Lagua v. Cusi
Lagua et al. v. Cusi, Jr. et al., G.R. No. L-44649, April 15, 1988
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Civil Law
- logging road closure
- Bureau of Forest Development
- P.D. No. 705
- jurisdiction
- petition for mandamus
- certiorari
- capacity to sue
- real party in interest
- agents of real parties in interest
- damages
I. Facts of the Case
Petitioners Laguas, Achanzar, and Donga sought damages after Eastcoast Development Enterprises allegedly closed their logging access road without authority, allegedly in defiance of orders from the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD). The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the BFD had exclusive authority to determine the legality of the closure before any damages action could proceed, and it also found that Daylinda Laguas lacked capacity to sue. Petitioners challenged the dismissal before the Supreme Court.
January 1, 1976
Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum directing Eastcoast’s chief security guard to prevent plaintiffs’ hauling trucks loaded with logs from passing a national highway loading area where the Japanese vessel would berth, resulting in the closure of the road and discontinuation of log loading on M/S Kyofuku Maru.
January 2, 1976
Acting Station Officer-in-Charge Indalecio L. Aspiras wrote to Eastcoast instructing the opening and allowing of plaintiffs’ trucks and machinery to pass the road that had been closed to them. Eastcoast’s resident manager ordered compliance, but the lifting of the closure took the whole day, preventing hauling of logs by plaintiffs that day.
January 3, 1976
As plaintiffs resumed hauling, Eastcoast’s security men again closed the same road to them upon a radio message order of defendant Maglana, despite the earlier BFD instruction to open it for plaintiffs’ use and passage.
January 5, 1976
After plaintiffs allegedly had no effective recourse, Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC detachment commander at Baganga to lift the alleged illegal checkpoint made by defendants.
1976
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against the defendants, alleging the road closures were unlawful and made to prevent their logging operations in a manner that disregarded BFD directives.
August 3, 1976
The trial court issued the questioned order dismissing petitioners’ complaint, holding that the Bureau of Forest Development had exclusive power to regulate the use of logging roads and determine whether their use violated laws, and that legality of the closure must first be determined by the Bureau before an action for damages could be instituted; it also ruled on the lack of capacity of Daylinda Laguas to claim damages in her personal capacity and found misjoinder of parties.
Petitioners elevated the dismissal to the Supreme Court via a petition for mandamus, arguing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and that the parties had legal capacity to sue.
April 15, 1988
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the trial court’s dismissal order, and remanded the case for trial on the merits, while modifying the ruling on the spouses Laguas’ capacity by ordering only the dropping of their names instead of dismissing the entire complaint.
II. Issues
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by holding that the Bureau of Forest Development must first determine whether the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal before an action for damages may be instituted.
Whether or not the spouses Laguas had legal capacity to sue for damages as mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga who were suing in their own behalf.
III. Ruling
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by holding that the Bureau of Forest Development must first determine whether the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal before an action for damages may be instituted.
The trial court gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the damages complaint on the theory that the BFD must first determine the legality of the road closure before the courts could act.
How the Court reasoned
- The Supreme Court treated the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice.
- The Court held that P.D. No. 705 does not give the Bureau of Forest Development authority to determine whether a logging road closure is legal or illegal as a pre-condition to a damages suit.
- Whether the closure was illegal is a matter to be established or disproved in a judicial proceeding; it is not something the Bureau alone is empowered to decide as a jurisdictional prerequisite for courts.
- Because the trial court required a prior BFD determination and dismissed the case on that ground, it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Rule applied
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
Whether or not the spouses Laguas had legal capacity to sue for damages as mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga who were suing in their own behalf.
The Supreme Court agreed that the spouses Laguas, being agents suing for damages in their own behalf, lacked capacity in their personal capacity; however, the complaint should not have been dismissed in its entirety because the real parties in interest (Achanzar and Donga) were also plaintiffs.
How the Court reasoned
- The Court affirmed that the spouses Laguas were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own behalf, so they did not have capacity to claim damages in their personal capacity.
- Despite the lack of capacity of the spouses Laguas, the complaint could still be maintained because Achanzar and Donga were real parties in interest and were also plaintiffs.
- The proper remedy under the Rules was to order the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas rather than dismissing the entire complaint.
“However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs.”
Rule applied
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
Doctrines
P.D. No. 705 does not confer on the Bureau of Forest Development authority to determine whether a logging road closure is legal or illegal as a prerequisite to an action for damages; illegality is a matter for judicial determination in the proper proceeding.
When the only defect is the lack of legal capacity of certain plaintiffs, the complaint should not be dismissed if the real parties in interest are also included; the names of the incapacitated plaintiffs should be dropped under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits SO ORDERED.
Notes
The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s disposition by requiring the dropping of the spouses Laguas’ names instead of dismissing the entire complaint.