logistics, Tactics and Training of the ASG x x x x In tactics, the ASG fighters are capable of reinforcing beleaguered comrades when in the general area of conflict, or sometimes from one island to another island like in the case of the ASG from Basilan reinforcing comrades in Sulu by watercraft. It can conduct offensive action against platoon, section, or squad-sized military formations, and disable armor assets using rocket propelled grenades, 90mm, and 57 mm recoilless rifles. Its fighters usually employ "hit and run"

tactics in view of their limited ammunition. Having no concern even for the Muslim residents, it resorts to hostage taking, to delay pursuing government troops and whenever cornered. Tactically, the ASG cannot sustain a prolonged armed engagement against the government forces.

The islands and vast water area favors the ASG as it affords freedom of movement. Therefore, the curtailment of movement along mobility corridors would be their critical vulnerability. The ASG creates political, economic, and social disorders to force Christians and non-Muslims to vacate areas it claims as its own.

This is best exemplified by the ASG's raid and massacre in Ipil town mentioned earlier, but the results were obviously unfavorable to them. It has exploited the power of media to discredit the administration and prop up their cause. This included the use of a popular Filipino actor who is an Islam convert, as a negotiator in one of their hostage activity in their Basilan jungle hideout.

While some of the ASG members were former MNLF rebels, it is most certain that some of them were trained in the Middle East and Malaysia. Most of the recruits were locally trained on guerrilla warfare in Basilan and Sulu. Their training included combat tactics, demolition, marksmanship, and other military subjects.

Comparatively speaking, the ASG is inferior to the military forces arrayed against it. However, the mastery of the terrain and ability to survive in extreme jungle conditions makes the ASG fighter more adept to his environment. This is a major challenge in Philippine counter terrorism operations.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt51b2) With all of these in tow, I believe that the crime of rebellion defies our ordinary impression that a crime's occurrence can be pinpointed to a definite territory, much less its existence bounded to a particular moment, in time.

Because of its nature, rebellion is hardly compatible with the norms of spatial and temporal limitability, as usually applied in our criminal law. It is in this specific light that we should understand the concept of an actual rebellion under the Constitution's martial law provision. That being said, I therefore submit that, for the purposes of assessing compliance with the first requirement of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, this Court should ascertain whether there is adequate proof to conclude that a rebellion, in light of its elements under the RPC, has already been consummated.

Once these elements are established, a state of actual rebellion (and not merely an "imminent danger thereof') already exists as a fact, and thus, it may be concluded that the said first requisite has already been met.

Consequently, the President would then have ample discretion to determine the territorial extent of martial law, provided that the requirement of public safety justifies this extent. Since as above-discussed rebellion, by nature, defies spatial limitability, the territorial scope of martial law becomes pertinent to Section 18, Article VIl's second (when public safety requires) and not its first requirement (actual rebellion). By these premises, it is also erroneous to think that the territorial extent of martial law should be only confined to the area/s where the actual exchange of fire between the rebels and government forces is happening.

To reiterate, rebellion is, by nature, a movement; it is much more than the actual taking up of anns. While the armed public uprising consummates the crime for purposes of prosecuting the accused under the RPC, its legal existence is not confined by it. It is a complex net of intrigues and plots, a movement that ceases only until the rebellion is quelled.

Commissioner Regalado had, in fact, observed that it is not necessary for an armed public uprising to happen "all over the country" so as to consider the situation "within the ambit of rebellion": MR. REGALADO: x x x If they conclude that there is really an armed public uprising although not all over the country, not only to destabilize but to overthrow the government, that would already be considered within the ambit of rebellion.x x x.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt52b2) At any rate, the 1987 Constitution or its deliberations did not mention anything regarding the need to show the presence of armed attacks all over a certain territory in order to declare martial law therein.

The President is, in fact, empowered to "place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law," provided that a rebellion already exists and that the public safety requires it. As above-intimated, it is this second requirement of public safety which determines the territorial coverage of martial law.

The phrase "when the public safety requires it" under Section 18, Article VII is similarly uncharted in our jurisprudence. Since it has not been technically defined, the term "public safety"

may be likewise construed under its common acceptation - that is, "[t]he welfare and protection of the general public, usually expressed as a governmental responsibility."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt53b2) For its part, "public welfare" has been defined as "[a] society's well-being in matters of health, safety, order, morality, economics and politics."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt54b2) Under Section 18, Article VII, the obvious danger against public safety and the society's well-being is the existence of an actual invasion or rebellion. Adopting the generic definition of the term "public safety,"

it may then be concluded that the phrase "when the public safety requires it" under Section 18, Article VII would refer to the government's responsibility to declare martial law in a particular territory as may be reasonably necessary to successfully quell the invasion or rebellion. In this sense, the territorial extent of martial law is therefore malleable in nature, as it should always be relative to the exigencies of the situation.

Under our prevailing constitutional order, no one except the President is given the authority to impose martial law. By necessary implication, only he has the power to delimit its territorial bounds. In the case of Spouses Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt55b2) the Court had occasion to discuss the extraordinary nature of the President's power to declare martial law, stating that the exercise thereof, among others, call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives: These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law.

There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt56b2) In the same vein, this Court, in Villena v. The Secretary of the Jnterior,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt57b2) stated that: There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.

Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt58b2) Considering the Constitution's clear textual commitment of the power to impose martial law to the President, this Court, in assessing compliance with Section 18, Article VII's public safety requisite, must give due deference to his prudential judgment in not only determining the need to declare martial law in the Philippines, but also determine its territorial coverage. However, as will be elaborated below, our deference to the President must be circumscribed within the bounds of truth and reason. Otherwise, our constitutional authority to check the President's power to impose martial law would amount to nothing but an empty and futile exercise.

While the Court's power under Section 18, Article VII is designed as an important check to the President's martial law power, the reality is that this Court carries no technical competence to assess the merits of a particular military strategy. Meanwhile, "the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call [(as well as the power to declare martial law]), on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt59b2) This resonates with the fact that: [The] President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces.

The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt60b2) With these in mind, the Court's task - insofar as the second requisite under Section 18, Article VII is concerned - should therefore be limited to ascertaining whether the facts stated as basis for a martial law proclamation are reasonable enough to warrant its imposition and that its territorial extent is likewise rationally commensurate with the perceived exigencies attending an actual invasion or rebellion.

As I see it, the reasonableness of the President's declaration of martial law as well as its extent may be determined by multiple factors. This Court may, for instance, consider the reported armed capabilities, resources, influence, and connections of the rebels; the more capable, wealthy, influential, and connected the rebels are, the greater the danger to the public's safety and consequently, the greater the necessity to impose martial law on a larger portion of territory. Also, this Court may consider the historical background of the rebel movement.

Past acts may reflect the propensity of a rebel group to cause serious damage to the public. Further, the Court should give leeway to the President's estimation of the rebels' future plan of action. If the estimation, when taken together with all the foregoing factors, does not seem implausible or farfetched, then this Court should defer to the President's military strategy.

In this relation, Fr. Bernas, in the Fortun case, pointed out that: [The issue of] whether there exists a need to take action in favor of public safety is a factual issue different in nature from trying to determine whether rebellion exists. The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense.

Its existence can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of existing armed movements.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt61b2) Truth be told, there are no fixed factors or requisites that go into this standard of reasonableness. However, as a guiding principle, this Court should always keep in mind that martial law is but a means to an end. It is an extraordinary measure that empowers the President to act as if he were a commanding general engaged in the theater of war;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt62b2) a legal mechanism which - as history has taught us - may bear unintended consequences to the liberties of our people.

Therefore, this Court should always ask itself whether or not the President's call to impose martial law in a certain territory is rationally commensurate to the needs of the public. For after all, the dangers to society's well-being, both actual and perceived, are what justify the imposition of martial law. Summary of Adjudicative Process under Section 18, Article VII To recap, the parameter "sufficient factual basis"

under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution simply means that there is adequate proof to show that the President had complied with the two requisites to impose martial law. These requisites are: (1) that there exists an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) that the public safety so requires the same. There is adequate proof that the President complied with the first requisite if the elements of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the RPC concur; this means that the rebellion is not merely imminent but has been actually consummated.

On the other hand, there is adequate proof that the President complied with the second requisite if it is shown that the public safety demands the imposition of martial law under a particular territorial extent; since public safety is a malleable concept, the Court should then gauge whether or not there is a reasonable need to impose martial law in light of the exigencies of the situation and concomitantly, whether its territorial extent is rationally commensurate to the said exigencies. In proving compliance with these two requisites, it goes, without saying that the Court should first ascertain the veracity of the facts presented by the government. This is for the obvious reason that the Court applies its legal analysis only to established facts.

As a general rule, the information provided by the executive agencies to the President is presumed to have been acquired and released to the public in the regular performance of their official functions. Moreover, as the information would be contained in public documents issued in the performance of a duty by a public officer, they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt63b2) Therefore, it is incumbent upon the citizen-petitioner to overcome this burden and debunk the information's veracity. If the objections against the facts stand unobjected or tum out to be invalid, then this Court may take them as true and correct, unless the falsity of the facts is apparent on its face, or that their inaccuracy surfaces throughout the court proceedings (for instance, when conflicting statements are made by the executive in their pleadings or during oral argumentation).

This is because of the Court's institutional incapacity to externally vet the information submitted by the executive, as some of them may be even classified as confidential. It should be clarified that the foregoing evidentiary rules do not negate the government's burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The government's initial burden of stating the factual basis of a martial law proclamation is likewise not dispensed with.

To be sure, the presumption of regularity in the sense discussed above is only limited to the quality of the information that the government presents. This presumption is not equivalent to a presumption of the entire proclamation's constitutionality or validity. The facts sought to be established through such information must still be shown to legally comply with the adjudicative parameters set forth above.

Verily, the presumption of regularity should only apply to issues of fact and not to conclusions of law. For instance, the fact that events A, B, and C, as presented by the government through official reports, have indeed occurred does not mean that an actual rebellion already exists or that martial law over the whole of Mindanao is already reasonable under the circumstances. Clearly, the duty of the Court is to determine the sufficiency of the proclamation's factual basis.

Such presumption only touches on the facts' veracity, which is but one aspect of the standard of "sufficiency." To reiterate, the presumption does not amount to a presumption of constitutionality or validity. The government remains duty bound to assert the factual basis of the martial law proclamation and prove compliance with the requirements of the Constitution.

The petitioner then holds the burden of evidence to debunk the basis proffered by the government and likewise, prove its own affirmative assertions. III. Factual Basis for the Imposition of Martial Law After a careful study of this case, it is my view that the President had sufficient factual basis to issue Proclamation No. 216 and thereby, legally proclaimed martial law over the whole of Mindanao.

It is apparent that the tipping point for President Duterte's issuance of Prbclamation No. 216 was the May 23, 2017 Marawi siege. The events leading thereto were amply detailed by the government as follows: (a) At 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG attacked various government and privately-owned facilities; (b) At 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the escape of inmates; killed a member of a PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles; (c) By 4:30 PM, interruption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; citywide power outage by evening; (d) From 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station; commandeered a police car; (e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas; (f) Control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, fell to the rebels; (g) Road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi junction; (h) Burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony; (i) Taking of hostages from the church; (j) Killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College; (k) Burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School; (1) Overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital; (m) Hoisting of ISIS flag in several areas; (n) Attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital; (o) Ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an armored vehicle; (p) Reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians; (q) Preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes; (r) Forcing young Muslims to join their group; and (s) Intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel, and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the Government.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt64b2) Petitioners attempted to debunk some of the factual details attendant to the foregoing events with the following counter-evidence:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt65b2) FACTUAL STATEMENTS | COUNTER EVIDENCE ---|--- 1.

that the Maute group attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among several locations. As of 0600H of 24 May 2017, members of the Maute group were seen guarding the entry gates of the Amai Pakpak Hospital and that they held hostage the employees of the Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat (Proclamation No. 216 and Report); | Statements made by: (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hospital; (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial; (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo Carlos; (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard Arevalo; and (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra denying that the hospital was attacked by the Maute Group citing on-line news articles of Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and Bombo Radyo.

2. that the Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); | Statements made by PNP Director General Ronald dela Rosa and Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra in the on-line news reports of ABS CBN New and CNN Philippines denying that the Maute group occupied the Marawi Police Station. 3.

that lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered one of its armored vehicles (Report); | Statement made by the bank officials in the on-line news article of Philstar that the Marawi City branch was not ransacked but sustained damages from the attacks. 4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was burned (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); | Statements in the on-line news article of Philstar made by the Marawi City Schools Division Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto denying that the school was burned and Department of Education Assistant Secretary Tonisito Umali stating that they have not received any report of damage.

5. that the Maute Group attacked various government facilities (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report). | Statement in the on-line news articles of Inquirer made by Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra stating that the ASG and the Maute Terror Groups have not taken over any government facility in Marawi City.

However, the counter-evidence presented by petitioners largely consist of uncorroborated news reports, which are therefore inadmissible in evidence on the ground that they are hearsay. In Feria v.

