Compare jurisdictional over procedural requirements

This means courts keep their existing power to hear cases unless a law changes it. So “jurisdiction” is treated as something courts have (or lose) by law, not merely by technicalities in procedure.

This means procedure keeps working unless properly changed. So procedural rules are generally “operative” and can exist alongside jurisdiction without automatically deciding whether the court has power over the case.

This makes the completion of the required protests a condition before going to court. It is framed as a prerequisite to being allowed to start court action.

This explicitly links violation of that prerequisite process to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. It is the clearest example in the sources of a requirement treated as jurisdictional.

This shows that specific kinds of disputes are assigned to a specific court. So “jurisdiction” here is about which court can decide the particular dispute type.

This shows that, once you are properly in court, the case will follow a particular procedural mode (Rule 65). That is different from the jurisdictional “only after protests” prerequisite stated earlier in the same section.

This confirms that certain court powers (here, TROs and injunctions for infrastructure projects) can be exclusively assigned by law. It again shows jurisdiction as a legal allocation of power.

This describes how criminal jurisdiction is allocated by court type and by the “except” categories. It sets up jurisdiction as a threshold allocation of authority over certain offenses and cases.

This states that MTC/MCT/MCTC courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over certain ordinance violations. It is an example of a jurisdictional rule: it tells you which court is empowered to hear the case first.

This further allocates criminal authority by penalty range (and a special criminal-negligence proviso). Again, that is about the court’s power over the type of case, not merely about how the case is processed.

This links the existence of jurisdiction to the ability to use necessary court tools, and it treats “procedure” as the set of steps used to carry jurisdiction into effect. It supports the idea that not every defect is the same as a defect in the court’s underlying power.

This settles that some legal defects in a criminal case can be waivable (procedural in effect), while other defects are not the same as waiverable matters. It supports separating “jurisdictional” problems from other “infirmities” that may still be corrected or waived.

This makes the key line: if the defect is “procedural” in character, it does not necessarily block the court from taking cognizance. So a requirement’s non-compliance does not automatically mean the court lacks jurisdiction.

This confirms that some pre-filing authority defects are not treated as automatically jurisdiction-destroying. Instead, they become subject to waiver by the accused’s conduct.

The Supreme Court in Gomez v. People of the Philippines explained that the lack of prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the accused. This requirement is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the accused expressly or impliedly.

This directly answers the jurisdiction vs procedure split for one kind of requirement: lacking prior written approval by the prosecutor is not a jurisdictional barrier to the court’s power over the case.

This shows another pattern: even when a law requires “clearance/certification,” the Court may treat the failure as not automatically taking away the court’s jurisdiction. So not every “prior requirement” is necessarily a jurisdictional requirement.

This illustrates a consequence of misclassifying a requirement as jurisdictional. If the requirement is not truly jurisdictional, dismissing on that ground can be void.

The 1987 Constitution preserves the continuing effect of procedural laws unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution, which indicates that procedure usually governs how cases are processed rather than whether a court exists or is empowered to act at all. (“All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue to exercise their jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the existing Rules of Court, judiciary acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative unless amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress.” (1987 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 10))

The Government Procurement Reform Act makes the completion of the protests contemplated in that Article a precondition for court action and expressly labels noncompliant filings as dismissed for “lack of jurisdiction,” which is a direct statutory marker that this requirement is jurisdictional in character. (“Court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated in this Article shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of the process specified in this Article shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” (Government Procurement Reform Act, Section 58))

The Judiciary Reorganization Act provisions on how trial courts exercise criminal jurisdiction show the type of requirements that define court authority over categories of offenses, which is jurisdiction in the strict sense rather than a mere procedural step. (“Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.” (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Act Establishing the Sandiganbayan, Section 32 (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)))

Rule 135, Section 6 reflects that when the procedure to carry a conferred jurisdiction into effect is not specifically pointed out, courts and officers may adopt a suitable process, which is inconsistent with treating every procedural irregularity as automatically jurisdictional. (“When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.” (Rules of Court, Rule 135, Section 6 | Legal Ethics))

Gomez v. People of the Philippines distinguishes formal requirements tied to the preliminary investigation process from jurisdiction, holding that the lack of certain prosecutor approval/authority does not affect the trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction and may be waived. (“Absence such constitutional or statutory fiat, such pronouncement or ruling cannot operate to create another jurisdictional requirement before a court can acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case without treading on the confines of judicial legislation. In effect, _Villa_ is rendered unconstitutional for violating the basic principle of separation of powers.” (Gomez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216824, 2020-11-10))

Gomez further states that the handling prosecutor’s lack of prior written authority or approval does not affect jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person, and that earlier doctrines treating such defects as jurisdiction-divesting are abandoned. (“Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned.” (Gomez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216824, 2020-11-10))

Denila v. Republic of the Philippines ties due process violations and failure to heed jurisdiction-related or authority-related guidelines to the court acting without authority, and then explains the role of certiorari for jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (“Judge Omelio exceeded the bounds of his authority when he bypassed the raffling process and re-assumed jurisdiction over the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment - both without any apparent justification.” (Denila v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206077, 2020-07-15))

Denila also describes the remedy scope, explaining that a writ of certiorari is a remedy for jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and is not a substitute for a lost appeal. This is based on the Court's discussion that certiorari is a comprehensive remedy against errors of jurisdiction and is designed for the correction of jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but not for correcting mere errors of judgment.