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Fcf Minerals Corporation v. Lunag

FCF Minerals Corporation v. Joseph Lunag, et al., G.R. No. 209440, February 15, 2021

G.R. No. 209440February 15, 2021Ponente: LEONEN, J.
  • Procedural (Remedial Law)
  • Civil Law
  • SLAPP
  • anti-SLAPP
  • Writ of Kalikasan
  • continuing mandamus
  • Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
  • mining
  • damages
  • attorney's fees
  • indigenous peoples
  • environmental advocacy

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I. Facts of the Case

FCF Minerals Corporation, a mining company holding a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with the Republic, was sued by Joseph Lunag, et al., who claim to belong to indigenous cultural communities, in a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus questioning its open-pit mining in Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition but denied FCF Mineral's claim for damages, holding that an award would go against the anti-SLAPP rule. FCF Mineral elevated the case to the Supreme Court, claiming that the petition was a SLAPP and that it was entitled to damages and attorney's fees.

  1. 2009

    FCF Mineral, a domestic mining corporation, entered into a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with the Republic, giving it the exclusive right to explore, mine, and utilize minerals in a 3,093.51-hectare contract area in Barangay Runruno, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya.

  2. 2012

    Joseph Lunag, et al., who claim to belong to the Ifugao, Kalanguya, and Cordillera Indigenous Cultural Communities, filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for Environmental Protection Order and Writ of Continuing Mandamus against the DENR Secretary, the MGB Director, the NCIP, and FCF Mineral. They claimed open-pit mining would destroy their ancestral land, that excavations 50-100 meters from their homes exposed them to landslides, that the Agreement violated Section 19(f) of R.A. No. 7942, and that the Indigenous Peoples' consent was fraudulently obtained.

  3. The Supreme Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan, held in abeyance the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for acceptance of the writ, hearing, reception of evidence, and judgment. Respondents were ordered to file verified returns.

  4. FCF Mineral's Return alleged that the petition was a SLAPP, that there was no evidence of environmental damage, that it had an Environmental Compliance Certificate and an approved Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility, and that it was still in the development phase. It also alleged that the contract area was outside protected areas and ancestral domain (with NCIP Certificates of Non-Overlap) and that Lunag, et al. were mere migrants. DENR, MGB, and NCIP, through the OSG, filed a consolidated return arguing no cause of action, a Field Report Memorandum showing no violations, that the area was part of the Magat River Forest Reserve opened to mining in 1999, and that free and prior informed consent was not required.

  5. FCF Mineral and the OSG filed Omnibus Motions praying for a hearing. FCF Mineral alleged that Lunag, et al. admitted being unlicensed small-scale miners and that the petition was meant to extort money. The Court of Appeals denied the prayer for a Temporary Environmental Protection Order for lack of extreme urgency, grave injustice, or irreparable injury.

  6. March 20, 2013

    The Court of Appeals held a hearing, but Lunag, et al. failed to appear and file an Answer. The court allowed FCF Mineral to present witnesses and exhibits.

  7. April 19, 2013

    The hearing continued for Lunag, et al. to present evidence, but they again failed to appear. The Court of Appeals required the parties to file memoranda, and FCF Mineral prayed for damages of P3,250,700.00 for lost management time, P3,564,455.00 paid to counsel (with a balance of at least P6,000,000.00), and P520,000.00 for aerial and ground photography.

  8. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus. It ruled that Lunag, et al. filed it for self-serving reasons as admitted unlicensed small-scale miners, that a CENRO Task Force found FCF Mineral violated no environmental law and attributed the damage to small-scale mining, that no cause of action was alleged, and that continuing mandamus cannot be an auxiliary remedy to the Writ of Kalikasan. It denied FCF Mineral's prayer for actual and exemplary damages for lack of basis.

  9. The Court of Appeals denied FCF Mineral's motion for reconsideration. It held there was no competent proof of actual damages, that awarding damages would go against the anti-SLAPP rule by becoming an instrument of coercion and retaliation discouraging legitimate environmental cases, and that attorney's fees were not warranted given respondents' lack of financial capacity.

  10. FCF Mineral filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court, claiming actual damages and attorney's fees totaling P10,774,309.00 under Rule 6, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and Civil Code Articles 2199, 2208, and 2229. It asserted that respondents had demanded P1,000,000,000.00 from it. Despite several orders and fines, respondents failed to file a Comment, so the Court dispensed with it.