Court of Appeals :(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt66b2) [N]ewspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt67b2) That being said, and without any other cogent reason to hold otherwise, the government's account of the May 23, 201 7 events as abovedetailed are to be taken as true and correct. In fact, even if the objections of petitioners are admitted, there are other incidents which remain unrefuted.

In his Report relative to Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte explained that the events of May 23, 2017 "put on public display the [Maute] group's clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt68b2) In consequence, "[l]aw enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected.

The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt69b2) To understand the Maute Group's political motive, a brief discussion on the origin and cause behind the Islamic State movement (ISIS or DAESH) remains imperative.

According to the OSG, the Maute Group from Lanao del Sur led by Omar Maute is but one of the four (4) ISIS-linked local rebel groups that operate in the different parts of Mindanao. These groups - the other three (3) being (a) the ASG from Basilan (ASG-Basilan), led by Hapilon, (b) the Ansarul Khilafah Philippines, also known as the Maguid Group from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat led by Mohammad Jaafar Maguid, and (c) the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) based in Liguasan Marsh, Maguindanao - have formed an alliance for the purpose of establishing a wilayah or Islamic Province, in Mindanao. The establishment of different wilayah provinces is part of ISIS' s grand plan to impose its will and influence worldwide.

It captures and administers territories all over the world, which conquered territories are referred to as a caliphate. The success of ISIS in conquering territories means that it has the capacity to acquire fighters and modern weaponry. As conveyed by the OSG, the United Nations has labeled ISIS as the world's most wealthiest organization (with an estimated income of $400 to $500 Million in 2015 alone), pointing out that it derives its income from operating seized oil fields, obtaining protection money from businesses, and profits from black market transactions.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt70b2) Based on military intelligence, Hapilon performed a symbolic hijra or pilgrimage to unite with the ISIS-linked groups in mainland Mindanao.

This was geared towards realizing the five step process of establishing a wilayah, which are: first, the pledging of allegiance to the Islamic State; second, the unification of all terrorist groups who have given bay 'ah or their pledge of allegiance; third, the holding of consultations to nominate a wali or a governor of a province; fourth, the achievement of consolidation for the caliphate through the conduct of widespread atrocities and uprisings all across Mindanao; and finally, the presentation of all these to the ISIS leadership for approval or recognition.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt71b2) In this light, the OSG asserted that the ISIS had already appointed Hapilon as the emir in the Philippines, which is the third step in the establishment of wilayah in Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt72b2) This fact was validated through an announcement in the ISIS weekly newsletter, Al Naba, and confirmed in a June 21, 2016 video by ISIS entitled "The Solid Structure."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt73b2) Notably, the foregoing evidence belie petitioners' supposition, based once more on an uncorroborated news article, that "the Maute Group is more of the clan's private militia latching into the IS brand to inflate perceived capability."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt74b2) In gauging the danger to the public safety, President Duterte provided information on the Maute Group's armed capability, as well as its connections.

He disclosed that "[b]ased on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of around 263 members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahadin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced by [the ISIS publication and video footage as above-stated]."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt75b2) Also, it remains evident that President Duterte considered the history of Mindanao in calibrating the gravity of the danger presented by the ISIS situation.

In fact, he began his Report to Congress by stating that "Mindanao has been the hotbed of the violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In more recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan x x x."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt76b2) According to the President, "two armed groups [(which are the same armed groups involved in this case)] have figured prominently in all these, namely, the [ASG] and the ISIS-backed Maute Group."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt77b2) In light of the foregoing, it is my conclusion that the President was justified in declaring martial law over the whole Mindanao.

Indeed, there exists sufficient factual basis that he had complied with the requirements of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (1) that there exists an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) that the public safety so requires the same. In particular, the government has established that an actual rebellion (and not merely an imminent danger thereof) already exists at the time President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216. The May 23, 2017 Marawi siege is evidently an armed public uprising, which motive is to further the ISIS's global agenda of establishing a wilayah in Mindanao, and in so doing, remove from the allegiance of the Philippine Government or its laws, the aforesaid territory.

Furthermore, it was amply demonstrated that the incidents in furtherance thereof would deprive the Chief Executive wholly or partially, of his powers or prerogatives.

As the President correctly explained, the events of May 23, 2017 "constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH [ wilayah] or province covering the entire Mindanao."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt78b2) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt79b2) Accordingly, "[t]here exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt80b2) Likewise, the second requirement of public safety was met.

It is my opinion that President Duterte' s imposition of martial law over the whole of Mindanao is rationally proportionate to meet the exigencies of the situation at the time he made such declaration. Without a doubt, the potency of the ISIS threat to complete its mission in establishing a wilayah here is a public safety concern, which affects not only Marawi City but the entire Mindanao. Again, as uncovered through unrefuted intelligence reports, the ISIS is already on the third step of this establishment process.

The next step would be the consolidation for the caliphate through the conduct of widespread atrocities and uprisings all across Mindanao. Surely, the President could not sit idly by and wait for the ISIS's plan to reach its full fruition before declaring martial law in order to respond to this exigent situation. More so, the historical actuations of the Maute Group and ISIS-related Groups, as well as that of the ISIS itself,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt81b2) showcase that the danger to Mindanao is not only apparent but real.

In other words, a widespread outbreak of violence, if left unpacified, looms in the horizon. The President also factored-in the armed capability of the Maute Group, which platoon of 263 armed members as of the year 2016, further coordinates with other ISIS-related groups operating all over various areas in Mindanao. As such, the government is faced with the possibility of a consolidated offensive from the Maute Group together with these other groups, such as the ASG-Basilan, the AKP, and the BIFF.

Amidst all these, President Duterte similarly considered the historical and cultural context of Mindanao. It is a known fact that the secessionist movement has been extant in Mindanao for decades. Likewise, Islam has been used as a rallying cry to radicalize fellow Muslims.

These historical and cultural factors tend to provide fertile ground for the ISIS to capitalize and foster its mission in establishing a firm foothold not only in minor sections but, in fact, in the entire Mindanoan province. By and large, I find it reasonable to conclude that all of the foregoing factors could very well coalesce into a perfect storm of disaster that genuinely endangers the public safety of those in Mindanao. Finally, it is important to note that the source of the Maute Group's support does not merely remain local.

The main ISIS caliphate abroad, which is one of the world's richest organizations according to the UN, including its other cell groups all over the world, can be variably tapped as funding or arms sources. In this regard, President Duterete aptly stated that "[t]he taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt82b2) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.

These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt83b2) In fine, since it was adequately proven that Proclamation No. 216 rests on sufficient factual basis and thus, complies with both requirements of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, I therefore vote to DISMISS the petitions. After all, it is this Court's bounden duty to rule based on what the law requires, unswayed by unfounded fears or speculation. The ghosts of our past should not haunt, but instead, teach us to become a braver, wiser and more unified nation.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1b2) "Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers." (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 [ 1941].) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2b2) See Salvador v. Patricia, G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3b2) Palma v. Q & S, Inc., 123 Phil. 958, 960 (1966).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5b2) "Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." (Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, 713 Phil. 570, 574 (2013), citing Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6b2) See Section 3 (c), rule I of the Rules of Court.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7b2) See Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 711 Phil. 414, 431 (2013). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8b2) The 2010 Rules of Procedure of the PET provide for the procedures on Revision of Votes, Technical Examination, Subpoenas, and Reception of Evidence, among others, in order to thresh out issues of fact raised in election protests and petitions for quo warranto. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9b2) See Section I, Article VIII ofthe 1987 Constitution.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10b2) See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526, 597 (2012). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11b2) Id. at 598.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13b2) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14b2) Cited in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. in Fortun, id. at 629. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15b2) Id.

at 629-630. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16b2) 149 Phil. 547 (1971). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17b2) 158-A Phil. 1 (1974).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18b2) See respondents' Memorandum dated June 19, 2017, pp. 45-46. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19b2) In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 16, at 585-586. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20b2) Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, supra note 17, at 47.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21b2) See ponencia, pp. 23-25, citing Record of the I 987 Constitutional Commission No. 043, Vol. II, July 30, 1986, pp. 476-477. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22b2) Romy's Freight Service v. Castro, 523 Phil. 540, 546 (2006); citation omitted.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23b2) Bernas, Joaquin G. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 485-486, as cited in the ponencia, pp. 47-48. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24b2) See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in Orceo v. Commission on Elections, 630 Phil. 670, 689 (2010), citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 180 (2003 ).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25b2) Id., citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 185 (2003). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26b2) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sufficient> (visited June 30, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27b2) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sufficient> (visited June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28b2) 392 Phil. 618, 643 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt29b2) Id.

at 643; emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt30b2) I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 773 (July 18, 1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt31b2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p.

474 (July 30, 1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt32b2) Supra note 10, at 592. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt33b2) Id.

at 593. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt34b2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 412 (July 29, 1986).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt35b2) Entitled "AN ACT PUNISHING THE CRIME OF COUP D'ETAT BY AMENDING ARTICLES 134, 135 AND 136 OF CHAPTER ONE, TITLE THREE OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (October 26, 1990). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt36b2) See Section 2 of RA 6968.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt37b2) People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481 (1995). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt38b2) Id. at 488; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt39b2) Reyes, Luis 8., The Revised Penal Code, Book II, Eighteenth Edition (2012), p. 86; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt40b2) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gravamen> (visited June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt41b2) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/movement> (visited June 30, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt42b2) Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 962, 969 (1975).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt43b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt44b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt45b2) Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book I, Eighteenth Edition (2012), p.

702, citing 22 C.J.S., 52; emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt46b2) <https://dictionary.thelaw.com/continuous-crime/> (visited June 30, 2017); emphasis and underscoring Supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt47b2) People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt48b2) Id. at 535-541. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt49b2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p.

413 (July 29, 1986); Emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt50b2) Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, supra note 17, at 48-49. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt51b2) <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a404925.pdf> (visited June 30, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt52b2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 413 (July 29, 1986); Emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt53b2) Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1268.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt54b2) Id. at 1625. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt55b2) 509 Phil. 486 (2005).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt56b2) Id. at 518; emphases and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt57b2) 67Phil.451 (1939).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt58b2) Id. at 462-463; emphasis supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt59b2) Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 28, at 644.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt60b2) Kulayan v. Tan, 690 Phil. 72, 90-91 (2012). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt61b2) Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 10, at 629-630; emphasis and underscoring supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt62b2) II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p.

398 (July 29, 1986). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt63b2) RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 23. Public documents as evidence.

- Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prim a facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt64b2) See Report of President Duterte to Congress, pp. 4-5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt65b2) See ponencia, pp. 63-64; emphases in the original. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt66b2) 382 Phil. 412 (2000).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt67b2) Id. at 423; citations omitted. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt68b2) Report of President Duterte to Congress, pp. 3-4.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt69b2) Id. at 6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt70b2) See respondents' Consolidated Comment dated June 12, 2017, pp. 4-5.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt71b2) See respondents' Memorandum, pp. 7-8. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt72b2) See id. at 8.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt73b2) Id. at 7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt74b2) See Petition (G.R. No. 231658), p.

15. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt75b2) Report of President Duterte to Congress, p. 3.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt76b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt77b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt78b2) Id.

at 6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt79b2) Id. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt80b2) Id.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt81b2) Other events were cited by the government to demonstrate that the atrocities were not confined to Marawi City: a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo Uno, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another was wounded.

b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three (3) Indonesians near Bakungan Island, TawiTawi. c.

On January 29, 2017 the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Basilan resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of three others. d. From February to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao.1âwphi1 This resulted in the death and wounding of several personalities.

e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu. f.

On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between rebels and government troops. g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde.

h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him three days later.

(See respondents' Memorandun, pp. 10-11). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt82b2) Report of President Duterte to congress, p. 6.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt83b2) Id. at 7 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE OPINION JARDELEZA,J.: I agree with the ponencia's conclusion that there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. I write separately to articulate my views on the standard for the Court's review of the sufficiency of factual basis of the proclamation and the suspension of the privilege under Article VII, Section 18.

I Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twentyfour hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

The provision is a microcosm of the system of checks and balances fundamental to our republican government. It exclusively vests upon the President the authority to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus-extraordinary powers that are essential to the security and preservation of the Republic and the safety of its citizens in cases where the sovereignty of the nation is under attack from foreign or homegrown enemies. As a check to this awesome executive power, which may be-and, historically, had been-abused, the Constitution grantsCongress, the other political arm of government, the plenary power to veto the President's decision for whatever reason and effectively substitute its own wisdom for that of the President's.

Additionally, the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to review the factual basis of the executive action and, if the factual basis proves to be insufficient, revoke the same. The powers given to the President, Congress, and the Court are independent of each other, and each is supreme within its own sphere. When the President declares martial law, such declaration is complete by itself-it does not require the affirmation or ratification by Congress, much less the Judiciary.

This is in keeping with the objective of martial law, that is, "the preservation of the public safety and good order,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1j) and which necessitates swift action by the President if it is to be effective. Should Congress, however, exercise its veto power, the "revocation shall not be set aside by the President."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2j) Neither is such revocation subject to judicial review.

