gr_179814_2015
Wilfred N. Chiok v. People of the Philippines and Rufina Chua, G.R. No. 179814 (consolidated with G.R. No. 180021), December 7, 2015
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Civil Law
- estafa
- Article 315(1)(b)
- double jeopardy
- finality of acquittal
- legal personality of private complainant
- Office of the Solicitor General
- civil liability after acquittal
- preponderance of evidence
- BP 22
- res judicata
- conclusiveness of judgment
- bail jumping
- Galman v. Sandiganbayan
- legal interest
I. Facts of the Case
Rufina Chua accused Wilfred Chiok, her investment adviser, of misappropriating ₱9,563,900.00 she gave him in 1995 to buy shares of stock. Chiok was convicted of estafa by the RTC, but the Court of Appeals acquitted him on reasonable doubt while still holding him civilly liable for ₱9,500,000.00. Chua questioned the acquittal and both parties questioned the civil award before the Supreme Court.
Mid-1989
Chua met Chiok, who offered to be her investment adviser. She made an initial investment of ₱200,000.00 to buy Meralco and PLDT shares and rolled over the investment and profits until 1994, never receiving documents for the stock transactions.
June 9, 1995
Chua accepted Chiok's proposal to buy shares in bulk for ₱9,563,900.00. She allegedly deposited ₱7,100,000.00 in Chiok's Far East Bank Annapolis account and handed ₱2,463,900.00 in cash at Han Court Restaurant, for which there was no receipt.
July–August 1995
Chua grew suspicious when Chiok avoided her calls and showed no sale document. He gave her two interbank checks (₱7,963,900.00 dated July 11, 1995 and ₱1,600,000.00 dated August 15, 1995), asking her to delay depositing the first. Both were dishonored for garnishment and insufficiency of funds.
October 25, 1995
Chua's counsel sent a demand letter. Chiok replied on November 16, 1995 that the money was Chua's investment in their unregistered partnership, which he invested with Yu Que Ngo. Chua then filed a complaint-affidavit in the Pasig Prosecutor's Office and Chiok was charged with estafa under Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 109927).
At trial Chiok denied enticing Chua to invest in stocks and denied receiving the ₱2,463,900.00 cash. He claimed the funds were a partnership investment to be placed by his best judgment, but admitted on cross-examination receiving ₱7.9 million in June 1995 and ₱1.6 million earlier, and said he invested ₱8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo (Capri Manufacturing). He said Chua panicked after being swindled by Gonzalo Nuguid, kept both sets of checks and rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle, and a later settlement failed because she demanded over ₱30,000,000.00.
In the separate BP 22 case, the trial court acquitted Chiok of criminal and civil liability because the prosecution failed to show notice of dishonor and that Chiok had five banking days to pay after notice. It added that the prosecution's theory was less believable than the defense.
December 3, 1998
The RTC of Pasig-Branch 165 convicted Chiok of estafa, sentenced him to 12 years of prision mayor minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal maximum, and ordered him to pay ₱9,563,900.00 with legal interest from October 25, 1995.
February–May 1999
The prosecution moved to cancel bail on February 1, 1999, and Chiok moved for reconsideration on February 15, 1999. On May 28, 1999 the RTC denied reconsideration and cancelled bail, finding probable flight or risk of committing another crime during appeal.
June 1999
Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal on June 18, 1999 (CA-G.R. CR No. 23309) and a certiorari and prohibition petition against the bail cancellation on June 19, 1999 (CA-G.R. SP No. 53340). An arrest order issued on June 25, 1999 was returned unserved on July 25, 1999 because Chiok could not be located.
July 27 and September 20, 1999
In the bail case the CA issued a TRO and later a preliminary injunction enjoining Chiok's arrest, ruling the offense non-capital and flight conjectural. Motions for reconsideration of the OSG and Chua were denied on November 16, 1999. The Supreme Court later reversed the injunction, with its decisions final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007.
September 21, 1999 and February 29, 2000
The CA dismissed Chiok's appeal for jumping bail because the arrest order was unserved. On February 29, 2000 it reinstated the appeal after learning of the TRO and injunction issued a day before the dismissal.
July 19, 2007
The CA, in a Special Division of Five, reversed the RTC and acquitted Chiok for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It found that the RTC merely recited evidence and relied on the weakness of the defense, that Chua's sole testimony was inconsistent and improbable (no receipts in six years of dealings), and that her acceptance of Yu Que Ngo's checks ratified the application of the funds, so misappropriation was not proven. It still held Chiok civilly liable for ₱9,500,000.00 with interest.
October 3, 2007
The OSG did not move for reconsideration, citing double jeopardy. Chua and Chiok moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied, holding that an acquittal is immediately final and re-examination would violate double jeopardy.
Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus on the criminal aspect (G.R. No. 180021), and Chiok and Chua appealed the civil aspect (G.R. No. 179814). The Supreme Court consolidated the petitions.
II. Issues
Whether or not Chua has legal personality to file and prosecute a petition questioning the CA's acquittal of Chiok.
Whether or not the case falls under an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy.
Whether or not Chiok's acquittal in the BP 22 case bars Chua's civil claim under the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua for ₱9,563,900.00 and, if so, what interest applies.
