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Knutson v. Sarmiento-Flores

Knutson v. Sarmiento-Flores, G.R. No. 239215, July 12, 2022

G.R. No. 239215July 12, 2022
  • Procedural (Remedial Law)
  • RA 9262
  • Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
  • protection orders
  • custody orders
  • offender
  • mother as offender
  • father as applicant
  • temporary protection order
  • permanent protection order
  • liberal construction
  • certiorari
  • hierarchy of courts

Read the full decision

I. Facts of the Case

Randy Michael Knutson, an American citizen, and Rosalina Sibal Knutson had a daughter, minor Rhuby Sibal Knutson. The dispute arose after Randy alleged that Rosalina repeatedly maltreated Rhuby, exposed her to a harmful environment, threatened to kill their daughter, sent Randy threatening/nude messages, and engaged in conduct leading to neighbors’ complaints and lease termination. On Randy’s behalf for minor Rhuby, he filed in the RTC Taguig a petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders under RA No. 9262, but the RTC dismissed it on the categorical view that a child’s mother who abused her own child cannot be an “offender” under the law and that the father could not use RA 9262 because he was not a “woman victim of violence.” The peculiarity is the first-impression question whether a father may invoke RA 9262 on behalf of his child against the mother who allegedly committed the violence, and whether the RTC’s restrictive reading caused grave abuse of discretion warranting Supreme Court intervention via certiorari.

  1. In 2005, Randy Michael Knutson and Rosalina Sibal Knutson met in Singapore, married, and had a daughter named Rhuby.

  2. By 2011, while the family lived in the Philippines, Randy and Rosalina became estranged; Randy alleged that Rosalina’s conduct included extra-marital affairs, weeks spent in gambling dens, leaving Rhuby with strangers, incurring large casino-related debts, and selling property provided by Randy.

  3. Randy further alleged that Rosalina maltreated Rhuby in Rhuby’s presence by pulling her hair, slapping her face, knocking her head, and on one occasion pointing a knife at Rhuby and threatening to kill her; Randy claimed Rosalina even texted him about her plan to kill their daughter and commit suicide.

  4. Randy reported the matter to the police station but was told authorities could not assist him in domestic issues; Randy also alleged that Rosalina later sent him naked pictures with a message implying he would not see her again.

  5. Neighbors allegedly complained about noisy parties and pot sessions in Rosalina’s apartment; the lessor terminated the lease after marijuana plants were confiscated on the premises.

  6. December 7, 2017

    Randy, acting on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed a petition under RA No. 9262 for Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the RTC Taguig City, Branch 69 (JDRC Case No. 313), alleging that Rosalina placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to Rhuby’s physical, emotional, moral, and psychological development.

  7. January 10, 2018

    The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that protection and custody orders under RA No. 9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child, holding that the child’s mother is not included as an offender under the law and that the remedies are for a “woman victim of violence,” relying in part on Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua.

  8. March 14, 2018

    The RTC denied Randy’s motion for reconsideration, reiterating RA No. 9262 does not apply where the mother committed violence against her own child; it reasoned that the title’s use of “and” indicates joinder and that “children” refer to those under the care of the woman victim of violence, and further maintained that a child’s mother is not an included offender.

  9. Aggrieved, Randy directly filed a Petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the RTC and arguing that RA No. 9262 should allow protection/custody orders despite the alleged offender being the mother, and that the legislative intent is to provide protection to children.

  10. July 12, 2022

    The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the RTC orders, and ordered that a Permanent Protection Order be issued immediately.

II. Issues

1
Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the Supreme Court may entertain Randy’s direct Petition for certiorari despite the hierarchy of courts doctrine in light of the circumstances of the case.

2

Whether or not RA No. 9262 allows a father to apply for protection and custody orders on behalf of his minor child against the child’s mother who is alleged to have committed violence against their child.

3
Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for protection and custody orders under RA No. 9262 for being inapplicable to a mother who allegedly abused her own child.

III. Ruling

Issue 1Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the Supreme Court may entertain Randy’s direct Petition for certiorari despite the hierarchy of courts doctrine in light of the circumstances of the case.

Yes

The Supreme Court entertained the petition despite the hierarchy of courts doctrine.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The Court recognized that circumstances existed to justify direct recourse to it.
  2. The case presented an issue of first impression on the application of RA No. 9262, warranting immediate resolution by the Supreme Court.
  3. The petition raised grave abuse of discretion by the RTC in applying RA No. 9262 in a restrictive manner.
  4. Considering the urgency and the nature of the statutory remedies for vulnerable sectors like children, the Court resolved to take cognizance.
“Here, circumstances exist to justify direct recourse to this Court.”

Rule applied

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; established jurisprudence allowing exceptions to hierarchy of courts when circumstances justify direct resort.

Issue 2

Whether or not RA No. 9262 allows a father to apply for protection and custody orders on behalf of his minor child against the child’s mother who is alleged to have committed violence against their child.