Compared to the political branches, the Court's role is more passive in that it only acts when its jurisdiction is invoked, consistent with its traditional power of judicial review which is "the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation-or instrument of intervention-of the judiciary in [the] balancing operation."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3j) Nonetheless, when its jurisdiction is so invoked, the Court's action is no less effective. If it finds that there is no sufficient factual basis, it can revoke the declaration of the President-even when Congress chooses not to exercise its veto power. II The petitioners filed their respective petitions pursuant to the third paragraph of Article VII, Section 18.

They posit that the provision confers special jurisdiction upon the Court which is distinct and supplemental to judicial power defined under Article VIII, Section 1.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4j) On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the power to review the sufficiency of factual basis falls under the Court's power to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Hence, the petitions should have been brought to us through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The resolution of this preliminary issue directly impacts how the core issue is framed (i.e., "whether there is sufficient factual basis for Proclamation No. 216"

or "whether the President acted in grave abuse of discretion in issuing Proclamation No. 216") and, consequently, the standard of review to be employed by the Court. A A case filed under Article VII, Section 18 is sui generis A proceeding under Article VII, Section 18 significantly differs from any other action falling within the Court's jurisdiction as specified under Article VIII, Section 5.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5j) First, as opposed to other public suits which require petitioners challenging a governmental act to show locus standi or legal standing, Article VII, Section 18 explicitly waives such requirement by granting standing to "any citizen." Legal standing refers to a party's personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.

It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6j) Thus, a party will generally be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that: (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7j) The requirement of legal standing is "rooted in the very nature of judicial power."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8j) It is a hurdle that a party must overcome to meet the "case and controversy"

requirement of Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5 that "lies at the very heart of the judicial function."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9j) A carte blanche grant of legal standing to any citizen presents a significant departure from the Court's exercise of judicial power. Second, Article VII, Section 18 textually calls for the Court to review facts. Again, this creates an exception to the long-standing legal principle that the Court is not a trier of facts.

This applies whether the Court exercises its power of review on certiorari or its so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction." In reviews on certiorari, it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10j) More so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, where neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11j) Third, Article VII, Section 18 prescribes a vastly different timetable within which the Court must decide the case. It unequivocally mandates the Court to "promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing."

In contrast, all other cases filed with the Court "must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12j) In view of these substantial distinctions, there can be no question that the framers of the Constitution intended the Court's power to revoke the President's action to be different from and supplemental to its primary judicial power-in the same way that Congress' power to revoke the same executive action is distinct from its primary function of enacting laws. It is a special power limited in scope and application. While it may be akin to the judiciary's broad function of judicial review, the power flows from Article VII, Section 18 itself, not from Article VIII, Section 1.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13j) Article VII, Section 18's reference to an "appropriate proceeding"

simply means that there must be a petition, sufficient in form and substance,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14j) filed by a Filipino citizen before the Court challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is precisely what petitioners have done. Shoehorning Article VII, Section 18 into Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5 is a superfluous exercise because the former is complete in itself.

As a provision that confers jurisdiction, Article VII, Section 18 defines a demandable public right, the purpose of which is the vindication of the Constitution, and specifies which court has jurisdiction and the circumstances under which such jurisdiction may be invoked. The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the applicable law, and the character of the relief prayed for.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15j) The substantive allegations for an action under Article VII, Section 18 would normally consist of (1) a presidential act declaring martial law and/or suspending the privilege of the writ and (2) the absence or falsity of the factual basis, and the relief to be sought is the revocation of the presidential act. An Article VII, Section 18 petition is therefore in the nature of a factual review unlike any other proceeding cognizable by the Court.

Alternatively, the reference to an "appropriate proceeding" could mean that the framers of the Constitution has left it to the Court, pursuant to its power to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16j) to provide the procedural means for enforcing the right of action under Article VII, Section 18-akin to what the Court had done when it promulgated the rules on Writ of Amparo, Writ of Habeas Data, and Writ of Kalikasan. The absence of such rule, however, does not derogate from the substantive public right granted to all citizens by Article VII, Section 18.

The peculiarities of the Court's authority under Article VII, Section 15 make it distinct from all other cases over which the Court has jurisdiction. This leads me to conclude that the envisioned proceeding is sui generis. It creates a public right of action that allows any citizen to challenge a specific governmental action even in the absence of direct injury or material interest in the case.

It involves inquiry into the factual basis of the act, not a review of errors of law or a determination of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. B Sufficiency of the factual basis is distinct from grave abuse of discretion Inquiry into the sufficiency of factual basis as a check to the President's commander-in-chief powers may be traced to the 1971 case of Lansang v. Garcia,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17j) which involved a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Lansang reversed the earlier doctrine in Barcelon v. Baker(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18j) and Montenegro v. Castaneda and Balao(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19j) that the President's assessment of whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the privilege of the writ is a political question that is final and conclusive upon the courts, and held that the Court had authority to inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, writing for the majority, explained: Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto.

What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion"-or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof'" when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist."

[Far] from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege [of the] writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.

Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless.

Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility. Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonweal, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not.

The untrammeled enjoyment and exercise of such right - which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order - is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and development. Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law - such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion - there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it.

Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent - no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be - for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse - when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied - to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20j) (Italics in the original, citation omitted.) The framers of the Constitution presumably agreed with the above discussion and deemed it wise to explicitly state in the commander-in-chief provision that the Court may review "the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ."

However, the Court did not actually resolve Lansang on the basis of the sufficiency of factual basis. Instead, upon the Government's urging, the Court went "no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. "(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21j) This led to the conundrum of Lansang, because as the Court claimed the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension, what proved decisive was the (lack of) arbitrariness of the President's own assessment of the facts.

As observed by the constitutionalist Father Joaquin Bernas, SJ, Lansang "consisted of one step forward, overruling Barcelon and Montenegro, and one step backward, reducing its newly assumed power to nullify."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22j) The apparent incongruity within Lansang may best be explained by looking at the constitution prevailing at the time of its promulgation. The 1935 Constitution did not specify the standard for reviewing the President's suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. At the time, the prevailing doctrine for judicial review of executive acts is Araneta v. Dinglasan:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23j) "[o]nly in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the Government is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24j) Thus, resort to the arbitrariness/grave abuse of discretion framework was the most principled work-around to the political question doctrine enunciated in Barcelon and Montenegro.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, unlike the Lansang Court, were not bound by the same limitation. They had a free hand to devise checks on the President's commander-in-chief powers. The presumption is that they were aware of Lansang's expansive discussion, quoted above, on the Court's power to inquire into the existence of the factual bases.

Concomitantly, they are also presumed to know that Lansang was ultimately decided on a finding that there was no arbitrariness attendant to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. Thus, when the final text of the Constitution mentions "sufficiency of the factual basis" while conspicuously omitting Lansang' s keyword of "arbitrariness,"

this must be construed as a deliberate preference of one test over the other. By textually adopting the sufficiency-of-factual-basis test, the Constitution raised the bar that the executive branch must hurdle in order to sustain the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Whereas Barcelon(as reinstated by Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25j) ) barredjudicial review of the presidential act under the political question doctrine and Lansang favored the abuse of discretion/arbitrariness test which is "hard to prove in the face of the formidable obstacle built up by the presumption of regularity in the perfonnance of official duty,"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26j) the 1987 text empowered the Court to make an independent determination of whether the two conditions for the exercise of the extraordinary executive powers have been satisfied, i.e., whether there is in fact actual invasion and rebellion and whether public safety requires the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

The shift in focus of judicial review to determinable facts, as opposed to the manner or wisdom of the exercise of the power, created an objective test to determine whether the President has complied with the constitutionally prescribed conditions.

This is consistent with the thrust of the 1987 Constitution "to forestall a recurrence of the long and horrible nightmare of the past regime when one single clause, the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution then in force that authorized the President to declare martial law was held to have nullified the entire Constitution and the Bill of Rights."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27j) The Solicitor General, by insisting that arbitrariness remains to be the standard for examining the sufficiency of factual basis, is effectively asking this Court to confine itself to the same trappings as Lansang. To reiterate, Lansang was a product of its time, decided prior to the introduction of comprehensive checks on executive power by the 1987 Constitution. The Court, as it decides the case now, is not subject to the same limitation as Lansang and need only be guided by the clear text of Article VII, Section 18.

The danger of fusing "sufficiency of the factual basis" with the standard of arbitrariness/grave abuse of discretion is this: the sufficiency of the factual basis is being measured by grave abuse of discretion. This is problematic because the phrase "grave abuse of discretion"

carries a specific legal meaning in our jurisdiction. It refers to such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perfonn a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28j) While inquiry into the sufficiency of factual basis may yield a finding consistent with the accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion, such as when the presidential proclamation was totally bereft of factual basis or when such factual basis had been manufactured by the executive, the correlation is not perfect. Good faith reliance on inaccurate facts, for instance, does not strictly satisfy the "capricious and whimsical"

or "arbitrary or despotic" standard. By setting the sufficiency-of-factual-basis standard, the Constitution foreclosed good faith belief as an absolute justification for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Under Article VII, Section 18, the Court is vested with the power to revoke the proclamation, not because of grave abuse of discretion, but because of insufficiency of factual basis.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt29j) The strength of Lansang as the controlling precedent is also not clearcut, as it was overruled by Garcia-Padilla prior to the 1987 Constitution. As already mentioned, the framers did not include "arbitrariness" in the final text of Article VII, Section 18.

While Lansang has its merits, it would be error to assume that, in the face of the plain language of Article VII, Section 18, it was readopted in full. The phrase "sufficiency of the factual basis" should be understood in the sense that it has in common use and given its ordinary meaning.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt30j) One does not always have to look for some additional meaning to an otherwise plain and clearly worded provision.

Just as the Constitution set the limited conditions under which the President may exercise the power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ, so did it set in no uncertain terms the parameters of the Court's review. We cannot expand these parameters by constitutional interpretation.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt31j) III The sole substantive issue to be resolved is, therefore, whether there is sufficient factual basis for Proclamation No. 216.

While I arrive at the same conclusion as the ponencia that there exists an actual rebellion and public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao, I propose a different standard of review for an Article VII, Section 18 proceeding. A Standard of reasonableness A review of the sufficiency of factual basis involves inquiry into the existence of two things: (1) actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) the demands of public safety. While they involve separate factual issues, these twin requirements are inseparably entwined.

Thus, the proper standard of review must be one that is applicable to both. The ponencia, relying on a dissent in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt32j) applied the standard of probable cause, which is defined as "such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man ' to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt33j) I have no serious misgivings to the underlying principle behind the adoption of such standard, other than, for obvious reasons, it is inapplicable in assessing the public safety requirement. This is because the standard of probable cause is one evolved by jurisprudence as part of the criminal process, particularly in searches, seizures, and arrests, and not for the purpose of evaluating the demands of public safety.

Martial law is essentially police power. It has for its object "public safety," which is the principal concern of police power.

However, whereas police power is normally a legislative function executed by the executive arm, martial law is exercised by the executive with the aid of the military.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt34j) In Mirasol v. DPWH,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt35j) the Court held: The sole standard in measuring [the exercise of police power] is reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation.

No allembracing test of reasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt36j) (Citations omitted.) Accordingly, the standard of review in determining whether actual rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the extraordinary presidential action should likewise be guided by reasonableness. As well put in an American case, reasonableness is "what 'from the calm sea level' of common sense, applied to the whole situation, is not illegitimate in view of the end attained."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt37j) Since the objective of the Court's inquiry under Article VII, Section 18 is to verify the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's action, the standard may be restated as such evidence that is adequate to satisfy a reasonable mind seeking the truth (or falsity) of its factual existence.

This is a flexible test that balances the President's authority to respond to exigencies created by a state of invasion or rebellion and the Court's duty to ensure that the executive act is within the bounds set by the Constitution.

The test does not require absolute truth of the facts alleged to have been relied upon by the President, but simply that the totality of facts and circumstances make the allegations more likely than not to be true.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt38j) Indeed, the proposed standard hews closely to probable cause, which speaks of a "reasonably discreet and prudent man," but without being subject to the same jurisprudential restrictions. The purpose of the inquiry is not to determine whether an offense has been committed by a specific person or group of persons, rather it is to verify the truth or falsity of the facts relied upon by the President.

The test of reasonableness is also comparable to the substantial evidence standard in administrative cases, which is defined as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt39j) But, again, substantial evidence has a specific legal meaning in our jurisdiction and is used in cases decided by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies. It does not and cannot be applied, in its accepted form, in testing the validity of a purely executive act, such as the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the President does not take evidence-in the sense in which the term is used in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings-before he acts.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt40j) What reasonableness, probable cause, and substantial evidence(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt41j) all have in common is that they use as a benchmark the hypothetical "reasonable mind"

or "reasonable person," which signifies a sensible mind, fairly judicious in his actions, and at least somewhat cautious in reaching his conclusions.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt42j) But consistent with the sui generis nature of the present petitions and in view of the fact that this is the first time the Court will resolve a challenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt43j) the more principled approach is to define a standard that is not hamstrung by the whole body of jurisprudence that is applicable to different sets of cases. Resorting to existing standards that were neither designed nor evolved to test the exercise of commander-in-chief powers, specifically the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of such exercise, would lead to a rule that is of questionable provenance.

B Twin requirements: Rebellion and demands of public safety The ponencia proposes that "rebellion" as used in Article VII, Section 18 refers to the crime of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While reference to the RPC definition may be useful, it is important to understand the legal etymology of rebellion as used in constitutional law.

