People Of The Philippines v. Constantino
People of the Philippines v. Orlando Constantino, G.R. No. 251636, February 14, 2022
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Criminal Law
- PD 1067 Water Code
- Article 91(B)(3)
- foreshore
- seashore
- unauthorized occupancy
- permit requirement
- DENR foreshore lease application
- criminal prosecution
- mode of appeal
- Rule 45
- notice of appeal
- administrative remedies
I. Facts of the Case
Accused-appellants, members of the White Sand Bentol Fishermen Cooperative, occupied a foreshore area and constructed structures without a DENR-approved foreshore lease permit and without the required permits/business clearances. They were convicted under Article 91(B)(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water Code), and on appeal, they raised defenses based on their cooperative’s pending foreshore lease application and on a prior civil suit granting them restoration of possession.
The Sangguniang Barangay of San Pedro passed Resolution No. 46 (Series of 2000) declaring the white sand area as a beach resort (as later alleged by the defense).
On May 14, 2000, the Sangguniang Panabo passed Resolution No. 299 (Series of 2000) confirming Resolution No. 46 (Series of 2000).
June 10, 2005
White Sand Bentol Fishermen Cooperative (WSBFC) filed a foreshore lease application (FLA) with CENRO-DENR Region XI-2B, Panabo City covering 93,497 square meters.
January 2009
Accused-appellants entered and occupied the foreshore area in Barangay San Pedro, Panabo City and constructed sheds/cottages and other structures and operated sari-sari stores without WSBFC’s FLA being approved by DENR and without the necessary business permit.
July 13, 2009
Prosecution witnesses discovered accused-appellants occupying the foreshore area, building structures, and operating sari-sari stores. Accused-appellants were said to have ignored notices to vacate sent by the Panabo City Government.
After July 13, 2009, the CENRO-DENR posted public notices that no foreshore lease application was approved in the subject area and that a pending application did not authorize occupation or possession, which accused-appellants disregarded.
November 8, 2009
Accused-appellants claimed that injunctive relief in a special civil case allowed their continued possession of the foreshore area.
December 4, 2009
In Special Civil Case (SCC) No. 30-08 for forcible entry filed by accused-appellants against Manuel W. Tan and others, the MTCC issued a decision restoring accused-appellants to possession of the subject foreshore area.
May 22, 2013
The Building Official of the Office of the City Engineer, Panabo City issued a Certification stating that no building permit had been issued to any of the accused-appellants.
March 7, 2016
The MTCC, Panabo City, convicted accused-appellants for violation of Article 91(B)(3) of PD 1067 for unauthorized occupation of a river bank or seashore/foreshore area without permission, ruling that a pending foreshore lease application did not authorize occupation/building and that the SCC No. 30-08 decision could not be used as a defense to the criminal charge.
September 5, 2017
The RTC, Branch 4, Panabo City affirmed the MTCC conviction in toto. It held that no required permit was sought or secured, that lack of permit is a violative act per se, that 'seashore' encompasses 'foreshore,' and that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable in criminal cases under PD 1067.
November 21, 2018
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. It ruled that the criminal complaint need not be filed by the NWRB and that it was properly filed through a complaint/information initiated through the prosecution based on a joint affidavit-complaint, and it reiterated that 'seashore' covers 'foreshore.'
June 17, 2019
The Court of Appeals denied accused-appellants’ motion for reconsideration.
February 14, 2022
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA and dismissed the appeal for improper mode by accused-appellants (filing only a notice of appeal instead of a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari), while also ruling on the substantive issues—holding that seashore includes foreshore and that exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in PD 1067 criminal prosecutions.
II. Issues
Whether accused-appellants’ filing of a mere notice of appeal, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, is a defect that warrants dismissal and renders the Court of Appeals judgment final and executory.
Whether accused-appellants were guilty of violating Article 91(B)(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1067 for unauthorized occupancy of the foreshore area without the necessary permit.
III. Ruling
Whether accused-appellants’ filing of a mere notice of appeal, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, is a defect that warrants dismissal and renders the Court of Appeals judgment final and executory.
Accused-appellants’ employment of the wrong mode of appeal warranted dismissal, and the Court of Appeals judgment was treated as final and executory.
How the Court reasoned
- The Supreme Court noted that accused-appellants filed only a notice of appeal.
- It held that the proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, consistent with the governing rules on appeals from the Court of Appeals in cases contemplated by Rule 45.
- Because the wrong mode was used, the defect was sufficient ground for dismissal under the procedural rules on disposition of improper appeal.
- As a result, the Supreme Court proceeded to treat the CA judgment as final and executory for purposes of the appeal.
“At the outset, the Court notes that accused-appellants availed of the wrong mode of appeal by filing a mere notice of appeal, the proper remedy being a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.”
Rule applied
Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court; Rule 56, Section 3 (Mode of appeal) and Section 6 (Disposition of improper appeal)
Whether accused-appellants were guilty of violating Article 91(B)(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1067 for unauthorized occupancy of the foreshore area without the necessary permit.
Accused-appellants were properly convicted because they occupied and built on the foreshore area without the necessary permit, and 'seashore' under the Water Code covers 'foreshore.'
How the Court reasoned
- The Court applied the elements of Article 91(B)(3) of PD 1067, focusing on the unauthorized occupation and/or construction on seashore/foreshore lands without the required permit.
- It accepted the lower courts’ finding that accused-appellants did not secure the required DENR approval/permit for occupation and construction; the evidence showed that their FLA was not approved and no building permits were issued.
- The Court rejected the defense that the criminal case should be defeated by reliance on a pending administrative application or on a special civil case restoration of possession; neither negated the statutory requirement of a permit for the acts punished under PD 1067.
- It clarified the statutory interpretation issue: the term 'seashore' encompasses 'foreshore,' so the information’s use of 'foreshore' instead of 'seashore' was not fatal.
- It also ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable in criminal cases involving PD 1067, because the prosecution for the penal provision proceeds notwithstanding administrative processes.
“As correctly held by the courts a quo , the term seashore encompasses foreshore lands.”
Rule applied
Article 91(B)(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines); PD 1067, Article 51; PD 1067, Article 93; Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Section 1 and Section 2
Doctrines
In prosecutions under Article 91(B)(3) of PD 1067, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required; the penal provision may be enforced notwithstanding pending administrative applications.
For purposes of Article 91(B)(3) of PD 1067, the term 'seashore' encompasses 'foreshore' lands.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE , the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 21, 2018 Decision and June 17, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01622-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Notes
The Supreme Court also treated the appeal as procedurally defective due to the use of the wrong mode of appeal (notice of appeal instead of a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari).