Facura v. Court Of Appeals

How the Court reasoned

1. Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules, as amended by A.O. No. 17, says an appeal does not stop the Ombudsman's decision from being executory. The Constitution gives the Ombudsman the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure.
2. Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court lets the CA stay an award pending appeal, but the Ombudsman's rule is a special rule. Under the principle specialis derogat generali (a special law prevails over a general one), it prevails over the Rules of Court.
3. The CA therefore has no discretion to stay an Ombudsman decision, even on terms it considers just. An injunction against the penalty would encroach on the Ombudsman's constitutional rule-making power.
4. An injunctive writ would also make Section 7, Rule III meaningless, because the penalty would never take effect while the appeal is pending.
5. No one has a vested right in public office. A respondent who wins on appeal is treated as preventively suspended and is paid back salaries, so no irreparable injury results from immediate execution.
6. The CA's reliance on Lopez v. CA was mistaken. The Court excused the error because its own earlier rulings (Laja and the initial Samaniego decision) were unclear on the point. The writ in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902 was dissolved and G.R. No. 166495 was granted.

Rule applied

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17; Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution; Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770; Section 12, Rule 43, Rules of Court

How the Court reasoned

1. Petitioners also complained that the writ was issued without giving them a hearing.
2. The Court had already held that the CA had no authority to issue an injunction against an immediately executory Ombudsman decision.
3. The writ was therefore improper whether or not they had been heard.
4. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question of notice and hearing.

Rule applied

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17

How the Court reasoned

1. Res judicata in its strict form needs identity of cause of action. The probable cause proceeding and the administrative case have different causes of action.
2. Conclusiveness of judgment, however, applies when the two cases involve different causes of action but the same parties, facts and issue. Once a fact or question is settled in an earlier case, it cannot be reopened in a later one.
3. Both proceedings arose from the same two sets of appointment papers and asked the same question: whether they contained false statements. Probable cause and administrative liability are both measured by substantial evidence.
4. In De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan, the Court found no absolutely false narration of facts in either set of appointment papers. That finding is therefore binding in the administrative case.
5. The binding effect is limited to the falsification issue. The other charges, such as dishonesty and neglect, were not settled in the criminal case, so the Court had to examine them separately.

Rule applied

Doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, Section 47(c), Rule 39, Rules of Court

How the Court reasoned

1. Falsification requires a false narration of facts. The earlier decision found none in either set of appointment papers.
2. Even without conclusiveness of judgment, the Court's own review reached the same result.
3. Both sets of papers were prepared and signed openly and were approved by Administrator Jamora. The retroactive dates reflected the actual dates of service of the staff under the Board members' memoranda.
4. The papers were irregular under CSC rules on retroactive appointments, but irregularity is not the same as falsity. They were also re-issued and sent to the CSC.
5. No falsification of official documents therefore occurred, and that charge fails.

Rule applied

Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (falsification of public documents); conclusiveness of judgment as applied from De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan

How the Court reasoned

1. The LWUA Board reinstated De Jesus on September 4, 2001, and the Administrator authorized him to sign appointment papers under the accreditation program.
2. The CSC declared the reinstatement illegal only on August 15, 2002, well after December 2001 when he signed the papers. Until then, he held the office and its signing authority.
3. On May 5, 2003, the CSC closed the dismissal case because LWUA failed to investigate in time, so his dismissal never stood.
4. Signing appointment papers was a ministerial duty under LWUA Office Order No. 205.01. He did not misrepresent his authority when he signed as representative of the appointing authority.

Rule applied

CSC Resolution No. 967701 (CSC Accreditation Program); LWUA Office Order No. 205.01; CSC Resolution Nos. 021090 and 030504

How the Court reasoned

1. Under the CSC accreditation rules, appointments are reported to the CSC through the ROPA within a fixed period.
2. Under LWUA's internal arrangements, preparing and submitting the ROPA belonged to the HRMO. The Deputy Administrator's role was only to sign the appointment papers.
3. The CA's finding that De Jesus defied the CSC rules was therefore based on a duty that was not his.
4. De Jesus did what his office required by signing, and the HRMO was the one answerable for the report.

Rule applied

CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments, Rule 7, Section 11; CSC Resolution No. 967701; LWUA Office Order No. 205.01

How the Court reasoned

1. Dishonesty requires an intent to deceive or conceal the truth, and the charges had to be proven by substantial evidence.
2. The request to the DBM for authority to hire confidential staff was signed by Administrator Jamora, not by De Jesus or Parungao, so they could not be blamed for any concealment in it.
3. The DBM later said its authority could be implemented retroactively to the date of actual service. The payments and appointments therefore had a basis.
4. The two sets of appointments were disclosed and approved by the Administrator, and the second was sent to the CSC. This showed openness, not concealment.
5. What happened was confusion about whether the CSC or the DBM governed the retroactivity of appointments, which is not dishonesty. The Ombudsman's finding of conspiracy therefore had no support.

Rule applied

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (dishonesty as an administrative offense); substantial evidence standard

How the Court reasoned

1. The HRMO is the officer responsible for preparing appointment papers and reporting them to the CSC through the ROPA under the accreditation program.
2. Parungao's office prepared the first set of appointment papers with retroactive dates but did not report it to the CSC. She did not deal properly with the CSC rules until she advised the Administrator on January 25, 2002.
3. This failure to give the required attention to a duty of her office is simple neglect of duty. It is a less serious offense than the gross neglect charged.
4. The Court found that she acted in good faith, because she followed the Board members' requests and later helped correct the appointments. This justified a light penalty.
5. She was therefore suspended for one month and one day without pay.

Rule applied

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (simple neglect of duty); CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments, Rule 7, Section 11