Club v. Commission On Elections

FELICIANO, J.:

In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646. Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.

Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987: Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful; xxx xxx xxx b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg.

881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis supplied) Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as follows: Sec. 90.

Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy.

Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 92. Comelec time.

- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.

(Emphasis supplied) The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec").

Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations.

Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.

No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty line." It is supremely important, however, to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows: Sec. 4.

The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information , all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(Emphasis supplied) The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,"

as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." 1 It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III , Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period - i.e. , "during the election period."

It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities.

In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." 2 The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.

For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one - that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. 3 Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic principles relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that power.

The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations.

It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations. Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods.

By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] ), has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period. Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes."

Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.

We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates. The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) - that it does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office - constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections.5 In Sanidad, the Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as follows: Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers - During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The Court, through Medialdea, J., said: .

. . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par.

of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.

Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis." 6 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied) There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b).

Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space"

on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out.

It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission7that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space,"

much the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time"

and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal. The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises.

Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government"

dictating what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to for a other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time"

and "Comelec space" in such mass media. Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves.

The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address.

That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid. My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J.

remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True enough Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on complete and perfect equality inter se without regard to their financial affluence or lack thereof.

But a regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which does not completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone constitutionally infirm. The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

That the supervision or regulation of communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality is made clear by the Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4). It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting of and commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates themselves.

All other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed to benefit the candidates themselves. Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded.

Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set.

But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves.

The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8 The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged"