The origin of rebellion as a ground for the exercise of the State's emergency powers may be directly traced to the "Suspension Clause" of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt44j) Although the provision is silent as to who has the power to suspend the privilege, it is widely accepted that the authority belongs to Congress, primarily because the provision is placed in Article I, which is the repository of federal legislative powers.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt45j) In the Philippines, a similar clause appeared in the Organic Act of 1902. Unlike the United States Constitution, however, the Organic Act explicitly stated who may suspend the privilege: That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which events the same may be suspended by the President, or by the Governor, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt46j) The Jones Law (1916) retained the same provision and added in a separate section that the Governor-General "may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Islands, or any part thereof, under martial law."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt47j) The 1935 Constitution similarly had two provisions, though with slight variations.

The suspension clause appeared in the Bill of Rights, which read, "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt48j) Meanwhile, of Article VII, Section 11 (2) vested the power to suspend and to declare martial law upon the President, thus: "[t]he President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such anned forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."

These two provisions were substantially retained by the 1973 Consti tution. In order to avoid a repeat of the excesses associated with the Marcos martial law, the 1987 Constitution narrowed the grounds for suspension of the privilege and declaration of martial law to "invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it." It removed lawless violence and insurrection as grounds, as well as the phrase "imminent danger thereof,"

which means that there must be actual rebellion. Notably, the grounds set by the 1987 Constitution are the exact same grounds that first appeared in the suspension clause of the US Constitution.

The similarity did not escape the attention of Father Bernas who, while agreeing that martial law under the 1987 Constitution falls under Willoughby's third fonnulation, observed that "[m]artial law in the Philippines jurisdiction is imposed not by or through an authorization from Congress but by the Executive as specifically authorized and within the limits set by the Constitution."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt49j) The origin of the phrase "rebellion or invasion" is not very clear, except that it was adopted to clarify and limit the meaning of "most urgent and pressing occasions" which appeared in the early formulation of the suspension clause.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt50j) No precise meaning of rebellion has been evolved in American jurisprudence, but the prevailing view is that the determination of whether a rebellion (or an invasion) exists rests with the legislature.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt51j) There has been two occasions when the US Congress has exercised this power: the first was in 1863 at the height of the American Civil War;(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt52j) and in 1871 primarily to combat the Ku Klux Klan.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt53j) On both occasions, the suspension statutes were tied to current events and passed to allow the federal government to respond to exigencies.

The US Congress also enacted statutes delegating the suspension authority to territorial governors, including the Philippine Organic Act of 1902. In 1905, Governor-General Luke E. Wright suspended the privilege in order to put down "certain organized bands of ladrones x x x in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas who are levying forced contributions upon the people, who frequently require them, under compulsion, to join their bands, and who kill or maim in the most barbarous manner those who fail to respond to their unlawful demands, and are therefore terrifying the lawabiding and inoffensive people of those provinces."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt54j) As required by the Organic Act, the Philippine Commission approved the Governor-General's order of suspension. The suspension was challenged in Barcelon, but the Court ruled that the determination is essentially a political question.

Nonetheless, the Court resolved that the conferment of authority upon the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission was valid. In Montenegro, the existence of rebellion was challenged because what existed was "intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized bands in different places x x x such sorties are occasional, localized and transitory."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt55j) In response, the Court, speaking through then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon, said: "[t]o the petitioner's unpracticed eye the repeated encounters between dissident elements and military troops may seem sporadic, isolated, or casual.

But the officers charged with the Nation's security, analyzed the extent and pattern of such violent clashes and arrived at the conclusion that they are warp and woof of a general scheme to overthrow this government vi et armis, by force and arms."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt56j) In Lansang, the Court measured the existence of a state of rebellion against the averments in the presidential proclamation that lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt57j) Barcelon was decided prior to the enactment of the RPC, but the Court recognized the shared authority of the Governor-General and Philippine Commission to suspend the privilege even in the absence of a statutory definition of rebellion.

Montenegro and Lansang, although enunciating diametrically opposed doctrines, both understood the word rebellion without reference to the RPC. Then came Garcia-Padilla, where the Court explicitly stated that "the terms 'rebellion and insurrection' are used [in the Constitution] in the sense of a state or condition of the Nation, not in the concept of a statutory offense."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt58j) Despite the varying factual circumstances and conclusions reached by the Court in these cases, they all have one thing in common: the word 'rebellion,' as used in the Constitution, was never seen as being confined to the RPC definition. The factual bases in Barcelon and Montenegro do not squarely fall within the definition of the RPC.

Lansang and Garcia-Padilla arguably did, but the analysis did not involve the RPC definition. In these cases, the Court consistently viewed rebellion from a national security perspective rather than a criminal law vantage point. The framers were presumably aware of these decisions, yet made no attempt to define rebellion.

There is nothing in the debates that show a clear intent to either limit it to the RPC definition(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt59j) or leave it the determination to Congress.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt60j) Therefore, rebellion in the Constitution properly refers to a "state of rebellion" rather than the "crime of rebellion."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt61j) The legislative construction of the suspension clause in the US supports this interpretation. The federal suspension statutes were enacted to respond to exigencies existing at the time of their enactment.

They were not constrained by preexisting penal statutes on rebellion. One may argue that in passing the suspension statutes, the US Congress effectively defined rebellion, and by defining rebellion in the RPC, the Philippine Congress did the same. The argument fails, however, because the RPC, as a general penal statute having for its objective the punishment of offenders, was hardly intended to respond to threats to the government.

More importantly, the US Constitution vests the power to determine the existence of rebellion to their legislative branch, whereas the Philippine Constitution textually commits to the President the power to make such determination. In other words, our Constitution vests upon the President the emergency powers that the US Constitution vested upon the US Congress. Of course, the President cannot declare martial law or suspend the writ on the basis of any disturbances.

There must be some baseline against which the President's action may be evaluated against. It has been suggested that what is essential is that armed hostilities is in defiance of authorities.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt62j) This is similar to the first portion of the RPC definition: "rising publicly and taking arms against the Govemment."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt63j) Black's Law Dictionary defines rebellion as an "open, organized, and armed resistance to an established government or ruler."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt64j) The common theme is that there is a public, armed resistance to the government. In my view, this definition is the most consistent with the purpose of the grant of martial law/suspension powers: to meet the exigencies of internal or external threats to the very existence of the Republic.

The other condition for the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ is the demands of public safety. Unlike rebellion, public safety is not as easily verifiable. Whether the exercise of the proclamation/suspension powers is required by public safety necessarily involves the prudential estimation of the President of the consequences of the armed uprising.

Because it is phrased expressly in discretionary terms, it is difficult to set parameters in a vacuum, however broadly, as to what predicate facts should exist. To me, the only requirement that can be logically imposed is that the threat to public safety must, applying the reasonableness test, more likely than not be genuine based on publicly available facts or military reports founded on verifiable facts. C Procedure in an Article VIJ, Section 18 petition As earlier discussed, the Constitution vested upon the President the exclusive authority to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

However, when subsequently challenged by a citizen, as in this case, the President must satisfy the Court as to the sufficiency of the factual bases of his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. As a sui generis proceeding, where the Court performs a function it normally leaves to trial courts, it is not bound by the strictures of the Rules on Evidence. For one, the Court cannot indulge the presumption of regularity of the President's action, as it might be accused of abdicating its coμstitutional duty to make an independent appreciation of the facts.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt65j) Neither can the general rule "he who alleges must prove"

strictly apply here. For the third paragraph of Article VII, Section 18 to operate as a meaningful check on the extraordinary powers of the executive, the better rule would be for the Government, at the first instance, to present to the Court and the public as much of the facts (or conclusions based on facts) which were considered by the President: x x x [S]ince the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the executive department, the executive department, if the President wants his suspension [and declaration] sustained, will have to open whatever findings the defiartment might have to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt66j) The Court shall weigh and consider the Government's evidence in conjunction with any countervailing evidence that may be presented by the petitioners. Applying the standard of reasonableness, we shall then decide whether the totality of the factual bases considered by the President was sufficient to warrant the declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Ideally, most of what the Government would present as evidence to justify the President's action can be set out in the Report he submits to the Congress.

The executive department can, for example, consider attaching to the President's Report proof of the factual bases for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ. These may include judicial affidavits, declassified or redacted military intelligence reports, and other products of the executive's fact-finding and intelligence gathering capabilities.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt67j) In fact, a sufficiently substantiated Report may work to allay the public's fears as to a possible abuse of the exercise of the President's extraordinary powers and even avoid/discourage legal challenges to it before this Court. Of course, it may well be that the President considered facts which, due to their nature or provenance, cannot be made public.

In New York Times Co. v. United States,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt68j) Justice Brennan noted the "single, extremely narrow class of cases" in which the First Amendment's ban on prior restraint ma' y be overridden: "such cases may arise only when the Nation is 'at war,' during which times ' [n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruitment service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops."'(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt69j) Here, Memorandum Circular No. 78, s. 1964, or the Rules Governing Security of Classified Matter in Government Offices, provides for four (4) categories (top secret, secret, confidential and restricted) covering the gamut of official matter which requires protection in the interest of national security.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt70j) Thus, and relative to this exercise, it is possible that there are matters which cannot be publicly disclosed by the Government as it may, for example, indicate the capabilities or major successes of our intelligence services or imperil or reveal secret sources.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt71j) Still, in my view, the Government's presentation of its evidence should, in the first instance, be conducted publicly and in open court.

The experience of this Court with the conduct of the in camera hearing held last June 15, 2017, and the nature of the evidence subeequently submitted by the Government in support of its Memorandum of June 19, 2017, is instructive. The Court, upon the Government's request, allowed an in camera presentation by the Government on the events that led to, and culminated in, the Marawi incidents of May 23, 201 7. Two military officers made separate presentations supported by slides.

While the first presentation dwelt principally with the identities and backgrounds of the groups that engaged in acts of terrorism and posed a threat to security in Mindanao, the second presentation focused primarily on the events that transpired on May 23, 2017.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt72j) At the end of the second presentation, I asked the Government if it was willing to make the presentations available to the public.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt73j) This is so because, save for one slide which referred to information shared by a foreign country,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt74j) none of the presentation materials contained, to my mind, sensitive military matters. Both presentations referred largely to past events that cannot possibly affect ongoing military operations.

There was no identification of confidential sources; on the contrary, most of the information presented were in the public domain and/or already cited in Proclamation No. 261 and the President's Report.

The Court, however, decided to leave it to the Government to determine which materials or information, not yet in the public domain, it would choose to release to the public.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt75j) Members of the Court, and later petitioner Edcel Lagman, then propounded questions to Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and AFP Chief-of-Staff Eduardo Año. Though the Solicitor General objected to some of the questions posed by petitioner Lagman, none of his objections were founded on the ground of a national security privilege. During my tum at asking questions, I emphasized to the Solicitor General the importance, in view of the Court's duty in this case, of providing as much of the facts which formed the bases for the President's action.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt76j) The Solicitor General thereafter agreed to prepare and submit judicial affidavits for this purpose.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt77j) As matters would turn out, the Memorandum filed by the Solicitor General on June 19, 2017 was supported by the judicial affidavits of Secretary Lorenzana and General Afio, which were, in turn, supported by materials contained in the two presentations made at the in camera proceedings of June 15, 2017.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt78j) My point is this: public interest would have been better served had the Court dispensed with the in camera proceedings in the first instance.

First, this is respectful of the public's right to information on matters of public concem.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt79j) The public is given a chance to follow the evidence being presented by the Government, as well as the questions posed to its representatives. Since the matter in issue concerns the President's exercise of his extraordinary powers, which necessarily involves restrictions on certain civil liberties, it is important that the public be fully apprised of the proceeding designed to check this exercise if only to assure them that no liberties are being unduly taken. Certainly, information on the facts supporting a declaration of martial law or the lifting of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lie at the apex of any hierarchy of what can be considered as "matters of public concem."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt80j) Second, it would ensure accountability by forcing the Government to make more diligent efforts to identify with specificity the particular pieces of evidence over which it would claim a privilege against public disclosure.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt81j) Third, the conduct of proceedings in public would ultimately lend credibility to this Court's decision relative to the President's action: The right of access to the judicial process has been defined as important for ensuring accountability and instilling confidence in the administration of justice.

In Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States recognized a heightened burden to justify judicial secrecy, in order to protect the credibility of the decision before the public. "Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat, which requires a compelling justification."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt82j) (Emphasis supplied.) I thus propose the following general procedure in the future conduct of similar proceedings: The Government, as early as the filing of its Comment to the petition, should present its case utilizing facts in the public domain or sensitive matter that it decides, in the public interest, to declassify and/or redact.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt83j) Only upon the invocation by the Government of "a specific and on-the-record evaluation that 'closure is essential to preserve higher values [than the public's right to access] and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest'"

can in camera presentation of evidence be considered and allowed.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt84j) For this reason, it is imperative that any invocation of privilege be timely made (i.e., in its Comment) so that both the Court and petitioners would have reasonable opportunity to respond. Petitionerscitizens may thereafter be given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Based on our experience in this proceeding, I submit that proffer by the Government of a fact (or conclusion based on facts) which it asserts the Court to consider, but not make of public record on grounds of national security, should come with a heavy presumption against its nature as a privileged matter,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt85j) imposing on the Government a heavy burden on why a specific fact should not be made public.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt86j) More than mere general invocations of reasons of national security, there must, for example, be some showing that the matter, if publicly disclosed, may reveal critical information relating to the capabilities of our intelligence sources, and or imperil secret sources, among others.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt87j) In the same manner, the Government may invoke (and subsequently justify the grant of) such a privilege in response to specific questions propounded by the Court or the parties to its witnesses.

