ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAG
Tano, et al. v. Socrates, et al., G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Political Law
- local ordinances
- fishery laws
- closed season
- coral conservation
- devolution
- municipal waters
- certiorari
- prohibition
- declaratory relief
- Rule 65
- hierarchy of courts
- presumption of constitutionality
I. Facts of the Case
Petitioners, including fishermen and the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan, sought to stop the enforcement of a Puerto Princesa City ordinance and a Palawan provincial resolution that imposed a five-year ban and “closed season” measures on the shipment/catching and dealing in certain marine species, particularly to protect corals. They filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (treated by the Court as such), assailing the ordinances and related mayor’s office order as unconstitutional and claiming the lower courts/prosecutors should be restrained from taking cognizance of related criminal prosecutions.
December 15, 1992
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92, effective January 1, 1993, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998, with exemptions and penalties.
January 22, 1993
Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, authorizing inspections of cargoes containing live fish and lobster shipped out and requiring holding for proper disposition when documents are missing.
February 19, 1993
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 to enact Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for five (5) years in and coming from Palawan waters, with a penalty clause and effectivity after publication.
1993
Respondents implemented the ordinances, resulting in criminal charges against petitioners for violations of the Palawan ordinance and the Puerto Princesa City ordinance, including prosecutions pending in a municipal circuit trial court and other criminal cases.
June 4, 1993
Without first seeking redress from the local government units, prosecutors, or courts, petitioners filed in the Supreme Court a special civil action originally captioned for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
June 15, 1993
The Court required respondents to comment and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy of the petition.
August 13, 1993
Respondents filed their comment defending the validity of the Palawan ordinance as a valid exercise of provincial power and denying due process and equal protection violations.
October 25, 1993
Petitioners filed an urgent plea for a temporary restraining order, asserting that the regional trial court was proceeding with a criminal case involving violations of Ordinance No. 2.
November 11, 1993
The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of the referenced criminal case.
July 12, 1994
The Court excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, and later considered the comment as the Answer; the Court gave due course to the petition and required memoranda.
April 22, 1997
The Court ordered the impleader of the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the OSG to comment, but later dispensed with the OSG comment after extension requests.
July 22, 1997
After deliberation, the Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition for want of merit.
August 21, 1997
The Supreme Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 110249 was rendered, affirming dismissal of the petition and upholding the assailed local measures as valid exercises of local legislative power.
II. Issues
Whether or not the petition, as filed, may properly invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction through certiorari and prohibition despite the pendency of criminal cases and alleged available remedies in the lower courts.
Whether or not the petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is premature for lack of cause of action when motions to quash were not shown to have been filed and denied.
Whether or not the petitioners’ claims for declaratory relief that the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional fall within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
Whether the challenged Ordinance No. 15-92 (Puerto Princesa), Office Order No. 23, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33/Ordinance No. 2 (Palawan) violate the Constitution—specifically Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution—by unduly restricting fishermen and marine merchants.
III. Ruling
Whether or not the petition, as filed, may properly invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction through certiorari and prohibition despite the pendency of criminal cases and alleged available remedies in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court held that certiorari and prohibition were not properly available to petitioners as a substitute for available remedies in the criminal proceedings and lower courts, though it still considered the matter due to the short remaining life of the ordinances and their novelty and importance.
How the Court reasoned
- The Court emphasized the hierarchy of courts and that direct recourse to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs should be allowed only for special and important reasons clearly and specifically stated in the petition.
- Petitioners failed to show that they first sought appropriate relief in the criminal proceedings or lower tribunals before coming directly to the Supreme Court.
- Even if procedural obstacles existed, the Court proceeded to resolve the case on the merits because the life of the challenged ordinances was about to end and the measures were of paramount and novel importance.
“There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied.”
Rule applied
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Section 1; hierarchy of courts doctrine
Whether or not the petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is premature for lack of cause of action when motions to quash were not shown to have been filed and denied.
The Supreme Court held that the petition for certiorari and prohibition failed for prematurity because petitioners did not show that motions to quash were filed and denied in the criminal cases.
How the Court reasoned
- Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are generally not proper when the alleged jurisdictional errors have not been raised and resolved in the proper forum through available procedural remedies.
- The Court found no showing that, as accused in the criminal cases, petitioners filed motions to quash and that these were denied.
- Accordingly, it could not be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that would justify recourse to extraordinary remedies.
“As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for _certiorari_ must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action.”
Rule applied
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Section 1
Whether or not the petitioners’ claims for declaratory relief that the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional fall within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled that it had no original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, and treated petitioners’ claims accordingly.
How the Court reasoned
- The Court treated petitioners’ request for a declaration that the ordinances are unconstitutional as a request for declaratory relief.
- It held that the Supreme Court is not vested with original jurisdiction over declaratory relief petitions, even if the issues are purely legal.
- The Court further explained that the Supreme Court only exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.
“As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved,11 it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.”
Rule applied
Rules on declaratory relief jurisdiction (as applied in jurisprudence); Supreme Court’s limited jurisdiction over declaratory relief petitions
Whether the challenged Ordinance No. 15-92 (Puerto Princesa), Office Order No. 23, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33/Ordinance No. 2 (Palawan) violate the Constitution—specifically Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution—by unduly restricting fishermen and marine merchants.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the challenged Puerto Princesa and Palawan ordinances (and found nothing unconstitutional in the mayor’s office order), ruling that the measures were reasonable exercises of police power under the Local Government Code and consistent with the Constitution.
How the Court reasoned
- The Court applied principles of decentralization and devolution under the Local Government Code and held that local legislative power over matters within devolved police power cannot be doubted.
- It identified the ordinances’ two main objectives: (1) a five-year “closed season” for covered species, and (2) protection of corals in Puerto Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
- The Court held that establishing a closed season falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, citing laws such as P.D. No. 1015 that allow closed seasons.
- As to environmental protection and the second objective, the Court treated it as within the general welfare clause and the express mandate to protect the environment.
- It reiterated the presumption of constitutionality of laws, including local ordinances, and required a clear and unequivocal constitutional breach to overthrow that presumption.
- The Court found Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, to be merely an implementation/administrative measure and not a separate permit requiring constitutional or statutory invalidation.
- It rejected the argument that BFAR jurisdiction under P.D. No. 704 is all-encompassing to exclude municipal governments from regulating municipal waters, noting municipal waters are generally under local government control except as to specific areas such as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal centers.
“In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.”
Rule applied
Sections 16, 149, 447(a)(1)(vi), 458(a)(1)(vi), 468(a)(1)(vi) of R.A. 7160; Sections 2 (Art. XII) and 2 and 7 (Art. XIII) of the 1987 Constitution; presumption of constitutionality
Doctrines
Extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition should not be used as substitutes for available remedies in the proper courts; petitioners must first show that available procedural remedies were pursued or that grave abuse of discretion/jurisdictional error has been established in the proper forum.
The Supreme Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved; it exercises only appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.
Local government units, under the Local Government Code’s principles of decentralization and devolution, may enact ordinances within their police power, including measures implementing fishery laws in municipal waters, such as closed seasons and environmental protection related to coral resources.
Laws and ordinances are presumed constitutional, and to strike them down there must be a clear and unequivocal constitutional breach beyond reasonable doubt.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for want of merit.
Notes
The Supreme Court treated the petition as one for certiorari and prohibition despite its caption for injunction, and it resolved the case on the merits notwithstanding procedural prematurity considerations due to the imminent end of the ordinances’ effectivity and the measures’ novelty and importance.