Strait v. Reyes
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al. (consolidated with Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al.), G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21, 2015
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Political Law
- Service Contract No. 46
- Tañon Strait
- NIPAS Act
- Environmental Compliance Certificate
- locus standi
- citizen suit
- stewards of nature
- Section 2 Article XII
- service contracts
- La Bugal-B'laan
- mootness
- alter ego principle
- Presidential Decree No. 87
- Presidential Decree No. 1586
- Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
I. Facts of the Case
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait (cetaceans), represented by their human 'Stewards' Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio. Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are FIDEC and fisherfolk representatives. They challenged Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for oil exploration in the Tañon Strait, a protected seascape, entered into by the DOE with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), along with the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued for it.
June 13, 2002
The Philippine Government, through the DOE, entered into Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX for geological and geophysical studies of Tañon Strait.
December 21, 2004
DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) covering about 2,850 square kilometers offshore Tañon Strait. SC-46 was signed only by the DOE Secretary, and JAPEX is a 100% Japanese-owned company. The Tañon Strait had been declared a protected seascape by Proclamation No. 1234 in 1998 under the NIPAS Act.
May 9 to 18, 2005
JAPEX conducted seismic surveys and multi-channel sub-bottom profiling of about 751 kilometers in and around Tañon Strait. No environmental impact assessment or ECC had been obtained before the surveys, since JAPEX only started to secure an ECC before the second sub-phase involving drilling.
January 31, 2007
The PAMB-Tañon Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-001 adopting JAPEX's Initial Environmental Examination and favorably recommending approval of its ECC application.
March 6, 2007
EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project.
November 16, 2007 to February 8, 2008
JAPEX drilled an exploratory well 3,150 meters deep near Pinamungajan, western Cebu.
December 17, 2007
Petitioners filed two separate original petitions before the Supreme Court. G.R. No. 180771 (certiorari, mandamus, injunction) was filed by the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, who impleaded then President Macapagal-Arroyo as an unwilling co-petitioner. G.R. No. 181527 (certiorari, prohibition, mandamus) was filed by FIDEC and fisherfolk to nullify the ECC, prohibit SC-46, and compel access to project documents. They alleged fish catch dropped 50-70 percent, payao were destroyed, there was no public consultation, and the exclusion zone was inadequate.
March 31, 2008
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) filed a Motion to Strike its name as respondent, claiming it was only a logistics contractor and not JAPEX's Philippine agent. The Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed and asked to implead JAPEX Philippines.
April 8, 2008
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527.
June 21, 2008
According to public respondents, SC-46 was mutually terminated by the parties effective this date.
September 23, 2008
The Court gave due course to the petitions and required memoranda. JAPEX filed no comment, so the resolution was re-served on JAPEX in February 2012.
March 20, 2012
JAPEX Philippines, by special appearance, filed a Motion for Clarification claiming it was not impleaded and that the case was moot. On April 24, 2012 the Court held JAPEX Philippines a real party-in-interest with no personality separate from JAPEX, as its branch office.
June 19, 2012
The Court denied JAPEX PH's further request for time to file a memorandum, dispensed with it, and submitted the case for decision.
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued that the Resident Marine Mammals lack standing, SC-46 is constitutional (an FTAA under paragraph 4 and exempt under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act), the ECC was validly issued, mandamus does not lie, the DOE's acts were acts of the President under the alter ego principle, and the case is moot due to the termination of SC-46.
April 21, 2015
The Supreme Court en banc resolved the petitions, striking out the former President as co-petitioner, upholding the Stewards' standing, and declaring SC-46 null and void.
II. Issues
Whether or not the petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the termination of SC-46.
Whether or not the Resident Marine Mammals and the Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, have locus standi to file the petition.
Whether or not former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo may be impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner.
Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is valid under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, including whether service contracts are prohibited and whether Presidential Decree No. 87 is a valid general law.
Whether or not the requirements that the President sign the service contract and that Congress be notified were complied with, notwithstanding the alter ego principle.
Whether or not the seismic surveys under SC-46, as exploration for energy resources under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, were exempt from the environmental impact assessment and ECC requirements under Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Whether or not SC-46 is valid considering that the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area and no law passed by Congress allows exploitation and utilization of its energy resources.
III. Ruling
Whether or not the petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the termination of SC-46.
The Court resolved the petitions despite the termination of SC-46 because recognized exceptions to the mootness rule are present.
How the Court reasoned
- A case ordinarily becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, such as when the contract being challenged has been terminated.
- Courts will still decide a moot case when there is an alleged constitutional violation, the issue is of paramount public interest, or the situation is capable of repetition.
- Here the petitions allege that SC-46 violates the Constitution and environmental laws, which are matters of public interest.
- The risk that similar service contracts could be made in protected areas means the situation is capable of repetition.
- Hence termination of SC-46 in 2008 did not stop the Court from resolving the petitions.
“In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case.”
Rule applied
Exceptions to the moot and academic principle: alleged grave violation of the Constitution, paramount public interest, and capable of repetition yet evading review.
Whether or not the Resident Marine Mammals and the Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, have locus standi to file the petition.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, have legal standing as citizens suing under the environmental rules; the need to give the marine mammals themselves standing has been eliminated.
How the Court reasoned
- Traditionally, a suit must be brought by a real party-in-interest under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and the marine mammals are not juridical persons.
- The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow any Filipino citizen, as steward of nature, to file a citizen suit to enforce environmental laws.