Otherwise stated, the Government should not be allowed a carte blanche invocation of privilege to justify an in camera proceeding. This will avoid normalizing what should rightly be the exception when it comes to the conduct of proceedings such as this. As Justice Stewart, in New York Times Co. v. United States, teaches us: For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.

x x x [S]ecrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt88j) Former Yale Law School Dean Eugene V. Rostow once said, "[t]he Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt89j) Similarly, when the Court sits, as it does here, as a trier of fact under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the citizenry is effectively empaneled as jury-at-large, looking over the shoulders of the Court and passing judgment on the judiciousness of our findings. In the end, the legitimacy of this Court's decision here will rest partly on the public's perception on how we conducted our fact-finding inquiry, and how we were able to reach our decision. A decision which is the product of a process done mostly in the sunshine will stand a better chance of gaining the people's acceptance over one clouded by generalized invocations of confidentiality.

IV As I have mentioned, I concur with the ponencia's appreciation of facts and the conclusion derived therefrom.

Nonetheless, I think it would be useful to clarify, basically to myself and to the public, how I arrived at the conclusion that there is sufficient factual basis for Proclamation No. 216 using my proposed paradigm. A Existence of actual rebellion It is undisputed that an armed conflict erupted between the government forces and the alliance of Maute and Abu Sayaff (ASG) terrorist groups in the afternoon of May 23, 2017, triggered by the attempt of the government to capture the known leaders of these groups, Isnilon 'Hapilon, Abdullah Maute, and Omarkhayam Maute. Five days earlier, on May 18, 2017, the military had received intelligence reports that local terrorist groups, particularly the Maute and ASG, were planning to occupy Marawi City, raise the ISIS flag in the provincial capitol, and declare Marawi City.

The planned siege is a prelude to the fourth step of the wilayat, or Islamic province, governed by Shariah law.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt90j) Hapilon is the leader of ASG-Basilan, a notorious terrorist group founded in the 1990s and previously affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah. Gen. Afio reported Hapilon and 30 of his followers performed a symbolic hijra, or pilgrimage to unite with other ISIS-linked groups in mainland Mindanao, last December 31, 2016.

Among those ISIS-linked groups is the Maute, a terror group with reportedly 263 members operating in Lanaodel Sur, with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in the country. The military confirmed the consolidation of ASG, Maute, Maguid, and other local terrorist groups in Central Mindanao during a series of AFP combat operations from January to April 2017.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt91j) As government troops moved into Marawi City to capture Hapilon and the Maute leaders at around 1300 of May 23, they were met with heavily anned resistance which resulted in the injury of several soldiers and at least one casualty. As the skirmishes continued throughout the day, the terror groups had forcibly occupied several establishments, including the Amai Pakpak Hospital, burned down and ransacked government and private facilities, freed inmates of the Marawi City Jail, killed and kidnapped a number of civilians.

In addition, as of 2200 of May 23, the terrorist groups had taken control of three bridges and set up several checkpoints. The President, who was then in Moscow but was regularly receiving military updates, issued Proclamation No. 216 at around 2200 (Philippine time).(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt92j) The petitioners do not dispute all the facts presented by the executive department. They only dispute a handful of them, namely: (1) the Amai Pakpak Hospital was not overrun by the enemy forces, (2) the police station was not burned down, (3) the Land Bank branch was not ransacked but merely sustained damage, and (4) the enemy groups had not taken over any government facility.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt93j) When asked to rebut the other facts presented, petitioners proffered that they have no personal knowledge.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt94j) The facts pertinent to rebellion, understood as a public, armed resistance to the government, are publicly verifiable.

These are mostly circumscribed between 1300 of May 23, 2017, when the military operation to arrest Hapilon and the Maute leaders began, and 2200 of the same date, when the President issued Proclamation No. 216. To me, the following undisputed facts are decisive of the issue of rebellion: (1) there was a sustained offensive against government troops from 1300 through 2200 with the terrorists showing no immediate sign of retreat; (2) the terrorists establishment checkpoints on public roads; (3) they publicly hoisted ISIS flags in various places; and (4) there were multiple military and civilian casualties and injuries. The totality of these more than adequately satisfies the constitutional requirement of actual rebellion.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt95j) Even when measured by the more rigid RPC definition, the siege of Marawi clearly constitutes rebellion.

There is an armed public uprising against the government and, considering the terrorist groups' publicly avowed objective of establishing an Islamic province, their purpose is clearly to remove a part of the Philippine territory from the allegiance to the government. The events that happened before-Hapilon being appointed as emir, his attempts to unify the local terrorist groups, and the acts of violence committed by the various Mindanao-based terrorist groups-mostly provide context for the events that transpired on May 23. While one can cast about disputing whether Hapilon and the Mautes have united with other local terrorist groups or whether they have actual links with ISIS, the facts that occurred on May 23-the existence of which cannot be reasonably deniedexemplifies the essence of rebellion under the Constitution.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt96j) Even granting the facts controverted by the petitioners to be true, these are minor details in the larger theater of war and do not alter the decisive facts necessary for detennining the existence of rebellion.

B Public safety necessitates declaration of law in the entire Mindanao The government disclosed that there has been a rise in terroristic activities-bombings, kidnap for ransom, beheadings and other acts of atrocities-perpetrated by terrorist groups in Mindanao since the fourth quarter of 2016 until the siege of Marawi. Military leaders assessed the upsurge as a response to the "call to anns" issued by Hapilon who was anointed by ISIS as the emir or leader of all ISIS forces in the Philippines.

Since the performance of the symbolic hijra, General Afio reported that they have monitored collaborative activities of three major terrorist groups-the ASG, the Maute, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) along with foreign terrorists. It is also claimed that Hapilon has been receiving support from foreign terrorists who provide funding and facilitate the transport of pro-ISIS recruits from other Southeast Asian countries to Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt97j) General Afio also revealed that the grand plan of the Hapilon-led group is to take over Marawi City and further march to Iligan City. The siege of Marawi City was supposed to serve as the prelude for allied terrorist groups to stage their own violent uprising across Mindanao for the purpose of attaining their ultimate goal of establishing a wilayat.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt98j) The siege of Marawi City and the recent increase in terrorist activities in Mindanao have, to my mind, reasonably established that there is sufficient factual basis that public safety requires the declaration of martial law for the entire Mindanao.

The objective of ISIS to establish an Islamic caliphate is well-known.

Whether Hapilon is actually sponsored by ISIS is less clear, but he has publicly proclaimed that he is the emir of all ISIS forces in the Philippines and the announcement in an ISIS newsletter that he has been appointed as such has not been controverted.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt99j) The five-step process to establish of wilayat is not disputed, and the assessment that Hapilon and his followers are somewhere between the third and fourth steps are confirmed by the uncovered plot to assault Marawi.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt100j) Add to this their penchant for raising the ISIS flag during the siege of Marawi, then it becomes clear that the ASG and the Mautes are, at the very least, ISIS-inspired. Their public statements and terroristic acts are being used as propaganda to recruit more members, and if they are in fact not yet ISIS-linked, to get the attention and support of ISIS.

These groups are no less dangerous just because there is some doubt as to their direct linkage with ISIS. As the siege of Marawi and their past terror activities have shown, the threat they pose is real. The guerilla tactics employed by these groups and their familiarity with the terrain make it difficult to confine them to one area.

We can take judicial notice of the fact that Marawi lies in central Mindanao, with access to other provinces in the Mindanao island, through nearby forests, mountains, and bodies of water.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt101j) As last year's attack on Davao City showed, the terrorists are capable of launching attacks in other areas of considerable distance from Marawi City.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt102j) In the absence of countervailing evidence or patent implausibility of the facts presented by the executive department, it is difficult, if not irresponsible, to cast aside the statements personally made before the Court by the Secretary of Defense and the AFP Chief-of-Staff. The standard of reasonableness requires the Court to exercise caution in evaluating the factual assertions of the executive department, but it does not create a presumption against matters coming from their side.

After the oral arguments and the submission of the pleadings, I find nothing incredulous or far-fetched with respect to the claimed capabilities and objectives of the terror groups. The executive's assessment of the nature and level of threat posed by these ISIS-inspired terror groups in Mindanao is not incompatible with local(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt103j) and foreign(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt104j) media reports and publicly available research papers.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt105j) Understandably, the information provided to the Court is not perfect(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt106j) and, given the 30-day period imposed by the Constitution, we do not have the time to vet it to the point of conclusiveness. But that is the constraint inherent in the nature of the process dealt us by Article VII, Section 18.

The role of the Court is to determine whether, on the basis of the matters presented to us, the threat to public safety is genuine. I conclude that, more likely than not, it is. In view of the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the petitions.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1j) Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 335 (1946). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2j) Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 284.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3j) Id at 124. Citation omitted. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4j) CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

x x x Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5j) CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an en-or or question of law is involved. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6j) Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 487.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7j) Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 354, 360. "We have generally adopted the 'direct injury test' to determine whether a party has the requisite standing to file suit" (Knights of Rizal v. DMC!

Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017, Jardeleza, J., dissenting). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8j) Lozano v. Nograles, supra. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9j) Kilosbayan, lncorporatedv.

Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 130, 139. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10j) Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 358, 368-369. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11j) Malayang Mangggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 24, 40-41.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12j) CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13j) The Constitution is replete with examples of supplemental powers being granted to different branches. For instance, the President's power to veto a bill passed by Congress (Art. VI, Sec. 27) is distinct from his primary duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed (Art. VII, Sec. 17).

Similarly, the Senate's power to ratify treaties entered into by the Executive (Art. VII, Sec. 21) is distinct from its core legislative power (Art. VI, Sec. 1). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14j) Munsalud v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 167181, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 144, 151- 153. A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following: l.

A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action indicating the names of the parties, and the docket number which is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket number; 2.

The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading; 3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel; 4. Verification.

This is required to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative; 5. A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which although not jurisdictional, the same is obligatory; 6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court.x x x xxx In case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional requirements that go into the form of the pleading should be incorporated, viz.: 1.

The Roll of Attorney's Number; 2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; and 3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime Membership Number.

4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue (effective January 1, 2009). xxx Substance is one which relates to the material allegations in the pleading.

x x x It is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court. (Underscoring in the original.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15j) Galindo v. Heirs of Marciano A. Roxas, G.R. No. 147969, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 497, 511. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16j) CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17j) G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18j) 5 Phil. 87 (1905). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19j) 91 Phil. 882 (1952).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20j) Lansang v. Garcia, supra note 17 at 473-475. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21j) Id. at 481.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22j) Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 541. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23j) 84 Phil. 368 (l 949).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24j) Id at 424. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25j) G.R. No. L-61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26j) Id.

at 497. , (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27j) Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987, 150,CR 44, 174. Teehankee, CJ, concurring.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28j) Soriano v. Mendoza-Arcega, G.R. No. 175473, January 31, 2011, 641SCRA51, 57. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt29j) Compare with the rule in libel that a person is liable only when it is proved that he acted with "actual malice." lfa person makes a statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false, then it may be said that he acted with actual malice.

On the other hand, if is not so aware or reasonably determined the facts to be true, even if they later turn out to be false, he cannot be accused of actual malice and would thus not be liable. [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)]. The actual malice rule is similar to the standard of abuse of discretion.

In a martial law situation, a President who bases his proclamation on facts which he is aware to be false or with reckless disregard whether they was true or false, may be said to act with grave abuse of discretion. However, if he is not so aware or reasonably determined the facts to be true, he cannot be accused of grave abuse of discretion. This situation is obviated by Art. VII, Sec.

18 when it sets truth or falsity as the standard. Whereas in libel, truth is not a defense, in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis, truth is an acceptable justification by the executive (and falsity an adequate ground to revoke). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt30j) Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270, 292.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt31j) See Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt32j) G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, 668 SCRA 504. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt33j) Kalata v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 141, 148.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt34j) Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 902. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt35j) G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt36j) Id. at 348. See also Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board v. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 200740, October 2, 2013, 706 SCRA 675 and City of Manila v. laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt37j) In Re Hall, 50 Cal.App. 786 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1920). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt38j) On this point, I fully agree with the ponencia that "[i]n determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.

Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report." (Ponencia, p. 50.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt39j) RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5.

Italics supplied. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt40j) Lansang v. Garcia, supra note 17 at 481. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt41j) In my view, it is difficult to precisely define the graduation between probable cause and substantial evidence, because whereas the latter is the basis for determining administrative liability, the former is a justification for deprivation of liberty.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt42j) Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition, Vol. 36, pp. 559 & 570. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt43j) The majority in Fortun v Mocapagol-Arroyo held that the case was already moot.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt44j) U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art.I, § 9, cl. 2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt45j) Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 251 (2014), p.

