PLAI

Decision

Jose v. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 121227 · 1998-08-17 · PURISIMA, J. · LawPhil

VICENTE SAN JOSE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OCEAN TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., respondent

PURISIMA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul a Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated April 20, 1995 in NLRC-NCR-CA-No. 00671-94 which reversed, on jurisdictional ground, a Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated January 19, 1994 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-02101-93 a case for a money claim - underpayment of retirement benefit. Records do not show that petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration of subject Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which motion is, generally required before the filing of Petition for Certiorari. While the rule prescribing the requisite motion for reconsideration is not absolute and recognizes some exceptions, there is no showing that the case at bar constitutes an exception.

Nevertheless, we gave due course to the petition to enable the Court to reiterate and clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over money claims, and to render substantial and speedy justice to subject aged stevedore retiree who first presented his claim for retirement benefit in April 1991, or seven years ago. Labor law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter, should be fully conversant with the requirements for the institution of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. For instance, it is necessary that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission must first be resorted to.

The ruling in Corazon Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112630, September 5, 1997, comes to the fore and should be well understood and observed. An ordinary allegation - ". .

. and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" (Rule 65, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court) is not a foolproof substitute for a Motion for Reconsideration, absence of which can be fatal to a Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioner cannot and should not rely on the liberality of the Court simply because he is a working man. In the Jamer case, this court said: . .

. This premature action of petitioners constitutes a fatal infirmity as ruled in a long line of decisions, most recently is the case of Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission - The filing of such motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed.

. . .

Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is an adequate remedy; hence certiorari proceedings, as in this case, will not prosper. As stated in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-03-0201-93, dated January 19, 1994, the facts of this case are undisputed. The Labor Arbiter reported, thus: Complainant, in his position paper (Record, pages 11 to 14) states that he was hired sometime in July 1980 as a stevedore continuously until he was advised in April 1991 to retire from service considering that he already reached 65 years old (sic); that accordingly, he did apply for retirement and was paid P3,156.39 for retirement pay .

. . (Rollo, pp. 15, 26-27, 58-59).

Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR- Case No. 00-03-02101-93, January 9, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 15017, at pp. 16-17). The Labor Arbiter decided the case solely on the merits of the complaint. Nowhere in the Decision is made mention of or reference to the issue of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (Rollo, pp. 15-17).

But the issue of jurisdiction is the bedrock of the Petition because, as earlier intimated, the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, hereinbelow quoted, reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision on the issue of jurisdiction. Reads subject Decision of the Labor Arbiter: Respondents, in their Reply to complainant's position paper, allege (Record, pages 18 to 21) that complainant's latest basic salary was P120.34 per day; that he only worked on rotation basis and not seven days a week due to numerous stevedores who can not all be given assignments at the same time; that all stevedores only for paid every time they were assigned or actually performed stevedoring; that the computation used in arriving at the amount of P3,156.30 was the same computation applied to the other stevedores; that the use of divisor 303 is not applicable because complainant performed stevedoring job only on call, so while he was connected with the company for the past 11 years, he did not actually render 11 years of service; that the burden of proving that complainant's latest salary was P200.00 rests upon him; that he already voluntarily signed a waiver of quitclaim; that if indeed respondent took advantage of his illiteracy into signing his quitclaim, he would have immediately filed this complaint but nay, for it took him two (2) years to do so.

The issue therefore is whether or not complainant is entitled to the claimed differential of separation pay. We find for the complainant. He is entitled to differential.

We cannot sustain a computation of length of service based on the ECC contribution records. Likewise, the allegation that complainant rendered service for only five days a month for the past 11 years is statistically improbable, aside from the fact that the best evidence thereof are complainant's daily time records which respondent are (sic) duty bound to keep and make available anytime in case of this. The late filing has no bearing.

The prescription period is three years. It is suffice (sic) that the filing falls within the period. Whether or not complainant worked on rotation basis is a burden which lies upon the employer.

The presumption is that the normal working period is eight (8) hours a day and six (6) days a week, or 26 days a month, unless proven otherwise. Also, the burden of proving the amount of salaries paid to employees rests upon the employer not on the employee. It can be easily proven by payrolls, vouchers, etc.

which the employers are likewise duty bound to keep and present. There being non, we have to sustain complainant's assertion that his latest salary rate was P200 a day or P5,200 a month. Therefore, his retrenchment pay differential is P25,443.70 broken down as follows: P200 x 26 days = P5,200 x 11 years