Collado v. Court Of Appeals
Collado, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002
- Civil Law
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- land registration
- confirmation of imperfect title
- Marikina Watershed Reservation
- Regalian doctrine
- inalienable public land
- annulment of judgment
- Section 48(b) CA 141
- intervention
- Executive Order No. 33
- Proclamation No. 1283
- Proclamation No. 1637
- forest land
I. Facts of the Case
Edna Collado and her co-applicants sought confirmation of imperfect title over a 120-hectare parcel in Antipolo, Rizal, which the Republic and the intervenor ISF awardees said lies within the Marikina Watershed Reservation. The land registration court granted the application, but the Court of Appeals, on the Solicitor General's petition for annulment of judgment, declared that decision void. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
July 26, 1904
Executive Order No. 33 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation. Petitioners' earliest predecessor, Sesinando Leyva, had had the lot surveyed in his name on March 22, 1902.
June 21, 1974
Proclamation No. 1283 created the Boso-Boso townsite reservation in Antipolo and San Mateo, Rizal, comprising Lot A (inalienable) and Lot B (alienable and disposable).
April 18, 1977
Proclamation No. 1637 amended Proclamation No. 1283 and revised the townsite's area and technical description. Per the DENR Secretary, it excluded Lot A, which includes petitioners' lot, and reverted it to the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
April 25, 1985
Edna T. Collado filed an application for registration of a parcel of about 1,200,766 sq. m. in Barangay San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal (Psu-162620). The attached technical description stated that the survey was inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
March 24, 1986
Collado filed an Amended Application adding co-applicants, and more applicants joined later. The Republic and the Municipality of Antipolo opposed, and the court declared a general default except as to the oppositors. Petitioners claimed possession since time immemorial, tax declarations, tax payments and nine transfers from Sesinando Leyva down to the present owners.
March 18, 1986
The Bureau of Forest Development certified that the lot was within the area excluded from the Marikina Watershed under Proclamation Nos. 1283 and 1637. Petitioners relied on this certification.
March 2, 1988
The Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administrator reported that part of the plan was already decreed to others and that the rest of Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. He recommended dismissal of the application.
June 5, 1990
Proclamation No. 585 excluded 1,430 hectares from EO 33 and placed them under the DENR's Integrated Social Forestry Program. Stewardship certificates were issued to residents, including the intervenors, between 1989 and 1991.
January 30, 1991
After the Solicitor General's office failed to appear at the January 9 and January 14, 1991 hearings, the RTC of Antipolo, Branch 71 (LRC No. 269-A) decided on petitioners' evidence alone. It confirmed their imperfect title, finding open, public, notorious possession since time immemorial, tax declarations and payments, and that the Watershed proclamations are subject to private rights. It also relied on the Bureau of Forest Development certification of exclusion.
April 23, 1991
The Solicitor General received a copy of the RTC decision. Petitioners claimed that it had received the decision on February 18, 1991 and that the decision had become final. On May 6 or 7, 1991, the RTC ordered the Land Registration Authority to issue the decree of registration.
August 6, 1991
The Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment under Sec. 9(2), BP Blg. 129, on the ground that nothing showed the lot to be alienable and disposable. On August 8, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order against execution of the RTC decision.
August 8, 1991
The intervenors, who learned of the case on July 31, 1991, filed a motion for leave to intervene and an opposition in intervention before the RTC. On August 14, 1991, they filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial, which the RTC could not act on because of the restraining order.
November 29, 1991
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc. moved before the Court of Appeals to intervene and to admit a petition-in-intervention, asserting that the lot is inalienable watershed land. The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention.
June 22, 1992
In CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, the Court of Appeals declared the RTC decision null and void. It held that under the Regalian doctrine petitioners had not shown that the land was declared alienable and disposable. It found that the technical description and the LRA report confirmed the land is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation, that forest lands are inalienable, and that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity.
Petitioners brought a petition under Rules 45 and 65 to the Supreme Court. They argued that they had private rights before EO 33, that Proclamation No. 1283 made the lot alienable, that the annulment petition and the intervention were filed late, and that res judicata and estoppel applied.
II. Issues
Whether petitioners acquired private rights over the lot before Executive Order No. 33 of 1904 reserved it as a watershed, by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
Whether the lot was released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation and became alienable and disposable land, through Proclamation No. 1283 (1974) and the Bureau of Forest Development certification, so that it may be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141.
Whether the Court of Appeals properly gave due course to the Republic's petition for annulment of judgment despite the alleged finality of the RTC decision, res judicata and estoppel.
Whether the Court of Appeals properly allowed the petition-in-intervention of the Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., even though it was allegedly filed out of time.
III. Ruling
Whether petitioners acquired private rights over the lot before Executive Order No. 33 of 1904 reserved it as a watershed, by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
Petitioners did not acquire private rights before 1904. Mere possession of land under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 did not create a presumption that the land was alienable, and once EO 33 reserved the land, later possession could not ripen into ownership.
