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Antonio v. Pesigan

Oposa, et al. v. Factoran, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

G.R. No. 101083July 30, 1993
  • Procedural (Remedial Law)
  • Civil Law
  • Political Law
  • right to a balanced and healthful ecology
  • intergenerational responsibility
  • class suit
  • standing to sue
  • timber license agreements
  • political question
  • non-impairment clause
  • police power
  • cause of action
  • certiorari
  • grave abuse of discretion
  • environmental law

Read the full decision

I. Facts of the Case

Minors, represented by their parents, and the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. filed a taxpayers' class suit against the DENR Secretary to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) and stop the issuance of new ones, alleging massive deforestation. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action, for raising a political question, and because the relief would impair contracts. Petitioners went to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

  1. Minors Juan Antonio Oposa and others, represented by their parents, together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), filed Civil Case No. 90-77 (also cited as 90-777) before RTC Makati, Branch 66, as a taxpayers' class suit against DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. They claimed to represent their generation and generations yet unborn, and sought the cancellation of all existing TLAs and an order to stop receiving, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

  2. The complaint alleged that the Philippines had about 16 million hectares of rainforest (about 53% of the land area) 25 years earlier, which fell to about 1.2 million hectares in 1987 and about 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth forest more recently, with deforestation of about 200,000 hectares per year. It alleged that TLAs covering 3.89 million hectares had been granted for commercial logging, and that deforestation caused water shortages, erosion, siltation, flooding, drought, species extinction and global warming.

  3. March 2, 1990

    Plaintiffs served a final demand on the Secretary to cancel all logging permits. He failed and refused to cancel the existing TLAs.

  4. June 22, 1990

    Secretary Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs had no cause of action and that the issue was a political question to be addressed by the legislative or executive branches.

  5. July 12, 1990

    Petitioners opposed the motion. They argued that the complaint showed a clear cause of action, that the motion was dilatory, and that the action raised a justiciable question involving abuse of discretion.

  6. July 18, 1991

    Respondent Judge Eriberto Rosario granted the motion and dismissed the case. He held that the complaint stated no specific legal right or wrong and was based on vague assumptions and unverified data, that it raised a political question, and that cancelling the TLAs and enjoining new ones would impair the non-impairment clause.

  7. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion. They invoked Civil Code Arts. 19, 20 and 21, E.O. No. 192, P.D. No. 1151, Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution and natural law, and argued that TLAs are not contracts and may be revoked when public interest requires. The Solicitor General argued that no specific violated legal right was alleged, that the matter is political and should be addressed to Congress, and that cancelling TLAs without notice and hearing would violate due process.

  8. May 14, 1992

    The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition after the OSG filed its Comment and petitioners filed a reply, and required the parties to submit memoranda.

II. Issues

1
Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the civil case is a valid class suit and petitioners, including minors representing future generations, have standing to sue.

2
Civil Law

Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action based on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology to seek cancellation of timber license agreements and prevent the impairment of Philippine rainforests.

3
Political Law

Whether or not the complaint raises a political question that bars judicial review.

4
Political Law

Whether or not the cancellation of timber license agreements, or the prohibition of new ones, would violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

5
Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint.

III. Ruling

Issue 1Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the civil case is a valid class suit and petitioners, including minors representing future generations, have standing to sue.

Yes

The case is a valid class suit. The minors may sue for themselves, their generation and future generations.

How the Court reasoned

  1. A class suit is proper when the subject matter is of common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
  2. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology concerns all citizens, so the subject matter is of common and general interest.
  3. The parties are too numerous to be joined, so a representative suit is proper.
  4. The minors can sue on the basis of intergenerational responsibility: every generation has a duty to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony of nature.
  5. Because the right belongs to future generations as well, the present generation can represent them in asserting it.
“We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.”

Rule applied

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court (class suit); Section 16, Article II, 1987 Constitution; principle of intergenerational responsibility

Issue 2Civil Law

Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action based on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology to seek cancellation of timber license agreements and prevent the impairment of Philippine rainforests.

Yes

The complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. It alleges a specific legal right, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, with a correlative duty not to impair the environment.

How the Court reasoned

  1. A cause of action requires a legal right of the plaintiff, a correlative duty of the defendant, and a violation of that right.
  2. Section 16, Art. II recognizes the right to a balanced and healthful ecology. It is a self-executing right that needs no statute to be enforceable, and it is linked to the right to health.
  3. The right carries a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This duty is reflected in E.O. No. 192, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152, which charge the DENR with protecting natural resources.
  4. The complaint prima facie alleges a violation of that right through the grant of TLAs, the continued deforestation, and the Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs.
  5. The trial judge therefore erred in finding no specific legal right alleged. Cancelling the TLAs, however, requires that the TLA grantees, as indispensable parties, be impleaded.
“We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”

Rule applied

Section 16, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Section 15, Article II; E.O. No. 192; P.D. No. 1151; P.D. No. 1152

Issue 3Political Law

Whether or not the complaint raises a political question that bars judicial review.

No

The case does not raise a political question. It seeks enforcement of a right under policies already formulated in law.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The political question doctrine used to bar judicial review of matters committed to the political departments.
  2. The 1987 Constitution expanded judicial power to include the duty to determine whether any branch or instrumentality has gravely abused its discretion.
  3. The policy has already been formulated in the Constitution and statutes. The petitioners ask the court to enforce that existing right, not to make policy.
  4. Thus the political question doctrine is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, and the court may review the Secretary's alleged abuse of discretion.

Rule applied

Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution (expanded judicial power)

Issue 4Political Law

Whether or not the cancellation of timber license agreements, or the prohibition of new ones, would violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

No

The non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. A timber license is not a contract or property right and may be revoked when the public interest requires.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The non-impairment clause protects contractual obligations against laws that impair them.
  2. A timber license is a mere privilege and is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause.
  3. Under P.D. No. 705 and settled doctrine, licenses may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when public interest requires, and a license holder has no right to renewal.
  4. Even if TLAs were contracts, no law or executive issuance cancelling them is involved, so the clause is not triggered.
  5. Any such law would be a valid exercise of police power to protect the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and the non-impairment clause must yield to police power. The clause also does not apply to new licenses, since no contract yet exists.
“Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27 cannot be invoked.”

Rule applied

Section 10, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Section 20, P.D. No. 705; police power; Tan v. Director of Forestry

Issue 5Procedural (Remedial Law)

Whether or not the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint.

Yes

The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint, and his order is set aside.

How the Court reasoned

  1. The judge dismissed the case on the grounds of no cause of action, a political question and impairment of contracts.
  2. The Supreme Court found each ground erroneous: the complaint states a cause of action, it raises a justiciable question, and the non-impairment clause does not apply.
  3. The judge also dismissed the case without proper evaluation of the constitutional right invoked and the allegations of the complaint.
  4. Such errors amounted to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, so certiorari lies and the dismissal is set aside.
“We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”

Rule applied

Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court; Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

Doctrines

1

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing right that carries a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment, and may be enforced in court without a specific statute.

2

Minors may file a class suit for themselves, their generation and succeeding generations, based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

3

The political question doctrine is no longer an insurmountable bar to judicial review given the expanded judicial power under Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

4

A timber license is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause. It may be revoked when public interest requires, so the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked, and in any case it must yield to police power.

Final Disposition

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Notes

The decision refers to the civil case as both No. 90-77 and No. 90-777. The Court noted that the grantees of the TLAs are indispensable parties and allowed petitioners to amend their complaint to implead them. Substitute respondent DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala was ordered on motion of petitioners.