Paper Industries Corporation Of The Philippines v. Laguesma
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al., G.R. No. 101738, April 12, 2000
- Procedural (Remedial Law)
- Labor Law
- certification election
- managerial employees
- supervisory employees
- Article 245 Labor Code
- reorganization
- job description
- due process
- right to self-organization
- section heads
- unit managers
I. Facts of the Case
Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) opposed a certification election sought by the PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union (PBSTSEU) among its supervisory and technical staff employees. PICOP claimed that, after its reorganization, its section heads and supervisors (renamed section managers and unit managers) had become managerial employees who could not join a union. The Undersecretary of Labor ruled that they were only supervisory employees and eligible to vote, and PICOP elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by certiorari.
PICOP, which manufactures paper and timber products in Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, has over 9,000 employees. About 944 are supervisory and technical staff employees, and about 487 of them are signatory members of PBSTSEU.
August 9, 1989
PBSTSEU filed a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of PICOP's supervisory and technical staff employees for collective bargaining purposes.
August 10, 1989
A notice set the initial hearing for August 18, 1989. It was reset to August 25, 1989 at PICOP's request for 15 days to file its comments or position paper, but PICOP filed none. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed petitions for intervention.
September 14, 1989
Med-Arbiter Arturo L. Gamolo granted the interventions of FFW and ALU. He also issued an Order setting a certification election among the supervisory and technical staff employees with four choices: PBSTSEU, FFW, ALU, and no union.
September 21, 1989
PICOP appealed, claiming grave abuse of discretion because the Med-Arbiter decided without letting it file comments, and claiming PBSTSEU had no personality to file the petition.
November 17, 1989
The Secretary of Labor upheld the Med-Arbiter's Order. He modified it to allow supervisory and staff employees in Cebu, Davao and Iligan City to take part in the election.
January 18, 1990
At the pre-election conference, PICOP objected to including some section heads and supervisors in the voters list. It said that under its reorganization into four main business groups they were reclassified as managerial employees (section managers and unit managers) with authority to hire and fire.
March 27, 1990
After the parties submitted position papers and evidence, Med-Arbiter Phibun D. Pura held that the supervisors and section heads were managerial employees and excluded them from the voters list.
April 17, 1991
PBSTSEU and ALU appealed to the Office of the Secretary of DOLE, and PICOP submitted evidence opposing the appeal. Undersecretary Laguesma set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and declared the supervisors and section heads supervisory employees eligible to vote.
August 7, 1991
The Undersecretary denied PICOP's motion for reconsideration. PICOP then filed this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that it was denied the chance to present additional evidence on the reorganization, that the employees are managerial, and that its documentary evidence was disregarded.
II. Issues
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, and denied due process, in refusing PICOP's plea to present additional evidence on the supervening reorganization of its organizational structure.
Whether or not the section heads and supervisors (now section managers and unit managers) of PICOP are managerial employees ineligible to join a labor union under Article 245 of the Labor Code.
Whether or not the public respondent disregarded PICOP's documentary evidence and erroneously relied on unsubstantiated claims that the reorganization was a sham to frustrate unionization.
III. Ruling
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, and denied due process, in refusing PICOP's plea to present additional evidence on the supervening reorganization of its organizational structure.
There was no grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process. PICOP had already submitted voluminous documents and was heard, and its objection came late.
How the Court reasoned
- Due process requires only an opportunity to be heard, not that a party be allowed to present evidence indefinitely.
- PICOP was given the chance to file its comments but failed to do so. It later submitted voluminous documents and evidence on the reorganization and opposed the appeal.
- Since PICOP was actually heard, the refusal to admit further evidence was not a denial of due process.
- PICOP raised its objection about managerial status only at the pre-election conference, well after the petition was filed. This showed it was meant to thwart the employees' statutory right to a certification election.
- No obstacle must be placed in the way of certification elections, because they are a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
“What the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard.”
Rule applied
Due process in administrative proceedings (opportunity to be heard); statutory policy favoring certification elections
Whether or not the section heads and supervisors (now section managers and unit managers) of PICOP are managerial employees ineligible to join a labor union under Article 245 of the Labor Code.
The section heads, supervisors, and unit or section managers are only supervisory employees, not managerial employees. They may therefore join a union and vote in the certification election.
How the Court reasoned
- Article 245 bars managerial employees from joining labor organizations but allows supervisory employees to form their own union.
- A managerial employee is one who lays down and executes management policies and has the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
- A manager title does not by itself make a person a managerial employee. The title must be reconciled with the actual job description, which determines the nature of the employment.
- The job descriptions of the concerned employees show they do not lay down company policies, so they are only supervisory.
- Their authority to hire and fire is merely recommendatory and subject to review and approval by superiors. It is therefore not the exercise of independent judgment required of managerial employees.
- The Undersecretary was therefore correct in declaring them supervisory employees eligible to vote.
“Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated "manager" does not _ipso facto_ make him one.”
Rule applied
Article 245 of the Labor Code (managerial employees ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization; supervisory employees may form their own); definition of managerial employee
Whether or not the public respondent disregarded PICOP's documentary evidence and erroneously relied on unsubstantiated claims that the reorganization was a sham to frustrate unionization.
The Undersecretary did not disregard PICOP's evidence. Weighing the actual job descriptions, he correctly found that the employees remained supervisory despite the new titles.
How the Court reasoned
- PICOP's documents on the reorganization were considered, but the label of the positions was not decisive.
- What counts is the real nature of the work, as shown by the job descriptions, not the renamed titles.
- Since the job descriptions showed only supervisory functions, the reorganization did not make the employees managerial.
- PICOP's late and unsupported objection supported the view that the reclassification was used to frustrate the employees' right to unionize.
- The petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the Undersecretary's Resolution and Order are affirmed.
“Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, 32 for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment.”
Rule applied
Article 245 of the Labor Code; actual job description test; substantial evidence in administrative findings
Doctrines
The designation of an employee as manager does not by itself make him a managerial employee. The actual job description determines the nature of his employment.
Authority to hire and fire that is merely recommendatory and subject to review and approval by superiors is not an exercise of independent judgment, so it does not make an employee managerial.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires only an opportunity to be heard, not the unlimited presentation of evidence.
No obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, because it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
Final Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Resolution and Order of public respondent Undersecretary Laguesma dated April 17, 1991 and August 7, 1991, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Notes
Decision penned by Justice De Leon, Jr. for the Second Division. The case arose from a petition for certiorari against the Undersecretary of Labor's resolution.