Yes

RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody orders against the mother alleged to have committed violence against their child.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The Court found no substantial distinction between fathers and mothers who abuse their children that would justify exempting one parent from RA No. 9262.
  2. RA No. 9262’s policy is to guarantee full respect for human rights and to protect women and children from violence, which must be implemented to cover instances where the mother is the abuser.
  3. Section 5 of RA No. 9262 uses the disjunctive term “or” in describing “woman or her child,” indicating that coverage is not limited only to situations where the woman victim is the one directly abused.
  4. Section 4 mandates that the law “shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children,” and a restrictive reading would frustrate the statute’s purpose.
  5. The RTC’s interpretation anchored on the law’s title and conjunctive “and” weakened the penal provisions of Section 5 and removed from coverage cases where the mother herself is the abuser of her child.
  6. The Court rejected the discriminatory view that children abused by their own mothers must invoke other laws because only RA No. 9262 provides the specific preventive and protective remedies of protection and custody orders.
“RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody orders.”

Rule applied

Republic Act No. 9262, particularly Sections 4 and 5; the statutory rule of liberal construction in RA No. 9262; rules on statutory interpretation of “and” versus “or” within the statute’s provisions.

Issue 3Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for protection and custody orders under RA No. 9262 for being inapplicable to a mother who allegedly abused her own child.

Yes

The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition, and its orders were set aside.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The RTC adopted a restrictive theory that the child’s mother cannot be an “offender” under RA No. 9262 and that the remedies were only for a father who is a “woman victim of violence.”
  2. The Court held that any violence against a child is harmful to the child’s dignity and development and requires the law’s protective coverage regardless of whether the abuser is the father or the mother.
  3. The RTC’s restrictive reading frustrated RA No. 9262’s statutory policy because it effectively required both the mother and child to be victims of violence before the remedies could be granted.
  4. The Court emphasized that Section 5’s disjunctive phrasing and the statute’s liberal construction mandate support coverage of violence perpetrated by the mother against her child.
  5. By denying effective legal measures and preventive remedies created by RA No. 9262, the RTC’s approach amounted to an injustice toward vulnerable children.
  6. Accordingly, the Court reversed by granting the petition, setting aside the RTC orders.
“FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for _Certiorari_ is GRANTED.”

Rule applied

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Republic Act No. 9262, Sections 4 and 5; liberal construction and purposive interpretation of protective statutes.

Doctrines

1

There is no substantial distinction between fathers and mothers who abuse their children that warrants a different treatment or exemption from RA No. 9262; violence against a child is harmful and must be covered.

2

RA No. 9262 should be liberally construed to afford protective remedies to victims of violence against women and their children, and its coverage is not defeated by a restrictive reading based solely on the law’s title or the conjunction used there.

3

Section 5’s use of the disjunctive language supports coverage where the mother is the abuser of her child, and restrictive interpretations that frustrate the law’s protective policy are not controlling.

Final Disposition

The Court finds no substantial distinction between fathers and mothers who abused their children that warrants a different treatment or exemption from the law. Any violence is reprehensible and harmful to the child's dignity and development. The RTC maintained its position that the child's mother is not included as one of the offenders under RA No. 9262 anchored on the interpretation based merely on the title of the law. To recall, the RTC explained that the word "children" should not be isolated with the term "women" because the title of the law used the conjunction "and" which denotes joinder of phrases and clauses. As such, the children being protected refer to those under the care of the woman victim of violence. Yet, the penal provisions under Section 5 of RA No. 9262 do away with the conjunctive word "and" and used the disjunctive term "or" that signals disassociation or independence, thus: Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: (1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family; (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; (4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties; (f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphases supplied) Section 4 of RA No.

9262 mandates that the law "shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children." Obviously, the RTC's restrictive interpretation requiring that the mother and her child to be victims of violence before they may be entitled to the remedies of protection and custody orders will frustrate the policy of the law to afford special attention to women and children as usual victims of violence and abuse. The approach will weaken the law and remove from its coverage instances where the mother herself is the abuser of her child. The cramping stance negates not only the plain letters of the law and the clear legislative intent as to who may be offenders but also downgrades the country's avowed international commitment to eliminate all forms of violence against children including those perpetrated by their parents. The RTC's consoling statement that children who suffered abuse from the hands of their own mothers may invoke other laws except RA No. 9262 is discriminatory. The supposed reassurance is an outright denial of effective legal measures to address the seriousness and urgency of the situation. Suffice it to say that only RA No. 9262 created the innovative remedies of protection and custody orders. Other laws have no mechanisms to prevent further acts of violence against the child. In sum, the Court refuses to be an instrument of injustice and public mischief perpetrated against vulnerable sectors of the society such as children victims of violence. The Court will not shirk its bounden duty to interpret the law in keeping with the cardinal principle that in enacting a statute, the legislature intended right and justice to prevail.57 FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for _Certiorari_ is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 10, 2018 and March 14, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 69 in JDRC Case No. 313 are SET ASIDE. Let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued immediately. SO ORDERED

Notes

The RTC had relied on Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua in explaining that protection orders could not be issued in favor of a husband against his wife; the Supreme Court rejected the RTC’s restrictive, categorical framing when the violence is alleged to be perpetrated by the mother against her child under RA No. 9262.