NFSW v. Ovejera
National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) v. Ovejera, G.R. No. L-59743, May 31, 1982
- Labor Law
- strike
- cooling-off period
- strike-vote
- Article 264 Labor Code
- 13th month pay
- PD 851
- Christmas bonus
- police power
- Marcopper v. Ople
- prohibition
- illegal strike
- Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
I. Facts of the Case
NFSW, the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC), struck on January 28, 1982 to compel payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851 on top of the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses CAC already gave. Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the strike illegal for violating the cooling-off period and the strike-vote reporting requirements of the Labor Code, as amended by BP 130. NFSW filed a petition for prohibition directly with the Supreme Court to annul the decision.
February 16, 1981
NFSW, bargaining agent of about 1,200 of CAC's more than 2,000 employees, concluded a CBA with CAC effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984. Art. VII, Sec. 5 maintained the practice of granting Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, with the Christmas and milling bonuses amounting to 1-1/2 months' salary.
November 28, 1981
NFSW struck allegedly to compel payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851 in addition to the bonuses CAC workers were already enjoying.
November 30, 1981
CAC and NFSW entered into a compromise agreement to settle the strike. Paragraph 4 provided that they would abide by the final Supreme Court decision in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
June 11, 1981
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Ople (G.R. No. 51254) on the vote of seven Justices. The case was still pending on reconsideration when the compromise agreement was signed.
December 15, 1981
The Court denied the motion for reconsideration in Marcopper, with only five Justices voting for denial (3 dissented, 2 reserved their votes, 4 did not take part).
December 18, 1981
Entry of judgment was made in the Marcopper case, the decision having become final and executory.
After the Marcopper decision became final, NFSW renewed its demand for the 13th month pay, and CAC refused.
January 22, 1982
NFSW filed with the MOLE Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay.
January 28, 1982
Six days after the notice, NFSW struck.
January 29, 1982
One day after the strike began, NFSW filed a report of the strike-vote with MOLE.
February 8, 1982
CAC filed a petition (R.A.B. Case No. 0110-82) with Regional Arbitration Branch VI-A, MOLE, Bacolod City, to declare the strike illegal. It argued that the strike violated BP 130 because it was declared before the 15-day cooling-off period for ULP strikes expired and before seven days had lapsed from submission of the strike-vote result.
February 20, 1982
After position papers and a hearing, Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera declared the January 28, 1982 strike illegal. He directed CAC to resume operations and accept back employees (except those preventively suspended), directed payment of salaries of those placed on preventive suspension, and ordered NFSW, its officers, members and sympathizers to desist from acts impairing milling operations.
February 26, 1982
NFSW, bypassing the NLRC, filed a petition for prohibition in the Supreme Court. It alleged that Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial Commander were threatening immediate enforcement of the decision in violation of its fundamental rights, and prayed for a preliminary injunction and annulment of the decision. The Court heard the parties and received memoranda but issued no restraining order.
II. Issues
Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal for failure to observe the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the report of the strike-vote result under Article 264 of the Labor Code.
Whether under Presidential Decree 851, CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month pay in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses it already grants.
III. Ruling
Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal for failure to observe the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the report of the strike-vote result under Article 264 of the Labor Code.
The strike was illegal because the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report are mandatory, and NFSW observed neither. The restrictions are a valid exercise of police power.
How the Court reasoned
- Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by BP 130, requires a notice of strike, a cooling-off period, a strike-vote, and a report of the strike-vote result to MOLE. After the report, a 7-day period must lapse before the strike may be staged.
- The Court held that these waiting periods and filing requirements are mandatory, not merely directory. They serve to allow mediation and conciliation and to ensure that the strike vote is genuine and informed.
- Treating the periods as optional would defeat these purposes.
- The Court found the restrictions reasonable and essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives of the law, so they are a valid exercise of police power.
- NFSW filed its strike notice on January 22, 1982 and struck on January 28, 1982, only six days later, before the 15-day cooling-off period for a ULP strike ended.
- NFSW filed its strike-vote report on January 29, 1982, a day after it struck, so the 7-day ban after the report was also ignored.
- Because both requirements were violated, the strike did not conform to law and was illegal.
“Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the strike staged by petitioner is not in conformity with law.”
Rule applied
Article 264(c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Labor Code, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 (cooling-off period, strike-vote and 7-day ban); police power of the State
Whether under Presidential Decree 851, CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month pay in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses it already grants.
CAC need not pay a separate 13th month pay because its Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses already equal or exceed the 13th month pay required by PD 851. The Marcopper decision lacked the votes to be doctrinal, so the compromise condition was not met.
How the Court reasoned
- PD 851 and its implementing rules exempt employers who already pay a 13th month pay or its equivalent, including Christmas and other cash bonuses of at least 1/12 of the basic salary.
- CAC's Christmas and milling bonuses alone amount to 1-1/2 months' salary, exceeding the 13th month pay, so CAC falls within the exemption.
- NFSW relied on paragraph 4 of the compromise agreement, which bound the parties only to a Supreme Court decision that clearly held a separate 13th month pay is due.
- The Marcopper decision was reached with only seven votes on the original ruling and five on reconsideration, short of the eight votes needed for a doctrinal ruling.
- Marcopper therefore did not clearly hold that a separate 13th month pay is owed in addition to bonuses, so the condition in the compromise agreement was not satisfied.
- NFSW's demand for an additional 13th month pay therefore had no basis.
“The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal.”
Rule applied
Section 2, PD 851; Section 3(e) and Section 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851
Doctrines
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of the strike-vote report under Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by BP 130, are mandatory; a strike staged without observing them is illegal.
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban are reasonable restrictions on the right to strike and a valid exercise of the State's police power.
Under PD 851, employers who already pay a 13th month pay or its equivalent, including Christmas and other cash bonuses of at least 1/12 of basic salary, are exempt from paying an additional 13th month pay.
A Supreme Court decision needs the concurrence of eight Justices to be doctrinal; a ruling with fewer votes binds the parties but does not establish a doctrine.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Notes
The petition for prohibition was filed directly in the Supreme Court, bypassing the NLRC. No restraining order was issued, though the Court heard the parties and received memoranda.