Mercado v. Judge
Ma. Sugar M. Mercado and Spouses Reynaldo and Yolanda Mercado v. Hon. Joel Socrates S. Lopena, et al., G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Civil Law
- SLAPP
- Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
- R.A. No. 9262
- violence against women and children
- certiorari and prohibition
- hierarchy of courts
- premature petition
- material dates
- rule-making power
- environmental cases
- protection order
- grave abuse of discretion
I. Facts of the Case
Petitioner Ma. Sugar Mercado and her parents were sued in many civil, criminal and prosecutorial proceedings by her estranged husband, private respondent Kristofer Jay Go, and his relatives and friends. Petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition directly with the Supreme Court, asking it to declare these cases to be SLAPPs, which they said amount to violence against women under R.A. No. 9262, and to stop public respondent judges and prosecutors from proceeding with them. The Court dismissed the petition.
October 2015
Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of the couple's children (Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943) before RTC Quezon City, Branch 86, presided by Judge Buenaventura. The case remained pending.
September 2015 to November 2015
Private respondents filed against petitioners criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 7610, physical injuries, oral defamation, slander by deed, unjust vexation, unlawful arrest, slight physical injuries and grave coercion, as well as libel complaints before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP). Except for libel complaint NPS XV-INV-15J-11698, all remained pending.
November 5, 2015
Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for TPO/PPO (Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201) before RTC Branch 86 complaining of acts of domestic violence by Go. She also filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Go and his parents, which was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
February 2016
Beginning this month, private respondents filed further cases against petitioners: grave threats, violation of R.A. No. 10175 (dismissed for lack of probable cause), and two indirect contempt cases.
February 19, 2016
The RTC granted Mercado's petition and issued a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) in her favor. Go appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 106476).
November 23, 2016
The OCP dismissed the libel complaint NPS XV-INV-15J-11698.
March 3, 2017
The Court of Appeals denied Go's appeal and affirmed the PPO.
Mercado also filed against private respondents cases for indirect contempt, violation of R.A. No. 10175, and two R.A. No. 9262 complaints. The last two R.A. No. 9262 complaints were dismissed by the OCP for lack of probable cause.
Petitioners filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly with the Supreme Court. They claimed the cases against them are SLAPPs meant to harass them into giving up custody of the children, that such filing is itself abuse under R.A. No. 9262, and that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in taking cognizance of the cases. They sought a TRO or injunction, dismissal of the cases, and amendment of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC to add anti-SLAPP provisions.
September 14, 2017
Private respondents filed their Comment alleging procedural defects, forum-shopping, that the cases did not violate the PPO, that the cases had factual and legal bases, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion.
October 2, 2017
In G.R. No. 232206 (Kristofer Jay I. Go v. AAA), the Supreme Court denied Go's Rule 45 petition against the CA decision for failure to show reversible error.
November 9, 2017
The Secretary of Justice and the QC Chief Prosecutor, through the OSG, filed a Comment citing lack of requisites for judicial review, prematurity because other remedies were available, violation of the hierarchy of courts, and that SLAPP applies only to environmental cases.
II. Issues
Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition is procedurally proper, given the availability of other plain, speedy and adequate remedies, the failure to state material dates, and the rule on hierarchy of courts.
Whether the Court's rule-making power may be invoked by a private party through a Rule 65 petition to extend the concept of SLAPP to cases under R.A. No. 9262.
Whether the concept of SLAPP is applicable to cases of violence against women and children under R.A. No. 9262.
Whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases.
III. Ruling
Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition is procedurally proper, given the availability of other plain, speedy and adequate remedies, the failure to state material dates, and the rule on hierarchy of courts.
The petition was not procedurally proper. It was premature because other adequate remedies were available, it lacked a statement of material dates, and it disregarded the hierarchy of courts.
How the Court reasoned
- Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are available only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
- Petitioners had such remedies: they could take part in the pending cases and raise their defenses there, appeal adverse rulings, and seek review before the Secretary of Justice of prosecutors' resolutions.
- If private respondents violated the PPO, petitioners could seek contempt under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262.
- The petition also failed to include a statement of material dates, which Rule 46, Section 3, applicable through Rule 56, requires.
- Petitioners went straight to the Supreme Court, bypassing lower courts with concurrent jurisdiction, contrary to the hierarchy of courts.
- The novelty of the question raised does not excuse these defects.
“At the outset, the Court finds the filing of the instant Petition premature.”
Rule applied
Rule 65, Rules of Court; Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to Rule 56; doctrine on hierarchy of courts
Whether the Court's rule-making power may be invoked by a private party through a Rule 65 petition to extend the concept of SLAPP to cases under R.A. No. 9262.
A private citizen cannot invoke the Court's rule-making power through a Rule 65 petition. The power is exercised by the Court on its own and is not a remedy a party can demand.
How the Court reasoned
- Section 5(5), Article VIII gives the Court the power to promulgate rules on the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure.
- This is a plenary power that the Court exercises on its own initiative as a rule-making body.
- Rule 65 is a remedy for correcting grave abuse of discretion by a tribunal or officer, not a vehicle to compel the Court to legislate procedural rules.
- Petitioners' request to amend A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC to add anti-SLAPP provisions therefore could not be granted through this petition.
“SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body.”
Rule applied
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; Rule 65, Rules of Court
Whether the concept of SLAPP is applicable to cases of violence against women and children under R.A. No. 9262.
The SLAPP concept does not apply to cases under R.A. No. 9262. SLAPP, as recognized in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, is limited to environmental cases.
How the Court reasoned
- The only SLAPP rule the Court has adopted is in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.
- That rule covers suits connected with enforcing environmental laws, protecting the environment, or asserting environmental rights.
- This case has no relation to environmental matters, so the rule has no application.
- SLAPP is a procedural defense created by rule. It must be raised in the same action and only within the scope the Court prescribed.
- It cannot be used as a separate ground to stop independent cases, nor extended by petitioners to R.A. No. 9262 cases on their own.
“Transposed to this case, the Court finds no occasion to apply the foregoing rules as the Petition has no relation at all to "the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.”
Rule applied
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases), Rule 6; R.A. No. 9262; A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
Whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases.
Public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the cases. Nothing in the PPO prevents them from exercising jurisdiction.
How the Court reasoned
- Grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
- The PPO is directed to Go and bars him from committing acts of violence against Mercado.
- It does not take away the jurisdiction of the courts and prosecutors over cases filed by private respondents.
- It also does not stop private respondents from seeking judicial redress for their grievances.
- Several complaints were in fact dismissed by the OCP for lack of probable cause, showing the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
- Since no grave abuse was shown, the petition lacked merit.
“WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.”
Rule applied
Rule 65, Rules of Court; R.A. No. 9262 (PPO directed at the respondent-offender)
Doctrines
Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are premature where plain, speedy and adequate remedies remain available, and a direct resort to the Supreme Court violates the hierarchy of courts; the novelty of the issue does not cure these defects.
A petition filed with the Supreme Court under Rule 56 in relation to Rule 46, Section 3 must state the material dates; failure to do so is a ground for dismissal.
The Court's plenary rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution cannot be invoked by a private citizen through a Rule 65 petition.
SLAPP, under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, is a procedural defense limited to environmental cases and must be raised in the same action; it is not applicable to cases under R.A. No. 9262.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Notes
The Court did not pass on whether a SLAPP-type defense should be extended to R.A. No. 9262 cases as a matter of policy; it held only that the existing rule is limited to environmental cases and that the petition was an improper vehicle.