- Procedural rules may be applied retroactively to pending actions, so the citizen suit provision applies even though the petition was filed in 2007.
- The Stewards showed possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals.
- Because the human Stewards have standing, there is no need to rule that animals themselves may sue.
“The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.”
Rule applied
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Section 5 (citizen suit); Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.; retroactive application of procedural rules.
Whether or not former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo may be impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner.
Former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner, and her name is stricken from the title of the case.
How the Court reasoned
- Rule 3, Section 10 allows an unwilling co-plaintiff to be made a defendant, not a co-petitioner in the way the Stewards attempted.
- The Stewards impleaded her only on the basis of her declaration under the ASEAN Charter and lack of time to get her signature.
- A person's consent is needed to make her a petitioner; she had not agreed to join.
- Her name is therefore dropped from the case title.
“Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit.”
Rule applied
Section 10, Rule 3, Rules of Court (unwilling co-plaintiff).
Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is valid under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, including whether service contracts are prohibited and whether Presidential Decree No. 87 is a valid general law.
Service contracts are not banned per se, and PD 87 remains a valid general law, but SC-46 must still comply with the constitutional requirements for financial or technical assistance agreements.
How the Court reasoned
- Paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII permits the President to enter agreements with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration and development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
- Following La Bugal, service contracts are not prohibited per se by the 1987 Constitution; they must comply with its safeguards.
- PD 87 was not expressly or impliedly repealed by the Constitution or later environmental laws, so it remains the general law for oil exploration contracts.
- Thus the lack of a general law is no ground to void SC-46; the defect lies elsewhere, in non-compliance with the constitutional safeguards.
“Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.”
Rule applied
Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution; La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v. Ramos; Presidential Decree No. 87.
Whether or not the requirements that the President sign the service contract and that Congress be notified were complied with, notwithstanding the alter ego principle.
The President's signature and notice to Congress were not complied with, and the alter ego principle does not cure this; SC-46 is null and void.
How the Court reasoned
- Paragraph 4 requires the agreement to be entered into by the President and reported to Congress within thirty days of execution.
- SC-46 was signed only by the DOE Secretary, and respondents did not show that the President participated or that Congress was notified.
- Under the alter ego principle the acts of department heads are presumptively acts of the President, but this does not apply where the Constitution requires the President to act personally.
- Because these safeguards are mandatory, SC-46 is void for non-compliance.
“Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.”
Rule applied
Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution, paragraph 4 (President to enter into agreements and notify Congress within thirty days); La Bugal guidelines.
Whether or not the seismic surveys under SC-46, as exploration for energy resources under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, were exempt from the environmental impact assessment and ECC requirements under Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
The seismic surveys were not exempt from the EIA and ECC requirements; Section 14 of the NIPAS Act adds requirements and does not waive Section 12.
How the Court reasoned
- Section 12 of the NIPAS Act requires an environmental impact assessment for proposed activities in protected areas outside the management plan, and PD 1586 requires an ECC for projects in environmentally critical areas.
- Section 14 allows exploration for energy resources in protected areas only for gathering information, with least damage to surrounding areas, and with additional requisites.
- A statute must be read as a whole so that its sections are harmonized; Section 14 thus supplements, not supersedes, Section 12.
- Public respondents admitted that no ECC or EIA was obtained before the seismic surveys, which were not part of the management plan of Tañon Strait.
- Subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase cannot cure the earlier violation.
“Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.”
Rule applied
Sections 12 and 14, R.A. No. 7586 (NIPAS Act); Section 4, P.D. No. 1586; statutory construction that a statute is read as a whole.
Whether or not SC-46 is valid considering that the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area and no law passed by Congress allows exploitation and utilization of its energy resources.
SC-46 is invalid because exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a NIPAS area may only be allowed by a law passed by Congress, and none exists for Tañon Strait.
How the Court reasoned
- Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape under the NIPAS Act by Proclamation No. 1234.
- The NIPAS Act allows only exploration solely for gathering information on energy resources; exploitation and utilization require a law passed by Congress.
- SC-46 was not just for information gathering; it also covered extraction and petroleum production.
- No law of Congress specifically allows oil exploration or extraction in the Tañon Strait.
- Therefore no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done there, and SC-46 violates the NIPAS Act.
“Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.”
Rule applied
Section 14, R.A. No. 7586 (NIPAS Act); Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution; Proclamation No. 1234.
Doctrines
Despite mootness, courts may resolve a case when there is an alleged grave constitutional violation, the issue is of paramount public interest, or the situation is capable of repetition.
Under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, any Filipino citizen, as steward of nature, may file a citizen suit to enforce environmental laws; procedural rules apply retroactively to pending actions.
Service contracts for petroleum exploration are not prohibited per se by the 1987 Constitution, but they must comply with Section 2, Article XII, paragraph 4, including execution by the President and notification to Congress.
The alter ego principle does not apply where the Constitution requires the President to act personally.
Section 14 of the NIPAS Act does not exempt energy exploration in protected areas from the EIA and ECC requirements; it only provides additional requisites. Exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a NIPAS area may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Notes
The consolidated decision is by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, en banc. A branch office such as JAPEX Philippines has no personality separate from its foreign head office and is a real party-in-interest. Issues on mandamus for access to documents and the ECC's validity were framed, but the extracted portions mainly show the disposition on SC-46's nullity.