Lands v. Court Of Appeals
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bisnar and Amelia Bisnar, G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989
- Civil Law
- land registration
- imperfect title
- Section 48(b) Commonwealth Act 141
- forest land
- public domain
- timberland
- classification of public lands
- Executive Department prerogative
- possession
- confirmation of title
I. Facts of the Case
Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar applied for registration of title to two large parcels (Lots 866 and 870) in President Roxas, Capiz, claiming ownership by inheritance and long possession. The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development opposed, saying the lands were public domain and the applicants lacked sufficient title and the required possession. The trial court and the Court of Appeals granted registration, and the Director of Lands elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
July 20, 1976
Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed a joint application for registration of title to Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869 (28 and 34 hectares) in barrio Gen. Hizon, President Roxas, Capiz, claiming fee simple ownership. They alleged they inherited the parcels and had been paying taxes on them.
December 16, 1976
The Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application. They argued that neither the applicants nor their predecessors had any Spanish-era title, that they had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession for at least 30 years, and that the lands were public domain not subject to private appropriation.
February 24, 1977
The applicants filed an amended application, approved on March 14, 1977, which alternatively invoked Chapter 8 of Commonwealth Act 141 on the claim that they and their predecessors had possessed the land as owners for more than 50 years.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Capiz ordered registration of title in the applicants' names. It found that they and their predecessors had been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession under bona fide claims of ownership for more than 80 years, had planted coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and had converted part of the land into productive fishponds.
May 27, 1988
The Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 66426) affirmed in toto. It held that the Director of Forestry's classification of the lots as timberland cannot prevail without proof that the lots are more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands.
The Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that the lots are forest land that cannot be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141 and that classification is for the Executive Department, not the courts.
II. Issues
Whether the courts may determine the classification of public land as forest or agricultural despite its classification by the Executive Department.
Whether the lots in question, being forest land, may be registered under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, on the basis of long possession by the applicants and their predecessors.
III. Ruling
Whether the courts may determine the classification of public land as forest or agricultural despite its classification by the Executive Department.
Classifying public land as forest, mineral or alienable and disposable belongs to the Executive Department, not the courts. Land classified as forest stays forest until the government performs a positive act to declassify it.
How the Court reasoned
- Under Section 6 of CA 141, the President, on the recommendation of the Secretary, classifies public lands as alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. This is an executive function.
- The lots had been classified as timberland by the Bureau of Forestry, the competent executive agency.
- The Court of Appeals relied on Ankron vs. Government to hold that the classification fails without proof that the land is more valuable as forest than as agricultural land. The Supreme Court rejected that approach as inconsistent with later rulings.
- A positive act of the government is needed to declassify forest land and convert it into alienable or disposable land. Courts cannot do this by finding that the land is suitable for agriculture.
- No such positive act was shown, so the lots remained forest land despite the applicants' improvements.
“It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499).”
Rule applied
Executive prerogative to classify public lands under Commonwealth Act 141 (Section 6); Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499; Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351
Whether the lots in question, being forest land, may be registered under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, on the basis of long possession by the applicants and their predecessors.
The lots could not be registered. Section 48(b) applies only to public agricultural land, and possession of forest land, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
How the Court reasoned
- Section 48(b) of CA 141 lets possessors of public agricultural land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, or since the required period, seek confirmation of imperfect title.
- The Court read this provision as covering only alienable agricultural public land. Forest lands are excluded from its coverage.
- Because the lots were classified as timberland, they were not open to private acquisition. The 80 years of possession alleged by the applicants was therefore legally immaterial.
- The applicant for confirmation of imperfect title carries the burden of proving compliance with Section 48, including that the land is alienable and disposable. The Bisnars did not meet it.
- The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals granting registration were therefore wrong. The application had to be dismissed.
“Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 ; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 ).”
Rule applied
Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942; Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401
Doctrines
Classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is a prerogative of the Executive Department, not the courts.
A positive act of the government is needed to declassify forest land and convert it into alienable or disposable land.
Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land, and the applicant bears the burden of proving compliance with it.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the application for registration of title is dismissed.
Notes
The Court declined to follow the Ankron doctrine used by the Court of Appeals, in line with later decisions holding that land classification is an executive function.