258. The author summarized some of the views in footnote 13: "Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md.

1861) is the seminal defense of this position. See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV.

391, 408 (2007) ("[A] number of courts confronted some form of the legal question raised in Ex parte Merryman, and virtually all of them reached a similar conclusion-i.e., that Lincoln's extralegislative suspension of habeas corpus was unconstitutional."); id. at 408 n.117 (collecting citations).

While these lower court opinions are the only ones that address the question directly, dicta and separate opinions from the Supreme Court are consistent with this view. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Although [the Suspension Clause] does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood ... .

");Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 101 (1807) ("If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so."). For a thorough argument in favor of exclusive congressional suspension power, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Great Suspender's Unconstitutional Suspension of the Great Writ, 3 ALB. GOV'T L. REV.

575 (2010); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1336, at 208-09 (photo. reprint 1991) (1833) x x x (treating the suspension power as exclusively legislative); [David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 89 (2006)], at 71-72 (maintaining that the Constitution gives the power exclusively to Congress); [Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600.

689-90 (2009)], at 687-89 (arguing that structural, historical, and functional arguments foreclose any claim that the Executive possesses the suspension power); Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1263-65 (arguing that constitutional history and structure support the proposition that suspension power belongs exclusively to Congress. x x x" (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt46j) PHILIPPINE ORGANIC ACT OF 1902, Sec. 5, par.

7. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt47j) THE JONES LAW OF 1916, Sec. 21, par. b.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt48j) CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. III, Sec. 1(14). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt49j) Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 901.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt50j) Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt51j) Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 251 (2014); Tyler, ls Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV.

333 (2006). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt52j) Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt53j) Enforcement Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt54j) Barcelon v. Baker, supra note 18 at 89-90.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt55j) Montenegro v. Castaneda and Balao, supra note 19 at 886. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt56j) Id. Italics in the original.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt57j) lanrnng v. Garcia, supra note 17 ot 470. Italics in the original. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt58j) Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, supra note 25 at 492.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt59j) The ponencia cites the brief exchange between Comm. de los Reyes and Comm. Regalado, but it went no further than to suggest that the RPC definition may be considered.

There is no unequivocal intent to make the RPC definition is the controlling definition. As Fr.

Bernas, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, stated in his Brief of Amicus Curiae in Fortun: "Notably, however, the text of the Constitution, unlike the Revised Penal Code, makes no attempt to define the meaning of rebellion. What can all these say about the meaning of rebellion as basis for martial law or suspension of the privilege? x x x [In Lansang, Barcelon, and Montenegro] there is an unmistakable focus on the threat to public safety arising from armed action x x x.

[I]t is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code." Rollo(G.R. No. 190293), p. 516.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt60j) CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Secs. 3(1) & 6. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt61j) Note that reference to the word "repellion" in the fifth paragraph of Article VII, Section 18 is qualified by the phrase "judicially charge,.d,'fahich infers the existence of a penal statute.

No such qualification appears in the first paragraph. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt62j) Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt63j) The second part of the RPC definition, i.e., "for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory x x x"

ostensibly refers to a state of mind, which may be inferred from the overt act of armed uprising, but is no. easily ascertainable by the President. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt64j) Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., (2004).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt65j) The result would be similar to the discarded rule in Barcelon, with the President's determination being semi-conclusive upon the Court. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt66j) Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p.

553. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt67j) In accordance with the provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 78, s. 1964, or the Rules Governing Security of Classified Matter in Gonvernment Offices.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt68j) 403 U.S. 713 (1971). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt69j) Id. at 726.

Citations omitted. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt70j) Under the same Memorandum Circular, the term "matter" includes everything, regardless of its physical character, on, or in which information is recorded or embodied.

Documents, equipment, projects, books, reports, articles, notes, letters, drawings, sketches, plans, photographs, recordings, machinery, models, apparatus, devices and all other products or substances fall within the general term "matter." Information which is transmitted orally is considered as "matter" for purposes of security.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt71j) Memorandum Circular No. 78, s. 1964, Sec. II (4)(e) & Sec. III (11 )(f). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt72j) TSN, June 15, 2017, p.

16. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt73j) TSN, June 15, 2017, p. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt74j) TSN,June 15,2017,p.19.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt75j) TSN, June 15, 2017, p. 38. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt76j) TSN, June 15, 2017, pp. 96, 102.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt77j) TSN, June 15, 2017, p. 103. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt78j) The Government, invoking reasons of national security, withheld from the petitioners copies of "Operations Directive 02-2017"

and "Rules of Engagement for Operations Directive 02-2017," which were attached as Annexes 3 and 4 to the Affidavit of General Eduardo Ano. (See Memorandum for the Government, p.

5.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt79j) CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pe1taining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

(Emphasis supplied.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt80j) In General Comment No. 13 on Article 14 (Administration of Justice) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee provides that "[t]he publicity of hearings is an important safeguard in the interest of the individual and of society at large." Furthermore, and by way of illustration, Germany, as a general principle, forbids secret evidence in trials. German courts cannot base their judgments on secret information.

The German Federal Constitutional Court has deduced from Article 103 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), which guarantees to anyone the right to be heard, the right of all parties to a court procedure to know all the evidence on which the court envisages basing its judgment, and the right to comment on all such evidence. In the 1980 Friedrich Cremer case, however, the German Federal Constitutional Court accepted the use of"second hand evidence [or hearsay evidence based on classified intelligence information] on the condition that the lower probative force of this evidence be taken into account by the Court." (Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Nicholas Hernanz, and Amandine Scherrer, National Security and Secret Evidence Jn Legislation And Before The Courts: Exploring The Challenges, Study for the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs(2014); available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509991 /IPOL STU(2014 )509991 EN.pdf, (last accessed July 3, 2017.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt81j) Justice Douglas, in his Concurring Opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States, supra note 68 at 724, once said: "Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors.

Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. x x x" (Italics supplied.) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt82j) MacLean, In Open Court: Open Justice Principles, Freedom of Information and National Security(2011), p.

11, available at spaa.newark.rutgers.edu/sites/ default/files/files/Transparency Research Conference/Papers/Maclean E mi.pdf, (last accessed on July 1, 2017). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt83j) Memorandum Circular No. 78, s. 1964.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt84j) MacLean, supra at 18, citing Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt85j) This "heavy presumption" can, depending on the circumstances, even become well-nigh conclusive as against the privileged nature of a specific matter in issue.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt86j) New York Times v. United States, supra note 68 at 714.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt87j) Memorandum Circular No. 78, s. 1964, Sec. II (4)(e). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt88j) New York Times v. United States, supra note 68 at 729.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt89j) Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, Faculty Scholarship Series. 66 HARV. L. REV.

193, 208 (1952-1953). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt90j) Affidavit of Delfin Lorenzana dated June 17, 2017 and its attachments (Annex 1 of Respondent's Memorandum); Affidavit of Eduardo Año datyd June 17, 2017 and its attachments (Annex 2 of Respondents' Memorandum). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt91j) Affidavit of Eduardo Año, pp. 1-2.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt92j) Id. at 7-8; Affidavit of Delfin Lorenzana. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt93j) Annexes to Edee!

Lagman, et al.'s Memorandum. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt94j) TSN, June 14, 2017, pp. 10-23. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt95j) It has been suggested that the armed hostilities are not acts of rebellion, but merely acts of terrorism done in order to prevent the actual service of warrants on leaders of local terrorist groups.

In my view, it is more difficult to draw a bright-line between terrorism and rebellion today because of ISIS' objective of establishing an Islamic caliphate. Moreover, such reading defies logic and is belied by the facts. The terrorists mounted an offensive, which prior to the President's proclamation had been continuing for almost nine hours.

There were no signs of mass retreat by members of the terror groups to elude arrest; pn the contrary, they brazenly hoisted ISIS flags across Marawi. The executive department's claim that the military had preempted the terrorist groups' planned takeover of Marawi is confirmed by a video recovered by the military which showed Hapilon and the Maute leaders planning to conduct a Mosulstyle attack on Marawi on Ramadan. The more plausible conclusion is that the Mautes were forced to hastily move up the timetable for their plan in view of the military's preemptive action.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt96j) Prior to May 23, there may be doubts as to the existence of rebellion; after May 23, however, those doubts have all but dissipated. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt97j) Affidavit of Eduardo Año and its attachments. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt98j) Affidavit of Eduardo Año, p.

2. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt99j) Respondents' Comment, Annex 2-A. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt100j) Respondents' Comment, Annex 2-B. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt101j) Most notably, Lake Lanao and Agus River. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt102j) Davao City is roughly 257.3 km from Marawi City.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt103j) Paterno Esmaquel II, Admit ISIS presence in Philippines, analyst says, RAPPLER, May 25, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/GUWIQM; Returning IS fighters to regroup in the Philippines-experts, PHIL. STAR, April 4, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/CEjKQ3; Frances Mangosing, Analysts: ISIS a real threat to PH, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, January 14, 2016, available at https://goo.gl/9djqJt (all websites last accessed July 5, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt104j) James Griffiths, ISIS in Southeast Asia: Philippines battle growing threat, CNN, May 30, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/zuBPoV; Erik de Castro, ISIS-linked Rebels' Seizure of Philippines City Should Worry Other Counties in Southeast Asia, REUTERS, available at https://goo.gl/FiyFYL; Thomas Maresca, ISIS expands foothold in Southeast Asia with Philippine siege, USA TODAY, June 10, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/f76X2h; Felipe Villamor, Duterte Faces Test Battle With !SIS-linked Militants in the Philippines, NY TIMES, May 25, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/kmCeV8; Per Liljas, ISIS Is Making Inroads in the Southern Philippines and the Implications for Asia Are Alarming, TIME, April 14, 2016, available at https://goo.gl/wUfBw3; Oliver Holmes, Explainer: how and why Islamic State-linked rebels took over part of a Philippine city, THE GUARDIAN, May 29, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/FdwGLr; Philippines violence: IS-linked fighters 'among militants in Marawi', BBC, May 26, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/EZ77vV; Crispian Cuss, The returning jihad: !SIL in Southeast Asia, ALJAZEERA, July 12, 2016, available at https://goo.gl/Zb327y (all websites last visited July 5, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt105j) ISIS Followers in the Philippines: Threats to Philippine Security, Defense & Securite, October 13, 2015, available at https://goo.gl/w7LEQh; Rommel Banlaoi, The Persistent of the Abu Sayyaf Group, INSTITUTE FOR AUTONOMY AND GOVERNANCE, June 14, 2016, available at https://goo.gl/M7rVPF; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung & S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asian Responses, PANORAMA (2016), available at https://goo.gl/jzp5fw; Angel M. Rabasa, The Rise of ISIS and the Evolving Terrorist Threat in the Asia-Pacific Region, Quad Plus Dialogue (2015), available at http://thfreports.s3.amazonaws.com/quad/rabasa.pdf, Joshua Spooner, Assessing !SIS Expansion in Southeast Asia: Major Threat or Misplaced Fear, WILSON CENTER (2016), available at https://goo.gl/NKWyeJ; Shashi Jayakumar, The Islamic State Looks East: The Growing Threat in Southeast Asia, 10 CTC SENTINEL 27(2017), available at https://goo.gl/69PABv (all websites last visited July 5, 2017).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt106j) If the government was in possession perfect information, then it would have been easy for the military to avert the Marawi siege. Unfortunately, such proposition is more fiction than fact; military intelligence gathering is not an exact science. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top) SEPARATE OPINION MARTIRES,J.: "We seem to distrust all future Presidents just because one President destroyed our faith by his declaration of martial law.

I think we are overreacting. Let us not judge all Presidents who would henceforth be elected by the Filipino people on the basis of the abuses made by that one President. Of course, we must be on guard; but let us not overreact."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt1) On 29 August 2016, fifteen (15) soldiers were killed in Patikul, Sulu, as a result of an encounter with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On 2 September 2016, at least fourteen (14) people were killed and sixty-seven (67) others were seriously injured due to the bombing inCident in a night market in Davao City.

Moored on these incidents, as well as on government intelligence reports as to further terror attacks and acts of violence by lawless elements in the country, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte), pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief power to call out the armed forces whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence as enunciated in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 55 on 4 September 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account oflawless violence in Mindanao.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt2) On 23 May 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. This time, President Duterte anchored his declaration, aside from the reasons cited in the earlier Proclamation No. 55, on the acts committed by the Maute terrorist group on that same day, to wit:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt3) WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of the Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; x x x On 25 May 2017, President Duterte, in compliance with Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution requiring him to submit a report within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, submitted his written report to the Senate and the House of Representatives.

On 29 May 2017, the Senate(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt4) issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 stating that the Senate found the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional, and in accordance with the law, and that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same. On 31 May 2017, the House of Representatives, after constituting itself into a Committee of the Whole House, considered the President's report and heard a briefing from representatives of the executive department. Finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt5) expressing full support to President Duterte.

Before the Court, however, are three consolidated petitions brought under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution assailing the validity and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216. I vote to dismiss these petitions. The present petitions are dismissible for being "inappropriate proceedings.

