International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) and Nestor B. Micosa, G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993
- Labor Law
- illegal dismissal
- moral turpitude
- homicide
- justifiable causes
- Article 282 of the Labor Code
- probation law
- labor employment policy
- dismissal for conviction
I. Facts of the Case
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) employed Nestor B. Micosa as a laborer in 1977 and required compliance with an employment policy stating that an employer may dismiss an employee convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude. After Micosa was convicted of homicide (with mitigating circumstances), IRRI sought to terminate his employment, insisting the offense involved moral turpitude; Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
In 1977, IRRI hired Micosa as a laborer, making him bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations providing that an employer who has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed.
February 6, 1967
Micosa stabbed to death Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna.
September 15, 1987
Micosa was accused of homicide, and the criminal case was pending.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI’s Special Separation Program.
January 9, 1990
IRRI Director General Klaus L. Lampe disapproved Micosa’s application for separation, stating IRRI wanted to retain the skills and talents of persons like him.
January 23, 1990
The trial court rendered a decision finding Micosa guilty of homicide, appreciating the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance.
Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.
February 8, 1990
IRRI Director General Klaus L. Lampe personally wrote Micosa confirming his appointment as laborer (a regular core employee for an indefinite period) and stating he may not be terminated except for justifiable causes under the Labor Code.
March 30, 1990
IRRI Human Resource Development Head J.K. Pascual urged Micosa to resign because of his homicide conviction.
April 4, 1990
The Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II informed IRRI that Micosa’s probation application was meritorious because he was evaluated to possess desirable social antecedents.
April 6, 1990
Micosa told J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI.
April 22, 1990
J.K. Pascual replied insisting that the offense involved moral turpitude and that Micosa was charged with violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute’s Personnel Manual.
April 27, 1990
Micosa explained that the killing resulted from defending himself against unlawful aggression, argued the conviction did not involve moral turpitude, and stated he did not appeal so he could avail of probation benefits granted by the trial court.
May 7, 1990
Micosa sought help from IRRI’s Grievance Committee, which recommended his continued employment to the Director General.
May 21, 1990
J.K. Pascual issued a notice that Micosa’s employment would terminate effective May 25, 1990.
May 29, 1990
Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
August 21, 1990
Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena found the termination illegal, ordered reinstatement with full backwages from May 25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement, and dismissed the claim for damages (while attorney’s fees were awarded).
January 31, 1991
The NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s findings and conclusions but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.
May 12, 1993
The Supreme Court dismissed IRRI’s petition for certiorari for lack of merit, holding that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is not a justifiable cause for dismissal and that homicide, under the circumstances of the case, was not shown to involve moral turpitude.
II. Issues
Whether or not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment.
Whether or not a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
III. Ruling
Whether or not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment.
The Court held that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is not a justifiable cause for dismissal in the circumstances of this case.
How the Court reasoned
- The petition centered on whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes a justifiable cause under the Labor Code for termination of employment.
- The Court explained that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of the justifiable causes contemplated to legally support dismissal under the Labor Code framework as applied in this case.
“Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes.”
Rule applied
Article 282 of the Labor Code
Whether or not a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
The Court held that, on the facts shown, Micosa’s conviction for homicide was not sufficiently established to involve moral turpitude.
How the Court reasoned
- The Court distinguished between the mere fact of conviction and whether the particular crime, as charged and as determined under the circumstances, is properly classified as involving moral turpitude.
- It found IRRI’s conclusion that homicide involved moral turpitude to be unwarranted because the killing resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense against unlawful aggression by the victim.
- Because the decision did not show that the offense was so classified as involving moral turpitude, IRRI’s basis for termination failed.
- The Court noted there was nothing to show abuse of discretion by the NLRC in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling of illegal dismissal.
“Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.”
Rule applied
Article 282 of the Labor Code
Doctrines
A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude must be carefully tied to the legal concept of justifiable cause for dismissal; conviction alone does not automatically justify termination where the circumstances do not support that the offense involves moral turpitude.
Homicide is not automatically treated as involving moral turpitude; where the killing is found to have resulted from incomplete self-defense against unlawful aggression and the record does not classify the offense as involving moral turpitude, dismissal on that ground is unwarranted.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Notes
The Supreme Court sustained the NLRC’s affirmance of the Labor Arbiter’s determination of illegal dismissal, while noting deletion of attorney’s fees by the NLRC.