III. Ruling
Whether or not Chua has legal personality to file and prosecute a petition questioning the CA's acquittal of Chiok.
Chua has no personality to question the acquittal on the criminal aspect, because only the State through the OSG may do so. Her interest is limited to the civil liability.
How the Court reasoned
- Under the Administrative Code, the OSG alone represents the People before the Supreme Court and the CA in criminal cases. A private complainant cannot bring the criminal aspect of a case on her own.
- A private offended party's interest is limited to the civil liability arising from the offense. She may appeal or question only the civil aspect.
- The OSG did not appeal or move for reconsideration of the acquittal. It took the position that doing so would place Chiok in double jeopardy.
- The OSG also did not conform to Chua's petition, so there was no basis to relax the rule on personality.
- Chua's petition on the criminal aspect therefore could not prosper.
“Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.”
Rule applied
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code (OSG represents the State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and CA)
Whether or not the case falls under an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy.
The case is not an exception to the finality of acquittal and the rule on double jeopardy. The CA's acquittal stands.
How the Court reasoned
- A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed or reopened without violating double jeopardy. The only narrow exception is certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion, such as a sham trial or denial of the State's right to be heard.
- The CA validly acquired and retained jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Dismissal of an appeal for jumping bail under Section 8, Rule 124 is discretionary with the CA, and its reinstatement of the appeal attained finality.
- The Supreme Court's decisions in the bail case, which reversed the injunction, did not automatically revive the CA resolution that had dismissed the appeal.
- The Galman exceptions do not apply. There was no sham trial and the OSG was heard in the CA.
- Chua's complaints about how the CA weighed the evidence are, at most, errors of judgment, which cannot be corrected by certiorari, which reaches only errors of jurisdiction.
“We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.”
Rule applied
Double jeopardy, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; Section 6, Rule 120; Section 8, Rule 124; Galman v. Sandiganbayan exceptions; Rule 65
Whether or not Chiok's acquittal in the BP 22 case bars Chua's civil claim under the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
The BP 22 acquittal does not bar Chua's civil claim. It rested on lack of notice of dishonor and made no findings on the underlying transaction.
How the Court reasoned
- Conclusiveness of judgment bars relitigation only of facts or issues actually and directly resolved in a prior case between the same parties.
- Chiok was acquitted in the BP 22 case because the prosecution failed to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to him.
- The trial court's remark that the prosecution's version was incredible was only secondary and unnecessary to the acquittal.
- No findings of fact were made on the transaction that gives rise to civil liability, so there was nothing conclusive to bind Chua.
- Under Rule 111, civil actions in estafa and BP 22 cases may proceed simultaneously, subject to the prohibition on double recovery, so res judicata does not apply.
“Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the doctrine of _res judicata_ finds no application here.”
Rule applied
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, Section 47(c), Rule 39, Rules of Court; Rule 111 on simultaneous civil actions; BP 22
Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua for ₱9,563,900.00 and, if so, what interest applies.
Chiok is civilly liable to Chua for ₱9,563,900.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum from October 25, 1995 until finality and then 6% per annum on the total amount until satisfaction.
How the Court reasoned
- An acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not automatically free the accused from civil liability, which may be proven by preponderance of evidence.
- The monetary transaction was so proven: Chua's deposit slip, Chiok's own admissions on cross-examination that he received ₱7.9 million and ₱1.6 million, and his checks.
- Chiok's admission of '9.5 million' referred to the whole amount in issue, so he is liable for the full ₱9,563,900.00 rather than the CA's rounded ₱9,500,000.00.
- Chua made an extrajudicial demand on October 25, 1995, so interest runs from then.
- Following Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the principal earns 6% per annum from October 25, 1995 until finality, and the total amount earns 6% per annum thereafter until fully paid.
“We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of ₱9,563,900.00.”
Rule applied
Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 (acquittal on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability proven by preponderance of evidence); Nacar v. Gallery Frames on legal interest
Doctrines
Only the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, may question a judgment of acquittal on its criminal aspect before the Supreme Court or the CA; a private complainant's interest is limited to the civil liability.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and cannot be reviewed without violating double jeopardy; certiorari lies only in exceptional cases such as a sham trial or denial of the prosecution's right to be heard, not for mere errors of judgment.
Acquittal on reasonable doubt does not bar recovery of civil liability, which may be established by preponderance of evidence.
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply where the prior BP 22 acquittal rested on lack of notice of dishonor and made no findings on the underlying transaction; civil actions in estafa and BP 22 cases may proceed simultaneously subject to the bar on double recovery.
The CA's dismissal of an appeal for jumping bail under Section 8, Rule 124 is discretionary, and its later reinstatement of the appeal, once final, stands.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED insofar as they challenge the acquittal, and the petition in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED as to the civil aspect. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 19, 2007 and Resolution dated October 3, 2007 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: Chiok is ordered to pay Chua ₱9,563,900.00, with legal interest of 6% per annum from October 25, 1995 until finality of this Decision, and 6% per annum on the total amount from finality until fully satisfied.
Notes
Penned by Justice Jardeleza, Third Division. Consolidated petitions G.R. Nos. 179814 and 180021. The Court modified the CA's civil award from ₱9,500,000.00 to ₱9,563,900.00 and set the interest at 6% per annum following Nacar v. Gallery Frames.