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Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications

Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications and Philcom Corporation, G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006

G.R. No. 144315July 17, 2006Ponente: CARPIO, J.
  • Procedural (Remedial Law)
  • Labor Law
  • Article 263(g) assumption of jurisdiction
  • illegal strike
  • no-strike policy in vital industry (PD 823)
  • return-to-work order
  • immediate and executory effect
  • unfair labor practice (Article 248)
  • status quo and conciliation
  • writ of execution
  • backwages/salary
  • defiance of labor secretary orders
  • NCMB conciliation

Read the full decision

I. Facts of the Case

Philcom Employees Union (PEU) and Philippine Global Communications/Philcom Corporation were negotiating renewal of their CBA after its expiry on 30 June 1997, but the union staged a strike on 17 November 1997 while preventive/conciliation proceedings were ongoing. After the company sought assumption of jurisdiction under Article 263(g), Acting Labor Secretary Trajano issued orders on 19 and 28 November 1997 directing a return to work and requiring the parties to cease acts that would exacerbate the dispute; the striking employees did not comply. In parallel, the union filed charges of unfair labor practice and argued that the Secretary had no authority to resolve the legality of the strike. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the Secretary and the Court of Appeals properly acted on (1) the legality of the strike despite claimed procedural defects, (2) the dismissal of the union’s unfair labor practice charges, and (3) the requested directive for unconditional readmission and payment of salaries/backwages.

  1. 1997-06-30

    The parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired.

  2. 1997-07

    The parties began negotiations for CBA renewal.

  3. 1997-10-21

    PEU filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB-NCR docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS No. 10-435-97, alleging unfair labor practice.

  4. 1997-11-04

    Because of the notice of strike, the company suspended negotiations, and PEU filed another Notice of Strike docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS No. 11-465-97 on the ground of bargaining deadlock.

  5. 1997-11-11

    At an NCMB-NCR conciliation conference, the parties agreed to consolidate the two Notices of Strike and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings.

  6. 1997-11-17

    Despite the meeting and status-quo agreement, remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricaded entrances and egresses, and conducted a stationary picket at the main entrance.

  7. 1997-11-18

    The company filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction under Article 263(g) over the labor dispute.

  8. 1997-11-19

    Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction, enjoining any strike or lockout, directing a cease and desist from acts that could exacerbate the situation, ordering striking workers to return to work within 24 hours from receipt, requiring management to resume normal operations, and directing both parties to accept workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike; the order required position papers and evidence within 10 days.

  9. 1997-11-28

    A second Order reiterated the directive for striking employees to return to work immediately.

  10. 1998-01-07

    The Secretary denied PEU’s motion for reconsideration assailing the authority of Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction.

  11. 1998-10-02

    The Secretary issued the first assailed Order dismissing the union’s unfair labor practice charges and requiring compliance with return-to-work directives while addressing the dispute as within the Secretary’s assumed jurisdiction.

  12. 1998-11-27

    The Secretary denied motions for reconsideration, maintained that employer-employee relations were not severed by a mere merger, and reaffirmed jurisdiction over the legality of the strike; the Secretary also reiterated the orders to return to work.

  13. 2000-07-31

    The Court of Appeals denied PEU’s petition for review and affirmed the Secretary’s Orders dated 2 October 1998 and 27 November 1998.

  14. PEU filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 challenging the Secretary’s Orders as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, primarily arguing that the Secretary could not properly take cognizance of the legality of the strike and that the CA should have ordered unconditional readmission, backwages, and full compliance with return-to-work relief.

II. Issues

1
Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike despite the alleged absence of a proper petition to declare the strike illegal.

2
Labor Law

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Secretary’s dismissal of the union’s charges of unfair labor practices against Philcom.

3
Labor Law

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to issue an order mandating execution directing the company to unconditionally accept back to work the union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike and to pay salaries/backwages and the monetary equivalent of their other benefits from October 6, 1998 to date.

III. Ruling

Issue 1Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike despite the alleged absence of a proper petition to declare the strike illegal.

No

The Secretary properly took cognizance of and resolved the legality of the strike as part of the assumed jurisdiction under Article 263(g), and PEU could not prevent resolution by refusing to submit the issue for disposition.

How the Court reasoned

  1. Article 263(g) authorizes the Secretary to assume jurisdiction when a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout exists in an industry indispensable to national interest.
  2. The Court held that this authority extends to all questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute, not only to the specific incident pleaded by the employer.
  3. The legality of the strike was directly connected to the labor dispute over which jurisdiction was assumed, especially because the Secretary issued return-to-work directives to stop the strike.
  4. PEU’s argument that there was no proper petition to declare the strike illegal was treated as insufficient to bar the Secretary from resolving that legality issue.
“The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike.”

Rule applied

Article 263(g) of the Labor Code

Issue 2Labor Law

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Secretary’s dismissal of the union’s charges of unfair labor practices against Philcom.

No

The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the dismissal of the union’s unfair labor practice charges because the acts complained of did not fall under the prohibited unfair labor practices enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code.

How the Court reasoned

  1. Unfair labor practices are limited to those defined and enumerated by Article 248 of the Labor Code.
  2. After review of the acts alleged by the union as unfair labor practices, the Court found that they did not correspond to any prohibited act under Article 248.
  3. The dismissal reflected that even if the union perceived CBA-related issues, the specific complaints were not the statutory unfair labor practices charged.
“A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code.”

Rule applied

Article 248 of the Labor Code

Issue 3Labor Law

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to issue an order mandating execution directing the company to unconditionally accept back to work the union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike and to pay salaries/backwages and the monetary equivalent of their other benefits from October 6, 1998 to date.

No

The Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to order unconditional readmission through execution and payment of backwages, because the strike and strike activities were illegal and the striking employees knowingly defied return-to-work orders and committed illegal acts, so no writ of execution for their immediate return could issue.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The Court treated the strike as patently illegal in a vital industry protected by PD 823, and found the union’s strike activities involved unlawful methods and violations of required status-quo/conciliation obligations.
  2. Return-to-work orders issued after assumption of jurisdiction were treated as immediately effective and executory even if a motion for reconsideration was pending.
  3. Because PEU officers and members failed to comply immediately with the return-to-work orders and were found to have committed illegal acts during the strike and/or defied the orders, their situation did not warrant an automatic unconditional return via execution.
  4. The Court also indicated that who specifically participated in, committed, or defied illegal strike acts was a factual matter to be resolved in appropriate proceedings before the Secretary.
  5. Thus, an order mandating execution for unconditional acceptance back and awarding backwages for the period requested was properly not issued.
“Hence, the failure of PEU's officers and members to comply immediately with the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997 cannot be condoned.”

Rule applied

PD 823 (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 849); Article 264 of the Labor Code; Article 263(g) of the Labor Code

Doctrines

1

When the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute under Article 263(g), the authority extends to and includes all questions and controversies arising from that labor dispute, including the legality of a strike.

2

Return-to-work orders issued after the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction are immediately effective and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and knowing defiance of such orders cannot be condoned.

3

Unfair labor practice liability requires that the acts complained of fall within the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code; acts outside that enumeration do not constitute unfair labor practice.

Final Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 July 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53989 is AFFIRMED.

Notes

The decision also emphasized that execution directing unconditional return cannot automatically issue for participants/actors in an illegal strike who committed illegal acts or defied the Secretary’s return-to-work orders; determination of specific participants is a factual matter within the Secretary’s domain in appropriate proceedings.