PLAI

Decision

United States v. Pascual

G.R. No. 10363 · 1915-09-29 · CARSON, J. · LawPhil

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PASCUAL defendants-appellants. F. Boomer for appellants. Acting Attorney-General Zaragoza for appellee

CARSON, J.:

An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, Fourth Judicial District, convicting the appellants of The right of the appellants to maintain this appeal turns vs. Tamparong, p. 321, ante.) Counsel for appellants contend that the municipal council of the city of Baguio is not clothed with power to enact an ordinance defining, prohibiting and penalizing gambling by its charter (Act No. 1963), from which, as counsel The trial judge was of opinion that the power to enact (e) of section 32 of the Baguio Incorporation Act (No. 1963), which provides that "all laws We are of opinion, however, that since the express powers We think, however, that the validity of the ordinance under discussion and the power of the city council of Baguio to enact it must be sustained under the provisions of (gg) of section 8 of the Baguio Incorporation Act (No. 1963), as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2106, in (ll) of section 8 of Act No. 1963.

the provisions of that (ll) , Act No .1963, as amended): The city council shall have power by ordinance or - (c) To make such further ordinances and regulations (kk) of General grants of police powers of this character in municipal charters are frequently referred to as "the general welfare provisions" of the municipal charter in which they It will be seen that very extensive police powers are The principal contention of counsel for the appellants is that the Philippine Legislature having enacted a statute (Act No. 1757) defining, prohibiting and penalizing gambling, the exercise of power by the city council of Baguio to define, prohibit and penalize gambling should be held to be repugnant to or inconsistent with the prior exercise of In the case of United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1), we ruled under the authority of many cases cited from the express authority "to provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly houses of "Indeed, an act may be a penal offense under the laws Judge Cooley adds that "such is the clear weight of Judge Cooley quotes from the opinion in the case of vs. Jones (1 Wend., N. Y., 238, 261), where it is Judge Dillon, in his work on municipal corporations (5th The question here presented, however, is distinguished from that considered in the former case by the fact that This question is not without difficulty sa will readily be We think, however, that the fair and logical conclusion which should be drawn from the decided cases, as well as .

. . There are many acts of such a nature that may , if the legislature has so provided, be an offense against the state at large, and also against the special and In our former opinion, United States vs. Joson (supra), we said that, under the general doctrine, "an act may be Upon like reasoning, we are of opinion that where the commission or omission of a particular act is, in its nature, such that that its commission or omission within the territorial vs. City of Brooklyn (14 Barb., 425, 426): "There Thus drunkenness, disorderly conduct, smoking of opium and the keeping of opium dens, gambling, and the keeping of gambling dens and the like, are offenses the commission of which within the limits of a thickly settled urban We are aware that the rulings of the courts of last resort And to like effect in paragraph 876, volume II: "The We conclude that an ordinance enacted under a general The appellants inn this case were convicted of a violation of an ordinance of the city of Baguio prohibiting and ii) of Appellants having failed to establish their contentions as to the invalidity of the ordinance, their appeal must be vs. Tamparong (supra).

So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.