Cruz v. Environment
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
- Political Law
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
- IPRA
- R.A. 8371
- regalian doctrine
- ancestral domains
- ancestral lands
- NCIP
- Section 2 Article XII
- equally divided vote
- Rule 56 Section 7
- justiciable controversy
- standing
- President's power of control
- customary law
I. Facts of the Case
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the DENR Secretary, the DBM Secretary and the NCIP, assailing the constitutionality of several provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (R.A. 8371) and its Implementing Rules. They argued that the law violates the regalian doctrine, the rights of private landowners, due process, and the President's power of control. The Court's votes were equally divided at 7 to 7, so the petition was dismissed.
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus challenging Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of R.A. 8371 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules. They argued that these provisions deprive the State of ownership of lands of the public domain and of the minerals and natural resources in them, contrary to the regalian doctrine in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Petitioners also argued that the broad definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands may include private lands and so violates private owners' rights. They further argued that the provisions on the NCIP's powers and jurisdiction and on the application of customary law (Sections 51-53, 59, 63, 65 and 66) violate due process.
Petitioners also attacked Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which describes the NCIP's relationship with the Office of the President as 'lateral but autonomous'. They said this infringes the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII. They asked for a declaration of unconstitutionality, writs of prohibition against the NCIP, the DENR Secretary (DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998) and the DBM Secretary, and a writ of mandamus compelling the DENR Secretary to carry out the State's constitutional duty to control and supervise natural resources.
September 29, 1998
The Court required the respondents to file their comments.
October 13, 1998
The NCIP Chairperson and Commissioners filed a Comment defending the constitutionality of the IPRA and asking that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
October 19, 1998
The DENR and DBM Secretaries, through the Solicitor General, filed a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General took the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional because it grants indigenous peoples ownership over natural resources, and asked that the petition be granted in part.
November 10, 1998
Sen. Juan Flavier, Ponciano Bennagen and leaders and members of 112 indigenous peoples' groups moved for leave to intervene. They defended the IPRA and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
March 22, 1999
The Commission on Human Rights moved to intervene and/or appear as amicus curiae. It asserted that the IPRA expresses the parens patriae principle and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
March 23, 1999
The Ikalahan Indigenous People and Haribon Foundation moved to intervene, with a Comment-in-Intervention supporting the IPRA's constitutionality. The motions for intervention were granted.
April 13, 1999
The Court heard oral arguments. The parties and intervenors then filed their memoranda.
On deliberation, seven justices voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Santiago, sustained the challenged provisions. Justice Puno sustained all except Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 and gave a limiting interpretation of Section 57. Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy and lack of standing.
Seven other justices voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban found Sections 3(a)(b), 5, 6, 7(a)(b), 8 and related provisions unconstitutional, reserving judgment on Sections 58, 59, 65 and 66. Justice Vitug found Sections 3(a), 7 and 57 unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon joined them.
December 6, 2000
Because the votes were equally divided at 7 to 7, the case was redeliberated, but the voting remained the same. The petition was dismissed under Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. Issues
Whether or not Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules are unconstitutional for violating the regalian doctrine under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the IPRA are unconstitutional for violating the rights of private landowners.
Whether or not the IPRA provisions on the NCIP's powers and jurisdiction and the application of customary law (Sections 51-53, 59, 63, 65 and 66) violate the due process clause.
Whether or not Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998 infringes the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
Whether or not the petition raises a justiciable controversy and petitioners have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
III. Ruling
Whether or not Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules are unconstitutional for violating the regalian doctrine under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The Court could not declare these provisions unconstitutional because the votes were equally divided 7 to 7. The petition was dismissed, so the IPRA provisions stand.
How the Court reasoned
- Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution vests ownership of lands of the public domain and natural resources in the State (the regalian doctrine). Petitioners said the IPRA gives indigenous peoples ownership over these.
- Seven justices, led by Justice Kapunan, would sustain the challenged provisions. Justice Puno would also sustain them, except Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, and with a limiting reading of Section 57.
- Seven other justices (Panganiban, Vitug, Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon) would grant the petition. Justice Panganiban found Sections 3(a)(b), 5, 6, 7(a)(b), 8 and related provisions unconstitutional, and Justice Vitug found Sections 3(a), 7 and 57 unconstitutional.
- Declaring a law unconstitutional needs a majority vote, which was not reached. The Court redeliberated and the 7-7 vote stayed the same.
- Under Rule 56, Section 7, the petition is dismissed when the necessary majority is not obtained in an original action. The IPRA therefore remains in force.
“Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.”
Rule applied
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (regalian doctrine)
Whether or not Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the IPRA are unconstitutional for violating the rights of private landowners.
The Court did not strike down Sections 3(a) and 3(b) as against private landowners' rights, because the necessary majority was not obtained and the petition was dismissed.
How the Court reasoned
- Petitioners argued that the broad definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands could cover private lands.
- The justices were evenly split over whether these provisions are valid.
- No majority voted to declare the provisions unconstitutional, so the challenge failed.
- The vote remained 7-7 after redeliberation, and the petition was dismissed.
“As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.”
Rule applied
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Whether or not the IPRA provisions on the NCIP's powers and jurisdiction and the application of customary law (Sections 51-53, 59, 63, 65 and 66) violate the due process clause.
The Court did not declare the NCIP and customary law provisions void for violating due process, because no majority was reached and the petition was dismissed.
How the Court reasoned
- Petitioners said the provisions on the NCIP's powers and jurisdiction and on customary law (Sections 51-53, 59, 63, 65 and 66) violate due process.
- Seven justices would uphold these provisions. Justice Panganiban reserved judgment on Sections 59, 65 and 66, so there was no majority to strike them down.
- The 7-7 split continued after redeliberation, and the petition was dismissed.
“However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.”
Rule applied
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (due process); Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Whether or not Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998 infringes the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court did not declare the 'lateral but autonomous' provision unconstitutional, because the necessary majority was not obtained and the petition was dismissed.
How the Court reasoned
- Section 17, Article VII gives the President control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Petitioners said the 'lateral but autonomous' description of the NCIP's relationship with the Office of the President infringes this.
- Justice Puno would have struck down Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 but sustained the other provisions. The other justices in his bloc sustained the challenged provisions.
- The justices were evenly divided overall, so no majority declared the rule invalid. After redeliberation the petition was dismissed.
“Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.”
Rule applied
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution (power of control); Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Whether or not the petition raises a justiciable controversy and petitioners have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
The Court reached no majority ruling on justiciability or standing. Only Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss on those grounds, and the petition was dismissed because of the tie vote.
How the Court reasoned
- Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss solely because there was no justiciable controversy and petitioners lacked standing.
- The other thirteen justices reached the merits and were evenly split, seven to six, plus Justice Mendoza's separate ground.
- Because of the 7-7 tie, no binding majority ruling on justiciability or standing was made.
Rule applied
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; requirements of actual case or controversy and standing
Doctrines
Under Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when the Court is equally divided and the necessary majority is not obtained in an original action, the petition is dismissed after redeliberation.
A tie vote on the constitutionality of a law leaves the law standing, because a law is presumed valid until a majority of the Court declares it unconstitutional. A dismissal for lack of a majority sets no binding precedent on the merits.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, as the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Notes
This is the Per Curiam Resolution recording the outcome. The substantive opinions (Kapunan, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Vitug) are separate and not binding precedent on the merits because of the tie vote.