" The provision in the 1987 Constitution on which petitioners anchored their respective petitions reads: ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT x x x x Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (emphasis supplied) Notably, while Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution allows any Filipino citizen to assail through an appropriate proceeding the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, it is only the Court which was conferred with the sole authority to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In both instances, the citizen and the Court are expressly clothed by the Constitution with authority: the former to bring to the fore the validity of the President's proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the latter to make a determination as to the validity thereof.

It is through the exercise of this authority, after the proclam,ation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, that both the citizen and the Court pierce through the exclusive realm of the President in the exercise of his Commander- in- Chief powers. But it should be stressed that the exercise of this authority must be anchored on an "appropriate proceeding" that would bind the citizen and the Court as they march towards the sole domain of the Commander in Chief.

Clearly, therefore, the absence of an "appropriate proceeding" nullifies the exercise by the citizen of his authority and, unless the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion rules otherwise, divests it likewise of its authority to grant the plea of the suitor before it. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not categorically identify what the "appropriate proceeding"

is. For sure, the "appropriate proceeding" contemplated therein cannot be Section 18, Article VII itself for otherwise this could have been expressly spelled out in the provision.

Moreover, there is nothing in Section 18, Article VII from which it can be reasonably inferred that it is by itself a proceeding.

By using the phrase "appropriate proceeding," the Constitutional Commission obviously acknowledged that there already exists an available course of action which a citizen can invoke in supplicating the Court to exercise its awesome review power found under Article VIII of the Constitution. The words "appropriate proceeding"

should be read in their natural, ordinary and obvious signification, devoid of forced or subtle construction. "For words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation. And courts as a rule, should not presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt6) The argument that the "appropriate proceeding"

contemplated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is sui generis is tantamount to regarding the phrase "appropriate proceeding" as a surplusage and a superfluity, barren of any meaning. To follow this interpretation would mean that while Section 18, Article VII requires that there be an "appropriate proceeding"

to set the foundation for judicial review, that proceeding, however, is none other than Section 18, Article VII itself. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution. To fortify this stance, quoted hereunder is the deliberation of the Committee on the Executive of the Constitutional Commission, to wit: MR.

SARMIENTO. Mr. Davide, one last question: Why should it be appropriate proceeding? My idea is to remove simply "appropriate."

Say, in a proceeding or action brought before it by any citizen, it is for the Supreme Court to ... (Drowned by voices) MR. REGALADO.

It has to be appropriate. Father Bernas will answer that. MR.

CONCEPCION .... (Inaudible) proper party to(?) handle the Rules of Court, but if we grant it to anybody, or everybody, they have to hold appropriately. VOICE.

Proper action. MR. CONCEPCION.

Well, of course, the proceeding may be an ordinary action. I think, in general, it is appropriate proceeding. VOICE.

Appropriate. MR. CONCEPCION.

What are cases triable by courts ofjustice?(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt7) The fact is underscored that Justice Florenz Regalado, a legal luminary in remedial law, insisted during the deliberation that the "proceeding" be qualified as "appropriate." Unmistakably, Justice Regalado acknowledged that the "appropriate proceeding"

already exists, and corollary thereto can be logically inferred as existing independently of Section 18, Article VIL To stress, if the intention were otherwise, Section 18, Article VII could have plainly provided that it is by itself a proceeding which a citizen can avail of in assailing the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. But the use of the word "proceeding," which was even definedas "appropriate,"

can only mean that the proceeding has already been provided for in existing laws. The ponencia cites Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution as another constitutional provision which, like Section 18, Article VII, confers jurisdiction to the Court in addition to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. There is no issue that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution vests jurisdiction upon the Court to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or the Vice-President, in the same manner that Section 18, Article VII clothes the Court with the exclusive authority to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof.

Both Sections 4 and 18 of Article VII are not proceedings by themselves.

In the first, there are specific rules by which the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be assailed before the Court, while in the second, it is required that there be an "appropriate proceeding" filed by a citizen to set in motion the Court's review powers. The Constitution's explicit definition of the Court's judicial power in Article VIII is enlightening: ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Section 1.

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As mentioned earlier, when the Constitutional Commission used the phrase "appropriate proceeding"

in Section 18, Article VII, it actually acknowledged that there already exists an available route by which a citizen may attack the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof. And by defining the extent of judicial power of the Court in Section I, Article VIII, the Constitutional Commission clearly identifiedthat the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII is one within the expanded jurisdiction of the Court.

The position that the power of the Court to review the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is pursuant to Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution finds support in the following deliberations of the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: THE CHAIRMAN. We go to the last paragraph. The last paragraph of the revised resolution reads as follows: "

THE BASIS OF A PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MAY BE INQUIRED INTO BY THE SUPREME COURT IN ANY APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING OR ACTION BROUGHT BEFORE IT BY ANY CITIZEN AND IF IT SO DETERMINES THAT NO SUFFICIENT BASIS EXISTS FOR SUCH PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION, THE SAME SHALL BE SET ASIDE. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL DECIDE THE PROCEEDING OR ACTION WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM ITS FILING." Any remark?

MS. AQUINO. Mr. Chairman, the paragraph in effect vests in the Supreme Court the power of judicial review in terms of testing or determining the constitutional sufficiency of the basis of the proclamation.

Could it not be formulated in a more forthright way as to positively recognize the power of the Supreme Court to test the constitutional sufficiency or the power of judicial reprieve? No, no, no, formulate it that way, it belongs more to the judiciary than to this ... (Interrupted) MR.

DAVIDE. Yeah, Mr. Chairman, I was really thinking if this should be placed under the judiciary, in the article on the judiciary, I would submit the matter to Chief Justice Concepcion if the most appropriate place for this provision would be within the article on the judiciary. MR.

CONCEPCION. Well, in connection with the judiciary, we tentatively agreed on the following expression, you know, Section 1 says: "Judicial power shall be vested on the supreme Court etcetera." So the next paragraph either of the same section or a new section says: "Judicial power is the authority of courts of justice to settle conflicts or controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable including the question whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as well as the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus and to declare Martial law."

This is the provision that tentatively we are considering. MR. DAVIDE.

So this particular paragraph, Your Honor, on the Commander-in-Chief's provision giving the Supreme Court the authority to inquire into the factual basis of the proclamation of Martial or the suspension of the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus, can be included ... (Interrupted) MR CONCEPCION. It is involved already.

We are not satisfied with including the question whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction initially because we did not want to mention Martial Law in particular as if we were reflecting upon the action of the Supreme Court. I am particularly under special obligation in these matters because I have been a member of the court and I am expected to exercise greater attention, more courtesy to the Supreme Court, but upon the insistence of Commissioner Colayco we added: "AS WELL AS THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW." I realize that this would have to be taken up also in connection with the Martial Law powers of the President, but we also consider it relevant to the question of what is the nature and extent of judicial review or judicial power?

The first sentence says: "Judicial power shall be vested." So we have to define somehow what is the nature and extent of judicial power and it simply implies that judicial power extends the power whenever there is a question of abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. Well, the court has the power because that is the main function of the court in a presidential system to define and delimit the duties and functions of the different branches.

That is the system of checks and balances. MR. BERNAS.

Mr. Chairman, in the light of the explanation given by Commissioner Concepcion, may I suggest reformulation of this last paragraph and its transposition to the end of the first paragraph because in the first paragraph we are talking about the imposition of Martial Law, the mechanics for the imposition, the requirements for the imposition and after that we add a sentence saying: 'THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR ITS EXTENSION AND SHALL DECIDE THE CASE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM ITS FILING." THE CHAIRMAN. Where will you put that?

MR. BERNAS. At the end of the first paragraph or right after the first paragraph.

First we are talking about the imposition, then we talk about the invalidation, then after that we talk about the effects. THE CHAIRMAN. Will you please repeat?

MR. BERNAS. "THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR THE EXTENSION THEREOF AND SHALL DECIDE THE CASE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM ITS FILING."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt8) (emphasis supplied) x x x x Pertinently, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Section 5.

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.

x x x x A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt9) A petition for prohibition may be filed when the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercisingjudicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt10) Clearly, these are the two modes, i.e., "appropriate proceedings," by which the Court exercises its judicial review to determine grave abuse of discretion. But it must be stressed that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are not limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction of a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but extends to any branch or instrumentality of the government; thus, confirming that there are indeed available "appropriate proceedings"

to invoke the Court's judicial review pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. This position finds support in the Court's declaration in Araullo v. Aquino, Ill:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt11) With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, x x x Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, x x x to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt12) (emphasis supplied) Thus, when petitioners claimed that their petitions were pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, they, in effect, failed to avail of the proper remedy, thus depriving the Court of its authority to grant the relief they pleaded.

The Court must take note that the Constitutional Commission had put in place very tight safeguards to avoid the recurrence of another dictator rising in our midst. Thus, the President may use his Commander-in-Chief powers but with defined limitations: (a) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion he may call out the armed forces; and, (b) in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. In the same manner that there are limitations for the exercise by the President of his powers pursuant to Section 18, Article VII, the Constitution likewise provides for the specific manner by which such exercise can be attacked before the Court: only by a citizen of the Philippines and through an appropriate proceeding.

The absence of one of these requisites should have warranted the outright dismissal of the petition. But if only for the transcendental importance of the issues herein, I defer to the majority in taking cognizance of these petitions. After all, "[t]his Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance of the issues raised therein."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt13) The President did not act with grave abuse of discretion as he had sufficient factual basis in issuing Proclamation No. 216.

In the resolution of these petitions, it should be noted that Section 1, Article Vlll of the Constitution provides for a specific parameter by which the Court, in relation to Section 18, Article VII, should undertake its judicial review - it must be proven that grave abuse of discretion attended the President's act in declaring martial law and in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. Nothing short of grave abuse of discretion should be accepted by the Court. Grave abuse of discretion has a definite meaning.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done in a "'capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. ' The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an 'evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.'"(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt14) That same definition finds importance to this Court in assessing whether the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, acted with grave abuse of discretion. "Rebellion,"

as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution refers to the crime of rebellion defined under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which has the following elements: 1. There is a public uprising and taking arms against the Government; and 2. The purpose is either to: a.

Remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or b. Deprive the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. The presence of the first requirement is not controverted as petitioners admit that there was public uprising and taking arms against the Government in Marawi City at the time Proclamation No. 216 was issued.

Petitioners capitalize, however, on the second requirement, insisting that there is no proof that the uprising was attended with the culpable intent inherent in the act of rebellion. It bears emphasis, however, that intent, which is a state of mind, can be shown only through overt acts that manifest such intent.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt15) Thus, the culpable intent to commit rebellion can only be shown through overt acts manifesting that the perpetrators intended to remove the Philippine territory or any part thereof from the allegiance of the government or to deprive the President or the Congress of their powers or prerogatives. Proclamation No.

216 clearly stated overt acts manifesting the culpable intent of rebellion, to wit: 1. Proclamation No. 55, series of2016 was issued on 4 September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. 2.

There was a series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group, such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, leading to the issuance of Proclamation No. 55. 3. On 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas.

In the Report submitted by the President to Congress on 25 May 2017, he specifically chronicled the events which showed the group's display of force against the Government in Marawi City, such as the following: 1. Attacks on various government and privately owned facilities. 2.

Forced entry in Marawi City Jail thereby facilitating the escape of sixty-eight (68) inmates, and where a PDEA member was killed and on-duty personnel were assaulted, disarmed, and locked up inside the cells, and where the group confiscated cellphones, firearms, and vehicles. 3. Evacuation of the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas by BJMP personnel.

4. Interruption of the power supply in Marawi City, resulting in a city-wide power outage. 5.

Sporadic gunfights. 6. Ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, where a police car was taken.

7. Control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, with the threat to bomb these bridges to preempt military reinforcement. 8.

Occupation by persons connected with the Maute group of several areas in Marawi City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as Barangays Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar. 9. Road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction.

10. Burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. 11.

Taking of hostages from the church. 12. Killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation.

13. Burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. 14.

Overruning of Amai Pakpak Hospital. 15. Hoisting of ISIS flag in several areas.

16. Attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital. 17.

Ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines, and commandeering an armored vehicle. 18. Information that about 75% of Marawi city has been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of the Maute Group and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

19. Report that eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) have been seriously wounded. 20.

Reports regarding the Maute group's plan to execute Christians. 21. Preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes.

22. Forcing young Muslims to join their group. These circumstances, jointly considered by the President when he issued Proclamation No. 216, show that there was no arbitrariness in the President's decision to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.

Indeed, in the case at bar, it is the Government which has the burden of proof.

As defined by the rules, burden of proof is the "duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt16) Thus, it is the Government which has the duty to justify the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. Given the Government's evidence, as reported in Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report, there is no doubt that the Government was able to discharge its burden of proof. As such, the burden of evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, has been shifted to petitioners.

Petitioners, particularly in the Lagman petition, allege that there is no sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao as the facts, as stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report, are false, contrived, and inaccurate. They hark on the falsity and inaccuracy of five statements in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report. The general rule is that no evidence is needed for a negative allegation.