II. Issues

1
Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus filed by respondents constitutes a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) that petitioner mining corporation may invoke under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

2
Civil Law

Whether petitioner is entitled to actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Civil Code.

III. Ruling

Issue 1Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus filed by respondents constitutes a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) that petitioner mining corporation may invoke under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

No

The petition is not a SLAPP that petitioner may invoke. The anti-SLAPP remedy is only for individuals targeted by suits because of their environmental advocacy, not for a large mining concessionaire enforcing its mining grant.

How the Court reasoned

  1. A SLAPP is a legal action filed to harass, vex, or stifle a party's legal rights in environmental matters. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow it to be raised as a defense, and under Mercado v. Lopena it must be invoked in the same action and before the same court.
  2. The Court traced the concept to foreign sources such as California's anti-SLAPP statute and cases from British Columbia and Australia. It noted that Philippine law applies the rule narrowly, only to environmental cases, and bases it on the rights to free speech, assembly, petition, and a balanced and healthful ecology.
  3. The remedy protects ordinary citizens exercising constitutional rights to speak and seek redress. It is not a blanket provision that any defendant in an environmental case may invoke.
  4. FCF Mineral is not exercising free speech or the right to petition, nor advocating environmental protection. It is enforcing a large mining grant, which the anti-SLAPP rules were never meant to protect.
  5. Respondents are indigenous peoples and local community members, and the petition was directed against a powerful concessionaire with legal obligations. Allowing a corporation to use the remedy would turn it into a tool to silence the very citizens it was meant to protect.
  6. Losing a case does not instantly turn it into a SLAPP. Leeway must be given to communities, indigenous peoples, farmers, and miners who bring environmental complaints.
“The remedy of Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases cannot be indiscriminately invoked by any defendant in an environmental case.”

Rule applied

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rule 1, Sec. 4(g) and Rule 6, Secs. 1-2 (anti-SLAPP); Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 4 (free speech and petition) and Art. II, Sec. 16 (balanced and healthful ecology); Mercado v. Lopena

Issue 2Civil Law

Whether petitioner is entitled to actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Civil Code.

No

Petitioner is not entitled to damages or attorney's fees under the anti-SLAPP rule, since it cannot invoke that remedy. The Court of Appeals' denial of damages is affirmed.

How the Court reasoned

  1. Rule 6, Section 4 allows damages and attorney's fees to a party who proves the action is a SLAPP. Since petitioner cannot invoke the SLAPP remedy, that basis for damages fails.
  2. The Court of Appeals found no competent proof of the actual damages claimed, and the Civil Code provisions on actual damages (Art. 2199) require proof of loss.
  3. Awarding damages here would defeat the purpose of the anti-SLAPP rule by becoming an instrument of coercion and retaliation that discourages legitimate environmental suits.
  4. Losing the case does not entitle the defendant to damages, and respondents' lack of financial capacity weighed against awarding attorney's fees.
  5. Because the remedy was never intended for such a case, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' resolutions.
“We cannot authorize the use of this remedy to a case for which it was never intended.”

Rule applied

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rule 6, Sec. 4; Civil Code, Arts. 2199, 2208, 2229

Doctrines

1

The remedy of Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases cannot be indiscriminately invoked by any defendant in an environmental case. It may only be invoked by individuals who became targets of litigation due to their environmental advocacy.

2

SLAPP is not a remedy of powerful corporations to stifle the actions of ordinary citizens who seek to make them accountable, nor a tool for large concessionaires who have obligations and responsibilities under the law. The enforcement of a large mining concession is not an activity the anti-SLAPP rules are meant to protect.

3

In the Philippines, the anti-SLAPP rule is narrowly applied only to environmental cases and is founded on the rights to free speech, assembly, petition, and a balanced and healthful ecology.

4

SLAPP is a defense that must be invoked in the same action and before the same court (Mercado v. Lopena). Losing a case does not instantly transform it into a SLAPP or entitle the defendant to damages.

Final Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 00018 are AFFIRMED.

Notes

Penned by Justice Leonen (Third Division). Respondents failed to file a Comment despite several orders and fines, so the filing of their Comment was dispensed with. The Court of Appeals case is CA G.R. SP No. 00018.