candidates.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., took no part. Separate Opinions DAVIDE, JR ., J.: concurring: I fully concur with the majority opinion. I wish, however, to express my thoughts on some material points. The constitutional issue raised in these cases must be decided in the light of the provisions of our own Constitution and not on orthodox principles or classical definitions of certain rights which have, in the course of time and as a result of the interplay of societal forces requiring the balancing of interests and values, been unchained from their absolutist moorings. It is now settled that the freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression, which the Bill of Rights guarantees, is not an absolute right. Indeed, even in American jurisprudence, the overwhelming weight of authority maintains that "the right or privilege of free speech and publication, guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the several states, has its limitations; the right is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances, although limitations are recognized only in exceptional cases. Freedom of speech does not comprehend the right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and the manner, and place, or time of public discussion can be constitutionally controlled." 1 The foregoing rule proceeds from the principle that every right or freedom carries with it the correlative duty to exercise it responsibly and with due regard for the right and freedoms of others. In short, freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but with responsibility. I respectfully submit that there can be no higher form of limitation to a right than what the Constitution itself authorizes. On this, both the lettered and the unlettered cannot quarrel. In respect to freedom of speech or expression and of the press vis-a-vis the electoral process, the present Constitution lays downs certain principles authorizing allowable restraints thereon. I refer to the. following provisions of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: (1) Section 26 of Article II. (Declaration of Principle and other Policies) which reads: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service , and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (emphasis supplied) (2) Section 1 of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human rights) which reads: The congress shall give highiest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (emphasis supplied) (3) Section 4 of Article IX-C which provides: The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (emphasis supplied) There can be no doubt that the first two (2) provisions contemplate measures that would bridge the gap between the rich and the poor in our society. In the past, the equilibrium sought to be achieved was only in the economic and social fields. Thus, before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was defined as: Social Justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." 2 Aware of the lamentable fact that in the Philippines, no gap between these two unavoidable extremes of society is more pronounced than in the field of politics, and ever mindful of the dire consequences thereof, the framers of the present Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice provisions. Ours has been a politics of the elite, the rich, the powerful and the pedigreed. The victory of a poor candidate in an election is almost always an exception. Arrayed against the vast resources of a wealthy opponent, the former, even if he is the most qualified and competent, does not stand a fighting chance. Of course, there have been isolated instances - but yet so few and far between - when poor candidates made it. Forgetting first the evil use of gold, guns and goons which only the rich have access to, and focusing strictly on the legitimate aspect of the electoral struggle, propaganda, through the various forms of media, provides the most sophisticated and effective means of reaching the electorate and convincing voters to vote for a particular candidate. It is in this area, particularly in the use of television, radio and newspaper, that a poor candidate will not be able to compete with his opulent opponents who have all the resources to buy prime television and radio time and full pages of leading newspapers. With radio and television propaganda, the wealthy candidates, even as they leisurely relax in their homes, offices or hotel suites, can reach every nook and cranny of their municipality, city, province, district or even the entire Philippines and be seen or heard at any time of the day and night. During the contracted hours, their paid hacks can concentrate on dishonoring the poor and hapless opponent by hurling innuendoes of defects or vice. With newspaper advertisements, the wealthy candidates can reach thousands of readers daily. A worse scenario obtains where the rich candidates themselves fully or substantially own or operate a television or radio station, or publish newspapers. On the other hand, to a poor candidate, the campaign period would sadly prove to be insufficient for him to campaign in every barangay, even if he is running for a municipal position. Thus, not only would he already be at a disadvantage insofar as visibility and presentation of his issues or program of government are concerned, he would have no opportunity to rebut whatever lies his opponents may spread nor the chance to clear himself of false accusations. Accordingly, in response to the urgent mandate of Section 1 of Article XIII aforequoted, Congress passed a measure, R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, 3 introducing additional reforms to the electoral system which, inter alia, not only seeks to enhance the purity of the electoral process, but also aspires to ensure even just an approximation of equality among all candidates in their use of media for propaganda purposes. The latter is best evidenced by the provision challenged in this case, Section 11 (b), which reads: Section 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. - In addition to the forms of propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcement (sic) or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. This provision, understood in the light of Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is a reasonable regulation enacted to accomplish the desired objectives and purposes earlier mentioned. It neither constitutes proscribed abridgment of the freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely provides the rules as to the manner, time and place for its exercise during a very limited period. It makes reference to Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on "COMELEC time" and "COMELEC space." Said sections read in full as follows: Sec. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC) Obviously then, the airing and printing of a candidate's political advertisements can be done - and is even encouraged to be done - during the "COMELEC time" and within the "COMELEC space." This authority of the COMELEC is no longer purely statutory. It is now constitutional pursuant to the clear mandate of Section 4 of Article IX-C, which is quoted above. This constitutional grant removes whatever doubt one may have on the split verdict of this Court in Badoy vs. Ferrer, et al.,4 Interpreting a related provision, Section 12(f) of R.A. No. 6132, reading: The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers, magazines and periodicals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate this space equally and impartially among all candidates within the area in which the newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment or paid article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person for delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless all the names of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also mentioned with equal prominence. this Court ruled: Against the background of such facilities accorded by the law for all candidates, rich and poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal sanctions to insure the sanctity of the ballot against desecration and the equality or chances among the candidates, the restriction on the freedom of expression of the candidate or any other individual prescribed in par. F of Sec. 12 is so narrow as not to affect the substance and vitality of his freedom of expression itself. xxx xxx xxx Hence, consistent with out opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs. Comelec and Gonzales vs. Comelec[35 SCRA 28], this slight limitation of the freedom of expression of the individual, whether candidate or not, as expressed in par. F Sec. 12, it only one of the many devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and present danger of the perversion or prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The fears and apprehensions of petitioner concerning his liberty of expression in these two cases, applying the less stringent balancing -of-interests criterion, are far outweighed by the all important substantive interests of the State to preserve the purity of the ballot and to render more meaningful and real the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. In the fairly recent case of Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections,5this Court sustained, in effect, the validity of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. Thus: However, it is clear from Act. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11 (b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec , L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite. Even granting for the sake of argument that a doubt exists as to the constitutionality of the challenged provision, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. As this Court stated in Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al.: 6 . . . it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: "To doubt is to sustain." 7 The reason for this is that an act of the legislature approved by the executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not only on the courts, but also on the legislature and the executive as well. For the Court to strike our their acts as unconstitutional, nothing less than clear and convincing evidence of such breach of the Constitution must be shown. Petitioners have not acquitted themselves of that duty. The petitions then must be dismissed for lack of merit.