How the Court reasoned
- Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and natural resources such as watershed reservations are inalienable.
- Possession by private individuals under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 does not by itself create a presumption that the land is alienable and disposable, so petitioners' argument has no legal basis.
- A person claiming 'private rights' that survive a reservation must show compliance with the Public Land Act (Gordula v. Court of Appeals).
- When EO 33 was issued in 1904, Sesinando Leyva had been in possession for only about two years, and he held no title from the State.
- Once EO 33 reserved the lot as a watershed, it became inalienable and non-disposable. Possession after 1904 cannot be counted toward acquisitive prescription, because possession of forest or other inalienable public land cannot ripen into private ownership.
“Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.”
Rule applied
Regalian Doctrine; Philippine Bill of 1902; Act No. 926; Executive Order No. 33 (1904); Gordula v. Court of Appeals (private rights require compliance with the Public Land Act)
Whether the lot was released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation and became alienable and disposable land, through Proclamation No. 1283 (1974) and the Bureau of Forest Development certification, so that it may be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141.
The lot remains part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and is not alienable and disposable. Petitioners' evidence did not clearly show any release, and they also lacked the required period of possession, so their title is void from the start.
How the Court reasoned
- Section 48(b) of CA 141 applies only to alienable and disposable agricultural public land. Forest lands and watershed reservations are excluded.
- Only a positive act of the Executive, such as a proclamation, can declassify a watershed reservation. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
- Once land is included in a watershed reservation by proclamation, it is presumed to remain part of it until clear and convincing evidence of declassification is shown.
- Petitioners' 1986 Bureau of Forest Development certification is contradicted by the LRA report, the DENR Secretary's letter and the technical description attached to Collado's own application. It fails to show clearly and positively that the lot was released.
- Proclamation No. 1637 of 1977 excluded the lot from the townsite and reverted it to the Marikina Watershed Reservation. Even counting from Proclamation No. 1283 of 1974, petitioners had only 11 years of possession by April 25, 1985, short of the required 30 years.
- That the area is now populated does not change its legal classification. Any title to the lot is void ab initio (from the beginning).
“It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land.”
Rule applied
Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended; Executive Order No. 33 (1904); Proclamation Nos. 1283 and 1637; Regalian Doctrine; Section 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution
Whether the Court of Appeals properly gave due course to the Republic's petition for annulment of judgment despite the alleged finality of the RTC decision, res judicata and estoppel.
The Court of Appeals properly took cognizance of the annulment petition. Because the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over inalienable land, its decision was void, and the State is not barred by finality, res judicata, estoppel, laches or prescription.
How the Court reasoned
- A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be attacked at any time.
- The lot is non-registrable public land, so the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction. All its proceedings involving the lot are null and void.
- Under Martinez v. CA and Republic v. De los Angeles, the State is not barred by prescription, estoppel, laches or res judicata when it asserts its rights over non-registrable public land.
- Because of this, alleged procedural infirmities in the annulment petition, such as the date the Solicitor General received the decision, are immaterial.
“All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.”
Rule applied
Section 9(2), BP Blg. 129; Martinez v. Court of Appeals; Republic v. De los Angeles
Whether the Court of Appeals properly allowed the petition-in-intervention of the Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., even though it was allegedly filed out of time.
The Court of Appeals did not err in allowing the intervention. Intervention after judgment may be allowed in the interest of substantial justice.
How the Court reasoned
- Intervention is ordinarily allowed before judgment, but the rules on timing may be relaxed where substantial justice requires.
- The intervenors hold DENR stewardship certificates under the Integrated Social Forestry Program and have a legal interest in the status of the lot.
- The dispute between rival groups has cost lives and given rise to criminal cases, so a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides was warranted.
- Since the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the annulment case, it acted properly in granting the intervention.
“We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides.”
Rule applied
Rule 19, Sections 1 and 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Section 2, Rule 12, Rules of Court
Doctrines
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and lands not clearly within private ownership are presumed to be public. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are inalienable.
Once a parcel is included in a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, a presumption arises that it continues to be part of the reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown. Only a positive act of the Executive can declassify it.
Section 48(b) of CA 141 applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. The possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership, and such possession cannot be counted toward the period for confirmation of imperfect title.
A land registration court has no jurisdiction over inalienable public land. Its judgment is void and may be annulled, and the State is not barred by prescription, estoppel, laches or res judicata.
Intervention after judgment may be allowed in the interest of substantial justice.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, declaring null and void the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, dated January 30, 1991 in LRC No. 269-A, is AFFIRMED.
Notes
The two chunk extractions give slightly different accounts of the lot's area (120.0766 vs. about 126 hectares) and of the date of the RTC order directing issuance of the decree (May 6 vs. May 7, 1991). The digest follows the first. The decision is penned by Justice Carpio, First Division.