Is charter change possible for President Marcos?

This sets who can propose amendments or revisions under the 1987 Constitution: it is Congress (with a three-fourths vote) or a constitutional convention, not the President by himself.

This is another proposal route under the 1987 Constitution: the people can propose amendments through initiative, with the petition threshold and district representation the rule specifies.

This means the people’s initiative route has timing limits under the 1987 Constitution; the law does not allow the initiative proposal to be used too soon after ratification or too often.

This requires that, even after a proper proposal, the amendment (under the Section 1 proposal route) becomes valid only after ratification by a majority in a plebiscite held within the 60-to-90 day window.

Section 4 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides that any amendment under Section 2 shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held within the period specified after the sufficiency of the petition is certified by the Commission on Elections.

This separately confirms that, for amendments proposed by people’s initiative (Section 2), validity depends on majority ratification in a plebiscite, again within the 60-to-90 day window, counted from the COMELEC certification of petition sufficiency.

This explains that the 1987 Constitution replaced earlier constitutional regimes, so the specific amendment powers in earlier constitutions would control any charter-change effort during the Marcos period only if it happened before the 1987 Constitution took over.

This shows the basic amendment framework under the 1973 Constitution: proposal through the National Assembly (with the required voting standard) or a constitutional convention, and validity through majority ratification in a plebiscite held not later than three months after approval.

This clarifies that, during the transition at issue in that case, the “interim National Assembly” had the amending power rather than the normal system being applied the same way.

This provides the key transitional mechanism: the interim National Assembly could propose amendments by a majority vote when properly called, and the amendments still take effect only if ratified according to the constitutional amendment rules.

The Supreme Court in Sanidad v. Commission On Elections explained that the incumbent President had discretion as to when to initially convene the interim National Assembly during the constitutional transition.

This means the Court treated the incumbent President’s power as discretionary as to timing for convening the interim National Assembly during that transition period, which is relevant to whether charter change could be triggered during Marcos’s incumbency.

This confirms that, under the constitutional transition rules discussed in the case, the President’s role included deciding when to initially convene the interim National Assembly.

This supports that the discretion was not automatic “immediate convening,” so convening (and thus triggering the interim National Assembly’s transitional amending role) depended on the President’s timing decision within the transition framework.

The Supreme Court in Occena v. Commission On Elections stated that the Interim Batasang Pambansa, when acting as a constituent body, could propose amendments by a majority vote.

This explains that when the interim legislature is acting as a constituent body for proposing amendments under the transitional system, the proposal vote standard is majority, not the higher legislative proposal vote that would apply in a different setting.

The Court in Occena v. Commission On Elections explained that under the 1973 Constitution, an amendment or revision becomes valid only when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not later than three months after approval (see Occena v. Commission On Elections, G.R. No. L-56350 (1981-04-02)).

[PAST CONSTITUTIONS] “This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.” (1987 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 27)

This means that the earlier constitutional amendment procedure applied only before the 1987 Constitution took effect, as stated in Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution.

The Supreme Court in Sanidad v. Commission On Elections recognized that the incumbent President had the discretion to determine when to initially convene the interim National Assembly during the transition period.

This reflects the Supreme Court's recognition that, during the constitutional transition, the incumbent President had discretion over when to initially convene the interim National Assembly, which allowed the transitional amending body to be set in motion (Sanidad v. Commission On Elections, G.R. No. L-44640 (1976-10-12)).

This means that, according to the Supreme Court, the timing of convening the interim National Assembly was within the President's discretion during the transition period described in the case.

This means that, as explained in Occena v. Commission On Elections, when the interim legislature acts as a constituent body to propose amendments, only a majority vote is needed under the transitional procedure.

This means impeachment starts in the House, not the Senate. So the Constitution sets the “pursue/impeachment proceeds” trigger in terms of the House’s actions.

A majority vote of all the Members of the Committee is needed to submit its report to the House, and at least one-third of all the Members of the House is necessary to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.

This is one threshold expressed as “at least one-third” of all House Members. It is the House voting requirement for moving forward on the Articles of Impeachment after the Committee’s report.

This is the key point for how many “senators” (in the sense of how the process gets to the Senate trial) once the House threshold is met. After the House files impeachment by at least one-third of all House Members, the Constitution says Senate trial “shall forthwith proceed,” meaning the Senate is then called to conduct the trial.

This sets a different Senate threshold for conviction, not for whether impeachment is pursued/started. It requires two-thirds of all Senate Members to convict, but that is about conviction at the end of trial, not the earlier trigger to proceed.