However, "[i}n determining whether an assertion is affirmative or negative, we should consider the substance and not the form of the assertion. A legal affirmative is not necessarily a grammatical affirmative, nor a legal negative a grammatical negative; on the contrary, a legal affirmative frequently assumes the shape of a grammatical negative, and a legal negative that of a grammatical affirmative."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt17) Petitioners' allegations, though couched in a grammatical negative, is actually a legal affirmative - they are claiming that five statements in Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report are false. Being a positive assertion, petitioners are required to present evidence on their claim.

Notably, however, the evidence presented by petitioners are mere online news articles. The ponencia correctly observed that said news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt18) Moreover, the five statements assailed by petitioners merely constitute a few of the numerous facts presented by the President in his report. Even assuming that those five statements are inaccurate, such inaccuracy will not cast arbitrariness on the President's decision since petitioners did not controvert the rest of the factual statements in Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report.

In justifying the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao and not just in Marawi City, the President took note of the following circumstances in his report: 1. Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. 2.

In more recent years, there have been numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted authorities, such as the recent Zamboanga siege, Davao bombing, Mamasapano carnage, and bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these - the ASG and the Maute group. 3.

Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the J eemah Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, and the ASG.

It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical support to the Maute group. 4.

The events which transpired on 23 May 2017 in Marawi City, as earlier enumerated, were not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao. 5. The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resisted; and the brazen display of the DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.

6. Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages [in Marawi City]. 7.

Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions. 8. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected.

9. The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprived the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. 10.

Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered. 11.

The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorist and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao. 12.The group's occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.

These acts and circumstances, viewed wholistically, provided sufficient justification for the President to believe that rebellion existed in the whole of Mindanao, and that the security of the whole island was compromised. After receiving verified intelligence reports of the growing number of the Maute terrorist group, who are fully armed and prepared to wage combat to further their aims, coupled with the recent Zamboanga siege, Davao bombing, Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, the President had probable cause to believe that rebel groups have, in recent years, openly attempted to deprive the President of his power to faithfully execute the laws and to maintain peace and order in the whole island of Mindanao. As to the requirement of public safety, there are no fixed standards in determining what constitutes such interference to justify a declaration of martial law.

However, in Lansang v.

Garcia,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt19) the Supreme Court declared that "the magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of the privilege." With this as the yardstick, logic mandates that the extent of the rebellion shown by the above-mentioned circumstances, supported as they are by verified intelligence reports, was sufficient to reasonably conclude that public safety had been compromised in such manner as to require the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. The increasing number of casualties of civilians and government troops, the escalating damage caused to property owners in the places attacked by the rebel groups, and the incessant assaults in other parts in Mindanao leave no doubt that such dangers to public safety justified the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege.

To better understand who these rebel groups are, Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi (Professor Banlaoi), Chairman of the Board and Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and Head of its Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt20) gives an in-depth analysis:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt21) Though Philippine government forces are actually fighting in Marawi City unified armed groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the group that inevitably stands out in the ongoing military conflict is the Maute Group. The Maute Group is brazenly taking the center stage in the ongoing firefights because the main battlefield is Marawi City, the stronghold of the Maute family and the only Islamic city in the Philippines.

This armed group holds this label because the whole Maute family is involved in the establishment of an ISIS-linked organization that their followers call the Daulah Islamiyah Fi Ranao (DFIR) or the Islamic State of Lanao. The Maute family proclaimed the DIFR in September 2014 after performing a bay 'ah or a pledge of allegiance ~o ISIS leader, Abu Bakar Baghdadi. To advance ISIS activities in the provinces of Lanao, the Maute Group formed two highly trained armed groups called Khilafah sa Jabal Uhod(Soldiers of the Caliphate in Mouth Uhod) and Khilafah sa Ranao(Soldiers of the Caliphate in Lanao) headed by the Middle-East educated Maute brothers: Omarkayam Maute and Abdullah Maute.

The family organized a clandestine fortress on behalf of ISIS in its hometown in Butig, Lanao del Sur, and other satellite camps in the neighboring towns of Lumbatan, Lambuyanague, Marogong, Masiu, and even Marawi City. x x x x In Butig, the Maute Group was able to set up military camps with complete training facilities for combatants, bombers, community organizers and religious preachers. In fact, most of the suspects in the September 2016 Davao City bombing received bomb trainings in Butig where the Maute family initially organized an army of at least 300 ISIS fighters recruited from disgruntled members of families previously associated with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

x x x x But from Butig, the Maute Group just discreetly formed several hideouts in Marawi City with the intention of controlling the whole city to serve as the headquarters of the Maute-supported the Daulah Islamiya Wilayatul Mashriq (DIWM), the so-called Islamic State Province in East Asia. The DIWM is the umbrella organization of all armed groups in the Philippines that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Among the notorious armed groups in the DIWM are factions of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) as well as remnants of the Anshar Khalifa Philippines (AKP) and the Khilafa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM).

ASG commander Isnilon Hapilon serves as the overall leader or Amir of DIWM, whose members are called by ISIS as the Soldiers of the Caliphate in East Asia. Contrary to various reports, government forces are fighting in Marawi City not only the Maute Group but also other armed groups under tre DIWM.1a\^/phi1 There is no doubt, however, that key officials of DIWM are members of the Maute family. (emphasis supplied) According to Professor Banlaoi, these rebel groups are banded together by their belief in the Bangsamoro struggle:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt22) All Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, regardless of political persuasion and theological inclination, believe in the Bangsamoro struggle.

The term Bangsa comes from the Malay word, which means nation. Spanish colonizers introduced the term Moro when they confused the Muslim people of Mindanao with the "moors" of North of Africa.

Though the use of the term Bangsamoro to describe the "national identity" of Muslims in the Philippines is being contested, Muslim leaders regard the Bangsamoro struggle as the longest "national liberation movement" in the country covering almost 400 years of violent resistance against Spanish, American, Japanese, and even Filipino rule.

This 400-year history of Moro resistance deeply informs ASG' s current struggle for a separate Islamic state. (emphasis supplied) Clearly, the situation in Mindanao shows not just simple acts of lawless violence or terrorism confined in Marawi City. The widespread armed hostilities and atrocities are all indicative of a rebellious intent to establish Mindanao into an Islamic state or an ISIS wilayah, separate from the Philippines and away from the control of the Philippine Government.

Lastly, the peculiarity of the crime of rebellion must also be noted. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. 1âwphi1 It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.

Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt23) For purposes of declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, it is absurd to require that there be public uprising in every city and every province in Mindanao before rebellion can be deemed to exist in the whole island if there is already reason to believe that the rebel group's culpable intent is for the whole of Mindanao and that public uprising has already started in an area therein. The following exchange among the framers of the 1987 Constitution is enlightening: (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt24) MR. DE LOS REYES.

As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacanang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event-this Manila Hotel incident everybody knows what happened.

Would the committee consider that an actual act of rebellion? MR. REGALADO.

If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135. I am not trying to pose as an expert about this rebellion that took place in the Manila Hotel, because what I know about it is what I only read in the papers. I do not know whether we can consider that therewas really an armed public uprising.

Frankly, I have my doubts on that because we were not privy to the investigations conducted there. x x x x MR. DE LOS REYES.

I ask that question because I think modern rebellion can be carried out nowadays in a more sophisticated manner because of the advance of technology, mass media and others.

Let us consider this for example: There is an obvious synchronized or orchestrated strike in all industrial firms, then there is a strike of drivers so that employees and students cannot attend school nor go to their places of work, practically paralyzing the government. Then in some remote barrios, there are ambushes by so-called subversives, so that the scene is that there is an orchestrated attempt to destabilize the government and ultimately supplant the constitutional government. Would the committee call that an actual rebellion, or is it an imminent rebellion?

MR. REGALADO. At the early stages where there was just an attempt to paralyze the government or some sporadic incidents in other areas but without armed public uprising, that would only amount to sedition under Article 138, or it can only be considered a tumultuous disturbance.

MR. DE LOS REYES. The public uprisings are not concentrated in one place, which used to be the concept of rebellion before.

MR. REGALADO. No. MR.

DE LOS REYES. But the public uprisings consist of isolated attacks in several places-for example in one camp here; another in the province of Quezon; and then in another camp in Laguna; no attack in Malacanang-but there is a complete paralysis of the industry in the whole country. If we place these things together, the impression is clear-that there is an attempt to destabilize the government in order to supplant it with a new government.

MR. REGALADO. It becomes a matter of factual appreciation and evaluation.

The magnitude is to be taken into account when we talk about tumultuous disturbance, to sedition, then graduating to rebellion. All these things are variances of magnitude and scope. So, the President determines, based on the circumstances, if there is presence of a rebellion.

MR. DE LOS REYES. With the concurrence of Congress.

MR. REGALADO. And another is, if there is publicity involved, not only the isolated situations.

If they conclude that there is really an armed public uprising although not all over the country, not only to destabilize but to overthrow the government, that would already be considered within the ambit of rebellion. If the President considers it, it is not yet necessary to suspend the privilege of the writ. It is not necessary to declare martial law because he can still resort to the lesser remedy of just calling out the Armed Forces for the purpose of preventing or suppressing lawlessness or rebellion.

(emphasis and underlining supplied) What can be gleaned from the foregoing is that there was a recognition that acts constituting modem rebellion, with the aid of technological advancements, could be undertaken surreptitiously or could deceptively appear random. However, when isolated acts in several areas tend to indicate an attempt to destabilize the government or deprive the President of his powers in a specific portion of the Philippine territory, it may be considered rebellion, even if the armed public uprising does not manifest in the whole intended territory. As mentioned by Commissioner Regalado, this is a matter of factual appreciation and evaluation; and based on the facts obtained by President Duterte through intelligence reports, there was sufficient basis to conclude that rebellion was taking place in the whole of Mindanao.

It is high time to revisit the Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Perchance it is propitious that through these cases, the Court is given the chance to rectify itself when it made the following pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo:(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt25) Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.

Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. x x x x If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis.(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt26) Contrary to the above pronouncement, nothing in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution directs Congress to exercise its review powers prior to the judicial review of the Court.

The judicial power of the Court, vested by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, is separate and distinct from the review that may be undertaken by Congress. The judicial review by the Court is set in motion by the filing of an appropriate proceeding by a citizen. Indeed, the Constitution even requires that the Court promulgate its decision within thirty days from the filing of the appropriate proceeding.

With this explicit directive in the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that the process of judicial review cannot be conditioned upon the exercise by Congress of its own review power. All things considered, may I just emphasize that "[m]artial law is founded upon the principle that the state has a right to protect itself against those who would destroy it, and has therefore been likened to the right of the individual to self-defense. It is invoked as an extreme measure, and rests upon the basic principle that every state has the power of self-preservation, a power inherent in all states, because neither the state nor society would exist without it."(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt27) Given the series of violent acts and armed hostilities committed and still being committed by the Maute terror group, the Abu Sayyaf group, and the other armed rebel groups, which hostilities have the end view of establishing a DAESH/ISIS wilayah or province,(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#fnt28) no less than a declaration of martial law is to be expected on the part of a circumspect President to whom we entrust our nation's safety and security.

Thus, I vote to DISMISS these petitions. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES Associate Justice Footnotes (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt1) Statement of Mr. Francisco A. Rodrigo, Constitutional Commission Deliberations, 31 July 1986, p. 497.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt2) Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt3) Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 may 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt4) Introduced by Senators Vicente Sotto III, Aquilino Pimentel III, Ralph Recto, Juan Edgardo Angara, Nancy Binay, Joseph Victor Ejercito, Sherwin Gatchalian, Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Panfilo Lacson, Loren Legarda, Emmanuel Pacquiao, Joel Villanueva, Cynthia Villar, Juan Miguel Zubiri.

Senators Francis Escudero and Grace Poe did not sign the Resolution. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt5) Introduced by Representatives Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Rodolfo C. Farinas and Danilo E. Suarez. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt6) Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, 1998, p.

177. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt7) 17 June 1986, p. 188.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt8) 17 June 1986, pp.

183-187. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt9) Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sect. I. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt10) Id., Sec. 2.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt11) 737 Phil. 457 (2014). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt12) ld.at513. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt13) Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, 5 April 2016.

(emphasis supplied) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt14) Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 716 Phil. 500, 515-516 (2013), citing Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482 (2011). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt15) Clemente v. People, 667 Phil. 515, 525 (2011). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt16) Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sect.

1. (emphasis supplied) (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt17) Francisco, Evidence, p. 11.

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt18) Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000). (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt19) G.R. No. L-33964, 11 December 1991. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt20) Banloi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah, Essays on the Abu SayyafGroup, Third Edition, p.

137. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt21) The Maute Group and rise of family terrorism. www.rappler.com/though-leaders/173037-mautegroup- rise-family-terrorism.

Last visited on 3 July 2017. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt22) Banloi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah, Essays on the Abu SayyafGroup, Third Edition, pp. 24-25. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt23) People v. Dasig, 293 Phil. 599, 608 (1993).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt24) Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates Vol. II, pp. 412-413. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt25) 684 Phil. 526 (2012).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt26) Id. at 558-561. (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt27) Aquino, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, 158-A Phil. 1, 65 (1974).

(https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#rnt28) Consolidated Comment dated 12 June 2017. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation [](javascript:history.back\(1\)) [](https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr231658so2017.html#top)